The East Anglian Railways Company: a study in railway and financial history by Gordon, Donald Ian
Gordon, Donald Ian (1964) The East Anglian Railways 
Company: a study in railway and financial history. PhD 
thesis, University of Nottingham. 
Access from the University of Nottingham repository: 
http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/42430/1/703683_vol_1.pdf
Copyright and reuse: 
The Nottingham ePrints service makes this work by researchers of the University of 
Nottingham available open access under the following conditions.
This article is made available under the University of Nottingham End User licence and may 
be reused according to the conditions of the licence.  For more details see: 
http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/end_user_agreement.pdf
For more information, please contact eprints@nottingham.ac.uk
"The East Anglian Railways Company, A Study in 
Railway and Finanoial History" 
by 
Donald I Gordon,B.A. 
Thesis submitted to the University of Nottingham 
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, May 1964 
VOLUME 1 
The East Anglian RailwayS Company: A Study in Hailway and l"inuncial 
History 
by D.I.Gordon,B.A. 
Thesis subrni tted to the Uni versi ty of Nottingham for the de[;ree of 
Doctor of Philosophy, May,1964. 
This work covers the period from 1844 to 1862, and is set, against:;. 
a national background, in the King's Lynn area, then suffering a time of ~ 
severe economic transition as distant railways undermined the town's 
commercial monopoly, and low corn prices the abTicultural economy. The 
companies, authorised in 1845 and amalgamating as the East Anglian 
Railways in 1847, were founded in a complex of personal greed, parocn! 
ambition and commercial fears. In the following years they had to lear 
that they could not be the arbiters of the local economy. MisiSuided 
directors, faulty estimates, defective acoounts, the inadequacies of 
Parliament, the duplicity of the Eastern Counties Railway and other 
factors led to bankruptcy. Slow recovery and appreoiation of the 
company's proper place in the economy were complicated by the key role 
which the East Anglian assumed in the conflict between the Eastern -~.~---. 
Counties and Great Northern railways, the effects of which proved most 
serious to the local economy. 
Despite local need for the railways the bulk of the capital came 
from London and the north, and this, when considered with the state of 
the 0eneral eoonomy and other factors influencing public attitudes 
towards railway investment, led to grossly inflated capital commitmentso 
The company had also to learn through experience of the close relation-
ship between social conditions and revenue returns, and of the many 
problems of actual operation. 
But for a variety of personal, economic, geographical and finanr-i' 
reasons, and by more successful participation in railway politics, th~ 
comp~ survived, reaching stability by 1862. Its impact was seen to 
best advantage only in the long run, but its value to 1862 had been, in 
conjunction with other factors, to ensure for Lynn and local au~icult~e 
that the period was one of successful transition leading to prosperilY 
rather than one of decayo 
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Special Note on Railwgr Companies' Titles 
It has been found in the course of this study that confusion often 
exists over the correct titles of certain railw~ companies of this 
period; this is heightened by changes of names by the companies themselves 
and by the fact that in some cases two or even three versions were in 
current use. 
There are three particular examples in this work: 
a. Lewin speaks of the Yarmouth & Norwich, C.J.Allen of the Norwich 
& Yarmouth. Generally the latter has been adopted in this worko 
b. The East Dereham &: Norwioh (Lewin) was also known as the Direot 
lIorwich & Dereham - again the latter has been used. 
o. The Wisbeoh,St.Ives &: Cambridge Junction (Lewin) has been 
described in this work as the Wisbech,Maroh & St.Ives,the name 
in current use during the period. 
1:. 
Introduction 
Geographical isolation, natural advantages for agriculture and the 
absence of power or mineral resources together ensured that to 1840 the 
Industrial Revolution should have effected little change in the fundamental 
economic patterns of western Norfolk and the Fens. Cottage industries 
in the former, especially those concerned with textile manufactures, had 
declined severely, but overall this had been amply compensated for by the 
improved agricultural techniques for which the areas were renowned and by 
the ever increasing demands for produoe from the rapidly expanding 
industrial areas. In western Norfolk, where enclosure was almost complete, 
much of the soil had been enriched to a quite inoredible extent, while in 
the Fens wonders were being performed with land that, although highly 
fertile by nature, often had been onJ,y reoent1y reolaimed from marsh. 
Constant experiments and new discoveries, plus an inoreasing trend towards 
a mixed farming eoonolV, were indioations that the improving force was al 
yet by no means spent. 
But even so there were to the disoerning mind oertain disturbing 
elements in the situation. One was the unbalanoed nature of an econolV 
in which almost total reliance was plaoed on agrioulture alone. Another 
was the lack of flexibilit,y in commercial organisation, a faotor whioh 
sooner or later must inhibit the growth of even agrioulture. For 
centuries the norm of inland transport had been the river boats plying 
along the Ouse and Nene and their tributaries in conneotion with coastal 
shipping. In themselves the river interests exhibited all the more 
unfortunate elements of a monopo1y, but more signifioant were the 
opportunities for such offered by the situation to the ooastal town of 
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King's ~nn and, to a rather smaller extent, the river port of Wisbech. 
By 1840 the latter was engaged in a highly enterprising attempt to 
undermine ~nn, but its disadvantages were naturally such that the key to 
the whole area remained inevitably with its larger neighbour. But there 
the econo~ was static. Power was in the hands of a SlIlall group of rich 
merchants and bankers who had no incentive to progress ot al'\Y kind. The 
harbour facilities were poor and expensive, the channel between the sea 
and the town frankly dangerous, but, secure in the town's monopoly, the 
ruling element within Iqnn well knew that all the costs of inconvenience 
could be recouped from their customers, and. that major improvements 
might well attract unwelcome rivals to the town. 
But change was in the air, and no matter how much they disliked it 
the great merchants of ~nn had to accept that they could not continue to 
dwell in the past. Railways in other parts threatened to destroy their 
monopoly, and it was inevitable that soon the farmers and others would 
be in a position to welcome them into the very heart of Iqnn's traditional 
markets. Conditions were thus ideal for the enterprising individual, 
imbued with the spirit of the laisser faire econo~, who was moved to 
build his own private industrial 'empire'. Such a man was J.C.Williams, 
the junior partner in a firm of Iqnn solicitors, and in ma~ wa:ys a 
typical product of the middle olasses of the period, enriched by their own 
efforts, given new status and authority by the Parliamentary Reform Act 
of 1832 and now seeking new fields to conquer. The advent of railwa:ys 
provided Williams and mal\Y like him, includiD8 the mighty Hudson, with 
their great opportunity tor selt expression. 
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The attraotion of railways by l~ was plain, for by then enough 
of the pioneer lines had beoome suffioient~ established to show 
oonvincing~ that railw~s represented wealth both direot~ as an 
investment, and indireot~ as major oontributors to oommercial expansion. 
The ear~ diffioulties of such as the stookton & Darlington, the Liverpool 
& Manohester and the London & Birmingham had been forgotten, the total 
failures and the o~ partial~ successful, for example the Eastern 
Counties Railway, general~ overlooked. It is true to s~ that by the em 
of 1844 railways had captured the publio imagination and were being viewed 
in the general rather than the particular. To most the,y seemed an 
irresistable dynamic force, and there were ma~ individuals prepared to 
apotheos~e them as the panaoea for all eoonomio ills and frustrations, 
and. as the infallible means of personal gain. To Williams and his 
immediate assooiates railw~s represented all these things, but in addition 
the opportunity for a town suoh as IGrnn to extend its traditional markets 
at the expense of neighbouring towns. In that maI\Y other communities and 
individuals current~ shared the same ideas much of the locallY inspired 
railw~ enterprise of the period thus became a matter of self defence 
through aggression. 
In the course of time the overall effeot of railways was to u~ 
Britain both sociallY and economical~, but this ultimate was founded in a 
mass of paroohial and individual enterprise in whioh maI\Y of the participants 
were seeking to oonsolidate and improve on the conditions of the pre-
railw~ age, such retrogressive visions being given SUbstance by the 
greedy optimism of a purblind investing publio. Here was an essential 
~ 
element in the background to the ')lania'. When the fantasies of 184.5/6 
had cleared it remained for ma~ promoters and investors to discover that 
haphazard construction was after all not such a sound guarantee of securit.Y 
as they had liked to imagine. 
Through the medium of a group of lines that failed in their intentions 
but survived, these and ~ other aspects will be considered in what 
follows. The study covers only 17 years, but of necessity must be of some 
length if justice is to be done to the maI\Y themes suggested. The East 
Anglian Ra.ilw~s CompaI\Y is worthy of close examination as an ideal 
example of a small promotion of the 'Mania' period. designed to serve an 
agrioultural area; the value of the study is enhanced in that it was 
faoed by virtua1~ eve~ problem that oould beset an infant compaI\Y ot 
that period, and yet survived so that the whole sto~ can be told. But 
apart from these considerations there are the fascinating problems that 
arise from the contemplation of individuals, their motives and reactions, 
and, perhaps of even greater importance, those of assessing the 
relationship and interaction as between an area and its rai1~s, 
especial~ so in this case because the latter set out to be the arbiter 
of the former's econo~. Pina1~, in the events constituting the 
histo~ of the East Anglian is found a more than convenient microcosm 
of the inevitable process by which the nation's railways moved, slowly 
and unevenly, through amalgamations, from initial disorder towards 
a more rational and systematic form. 
Chapter 1 
The Awakening 
(~ 
Section 1: The Promoters 
The East Anglian Railways Comparv, formed in 1847 and absorbed into the 
Great Eastern Railway at its creation in 1862, w~s comprised of three 
promotions incorporated in 1845, the Iqnn & Ely, the Ely & Huntingdon, and 
the ~nn & Dereham. Each of these owed its conception to J.C.Williams, a 
Lynn solicitor, who was enabled to identify his personal ambitions with those 
of the mercantile community of his town. The occasion was the promotion of 
other lines within the area of ~nn's commercial monopoly which stimulated 
the town's instincts of self preservation and ensured that Williams would find 
suffioient support for his immediate purposes. There was nothing startling 
in the idea of such relatively small lines serving purely looal ends. 
Commercial thought was still oonditioned by the oircumstances of the pre-
railway age in which the inadequacies of transport facilities imposed their 
own severe limitations, while in aI:\Y case the idea of giant joint stook 
assooiations neoessary for larger projects had still to beoome an aocepted 
part of national life. Hence, nt the beginning of 1845, of the 2,235 route 
miles of railway open to traffic 1,13~~ miles were shared by 11 companies, 
but the remaining 1,100;. by no less than 92: 
J.C.Williams himself remains a somewhat shadowy figure as fAr as 
personal details are concerned. All that may be said with certainty is 
2 
that he joined the firm of Goodwin & Partridge in 1838, and then stayed 
1 H.G.Lewin; The Railway Mania & Its Aftermath, p.~. 
2 Iqnn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 9th November,186l. 
~ 
in Iunn until 1846, when, the firm having taken Edwards as a new partner, 
he went to open a London offioe for his firm, There he remained until the 
death of Goodwin in 1859 led to the partnership being dissolved. During 
the 13 years in London Williams was subjeot to no supervision from ~nn, 
and he used the opportunity so provided to divert large sums of the firm' s 
money into his own private speoulations in land, mines, buildings, estates 
and loans. Some of these at least must have proved sor~ failures, for 
towards the olose of 1860 his former partners, Partridge and Edwards, who 
had been tota1~ misled by the false aooounts supplied by Williams, were 
sudde~ oal1ed to aooount for immense sums reoeived by the London offioe 
in the name of the firm. Their combined private fortunes of £70,000 were 
inadequate to cover the deficiencies, and in 1861 they were brought before 
the courts as bankrupts! Williams fled abroad and no more was heard of him. 
It would obviously be unsound to argue from the above that Williams' 
partioipation in railway affairs had been equally dishonest, but the 
evidenoe will show that despite ma~ fine words concerning his interest 
in the future of Iunn his predominant motive was that of amassing a 
personal fortune without risk. ro that end he first stimulated and then 
exploited the fears of the town. He did not invest in his oreations~ 
His profit was to come through handling the multitudinous legal business 
associated with the launching of a new railwB3'. As will be seen he, in 
the name of his partners, exploited and defrauded the rai1wB3' companies to 
the utmost, so much so that in the 1850's the East Anglian took the firm 
to court in a quest for partial rep~ent of what it had spent in legal 
1 Iqnn Advertiser &: West Norfolk Herald, 1st November, 1861. 
2 This will be discussed in a later section where an analysis of the 
Subscription Contracts is undertaken. 
I 
charges. That the case was dismissed on technical grounds did not 
invalidate the essential justioe of its claim. 
As ear~ as 1836 Herapath had warned the public of the:-
" •• needy adventurer (who) takes it into his head that a line of 
railw~ from the town A to the town B is a matter of great publio 
utility beoause out of it he may get a great private benefit." 
and had gone on to link such with the "solicitor out of practice·~ a theme 
further developed by Jeaffreson and Pole in l8~ when the,y described the 
"attorney without practice" as invariab~ being the principal culprit in 
the fraudulent promotions of 1836 and 1~5 which had done little aore than 
2 
collect and then absorb deposits on shares. But Williams was not of this 
type. Quite apart from the fact that his firm was well established and 
high~ respected, he was genuine in his determination to create railways. 
Indeed, as will be seen in a subsequent chapter, the initial success of 
1845 was but the first stage in what he intended to be a veritable 
network including a grand trunk line from Manchester to Norwich. In that 
he was for a year or two after 1845 to maintain a high degree of personal 
control of the three companies through puppet directors it is indeed 
possible to believe that in ma~ w~s he saw himself in the role of a 
second Hudson, even if on a much smaller stage. 
In everything that he did Williams was shrewd aDd calculating, clever 
and persuasive; he abounded in self confidence, and had cultivated the 
appearance of complete frankness while making total~ disingenuous 
utterances. On one occasion he demanded to know who could object to him 
1 Quoted by J.Francis: A History of the English Railw~, London, 1851, Vol.2. 
p.296. 
2 Jeaffreson and. Pole: The Life of Robert Stephenson F.R.S., London, l8~, 
p.274-. 
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putting £50,000 in his own pocket if at the sa~e time he was putting 
£100,000 into those of other people~ On at least two occasions, apparently 
aware of the po~sible invidiousness of his personal position, he made direct 
references to his profession. On the first he apologised for being a 
solicitor, and avowed that his proposed lines were not a Mlaw,yer's jobM in 
2 the opprobrious sense of that term; a few weeks later he made a jest of it, 
declaring his sincerity even if it was the last 6/8d. he got from his 
practioe~ 
Three main factors account for ~lliams' success in 1844 and '~5. 
First there was his undoubted power of conveying conviction to those who 
heard him. Secondly there was his great ability in organisation. Thirdly, 
and in maI\Y wa:ys the most important, was the fact that his intentions 
conformed exactly to the immediate needs of his town, and to the inclin-
ations of the public at large on whose financial support all would be 
eventuulJ~ based. The nature of the growing enthusiasm for railways 
during 1844., and its climax in 1~5, will be examined in a later section, 
and it is sufficient to quote here from James Morrison M.P., a shrewd 
although prejudiced observer of the contempor~ scene~ 
" •• it would have been deemed illiberal at that time to suppose 
that directors could have aI\Ything in view in the powers they 
sought for but the advancement of the undertaking and the good 
of the shareholders; or that agents could by possibility be 
influenced in their movements by the heavy bills which would 
be incurred to them.· 
Williams did not of course work entirely alone. It would seem that 
his immediate associates numbered six. Of these the hardest to assess are 
1 Iqnn Advertiser &: West Norfolk Herald, 30th March, 1844; report on a Town 
2 Meeting held ~o consider the Iqnn &: ~ promotion on the 28th March, 1~. 
Ibid. 3 IbJ..d., 20th April, 1844; Town Meeting of the 17th April. 
4 J • Morrison: The Influence of English Railway Legislation on Trade and 
industry; London, l~, p.67. 
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his business partners, Partridge and Goodwin. Of the former little can be 
said except that he placed a moderate investment in the ~nn & Dereham line 
and subsequently held a number of East Anglian bonds; although practising 
in ~nn he lived at Snareshill House near Thetford. Charles Goodwin, the 
son of a Bishop of Carlisle (Doctor Harvey Goodwin), conducted "a large 
practice" amongst the most respected and wealthiest elements of ~'s 
societyt and was alrea~ a ve~ rich man~ He had been foremost in 
subscribing to the town's charities, and, as a building speculation in the 
late 1830's, had been responsible, as both designer and financier, for the 
3 first attempt to give King's IQnn a planned suburb; a plaque in St. 
Nicholas' church testifies that he was also a generous and actiTe church 
worker. Suoh a man had eve~hing to lose by lending himself to &qT 
deliberately unsound project, and it is significant that he remained a 
highly respected citizen of ~nn, as well as a borough councillor, despite 
the initial failures of the railw~s and the financial losses of a number 
of IQnn men who had invested in them. The problem is how men such as 
Partridge and. Goodwin oould lend themselves to the exploitation of the 
railw~ companies practised by Williams. The answer must be that they were 
for the most part deceived. It m83" be safely presumed that Williams 
retained control of all accounts connected with the companies, and that by 
working partly through a second. firm of solicitors, Messrs. Rooper, Ingraa 
&: Birch retained by the IQnn &: Dereham Compal\Y, and, from 1846 on, his own 
1 IQnn Advertiser, 15th February, 1890; 'Personal Recollections of a 
2 lunn Sexagenarian' (actually D.Thew, the editor). 
Ibid., 24th February, 1872;' Memoirs of IQnn', actually a lecture delivered 
by ".Armes to the IQnn Conversazione Society in 1858. 
3 Comprising Guanock Terrace, New Checker St., Goodwin Road and Albert St. 
(built through his own garden). Thew said of the scheme that it was 
successful after initial failure; Armes commented (1858) that it was 
"when building was a better speculation than it since has been." 
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London office he was enabled tokeep his partners in the dark as regards 
the actual details of the financial transactions between the firm and the 
rai1w~ companies. Obviousl3" Williams could not have proceeded without his 
business partners, while involving them did have the advantage ot gaining tor 
his projects an absolutel3" unimpeachable appearance of respectability. 
A third member ot the inner group was Charles Burcham, a civil 
engineer and surveyor, who was included no doubt to advise on the selection 
of practical routes for the lines that Williams had in mind; he was 
another sound and respected ~nn Citizen, a member of the Borough Council, 
and formerly, before the office was abolished in the 1834 reform ot 
municipal government, a Town Chamberlain: 
The three so far mentioned p1~ed no part in events after the lines 
proposed by Williams had been accepted by the ~nn community, but the 
three remaining members of his group were destined to serve as cOllpaI\Y 
directors, acting as both the mouth-pieces and the cover for Williams' 
activities. Whether they were his collaborators or merely his dupes is a 
difficult question that will be resolved in the more appropriate context 
of the events of 1847. It will then be shown that while the three were 
certainly not blameless they were more the viotims of Williams' guiles and 
of their own total inexperience of rai1w~ affairs than a~hing else. 
Certainly there was nothing to provoke suspicion in their records to 1~. 
First there was Sir J.W.H.B.Folkes (1786-1860) who lived at Hillington Hall 
and who owned most of the land within ~nn. Known locally as a popular 
and improving landlord he already had had a lengthy career in the publio 
eye. After two unsuccessful attempts to win a ~nn seat, in which he had 
1 
A Report on the Proceedings of H.II.Commissioners tor enquiring into the 
existing state of the Municipal Corporations of England and Wales; a 
verbatim report on the ~nn Enquiry, l6th-22nd March, 1833; ~nn, 1834, 
p.35. 
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been thwarted by the counci1'S-who1esa1e creation of Freemen in the Tor,y 
interest, he had represented Norfolk as a Whig M.P. between 1830 and 1832, 
and from then until 1837 the newly created division of West NOrfolk; in 
1838 he had been appointed High Sheriff of Norfolk~ In 1845 he was to 
become chairman of the Iqnn &: lD.y CompaI\Y although his investment was one 
of only £900. Subsequently he was also chairman of the Norfolk Estuary 
Compaqf (see below) which was concerned with providing a safe and direct 
channel between Iqnn Harbour and the open sea. Alongside Folkes as a 
promoter and director was William Everard (1797-1861), the younger brother 
in a wealthy merchant and banking family of the group which dominated the 
town. Everard held both shares and debentures in the railw~s, but, like 
Folkes, found it prudent to make a hasty withdrawal from the board in 
1847. In later years he was prominent amongst those creditors who 
hounded the East Anglian into temporary bankruptcy. Finally, there was 
Francis Cresswell, a former R.N.captain, a wealthy banker in partnership 
with Everard, a Borough Alderman, a church warden, and a man much 
interested in school and charitable work within the town. In short all 
three were successful and eminently respectable figures in ~ society, 
although it may perhaps be felt that the grounds which Folkes had for a 
grudge against the Tor,y families and Everard's junior status in his family 
(the seat of which was Middleton Hall) could have some significance. At 
this stage it may be said in their favour that they had committed themselves 
financially before their proposals were adopted by the town and While there 
was still the possibility that alternative suggestions might be given 
preference, for, during the winter of 1843/4 they had engaged the services 
1 The details given in respect of Folkes, Cresswell and Everard are deriTed 
from a wide variety of sources; in particular they come from obituary 
notioes in the Iqnn Advertiser &: West Norfolk Herald and the memoirs ot 
Thew and Armes cited in previous footnotes. 
l 
of J.U.Rastrick, already an engineer of renown and one who was en."lbled to com-
mand a high premium on his services, to survey the route between Lynn and ElY. 
One other name, although not that of a promoter, should be mentioned at 
this sbge, particularlY so as his written opinions are to be frequently 
quoted in the following pages. William Armes, a retired sea captain who had 
returned to his native town while still a relative~ young man to enter into 
partnership with J.Marsters in the manufacture of sacking and coconut matting, 
was an especial~ powerful advocate for both the ~nn & Ely and the Lynn & 
Dereham lines from what were almost entire~ disinterested motives: He 
was fearless in his criticisms of the obscurantist merchant coterie which 
dominated the town, and, as he spoke not only ',dth eloquence but from 
extensive comnercial knowledge and a wealth of practical experience gained 
in wide travels, the spontaneous support he gave to Williams at the critical 
Town Meetings, where irrevocable decisions had of necessity to be made, proved 
an invaluable support to the promoters. He may be said to have represented 
the progressive forces within the town which, until the issue of railways 
a,rose, had been held completely in check by the dominant frunilies. 
Section 2: The Vulnerability of King's ~nn 
In all probability Willinms had conceived the ~nn & E~ line as ear~ 
as 1843 at a time when there was a marked cha.nge in the public attitude 
1 Additional Note on William Armes (1804-1872); principal source his 
Obituary Notice in the :4Ynn Advertiser, March,1872. Born in Lynn he went 
to sea as a boy, eventual~ obtaining captain's rank which he held for 
eight years before returning to set up in business in the town ear\y in the 
1840's. He becnme the secretary of the ~nn Maritime Insurance 
Association, a, Borough Councillor (in 1853) and then a member of the Pilot 
nnd the Paving Commissions. His expert knowledge made him a key witness 
and speaker at enquiries and meetings in connection with both the railways 
Rnd the improvement of the harbour approaches. In 1852 he uublished an 
excellent monograph on ~nn Harbour, extensive~ quoted belo~. He was 
a Liberal in politics, a devout Wesleyan in religion. 
The Lines Proposed in 1844 in Relation to Lynn and the River Ouse 
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towards railway enterprise (see ohapter 2 below), and had then spent some 
months examining its feasibility. He was not, however, to be allowed to 
perfeot his plans at leisure. A series of railway promotions that intruded 
on ~nn's traditional preserves stimulated the Corporation of that town to 
make its own proposals for railw~ communication, and because of the need to 
oompete against these for 100a1 support Williams was foroed into the open 
during the early part of 1844. 
Of these proposals affeoting ~nn the 'earliest had oome from the London 
&: Birmingham CompaI\Y, whioh on the 4-th July, 1843 was authorised (by the 
aot 6 &: 7 Vio.o.lxiv) to construct a branch from a point near B1isworth, 
on its mainline, to Northampton, and then on, via the Nene Valley, to 
Peterborough~ The Eastern Counties Compa~, seeking to revive its drooping 
fortunes, responded by drawing up plans for the extension of the truncated 
Northern &: Eastern mainline2(on lease to the E.C.R. as from the 1st Janu~, 
1844) from its existing terminus at Newport to Brandon by way of Ely (26 
miles distant from King' s ~nn) from which intermedia.te point a branch was 
to be projected via Doddington (subsequently the route was diverted to take 
in Karoh) to Peterborough. In this w~ an end-on junotion would be effeoted 
with the Norwich &: Brandon CompaI\Y's line (then under construction), so 
providing Norwioh with through oommunication not o~ to London (which had. 
been promised since 1834- by the E.C.R.) but also to the midlands - the 
latter because the London &: Birmingham CompaI\Y agreed to make a short 
extension to its line and make use of the Eastern Counties station at 
1 The double track from B1isworth ~o Northampton was opened on the 13th 
May, 1845; the single track sectJ.on to PeterborOUgh to passengers 0 th 
2nd June, 1845, a~ to goods traffic on the 13th De~ember, 1845. ;aff~o 
2 exceeded expectat~on and the line was doubled throughout in Se t b 1846 
The oompaI\Y had been authorised to build to Cambridge but aft~ ~m :~; • 
had reached no further than from Stratford to Newport. Y a 
12. 
Peterborough (now Peterborough East). At the same time the Eastern 
Counties was oontemplating,the possibility of a northern projeotion fro. 
Peterborough to Linooln and York along what was substantial~ the route 
seleoted by the Northern & Eastern in 1836; during 1844 the surv~s for this 
were aotual~ oarried out, although, in faot, this was to be the o~ one 
of the proposals enumerated above whioh did not come to fruition as 
intended~ In the winter months of 1844, however, all seemed distinct 
probabilities and to ~nn they spelt undoubted ruin. 
To understand the nature of the threat it is now necess~ to examine 
brief~ the town's oommeroial aotivities and status, although detailed 
analJrsis of the content and volume of the trade handled there will be 
reserved for later contexts. ~nn's importance derived from its dual 
functions as a market centre and a sea and river port. In the ,former 
oapaoit,y it was just~ termed "The Emporium of Western Norfolk"2and was 
in fact, the focal point for an area, including much of the rapid~ 
developing Fenlands, some 25 miles or more in radius. As a seaport it 
derived its main substance from coastal shipping and the importation of 
coals and manufaotured goods from Hull and a variety of northern ports, 
1 The Newport-Brandon extension and the Trowse-Brandon section of the 
Norwich & Brandon Compa~ were both opened on the 30th Ju~, 1845· the 
openill8 of the Trowse Swing Bridge and the short extension int 0 N~rwich 
(Thorpe Station) on the 15th Deoember, 1845 completed the NOrwioh-London 
link; the Ely-Peterborough line was opened throughout on the 14th January 
1847. The northern extension, however, oontinued as a source of ' 
frustration to its promoters. Original~ proposed by the N & I in 1836 
but prevented by Parliament, the E.C.R.'s adoption of it met with no better 
fortune being, after a prolonged and bitter struggle, turned down in 1846 
in favour ot the London & York Compa~ (later the Great Northern). The 
E.C.R. and subsequent~ the G.E.R. oontinued to nurse the project (with 
March the starting point) but opposition and financial difficulties 
prevented realisation until 1882 when in a joint enterprise with the G.N.R. 
2 a line from Maroh to Linoo1n was opened. 
White's Norfolk Directory 1845, p.505. 
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although there was also a not-rnconsiderable foreign import trade, 
particularly in timber, wines, beer and general building materials. ~e 
harbour also stood at the mouth of the Great Cuse and its several navigable 
tributaries, the former being navigable for larger vessels for 24 miles and 
as far as Bedford for smaller craft. As a consequence of this Iqnn had 
become, over the centuries, the natural outlet for several inland countiesl 
which in their turn had come to depend on Iqnn for a very wide rall8e of 
imported goods. The Iqnn & ~ prospectus summarised the position without 
embellishment when it recorded:-2 
and 
"The extensive trade in timber, deals, wine, coals, oil cake, tar, 
flagstones, slates, pantiles and. other general merchandise carried 
on between the port of Kill8' s Iurnn and the towns of Brandon, 
Thetford, Mildenhall, Bury St • Edmunds , Newmarket, Cambridge, 
St.Neots, St.Ives, Huntingdon, Bedford, Biggleswade, Northampton, 
Peterborough and the districts adjoining these places.-
" •• the large mass of agricultural products comprisill8 corn, flour, 
wool, fruit, vegetables etc. etc. brought from these districts 
to the Port of King's lqnn for shipment to the northern markets." 
The prospectus was also justified in mentioning at length the SUbstantial 
trading connections in livestock which existed overland between Norfolk and 
London at that time, although such did not constitute an element in the 
monopoly, covering all other particulars indicated above, practised by IGrnn. 
It will be observed that !ornn's trading security was based on what were 
essentially negative grounds - principally the depth and direction of the 
Ouse and its tributaries and the favoured position of the town between sea 
1 White's Norfolk Directory 1845 s~s eight counties: Talbot Q.C. in 
evidence against the L & E bill before Committee I of the Commons said 
"part of seven" (Herapath; 21st April, 1845, p.594) as did a ~nn 
Guild Hall Petition in favour of the Norfolk Estuar,y Bill (Guild Hall 
2 Book, Vol.14, p.792f, 26th Feb.1849). 
April, 1844. A copy is preserved in the Castle Museum, Norwich. 
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and river. The town, fundamentally an entrepot in character, had acquired 
its monopolistic status during the ages when the extensive sea board of Bast 
Anglia and the large number of navigable streams traversing the area had 
made water transport the norm. As a consequence of this Bast Anglia had 
tended to divide itself into fairly secure and well defined areas of economio 
interest, each being centred on a central market town, of which the smaller 
ones were themselves within the sphere of one or other of the larger ports. 
This factor, combined with the comfortable distance which separated ~ 
from Norwich and Yarmouth and the town's situation at the lowest bridging 
point of the Quse, had for long assured I(y'nn of a secure position as a market 
and distributing centre, conflict of interest being confined to the marginal 
areas. 
Traditionally I(y'nn itself was accustomed to direct competition only in 
the area of central Norfolk, particularly so in the East Dereham district 
where Norwich merchants maintained a strong interest. It is true to s~, 
however, that the construction of the Norwich & Brandon line, even without 
the Northern & Eastern connection, would have extended that rivalr,y to 
Brandon and the areas of southern Norfolk and northern Suffolk where tunn' 8 
position was strong without being monopolistic. Nearer home Iunn men were 
becoming increasingly anxious for their interests in the northern Fens where 
Wisbech was making a determined bid to attract trade to its own harbour, but, 
up to 1844, the grossly unsatisfactory state of the Nene channel and the fact 
that Wisbech's hinterland was naturally restricted to the west side of the 
Cuse had made the threat much more imagined than real. 
The threat represented by the proposed railway extensions was one of 
three fold implication. Firstly, the cross country link between Norwich 
18 
and Peterborough with its direct oonneotions with the midlands and north 
threatened to sever ~nn from its extensive markets to the south of that 
line and. to introduoe a strong element of rivalry from NOrwich to the north 
of it! In this way the town stood to lose some of its most profitable 
holdings - 10,000 tons of ooal and general merchandise went eaoh year to 
Bury St.Edmunds alone2- as the use of its harbour would be rendered 
superfluous. Secondly, the northern extension of the Northern & Bastern 
would lead directly into the coal fields of Yorkshire from whioh ~nn harbour 
was accustomed to derive its staple trade - in 1843, for example, 237.213 
tons of coal were brought in coastwise as opposed to 94,390 tons of other 
goods from all souroes~ Once again the use of ~nn harbour, except on & 
ver,y restricted soale, would be made not o~ unnecess~ but also 
undesirable on grounds of cost. Thirdly, and for reasons that will shortly 
be made apparent, the best that ~nn could hope for from the Eastern Counties 
and the Northern & Eastern would be the projection of a branch to the town 
by way of W1sbech. If this transpired not o~ would that town be in closer 
rail oOlDDlunioation with London than was ~nn but would also be enabled to 
intercept all trade emanating from the midlands towards the latter. Thus, 
the natural advantages on whioh ~nn had flourished were facing oomp1ete 
nullification and ~nn men could gloomily contemplate an immediate future in 
which their harbour's trade would be drastically reduoed, and their 
oommeroial sphere reduced to a small and isolated portion of western and 
north-western Norfolk. 
1 The threat from Norwich was made more aoute because since 1833 the oit" had 
been in direct communication with the sea as a result of the new cut made 
from Reedham to St.Olaves, the deepening of Oulton Dyke, the erection ot 
looks on Oulton Broad and the making of a cut through the beach at 
2 Lowestoft. 
Armes: The Port of King' s ~nn; ~nn 1852, P .14. 3 Ibid. '!pp. p.56. 
.!2. 
All classes of ~nn society faced a common ruin with the decline of the 
harbour. The strong merchant community had, as individuals, extensive aDd 
diverse multiple interests in coal, corn and general merchandise, all of 
whioh would now be diverted away from the town in most SUbstantial quantities. 
The owners of the JJ+4 vessels currently registered in ~land the seamen and 
others who derived their livelihood from them (not to mention those connected 
with the fleet of some 190 fishing smacks belonging to the town)2all faced 
the possibilit,y of serious hardship. If the harbour lost status and rea~ 
aooess were provided to Norwich and W1sbeoh the town would also suffer 
severely as a market centre; thus the owners and employees of the 119 inns, 
the 38 beer houses and eight eating houses, the dozen breweries, the ten 
ma1thouses, the five machine makers, the basket makers, the saddlers, the 
coopers, the tailors and furniture makers, the gunsmiths and in fact all 
those who existed to meet the diverse needs of a wide rural area would meet 
with severe and direct loss; ~nn's population of 16,039 (1841) was also 
provided with no less than 13 firms of solicitors, an equal number of 
surgeons, three each of physicians, optioians and veterinary surgeons, five 
dentists and nineteen each of insurance offices, tailors and barbers~ a 
concent!'ation of services only justified by the enormous influx of country 
dwellers into the town each Tuesday and Saturday market day. Directly or 
indirectly all these various classes, and others, depended on the continued 
prosperity of the harbour. 
1 Of a total tonnage of 16,503; Admiral ty Preliminary Inquiry into the 
2 Norfolk Estuary Bill, April 1849, App.4, p.64. 
Ibid. The fishing fleet totalled 195 in 1848. 
3 The list is derived principally from White's Norfolk Directory 1845. It 
could be extended even further and made to include the four iron and brass 
founderies, the rope and twine makers, the sail makers and so on. 
Basically, none of the activities listed was ot more than looal 
significnnoe, but, beoause ot ~nn's monopolistio position, all were 
flourishing in 18J~. 
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How could there be such certain~ that trade would desert ~nn so 
complete~ once alternative means of transport were offered? The question 
of cost involved in a mixed sea and land jour~ apart, the answer was 
sufficient~ clear from the condition of the harbour and its approaches. 
These were so bad that, as they stood, ~nn was in no position to fight back 
on its own terms. Armes wrote of the former that he "never saw a harbour 
in which nature having done so much, man had done so little"! His 
strictures were ful~ justified. Up to 1838, when at last the first harbour 
master was appointed, neglect had been p28mitted to reach the chronic stage, 
and as a result much potential trade had been deterred from using the town. 
The conditions under which ships aotual~ sank at their moorings had passed 
2 
with the opening of the Eau Brink Cut in 1821, but right up to 184J. it was 
still common for vessels to be del~ed for d~s on end beoause the hea~ 
mooring ropes, stretohed over the harbour, to whioh they were attached had 
become entangled or even frozen together. In that latter year, however, 
the energy of lir. Bowker and the expenditure of £12,9003led to the provision 
of more manageable chains to which vessels were moored in tiers by their 
sterns~ It is an interesting commentary on former times that with the 
clearance time of vessels being reduced to a certain ten minutes three public 
houses in the vicinit,y of the harbour had to close for lack of custom~ 
1 The Port of King's runn, p .10. 
2 This work had been sanctioned in 1795 but because of inadequate financial 
powers and the opposition of landowners and the I(ynn CounCil it required 
27 years, seven further acts and the expenditure of some £500,000 before 
completion. It was situated im1. south of the harbour, was 2!mls. long 
and between 300' and 350' wide. It cut off a Sim1. curve in the Ouse aDd 
thereby improved the tidal scour through runn, aided river naVigation and 
facilitated the drainage of 320,000 acres of good farmland. 
3 The cost was to be recouped from the harbour tolls; the chains were them-
4 selves replaced by screw couplings in the ear~ l850s. 
Burnett; A Handbook of King' s Iqnn, London 1846, p. 77. 
5 ~~~: 1858 leoture; Iqnn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 2Jt.th February, 
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Remaining in 1844, however, was-the serious problem of silting. Reliance 
was still being placed on tidal scour, the consequence of which was that ships 
could be approached at low water o~ through inches of clinging mud; and 
their ports and windows had to be securely caulked or else they ran the risk 
of becoming waterlogged, so fi~ were they embedded in the mud when the 
2 
tide began to flow. As it was vessels often had to anchor a full 40 to 80 
yards from the warehouses~ a matter of heavy expense and lengthy delay. 
This latter defect arose from an entire~ unanticipated consequence of the 
Eau Brink Cut. At first this had benefited the harbour by increasing the 
force of the tidal scour; in May 1829 Telford and Rennie, the engineers ot 
the project, had written, "the channel in front of the town is deeper than 
4 before and from the town to the sea has seldom been better", but as tiae 
progressed the long term effect of the Cut was to divert the main channel 
towards the west bank of the river, that is the side away from the harbour, 
with such stea~ vigour that the house of a Mr. Broadbent of West ~ was 
actual~ swept away. Meanwhile, the harbour itself, especial~ between the 
Mill Fleet and the Customs House, became heavi~ silted~ the deposits 
eventual~ proving sufficient to prOVide the foundations for a new qu~§ 
To atone for this and the damage sustained also by the east banks of the 
Magdelan Fen? and to pay for the series of jetties and breakwaters built at 
liYnn to redirect the current towards the east bank, the Eau Brink 
COmmissioners were compelled to p~ a sum of £46,000 in compensation~ 
1 The Port of King's lqrm, p.lO. 2 Ibid. p.9. 
3 White I s Norfolk Directory 1845, p-518. 
4 Letter of Telford and Rennie to the Eau Brink CommiSSioners, 6th J4ay, 1829, 
6 and now in the archives of the lqnn Conservanr Board. Ibid. 
White's Norfolk Directory 1845, p-5l8. Ibid. 
a The Eau Brink Commissioners derived their income from a drainage tax on 
the 320,000 acres affected by the cut, and from a toll of 5d. per ton levied 
on all up river cargoes_ The Cuse Bank Commission itself was empowered in 
1837 (7 Wil.IV & 1 Vic.c.lxxxl) to raise funds for the upkeep ot the banks. 
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This was administered by the Ouse Bank Commission (created by an act of 1831, 
1 &: 2 ti1.IV c.b:xiii and otherwise known as the Haling Commission) and a SWI 
of £750 per annum was reserved for harbour works, but, in the event, the bulk 
of this was squandered on the upkeep of the mai~ decorative Marine Parade 
and on the depositing of silt, which was speedi~ swept away, along the west 
side of the river. 
As urgent as were the needs for sound harbour direction and the 
provision of both wet and dry docks, the solution of these problems, however, 
could not take precedence over that of an even more serious defeot, name~ 
the dreadful oondition of the harbour approaohes. In 1844 ~ was still 
approached from the sea along a wide and most treacherous curve of the Cuse. 
Both this and the outer approaohes were beset with submerged sandbanks, cr08S 
ourrents, shifting sands and aoute silting. The Admiralty Preliminary 
Inquiry into the Norfolk Estuary Bill (briefly stated, the promoters intended 
to make a straight out between the harbour and the sea) in 1~9 laid bare the 
full extent of the ohanne1' s inadequacy and the harmfu.l repercussions it had 
had on ~nn trade. On being asked to explain the nature of the defects 
Armes replied~ 
"I should s~ there are several. One to which frequent allusion 
has been made is that instead of its being a direct channel, it is 
a very circuitous channel, and, in addition to that the danger is 
inoreased by the fact that when the sands are overflowed the tide 
does not set straight through the channel, but across." 
Similarly, Mr. Wing, the counsel for the promoters, had commented in his 
2 
opening address: 
1 
"I believe there is hardly a:qy instance where the sands have shifted 
and the channel of the river varied so much as this has.-
Admiralty Preliminary Inquiry into the Norfolk Estuary Bill, 1849, p.30.: 
evidence of W.Armes. 
2 Ibid. p.2. 
and als01 
" •• at present it is a very circuitous channel and the estuary 
is full of light and shifting sands." 
The extent of the improvement made by the Eau Brink Cut was placed firm~ in 
perspective. W.Chace, the senior ~nn pilot, at first said of the channel, 
"I have known it worse", but further questioning elicited the admission that 
it was "only as good now as it generally was in my time; it always 
2 fluctuated" • 
The practical consequences of the situation had been, and still were, 
gravely detrimental to ~nn. An average of 30 vessels a year grounded in 
the vicinity of the harbo~ which meant that "from eight years' record ••• 
the cost to the port has been ld. per ton upon all cargoes delivered to p~ 
for the damages that have been sustained by vessels running aground between 
It-Lynn Roads and the town"; a further consequence was that maI\Y northern 
insurance oompanies oharged a higher premium on vessels bound for Lynn than 
on those for London and elsewhere~ Adverse weather added difficulties to 
the alrea~ hazardous passage and caused expensive delays; one ship of o~ 
13' draft was once seven days between the Deeps and the harbour, and another, 
the 'Cato', was on one occasion actuallY held for twent,y-six days? A 
further source of delay was that captains rarely dared to attempt a night 
passage, so badly lit was the channel~ but, even so, when in 18lt-7 the Pilot 
1 ~iralty Preliminary Inq~iry into the Norfolk ~stu~ry Bill, 1849, p.2.: 
eV1dence of W.Armes. Ibid. p.31. Ib1d. p.30. Evidenoe of 
4 W.Armes who was the secretary to the Jurnn Maritime Insuranoe Association. 
Ibid. The most notorious example was that ot the 'Ikm.-y ""i!:'-=-tJ11' rh:ch 
5 cost £350 to gefloat and a further £500 to repair. 
Ibid. Ibid. p.47., evidence of Mr. Garland (ex R.N.) 
7 White's Norfolk Directory 1845, p.52'O. There was a lighthouse at 
Iilnstanton, the property of F. Lane, the Iunn Town Clerk, but in the oare 
of Trinity HOuse. For the rest the Head Pilot was paid £35Op.a. out of 
which he supplied all lights and buoys except the Thief and Whiting Beacons. 
~ 
Commission sought authority to provide marker lanterns it was refused on the 
1 
ground that the council "do not deem it necessary". It is hard. to justity 
this complete~ parsimonious attitude, for the deterrent effect of the faotors 
enumerated above had been illustrated o~ too clear~ a few years previouslY 
when a representative of Birmingham business interests had visited ~ to 
investigate the possibility of despatching the midland city's products through 
the harbour there instead of that at Hull, but had abandoned his intention 
2 sole~ on account of the state of the channel. Another incidental result 
had been the stea~ deterioration of a onoe prosperous shipbuilding industr,y 
in the town~ Naval contracts had ceased about 1800, and, although three 
small yards survived in 1844, the industry was extinct by 1858~ 
As though the condition of the harbour and its approaches were not 
enough, there also remained an anachronistio system of harbour tolls and 
petty dues to hamper trade. The tolls were initial~ privileges conferred 
on I(ynn Corporation, which undertook to maintain the sea defences, harbour 
bridges and various other public works, over several centuries by various 
"indulgent mona.rohs"~ Apart from their extreme complexity, these tolls had, 
by the mid-nineteenth century, beoome "vicious in principle aDd injurious 
6 
in practice" having "ma~ times diverted a trade beneficial to the town", 
! Guildhall Book, Vol.14, p.829, minute of the 10th February, 1847. 
Admiralty Preliminary Inquiry into the Norfolk Estuary Bill, p.3~, 
evidence of W.Armes. 
3 A 600 ton warship, the • Auspicious' was launched in 1796, and one of 
22 guns, the 'Victor', in 1798. The last naval vessel built in lGrnn 
appears to have been the 'Duke of York' in 1800. ~ Armes gives this impression in his 1858 lecture; Hillen (p.737) gives a 
list of oonstructions after 1845 but includes nothing after the 600 ton 
'Arethusa' in 1855. As the Marsh Cut was open by then it is obvious that 
other factors were involved in the decline, for which see chapter 9 
below. 
5 Anne s : The Port of King's lQnn, p. 6. 6 Ibid. 
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but despite this the Corporation wilfully continued to exact its full dues 
and to meet eVllsion or doubtful oases with leg::!l sanctions! The complexities 
of the whole systeln defy simple explanation and the full tables are given in 
the appendices; but their general application, in round figures, was to impose 
a levy on general cargo entering the harbour of ~. per ton in the case of 
~nn freemen, and 3d. in the case of 'strangers'; for coals the figures were 
l~. and 6d. per ton respective1y~ As a result of these impositions and the 
state of the channel, already by 1844, HuH merchants were turning to Wisbech 
in preference to ~nn whenever the opportuni~ offered, and the former was 
deriving considerable benefit from the expanding trade of the midlands, 
whereas ~nn was most certainly not doing so; in addition a considerable 
Q!Jlount of the growing Baltic timber trade W:'.S being diverterl to "R'isbech 4 
concomitantly with the improvements made to the Nene navigation. Most 
alarming of all, however, were instances of Hull merchants having brought 
goods into Wisbech and then retailing them in ~nn at lower prices than 
identical goods brought Qirectly into the harbour there~ But, despite this, 
it was 1889 before the toll system was finally abolished, and in the meantime 
the Corporation had even added to it by imposing a tax of 4d. per ton on 
incoming cnrgoes to assist in defraying the cost of the Norfolk Estua~ Cut 
works. The reason for this obstinate attitui'ie, at least in the 1830s 
Rnd '403, was simply that the Corporation could not a.fford to sacrifice what 
W03 far and aw:?.y its largest single item of revenue. Total income averaged 
1 Guild Hall Book, Vol.14,p.807, minute of the 17th September,1846, for note 
of action taken against evasion of wharfage due. See also ibid, p.730, 
8th July,l344; p.728, 27th June,l844 and als02a case of the 9th November, 1846 where only £2-13-ld was involved. See Appendix A. 
3 Admiralty Preliminary Inquiry, p.29, evidence of E.Lane Swatman, the 
collector of the dues; also ibid. p.66, App.5. 
4 Ibid. p.31, evidence of W.Armes. 
5 Ibid. 
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some £7,000 per annum; rising In a good year, such as 1845, to as much as 
£9,300, the fluctuations themselves revealing the importance of the toll 
receipts as it was these which were, being dependent on the state of trade, 
the variable factor. In 1844 the town dues and groats contributed 
£3,042-4--5d. and £543-1-Od. respectively to the revenue, the corresponding 
2 
figures for 1845 being £4,211-14-3d. and £646-5-Od. These facts and 
---~, 
proportions have onlY to be set against the insecure state of the Corporation 
finances of the time for the position to be clearly understood; as early aa 
1842 a council minute had spoken of the "depressed state of the Corporation 
finances"~ am, in fact, the financial year endiD8 August 1845 left the 
authorit,y with a balanoe of no more than £465. 
The responsibility for the degree of ~'s unpreparedness 1~ squar.~ 
with the dominant merchant families of the town to which sOlIe reference has 
been made in prece~diD8 pages. The "high castet coterie numbered perhaps 
thirty or forty merchants, bankers and lawyers and centred on the families 
of Everard, Bagge, Hogge and Self who lived around the inner oourts of the 
town in combined business and domestic premises. These families "graduall;y 
and kindly (had taken) the management of the several commercial interests 
5 
until all were completely in their own hands", they had appropriated every 
inch of the river frontage so that the "private properties" of "small men" 
6 
were sometimes kept laden "month after month", and they had also acquired a 
1 White's Norfolk Dreotory, 1845 p.527. 2 Admiralty Preliminary Inquiry, 
p.66, App.5. 4 Minutes of the General Committee, Vol.3, p.173, 20th 
June, 1842- So designated by Armes in his lecture of 1858. 
5 The Port of KiD8' s lunn, p-7 - This was a just contention as examination of 
White's Norfolk Directory and other contemporary sources reveals. The 
Everard family had interests in brewing, malthouses, the manufacture of rope 
and twine, in wine, coal, timber, general merchandise and shipping, it also 
owned a rich bankiD8 firm: the Bagges were brewers and general merchants: 
the Hogges were brewers and ma1sters and also coal, wine and timber 
merchants: the SEJlfs were merchants in corn, seed, oi1cake, coal and 
timber. b Ibid. 
-.----------~ 
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1'1 complete hold over the local trp.desmen so that !1.~ burgess detected in 
seeking alternative quotations from any source other than that with which he 
1 
normally dealt vms likely to be shunned by the whole trading community. 
There was no possibility of redress, for not only were the families closely 
bound by friendship, intermar:riage and business 8.l1i:mces, they also 
controlled the civic2and social life of the town as surely as they did its 
economic activities. 
Immediately prior to the reform of municipal government in 1835, when 
only the 250 or so freelnen of the borough, themselves the creatures of the 
coterie~ enjoyed the franchise, seventeen of the thirty council seats were 
occupied by members of the four principal families; of the remainder seven 
. ~ 
were held by friends of the group and four were vacant. Reform had made 
little practical difference, and in 1~~ the members of these families, their 
business associates and friends could still combine to form a majority. 
They were aided by the fact that the new electorate, barely a thousand strong 
even by l~ consisted in the main of the former freemen (who were to retain 
their privileges for life) and the newly enfranchised small tradesmen who did 
not do.re to offend those on whom their businesses depended. They also 
inspired respect as individuals. The investigating commission of 1833, 
a prelude to the 1835 act, found no irregularities in their conduct of 
1 R.J.Hillen: a Histor,y of the Borough of King's ~nn, Norwich 1907, p.603. 
2 For details of the 18W5 council see Ap')endix B and below in pp.ssim. 
3 The freedom could be obtained by Mayoral Gift, by Patrimony (the first 
born son of a freeman), by purchase (usually at ,£150 by 1835 a1thoueh 
the price could be raised, and on occasion was, to exclude und~~sirab1e 
a.t-)::llic~mts), or by serving a seven year apprenticeship in the borough. 
4 The Town Clerk v;~.s also an Everard by 1:~,rd.8::e, but this lie.son took place 
f'.fter his aonointment. 
5 IVhite's Norf~lk Director,y 1845, p.525. 
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affairs; while in subsequent years substantial subscriptions and encourage-
ment towards a new lunn hospital and improved market accommodation, as well 
as to other town improvements, and the provision of the beautiful Town Walks 
gave material proof of the coterie's zeal for the well being of ~nn's 
oitizens. 
While Iurnn' s trade stagnated beoause it had "been managed by too few 
hands"2the families in question waxed prosperous, either storing their 
aooumulated wealth or, as in the case of the Everard and Bagge families, 
ilIVesting in land and taking up residence on nearby oountry estates. A 
bitter critiC, mindful of lunn's needs, might complain that they were too 
rich to oare about their neighbours~ and in one sense this was true, but it 
would be more exaot to s~ that they ignored the need for harbour and ohannel 
improvements because they had a vested interest in retaining things as they 
were. Existing conditions had made them rioh, but further developments 
might well lead to the emergence of unweloome rivals in the town and a 
oonsequent undermining of their position. Iurnn itself possessed a wide-
spread trading monopolY and within this the coterie had its own secure 
monopolY. If the harbour service was oostlY and ineffioient it was little 
matter to them, for the costs could easilY be recouped from the traders, who 
in their turn passed them on to the consumers obliged by geographical 
circumstances to deal in lunn. If the channel was a source of delay am 
danger to shipping it was again a matter of small concern, for the extra 
costs involved were still less than those which would be incurred by an 
1 See "A Report of the Proceedings (verbatim) of H.M.Commissioners for 
Enquiring into the existill8 sta.te of the Municipal Corporations ot England 
and Wales at King's IQrnn, November 1833-: Iqnn 1834. 
2 The Port of King's Iqnn, p.7. 3 Letter of 'erito', ~ 
Advertiser &: West Norfolk Herald, 15th February, 1862. 
~ 
outside rival's attempts to utilise overland transport and ignore the Ouse 
and its tributarie8. Until the ndvent of rail~s the position was, in fact, 
iapregnable ~nd the incentive to improvement non-existent. 
Two exacples, the s~cond of which i8 particular~ relevant to this 
stu~, will suffioe to illustrate the mental outlook of the Lynn civio 
authorities. On the Grounds indicated above they had first of all 
resolute~ opposed the Eau Brink Cut, thereby incurring the hostili~ of .~ 
1 
of the up-country gentry which, even by 1858, had not been ful~ al~ed. 
This fearful suspioion of at\Y ohange, perhaps pa.rt~ justified by later eTents 
in this foraer instance, was seen in its worst manifestation in the reaction 
of the council to proposals to improve the harbour approaches during the 1830s. 
2 In 1837 Lord George Bentinck and others had commissioned Sir John Rennie to 
report on a grandiose so heme for ~nclosing 150,000 acres of the WaSh and so 
form a new 'Victoria County'. In 1839 the engineer reported faTourable 
conclusions. At a oost of £2,000,000, a sum that would speeii~ be recouped 
by the value of the reclaimed land, he proposed to straighten and confine the 
rivera Witham, WeIland, Nene and Quse, and lead thell to a common outfall soae 
miles froll the existing ooastline. Three times this was put to Parliament 
and three tiaes it was rebuffed. The high initial cost pa.rtially explains 
this, although the aoreage created would have been worth three times as much, 
but the oain blame must be attaohed to the aotively hostile attitude of the 
1 Armes: leoture of 1858. 
2 Lord ~or..6..e_C.ave~s~:.Bent_~_k.-l.l:.802-48), son of the fourth Duke of 
Portland; M.P. for ~nn from 1828 on, n substantial landowner in the 
distriot; earned his fame by lea.ding the attaok on Peel in 1~5/6 OTer the 
repeal of the Corn taws. Woodward: The 18e of Reform, Oxford Press, 1938, 
p.118fn. says that Peel offered hill offioe in l84l, but he refused the offer 
as he could not spare the time from racing - his connection with this sche.e 
howeTer, indioates that he was not without a serious side. ' 
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Lynn Council, for "as it seems one duty of corporate bodies to resist good 
projects, so the ~nn Corporation strenuous~ opposed this": Its members, 
indeed, lent themselves to the general credulity which dogged the project from 
its outset. Some maintained thut the water of the Cuse would run so fast 
that E~ would be the port instead of ~nn, some feared that the channel 
would dry up and that a new town would arise at the river mouth to replace 
~, while others gloomi~ prophesied such a pile-up of tidal waters that 
the town would be complete~ inundated by flood. Fortunately for Lynn the 
promoters were not complete~ deterred and caused J.M.Rendal, in 1839, to 
draw up a very much modified plan to cost o~ £500,000. This simply 
involved a 2~ mile straight cut (actually in tvlO parts, Marsh Cut and 
Vinegar Middle Cut) between ~nn harbour ~nd the sea, and would lead to the 
reclamation of no more than 70,000 acres. Despite the obvious benefits of 
this proposal and its essential moderation, resistance and indifference 
continued and in 1844 it was still no more than a carefully devised plan 
and a stick which critics were using with increasing effect to beat the 
council. It may be noted at this point that, helped by the stimulus of 
external threats to ~nn's security, the patience and persistence of the 
promoters was rewarded in 1846 when the Compa~ of the Promoters of the 
Norfolk Estuary was at last duly incorporated and its project sanctioned. 
Even so, a further four years elapsed before the first sod was cut, and 
another three before the work was complete after difficulties And legal 
complications to which reference must be made in a later chapter. 
In view of the above it will hardly be an occasion for surprise that 
1 Armes: Lecture of 1858. 
2.! 
the reaction of the tunn authorit:ies to the Northern & Eastern extensions 
was one of culpable sloth - indeed, they were probab~ taken by surprise at 
the sudden turn of events. William Everard, one of Williams' group, 
admitted as much in his own case when he said that two years before he had 
thought that railways would never come to tunn, but that now they were at Ely 
1 
they could no longer be ignored - a sentiment revealing his reason for 
becoming associated with the L & E promotion, and also a degree of foresight 
not shared by others of his fami~ and their fellow merchants. Not until 
the 5th February, 1844 did the General Committee of the council meet to 
discuss the alarming situation, conclude that the council must "oppose a~ 
2 bill which should exclude this town from the proposed railway communication", 
and decide to recommend the council to appoint a deputation to approach the 
borough's M.P.s and charge them to wait on the E.C.R. and N & E boards "for 
the purpose of urging upon them the necessi~ of making tunn the terminus 
or junction,,30f the extensions. 
Section 3: The Rural Concepts 
On the 7th February the deputation (henceforward designated the Railw~ 
Committee) was du~ appointed to "open a negociation (sic) with the mrectors 
of the several companies which are about to extend their present line of 
Railroad in this neighbourhood for the purpose of making the best arrangement 
in their power to secure to the town the most efficient line which can be 
obtained"~ The committee was exhorted to "lose no time" in its task _ 
a commendable sentiment, except that it was already far too late. The 
1 Iurnn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 30th March, 1844. Speech at the 
Town Meeting of the 28th March. 
2 General Committee Minutes, Vol.3, p.2l9: minute of the 5th February, 1844. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Guild Hall Book, Vol.14, p.721; minute of the 7th February, 1844. 
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Northern & Eastern had complete~its initial surveys, and the Eastern 
Counties proprietors had given their approval to the Brandon and Peterborough 
1 
extensions on the 10th January, 1844; by mid-February the shares had been 
subscribed; and, of course, the plans and requisite deposit lodged with the 
Board of Trade and Court of Chancery respective~~ Finally, on the 21st 
February, the Eastern Counties proprietors signified their approval of the 
Lincoln extension~ To even contemplate that they would be prepared to alter 
plans so far advanced for the sake of one community's interests was 
positive~ naive. 
For five days the members of the Railway Conunittee cogitated and drew 
lines on maps, emerging at the end of that time with two schemes involving 
66 miles of comp1ete~ new railway and a battery of ingenuous arguments? 
The first scheme represented what, in the committee's view, would happen if 
the E.C.R. and N & E were unimpeded in their progress, and forecast a branch 
line, 26 miles in length, running from Turf Fen (a point of no significance 
except that it was exact~ midway between E~ and Peterborough) through 
Wisbech and on to a terminus at Iqnn. This, it was pointed out, would place 
Iqnn at a serious disadvantage to its rival, Wisbech, and would render the 
route to both E~ and Peterborough circuitous, and in either case 30 to 35 
minutes longer than by direct lines to either of the two towns. It is 
curious that men accustomed to spending hours and even days in wearisome 
road journe,ys should now consider such a relatively small time a major 
handicap, but, as difficulties were being de1iberate~ created to enhance 
1 Railway Times, 13th January, 1844, p.26; E.C.R. meeting of the lOth January. 
2 Ibid., 24-th February, p.210; E.C.R. meeting of the 21st February. 
3 Ibid. 4- Ibid. 
5 General Committee Minutes, Vol.3, pp.220-1, 12th February, 1844. 
The Proposals of the L~n Corporation Railway Committee 
Tl.IRF FEN . 
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the attractiveness of the alternative and positive proposal, and although 
the same issue was short~ to arise in another context, too much attention 
need not be paid to it. The o~ virtue of this first scheme was that it 
recognised the fact that the E.C.R. could not be expected to ignore Wisbech 
for the sake of ~nn - a realistic view subsequent~ confirmed in personal 
1 interview with the great Robert Stephenson who reminded the deputation fro. 
I(y'nn that Wisbech was nearer to both London and Peterborough than was Iunn, 
and that the latter "must not forget that Wisbech would have a claim on 
Parliament for a railway committee, and could not be overlooked in the general 
convenience which is now regarded by the House of Commons in all applications 
2 
f'or Railway Acts". Stephenson may have been too generous in attributing 
consistency to Parliament's handling of railway matters (in fact, the lack of 
it was a major f'actor in the development of the 'Mania' conditions): but as a 
practical railwayman concerned with the economics of operation he had 
recognised the gulf existing between the companies and pure~ sectional 
interests. 
Such a gulf' was blissful~ ignored in the audacious and egocentric 
proposals which the Railway Committee proffered as the solution to all ~nnts 
4-difficulties. The Eastern Counties Compan.r was to be asked to drop its Ely 
to Peterborough line entire~, and substitute in lieu one running north-west 
from Brandon to ~nn and then on via Wisbech to Peterborough. In this way 
~nn would be assured of a safe position on a cross country line and would be 
enabled, by means of the railway and the continued use of the Ouse navigation, 
not o~ to keep its traditional markets intact, but also preclude the 
1 See below for the de~ai1s of this visit, which took place towards the end 
of March, 1844· General Committee Minutes, Vo1.3, pp. 230-5· 6th A ril l~; report of the ~ommittee on its activities in London, for which s~~ , 
below. See chapter 3 below. 
4- Ibid, pp.220-l; minutes of the 12th February, 1844. 
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possibility of a~ interference from Wisbech, and limit that from Norwich, 
in the town's London, Norfolk and Suffolk markets. The fact that the journe.y 
to London would now be even more circuitous was this time convenient~ ignored. 
In seeming~ disinterested justification, it was pointed out to the E.C.R. and 
the N & E that by the adoption of these suggestions they would be required to 
provide o~ 66 miles of new railway as opposed to 68 miles under the former 
alternative (that is: Ely to Brandon 14 miles, Brandon to Lynn 22 miles, and 
Iqnn to Peterborough 30 miles, as compared with Ely to Brandon 14 miles, ~ 
to Peterborough 28, and Turf Fen to lunn 26) and would thereby avoid crossill8 
"the worst part of the Fens". Quite apart from all considerations of timing 
in its production, and ignoring the unfounded assumption as to the starting 
point of the lunn branch, a plan such as this, conceived in only five days by 
a committee without a single technical qualification amongst its members1 and 
pure~ specious in content, deserved short shrift. It got it. On the 15th 
Februar,y the council was reduced to impotency by the news from Bentinck that 
it was alrea~ too late in the session for lunn to achieve its object - news 
countered by a total~ ineffective resolution urging on Bentinck "the strong 
feelings of this Council and the Corporation at large" that the E~ to 
Peterborough railway "would be so injurious to the interests of the town that 
it will be incumbent upon the Corporation to oppose the projected bill in 
2 
ever,y stage unless some satisf."lctory arrangements be made". It is to be 
noted that the equal~ potent threat of the northern extension had so far 
received no specific mention; if Lynn obtained its railway to Peterborough 
such a line could presumably be made to serve lunn' sends, but if Lynn failed 
1 Wayte was a pnysicinn, Goodwin and Platten soliCitors, R.Bagge a merchant 
and brewer, Self a merchant. Goodwin, being privy to Williams' intentions 
was probab~ no more than a passive but interested Spectator. 
2 General Committee Minutes, Vo1.3, p.223; minutes of the 15th February. 
l§. 
in its purpose it would represent a chronic danger which, as far as the 
evidence shows, was not yet ful~ appreciated. 
From this time on the council was constant~ on the retreat, itself a 
favourable omen for Williams, fighting a losing battle with dwindling 
confidence and certainty of intention. On the 17th Februa~, Goodwin, then 
absent on private business in London (most probably in connection with 
Williams' schemes), was directed by letter to sound the N & E board on the 
possibilities of a ~nn extension from Brandon (a last flicker of hope) or, 
1 
and this was a new departure, from Ely. It was obvious that the council, 
fearful of forfeiting the goodwill of the two companies, was now prepared 
to concentrate on seeking a second best rather than surrender to the 
appalling possibilit,y of the Turf Fen branch which would throw all the 
advantages to Wisbech; the idea of ~nn creating its own railway had still 
not been officially considered. Goodwin conferred with the E.C.R. board 
and returned to present his report on the 4th March: As a result the 
Railway Committee then decided that what it wanted was a lihe to Ely via 
Downham Market, and promptly took steps to obtain a joint conference with 
the E.C.R. directors on the matter~ Obviously Goodwin's persuasive powers 
were more in evidence than was his undoubted duplicity. Ve~ understandablY 
the E.C.R. had rejected the original proposals for a Brandon to Lynn line, 
and had apparently given grounds for believing that after all it would be 
prepared to overlook Wisbech, but this can only have been on the understanding 
1 General Committee Minutes, Vol. 3 , p.224; minute of the 17th February. 
Confusion m~ be caused by the apparent inconsistency of references to the 
E.C.R. and N & E; as the latter was leased to the former by this time the 
references may be taken as synoqymous, although the N & E remained 
nominally independent until 1902. 3 
2 Ibid. p.226, 4th March, 1844. Ibid. 
g 
that it would not be called upon to finance the ~nn to E~ line - a point 
on which Goodwin, alone of the committee, was able to give assurance. Given 
this guarantee the E.C.R., alrea~ heavi~ committed elsewhere, could 
temporari~ afford to ignore Wisbech in favour of the ~ & ~ route for it 
. 1 
"would consequent~ be saved the trouble of that part of the l1ne", yet 
2 
"would receive a large amount of traffic from it". It is also a distinct 
possibility that it was at this stage that, as the price of acquiescence, 
Williams private~ intimated his willingness to throw off a Wisbech branch 
from the L & E to meet a future E.C.R. extension to that town1 if this was 
indeed the case, both parties to the understanding could feel satisfied, the 
former because such a branch fitted in with his ultimate intention of making 
~nn the centre of a railway network, the E.C.R. because a short line 
(eventual~ it was constructed from March) would give it direct access into 
the heart of the ~nn and Wisbech feud, so that whatever the outcome of this 
it would carr.y a substantial share of the victor's spoils. At the same time 
as preparing the E.C.R. and the N & E for the emergence of a private compa~, 
Goodwin was also manoeuvring the potential opposition within ~nn into 
adopting the route already selected by the promoters of the compa~ in 
question, so achieving a double victor.y. 
But within a week the committee had changed its mind again. It now 
determined that ~nn's best interests would be served by securing "the best 
practical access to London and to the manufacturing districts in the west 
1 Railway Times, 4th May, l~, p.505. Chairman's report to a meeting of 
E.C.R. shareholders. 
2 Ibid. 
3 For full discussion of the Wisbech branch see chapter 2 below. 
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and north of England", and that If on~ one line could be obtained it had 
better be a direct line to Peterborough, although ever,y effort should be made 
2 
to obtain the ElY line as well. Faced with the inevitabilit.y of change the 
counoil was by now at a loss to know in whioh direction ~nn could seek new 
markets and security, a choice made much more diffioult by the oomplete 
dependence on the E.C.R. which the council had assumed, and which made it 
axiomatic that onlY one railway for the town oould be reallY expected. 
Acting on its latest resolve, the committee now formed itself into a 
deputation to visit London to gain fuller information on the several current 
projections within the scope of "Iunn connections"~ and also negotiate "the 
most efficient line of railway which can be obtained"~ The subsequent 
intensive series of interviews, conducted during the seoond and third weeks 
of March at a cost to the Corporation of £76-l0-3d~, proved a bitter 
awakening to those members of the committee who might still have indulged 
themselves in private fantasies. 
Sir John Rennie and Mr. Rendel, both involved in the so far abortive 
6 
Norfolk Estuary proposals and manifesting a friend~ disposition to ~nn, 
seoured the deputation a meeting with Robert Stephenson (then engineer to 
both the Northern & Eastern and. the London & Birmingham companies) as it was 
he "whose present and projected lines promised the readiest access from ~ 
7 
to London and Peterborough". This introduotion, however, was the high-water 
mark of co-operation met by the deputation. Stephenson himself was 
1 General Committee Minutes, Vol.3, p.230; minute of the 6th April 
oomprising the committee's report on its interviews in London and 
elsewhere during the previo~s weeks. 
2 Ibid. Ibid. 4 Ibid. 
S Guild Hall Book, Vol.14, p.726, 8th May, l~. 
6 General Committee minutes, Vol.3, pp.230-5, 6th April, 1844. 7 Ibid. 
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brutal~ discouraging, and elsewhere non-committal ~iability was the best 
that was encountered. Mr. Roy, the N & E solioitor, guaranteed the "utmost 
cordiality" in receiving al\Y application from IJnn, but nothing more 
sUbstantial; the N & E directors were somewhat more frank for although the,y 
expressed "their desire to meet the wishes of the Town of Lynn" this was onlY 
"as far as was consistent with the claims of other influential districts" 
1 
within the area. 
The interview with Stephenson proved decisive.· He, of course, would 
know of Williams' intentions, and it was real~ his task to insure against 
the possible failure of the private promotion by inducing the ~nn men to 
accept the idea of a branch to IJnn via Wisbech as would follow such an 
eventuality. Stephenson urged the ~nn deputation to the view that the town 
must accept "a comprehensive scheme embracing the neighbouring count,y as well 
2 
as IJnn", reminding the members that Parliament would not overlook Wisbech 
even if the E.C.R. and the N & E chose to do so, but sugaring the pill by 
informing them that his own compa~ had decided to adopt "the only feasible 
plan" and take its E~ to Peterborough line by way of March rather than by 
the insignificant Doddington, and to commence both its ~nn branch and 
3 
northern extension from the former. This was an obvious improvement from 
the E.C.R. viewpoint, for it placed London, the N & E mainline and. the York 
extension virtual~ in a direct line, and thereby reduced the distances 
involved without the sacrifice of al\Y major centre of population; it also 
considerab~ altered the oomplexion of the matter in ~nn eyes for it 
1 General Committee minut5s, Vol.3, pp.230-5, 6th April, 1844. 2 Ibid. Ibid. 
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offered at one and the same time direct and ready access to the northern 
markets and almost direct communica.tion with both London and. Peterborough, 8. 
most happy compromise to solve a difficult dilemma; In contrast to the 
committee's own proposals the journey to London would now take an extra 18 
minutes, that to Peterborough an extra 8 minutes~ Moreover, as Stephenson 
did not neglect to point out, these advantages would be assured to the town 
"without the contribution of one sixpence from the inhabitants of Lynn and 
the avoiding of the risk and expense which would inevitab~ attend the 
formation of an independent compa~ to carr,y out either a direct line from 
3 Iornn to Ely or from I\1nn to Peterborough". The engineer hammered this home 
by opining that neither the existing nor the potential traffic justified a 
direct line to either E~ or Peterborough, and as a further encouragement 
dismissed as "chimerical" I\1nn's constant fears of Wisbech~ The cogency 
of Stephenson's arguments was not lost on the deputation which allowed itself 
to be completely convinced by what it had heard, and returned to Lynn 
prepared to advocate before the town the choice of the Wisbech and March line 
as preferable to all others. It also came back with a new awareness of 
the urgent need for harbour and channel developments. It had been pressed 
on the deputation from all sides that although "the harbour possesses greater 
capabilities for extensive commerce than almost a~ other port on the east 
coast"~ railways without harbour improvements would be "comparatively 
va1ueless,,6- a true prophecy which boded ill for the success of Williams' 
enterprise but which, in fact, made it doubly desirable in the eyes of Lynn 
men that no possibility of advantage should be given to Wisbech. 
1 General Committ5e Minutes, Vol.3, pp23Q-S, 6th April, 1844. 
2 Ibid. 6 Ibid. 4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid, p.235. Ibid. 
~ 
One of the deputation had been incautious enough to inform the N& E 
directors, in support of his new found convictions, that some 90,% o~ ~nn 
men in fact favoured the W1sbech line~ Although the official report of the 
Railw~ Committee was not made public until the 6th April, this indiscretion 
and the decisions made by the committee were, in fact, wide~ known in ~nn 
as early as the third week of March, a leakage of information for which 
Goodwin was obviously responsible. The disclosure precipitated a storm of 
feeling in the town, a situation carefully fostered and exploited by Williams 
and his associates who, faced by the tacit assumption, still widely 
entertained, that ~nn could have o~ one railway, could no longer afford to 
remain under cover. Williams was, however, prepared. The feasibility o~ 
the Ely route had been established by private survey, and feelers as regards 
practical financial support had produced promises that were "not positiven2 
but which were sufficient to reveal "individuals ready to use every exertion 
to obtain so desirable an object ft3as the ~nn & ~ line. Thus prepared, 
and after assiduously stirring up feeling amongst his fellow citizens 
against the Wisbech line, Williams achieved his purpose at two meetings, those 
of the 25th and 28th March. To the first Williams himself invited the 200 
persons present, using, or so he claimed, the Rate Book to ascertain the 
leading occupiers as being representative of the community at large; the ~or 
of. the borough, Alderman Wayte, was invited to preside. The cry was raised 
that this was "an assuming meetingll~ a "partial meeting"~ and Wayte 
complained bitterly of the "odium,,6he had incurred by convening it at the 
1 Armes at the Town Meeting of the 28th March, 1844; ~nn Advertiser & West 
Norfolk Herald, 30th March, 1844. 
2 ~nn Advertiser & West Norfolk3Herald, 28th March. Ibid. 
4 Ibid. Meeting of the 25th. 5 Ibid. 
30th March 1844.; Williams on the 
Meeting of tge 28th. 
Ibid. 
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request of Williams and Swatma~-:-and., in addition, was able to cite the names 
of several of the town's leading citizens who were surprised at receiving no 
invitation on the basis claimed by Williams. Wayte was, in fact, in a most 
awkward situation. Conscious of the low repute in which the council stood 
at a time when events had served to remind the town of its unhelpful attitude 
towards the Norfolk Estuary proposals, he could hardly refuse a meeting on a 
subject such as the railw~ which was so vital to the interests of the 
community at large; moreover, Williams would probably have had his meeting 
with or without official civic sanction, and. under the former alternative the 
Railway Committe, of which Wayte was a member, would at least have the 
opportunity of presenting the case, which it genuinely believed was in the 
best interests of ~nn. 
Williams won over the meeting of the 25th March without difficulty and 
was so enabled to move on with confidence to the completely open Town Meeting 
2 
which followed, after three d~s of "rising animosity", on the 28th. 
Williams had intended such a meeting, and his opponents, the protagonists of 
the Wisbech line, had demanded it in order to give themselves time to organise 
their defences and refute the charge that they, as represented by the Rai1w~ 
Committee, were seeking to impose a railway polioy on the town. But onoe 
again it was Williams who emerged triumphant on the 28th when the town 
committed itself to the promotion of an independent ~nn & Ely Rai1w~ Compa~. 
The extent of his victory was to be measured in the composition of the 
oommittee appointed by the Town Meeting to prosecute this object, and, in 
particular, to enlist the support of the local M.P.! and 1andowners~ Three 
1 The Collector of the Town Charities. 
2 ~nn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 30th March, 1841+; Wayte' s remarks 
from the chair on the 28th March. 
3 Ibid. 
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was to constitute a quorum in this committee which contained not o~ Williams 
himself but also his followers, Goodwin, Everard and Cresswell; there were 
o~ three other members, name~ Hogge, Bagge (R) and Bowker, of whom Bagge 
at least, although a member of the council's Railway Committee, had been more 
than half convinced of the need for an independent promotion by the arguments 
which he had heard at the two meetings. 
In accounting for Williams' success it is wise to take into account the 
techniques he employed before examining the strict logic of his argument. 
Indeed, in the high~ charged atmosphere of the Guild Hall, with his audience 
eager to follow aqy positive lead which promised to lighten the burden of its 
members' growing anxiety (and even bring a possible expansion of business) 
the promoter had a comparative~ easy task. He won the day because he 
correct~ interpreted the mood of the town and was able to stir up its fear 
of Wisbech; because the enlightened members of the community, and in 
particular William Armes, rallied to him; because the council which sponsored 
the alternative was suspect following its attitude towards the Estua~ Cut, 
and, above all, because of his own tactful circumspection and skill in 
manipulation. At both meetings Williams himself spoke last, thereby forcing 
his opponents to declare their case in full; he was careful, until certain of 
victor,y, to maintain a disinterested pose, claiming on the 25th that he was 
1 . 2 
"unfettered" and that he had no particular scheme to "cram down the meetJ.ng" -
a claim refuted not only by the evidence a1rea~ advanced, but even more 
strikingly by the fact that the same issue of the local press which carried 
the reports of the two meetings also bore notices that the surveys were 
1 lQnn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 30th March, 1844. 
2 Ibid. 
" 
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already underway, that a site for the Iornn terminus had already been marked 
out and that a prospectus would short~ be issued: This latter, in fact, 
appeared on the 20th April, and was a document of such comprehensiveness as 
to make it highly unlikely that it could have been compiled and printed 
within a mere three weeks. Finally it may be remarked that the crucial 
motion of the 28th March, proposed by Everard, was in itself a model of 
" "t 2 ~ngenu~ y:-
"That it is highly desirable to the interests of the town that a 
direct line of railw~ communication by w~ of Downham and Littleport 
should be established between King's ~nn and Ely; and that this 
meeting pledges itself to give its cordial support to aqr compa~ 
that m~ endeavour to car~ such a line of communication into effect." 
Thus, to accept the principle was to accept the practical implications of 
supporting a compaIij" which, despite the phrase "aIij" compaIij"", had in essence 
already been formed. 
It was a tribute to Williams' thoroughness in arousing feeling against 
the Wisbech line that at the meetings of both the 25th and 28th of March the 
burden of representing the case for it had fallen almost entire~ on one man, 
namely Lionel Self, a member of the Railway Committee. He received some 
backing from Platten and had the oomfort of Wayte's partisan support from the 
ohair, but very little else; R.Bagge, on whom he might have looked for 
assistance, began by making his complaint that the meeting of the 25th was 
"premature and not oourteous to the members of the deputationn3and finished 
by supporting 'Nilliams and agreeing, as noted above, to serve on the 
committee which was to prosecute the formation of the ~nn& Ely Compa~. 
At last something of sufficient magnitude had occurred to break down the 
unity and the exclusiveness of the "high caste". 
1 I(ynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 30th March, 18114• 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
Section 4: The Merits of the Case 
The case for the Wisbech line, as represented by Self, was that it would 
provide ~nn vdth the opportunity to develop new markets in the midlands and 
north with the distinct possibility, if the right efforts were made, that Lynn 
would be enabled to supplant Hull as the port for Birmingham~ If the Ely 
line were built in preference to one to Wisbech it would throw eve~ advantage 
in the development of such new markets to the latter, and would mere~ 
duplicate the river facilities that alrea~ existed for bringing trade into 
In the immediate context, Self believed that Williams was an alarmist 
in seeking to displ~ the trade of ~nn as in decline; for example, for the 
years 1841 to 1843 there was a variation of no more tian 1,200 quarters in 
corn exports, and if flour were taken into consideration the figures were 
aotual~ up on those of previous years. In short, Wisbech was doing Lynn no 
harm, and by adopting a line to there the latter had nothing to lose but 
everything to gain. It was also argued that it would be fol~ to antagonize 
the Eastern Counties before that company's plans for ~nn were known. 
The arguments for the E~ promotion came principally from Williams and 
.Armes. They plaoed emphasis on the view that the citizens of Lynn were "a 
declining people" ('To be Let' and 'To be Sold' notices were to be seen 
eve~here in the town), and argued that, as railway boards were invariablY 
selfish, the town must save itself by its own efforts and prooure a line that 
was suited to its particular and individual needs. The choioe of the Wisbeoh 
1 The opinions quoted in this and the subsequent paragraph are all derived 
from the meeting of the 28th March, 1844; ~nn Advertiser &: West Norfolk 
Herald, 30th Harch, 1844. 
2 A point echoed by R.Bagge, illustrating not o~ his conversion but also 
his disillusionment as a result of the treatment received by the Railway 
Committee while in London. 
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line would, they held, automatioal~ involve the loss of the St. Ives, the 
Huntingdon, the Norwich and the Brandon markets to Wisbech, and admit 
competition to those of Bury St.Ed.munds, Newmarket and Cambridge, hitherto 
supplied by ~ater ana held by ~nn in "undisputed sw~ft. Moreover, the 
Wisbech line could o~ reach to the opposite side of the Ouse (a reasonable 
assumption at the time as the provision of high clearance for shipping would 
render the bridging of the river an enornous~ expensive project), and would 
lengthen the route to London by nine miles. It was ~nn's plain du~ to 
overcome the handioap of being a hundred years behind the times by establish-
ing rapid cOlmnunication with its existing markets, for otherwise, as Williams 
put it, "the town would go to the wall". Not only would the railwB3' to Bl.y 
be quicker than the river it would also be much cheaper, and here Armes 
produced figures obtained from a friend, a railway director, to show that the 
existing rates between Manchester and Cambridge were, by a mixture of road and 
water conveyance, between 4/- and. 4/8 per cwt., but by Hull and Iqnn and then 
by railway the cost would be reduced to onlY 3/6a. Potential gains from the 
ElY line included the possibility that ~nn could become a leading packet 
station for northern Europe (passengers from Southampton could be in Iqnn 
within ten hours) and for Scotland, the former being the suggestion of 
Mr. Creed, the secretary of the London & Birmingham Railway. In addition 
the existing trade with Hull would be strengthened; this was a telling point 
as alrea~ there was the possibility of a third vessel being taken into 
regular service on that run. Finally, the Ely line would establish direot 
communication with London and near~ such with the midlands and north; 
north-east Norfolk would find ~nn as convenient a centre as Norwich. Best 
of all, these advantages would be gained without Wisbech deriving the 
slightest benefit. 
!il.. 
Before assessing the merits of these two viewpoints it is as well to 
establish that in fact ~nn had little if anything to fear from Wisbech as 
such. In this reference should first be made to the trading figures for 
~nn Harbour over the period in which Wisbech had been steadi~ improving 
its own trade. 
Iqnn Harbour Trade, 1831-1845 
Year Coals Imported Other Imports Ships registered Customs 
( tons) (tons) in wnn Receipts (£) 
1831 200,664 69,492 116 45,732 
1832 230,456 82,225 122 38,902 
1833 231,936 76,190 119 34,125 
1834 204,322 52,146 122 38,423 
1835 211,821 84,613 122 42,627 
1836 232,614 97,920 121 52,407 
1837 252,334 95,556 132 59,514-
1838 222,811 108,021 135 62,791 
1839 234,647 109,707 134 67,252 
1840 236,882 105,271 140 67,139 
1841 256,094 109,560 142 64,390 
1842 243,252 86,797 148 48,994 
1843 237,213 94-,390 14-7 4-0,741 
1844- 198,775 122,695 144- 61,306 
1845 302,463 14-1,935 157 62,253 ~-----
Source: W.Armes; The Port of King's ~nn, Appendix, p.56. 
N.B. 1. For the years 1831-184-0 Armes gives the coal imports in chaldrons; 
these have been taken as representing 25 cwt. each (see Appendix 
A) and converted according~. 
2. The rise in general imports after 1835 is largely to be attributed to 
the introduction of the bond system to Iornn, namely to three timber 
yards in 1832, to sugar and tea brought coastwise in 1835, and to all 
foreign imports save tobacco, tea and East India goods in 1837. 
3. During the period covered exports, mostly in the form of agricultural 
produce, averaged some 67,000 tons per annum (Admiralty Prelimina~ 
Inquiry into the Norfolk Estuary Bill; evidence of Armes, p.32.). 
The obvious conclusion to be drawn from these figures is that above all 
else Iornn's trade was essentially static, or as Armes described it in 
reference to the pre-railway days, "not buoyant, busy or very progressive, 
1 
but sluggish, uniform and almost stagnant". EspeCially does this become 
1 "t 14 Op.cJ. • p. • 
~-: 
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olear when it is remembered that1rhe town's population had risen ~ro. 13,370 
in 1831 to 16,039 in 1841, and that it was continuing to increase. 
Partioularly is the lll.Ok of progress made evident in the totals o~ imported 
ooa1s, in which the yearly averages over the three cycles o~ 1832-6, 1837-41 
and 1842-8 are, in tons, 222,354, 240,554 and 241,114 (ooa1 imports in 1846 
were 208,392 tons, in 1847 264,671, and in 1848 232,831) respeotively. The 
level o~ the trade m~ thus be seen to have been stea~, and the ~luotuations, 
• 
for the most part related to the general trade oyc1es, o~ little lasting 
significanoe. The drop of some 40,000 tons as between 1843 and '44 is 
surprising, but probably arose because maI\Y merchants allowed their stocks to 
run low in the hope that the 1845 budget would see the removal of the tax on 
exported ooal imposed in 1842. The ~aot that this hope was realised, the 
opening of the Norwioh & Brandon Railway and general prosperi~ would then 
account for the remarkable figure for 1845. General import s had reoei ved 8 
boost with the establishment o~ the bond system in Iqnn, thereafter remaining 
stea~ until the depression years of 1842 and 1843; reoover,y oame in 1~ 
largely beoause of the additional timber imported in connection with the 
railw~ oonstructions around Ely. The importance o~ this timber to 1(ynn is 
suggested by the sudden jump in customs receipts, timber being one of the few 
raw materials whioh Feel's budgets of 1842 and '45 left subject to such duty. 
The increased volume o~ timber entering the harbour oompensated for losses in 
other direotions, but in so doing underlined the precarious position of the 
town' s eoonomy. In partioular reference should be made to the importation 
of wines froll Portugal and Spain, down by 1845 to 1,000 pipes per annum 
(a pipe equals 105 gallons) or barely ha~ the amount once brought into the 
1 harbour, and to that o~ wines and beers ~rom the Netherlands, down to 
1 White's Norfolk Directory 1845, p.519. 
lt2. 
126,000 gallons in 1844 as opposed to 256,600 in 1771~ although in the latter 
case the increased number of ~nn's own breweries was a major factor involved, 
and in both cases hea~ falls had been in evidence long before Wisbech had 
begun to develop. 
Not o~ was there lack of evidence that Wisbech had done the harbour 
trade of IQnn azv harm, there was nothing to suggest that it ever would. 
Wisbech, a small market and harbour town on the Nene, was, with its 184l 
population of 8,530, onlY half the size of IQnn. As the Fens had been 
reclaimed and developed so its role as the exporter of its area's corn to 
both south and north had developed, and the town had certai~ increased in 
wealth and status, but it could do little to expand the extent of its 
influence because of the gross~ unsatisfacto~ state of the Nene channel. 
Prior to the 1830's o~ vessels of under 60 tons burthen had been able to 
reach the town, and on maqy occasions even these had been held ('neaped') 
2 
within a few miles of the harbour for periods as long as three weeks. A. 
a consequence Wisbech merchants of the time had frequent~ been obliged to 
adopt the extremely hazardous and costly expedient of unloading their goods 
at Sutton Wash, an exposed anchorage rendered doubly dangerous by the 
3 
extensive sandbanks there. It was little wonder that Wisbech was hardly 
known outside its immediate area, or that Bradshaw in one of his earlier 
editions should show the 'Forager', a vessel on the Hull to Wisbech run, 
under the heading of 'Foreign Sailings'~ 
1 R.J.Hillen: A History of the Borough of King's ~nn, NOrwich, 1907, p.539. 
2 N.Walker & T.Craddock: The History of Wisbech and. the Fens, Wisbech, 1849, 
. p.440. 
3 Walker & Craddock, op.cit., p.440. 
4 Gardiner: A History of Wisbech and Its Neighbourhood, 1848-1898, London 
and Wisbech, 1898, p.3. 
2.Q. 
The cause of ~nn's alarm, cleverly exploited to such good effect by 
Williams, was the strenuous efforts made under civic leadership during the 
1820's and '30's to improve the situation. In 1830 the new Nene Outfall 
Cut was opened to prevent further shifting of the channel, and between 1827 
and 1832 the straightening of the river above Kinderley's Cut so increased 
1 the tidal scour that the river bed at Wisbech was lowered a good ten feet. 
Other major improvements were the completion of the North Level Main Drain, 
further increa.sing scour and depth, and the construction of the Sutton Bridge 
Embankment which served to confine the upper stretch of the river to its 
proper course. B,y 1849 it could thus be written~ 
"(a vessel m~) ••• sail with the utmost regularity and may calculate 
on the passage from Wisbech to the sea offering no obstruction 
to her voyage. Besides, three voyages to Wakefield or London 
can now be performed in the time that two formerly required, or 
it m~ be nearer the truth to s~ two instead of one." 
Naturally a great increase of trade followed these various improvements, 
3 
until by 1865 the town could be described as the "port of Cambridgeshire". 
In 1829 only 55,040 tons of shipping had visited the harbour, but this rose 
to 63,180 tons in 1830, and continued to rise until in 1847 the total was 
4 167,443 tons. 
The principal imports in this trade were coals and timber, the Bole 
exports of signifioance corn and other agricultural produce. The river 
improvements and the development of the Fens had brought great increases in 
the latter especially, and in one period of eight days during 1843 no less 
than 10,000 quarters of corn had been Shipped from the harbour~ The total 
1 H.C.Darby: The Drainage of the Fens, Cambridge, 1956, p.202. 
2 Walker & Craddock, op.cit., p.464. 
3 W.White: Eastern England from the Thames to the Humber, London, 1865, p.257. 
4 Walker & Cradd.ock, op.cit., p.464. 
5 Gardiner, op.cit., p.l02. 
2! 
exports for that year suggest that the gap between ~nn and Wisbech was 
narrowing rapid~. 
Exports of Agricultural Produce in 1843 (in quarters): . 
Wisbech ~ Wisbech &.w. 
Wheat 95,220 120,304- Oats 5,337 
Barley 1,810 Peas 563 106 
1Ia.lt 50 Seeds (sacks) 3,280 5,733 
~e 44-3 Flour 36,672 
Source: F.N.Bacon: A Report on the Agriculture of Norfolk in 184.4.; 
London, 1845 p.127. 
It is true that Wisbech had certain advantages to offer. Because of a less 
costlY harbour service farmers were often able to obtain a better price from 
the dealers at Wisbech than at ~nn - a difference of ~- per quarter being 
quoted on occasion; A second advantage over ~nn was that the coal boats 
were utilised to carry the exports, a factor which enabled Wisbech merchants 
to send coals up-river at a considerable profit but still at a lower cost 
than Iunn coals. 
Under existing conditions, however, despite the loss of some of the 
Baltic timber trade, there was no real threat to ~nn. But while that town's 
harbour trade had remained relative~ static the visible results of Wisbech's 
gigantic efforts had excited alarm and jealousy, and it was these that 
Williams was enabled to exploit; that ~nn's trade had not declined, and that 
the rise of the former's was attributable above all else to the development 
of the Fens were factors that he naturallY ignored. By 1844., in geograph-
ical terms, Wisbech had expanded its markets to the utmost; the Ouse was an 
effective barrier to the east and it depended entirelY on the efforts made 
by ~nn to improve its harbour facilities as to whether or not Wisbech was 
1 ~nn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 30th March, 1844.; Armes at the 
Town Meeting of the 28th March. 
g 
enabled to intercept midland trade and nibble further at the edges of the 
former's preserves. Despite its own handicaps ~nn still possessed ever.y 
natural advantage over its rival, for even after the improvements that had 
been made the channel at Wisbech still remained comparatively poor and an 
impediment to the full ebb and flow of the tide: Further development of the 
harbour's capacity would have to be prefaoed by the deepening of the lower 
stretches of the Nene to 17', a similar deepening at Peterborough and the 
reduction of the river's course from there to Stone's End to a parabolio 
2 
curve. Sir John Rennie reported on these matters in 1844, but his 
suggestions were not implemented, presumably because the cost was quite 
h ObotO 3 pro J. :L J.ve. 
The conclusions from this evidenoe must be that as long as both towns 
obtained railway communication the balance between them would remain unohanged, 
provided that Iqnn made the neoessary efforts to improve its harbour 
facilities. But it was this latter consideration that constituted the fatal 
weakness in the argument for the Wisbech line, for the new markets foreseen by 
Self were entirely conditional on harbour and channel improvements which 
would of necessity take years to complete, and so involve a time lapse in 
whioh Iqnn might well be irretrievably ruined as a commercial centre by the 
railways a1rea~ under construction or planned around Ely. On the other 
hand the chronic failing in Williams' case for the Ely line was that he 
apparently visualised a future in whioh Iqnn would continue to be an important 
entrepot in north to south trade, and in which everything would be the same 
1 Miller & Skertcbly: 
1878, p.76. 
2 Ibid., p.201. 
The Fenland, Past and. Present; Wisbech 
3 Darby, op.cit., p.202. 
and. London, 
22.. 
except that his railway would have replaced the River Quae as the principal 
link with the interior; the possible e~~ects o~ other lines, particular~ 
of north to south trunk lines, were completely overlooked. However, as 
Williams' proposals offered immediate protection for existing markets and, 
provided harbour improvements were made, a basis ~or future expansion in 
the directions indicated by Self it m~ be said that in Cho~ing the E~ 
route the citizens o~ Iuml had, in difficult and confusing circumstances, 
made the better choice. 
Cha.pter 2 
"The Great Chance For All-
Section 1: A Golden Promise 
Essential~, the railway promoters of l~ were the products of a 
striking revival in national prosperity. They supplied the principal need 
of an expanding economy by turning the first fruits of it to their own and 
the national benefit. Long continued peace, Peel's free trade budgets and a 
series of good harvests were the causative and sustaining factors behind the 
r 
remarkable growth of both internal and foreign trade after 1842. 
r 
Abroad, the 
contiDent was sharing the boom, and British trade benefited according~; 
trade with the U.S.A. jumped from an annual value of £3.5m. in 184.2 to £7.9m. 
1 in l~ following the settlement of vexatious bound~ disputes, and 
consequent~ friendlier relations and improved credit facilities; in the 
same period, trade with Asia, aided by the new markets gained at the Treaty 
2 
of Nanking (1842), increased from £7. 5m. to £11.3m. At home, as a re suIt of' 
these various factors, bullion reserves in the Bank of England rose from 
3 £8.3m. in 1842 to £l5.4m. in IBL.4, the money rate dropped to a mere 2~ in 
the September of this latter year, and 3% Consols were quoted a.bove par for 
the first time since the Seven Years War. None could remember a longer 
4-
contimlance of cheap money, which, by 1844, had persisted for two years. As 
domestio industry was, by and large, already sound~ financed5 so that 
profitable fields of investment were laoking~ it was largely inevitable that 
1 Geyer, Rostow &: Schwartz: The Growth &: Fluctuation of the British Economy 
1790-1850, Oxford 1953, p.3l5 and quoting Tooke, IV, p.55. 
2 Ibid. p.314. 
3 Ibid. 
4- D.Morier Evans: The Commercial Crisis 1847 &: 1848; London 1849, p.l. 
S G~er, Rostow &: Sohwartz, op.cit. p.3l6. 
6 D.Morier Evans, op.cit. p.3. 
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the rapidly accumulating volume of unemployed capital should be applied to 
the further extension of the railw~ network~ 
Railway investment had much to recommend it. Above all it seemed to be 
unusuallY profitable. When the stockton & Darlington paid a 15% dividend for 
1843, and the London & Birmingham, the Grand Junction and the York & North 
Midland all paid 10%, the "desire and hope for dividends of 10 to 15% instead 
2 
of the accustomed 3 to ~" were planted in ma~ breasts. Misleading alld 
incomplete traffic statistics (for such they were before the Regulating Act of 
1844 enforced some degree of scientific order in them) could now be recruited 
indefinitelY to stimulate a growing public interest. For example, there 
could be adduced the 4,000,% traffic increase achieved by the Stockton & 
Darlington line in its first nine years~ the fact that the amount of 
travelling done in the kingdom had doubled within the last 25 years4 
(Parliament was already permitting promoters to include a 100% increase on 
existing passenger conditions in their estimates), the steady rise of receipts 
per railway mile to the 1843 level of £2,234 per annum~ and countless other 
similar examples. Disturbing figures, the small dividends of dubious origin 
paid by the Eastern Counties and the 50% working expenses of that line for 
example, were now increasingly overlooked or dismissed on grounds of bad 
management or mistaken estimates which need not be repeated in future 
enterprises. 
1 See Hansard 1844, lxxii, p.233 for Gladstone's expression of this view. 
2 J.Morrison: The Influence of English Railway Legislation on Trade and 
Industry; London 1848, p.72. 
3 Eastern Counties Railw~ Prospectus, 1834. 
4 Francis, op.cit. Vol.2, p.136. 
5 H.G.Lewin: The Railway Mania & Its Aftermath 1645-52, London 1936, p.114. 
2.§. 
Grounds, other than the mere expectation of profit, on which the 
strengthening impulse towards railw~ investment could be rationalised were 
mal.\Y and varied. Having been "so frequently checked, thwarted and mortified" 
in individual ventures, the British investor welcomed the opportunit,y of 
enterprise in the safety of association~ Foreign investment had alw~s been 
attended by an element of risk, but here was a chance to keep the investment 
under one's own eye and know it to be safe from defaloation or political 
upheaval, and at the same time to have the satisfaction of knowing that 
capital produced in this country was being absorbed here in creating roads 
and fuller empla,yment, and in the stimulation of the national econo~. 
Moreover, a railw~ was not subject to the risk of premature exhaustion (as 
were, for example, mines) and as it embraced all sections of the econo~ a 
seotional recession need not be serious to the railw~ investor. 
Also to be considered was the generally favourable history of railw~ 
investment in this country, a history marred by few bitter memories. The 
boom of 1836 had never reached fever heat (no matter what its contemporaries 
m~ have thought) and the subsequent reaction, in which railwB\Y share 
quotations sank no lower than the 79.~ of M~ 1839 (this taking June 1~0 as 
100), had ruined few. Confidence had never rea~ been completelY lost after 
1836; rather had there been a reluctance to advance further capital until the 
new~ authorised lines had proved their worth. Thus, additional capital 
sought by the companies to ensure completion had, because of the growing 
interval between their authorisation and realisation and the general shortage 
1 G~er, Rostow & Schwartz, op.cit. p.3l6, fn.l, in quoting from a Circular 
to Bankers which commented on the marked tendency of British cauitalists 
to combine during periods of recovery from depression; at this time joint 
stock companies, other than railw~s, were few in ID.lJD.ber. 
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of available capital, frequent~ to be raised in the form of preference 
shares - at guarantees of as much as ~ on occasions! When such were 
honoured in p~ent of dividend a further cause for confidence was established. 
In general terms, by 1843, 15 of the 23 com)anies sanctioned in 1836 had been 
completed in their entirety, 1 partially so, and 3 in s modified form; o~ 
2 ~ had been tota~ abandoned. The shares of 13 of these stood below par -
stock which had cost £l8m. being current~ valued at £ll~~ - but even these 
were following a rising trend am were soon to be carried to a premium. One 
may safely agree with a contemporary who wrote that to this point railways 
were "an investment into which men entrusted the savings of their lives and 
~ had not been betrayed". Unfortunate~, however, the probity and business 
aoumen of the railway pioneers in general, and of the 'Liverpool Party' in 
particular, which had contributed so largely to this happy situation had also 
tended to obscure from the public vision the countless pitfalls which 
encumbered railway enterprise, and the maDiY' opportunities it offered to the 
rogue. 
Rapidly the view obtaining between 1836 and 1~2 that the country 
alrea~ possessed all the lines that its econo~ could support5(with the 
allowed exceptions of a few feeder branches and light railways in careful~ 
6 
selected agricu~tural district) lost ground. PUblic judgement endowed 
railways with all economio virtues and now represented the existing network as 
a mere skeleton; the standards of the more successful companies came to be 
accepted as the norm, and proposals for new lines were increasing~ regarded 
not so much according to their own particular merits but rather in general 
1 G.H.Evans: British Corporation Finance 1775-1850: A Study in Preference 
Share~, Balt~ore 1936, p.9l. 3 4. 
2 Franc~s, 0p.c1t.Vol.2, p.34. Ibid. Ib1d. op.cit.Vol.l, p.138. 
5 Cf.Francis, op.cit.Vol.l, p.132 and Morrison, op.cit. p.16. 
6 Railway Times, November 1836. 
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and flattering terms. Fundamentally, this revolution in attitude was a 
matter of changing economic circumstances. In 1836 depression was imminent 
and men were alarmed at the vastness of the capital committed and yet to be 
called; in the years of 1~3 to 1~5 the lines of 1836 were seen to be 
complete, rai1w~s had proved themselves in eve~ particular, there was 
capital to spare and men were enjoying that light headed reaction which 
followed escape from long and deep depression. The government singularly 
failed to recognise the symptoms or to apply the brake to the quickening 
enthusiasm which was alre~ in 1844 hastening to excess. Addicted to a 
policy of 1aisser faire, fea.rful of interfering with the free flow of capital 
and influenced by the view that "if you interfere by legislation you take 
some of the responsibilit,y from the railway companies and assume it 
1 yourselves", the government contented itself with ineffectual dabs at the 
loopholes in the system of compa~ incorporation. Its chief fault l~ in 
failing to place a restraint on compa~ dividends. For years James 
Morrison had expostUlated in vain that to suffer companies to pay high 
dividends as if subject to no restraint (theoretically, rates should have 
been reduced after a lQ% dividend had been paid, but in practice this limit 
could easily be evaded) was not to give a boost to legitimate enterprise but 
a licence to the most extravagant specu1ation~ This had been Morrison's 
theme sinoe 1836; at first he had been told that his proposed bill for 
establishing control over the rai1w~ oompanies was unnecessary as no further 
lines could p~3_ now he was ignored because he was out of tune with the 
times. With the emasou1ation of Gladstone's 'Railway Plunder Bill' in 1844 
1 Sir Robert Peel quoted by Francis, op.oit. Vo1.2, p.40. 
2 Morrison, op.cit. p.4. 
3 Ibid. p.16. 
22. 
by the railw~ M.P.s alrea~ in the Commons the principle of control was 
1 final~ renounced, and promoters were given a carte blanche to promise the 
earth. 
A table best illustrates the various features and trends described in 
the previous paragraphs; in particular m~ be discerned the rapid development 
of confidence which coincided not o~ with the onset of prosperi~ but 
also the demonstration of proven worth by the established companies after 
1842. The high proportion of preference shares for 1843 and '44 is 
explicable on the grounds that a full year usual~ lapsed between the 
issue of a compaI\Y' prospectus and. the sanctioning of its bill - thus the 
lines authorised in 1843 were conoeived in 1842 while the depression still 
obtained; those of 1844 similarly refer back to 1843 when the wave of 
prosperit,y was still o~ in its formative stages - moreover, nearlY one 
sixth of the preference shares of that year relate to the special oontext 
of the Eastern Counties Railway which will be considered at a later stage. 
1 A list of the prinoipal acts affecting railw~s for the period of 1830 
to 1845 emphasises just how little interference there was in the affairs 
of the railway oompanies: 
11 Geo.IV & Will.IV.cap.68 1830: protection of carriers against loss of, 
or inju~ to merchandise. 
7 Will.IV & 1 Vict. cap 83 1837: to make clerks accept documents etc. as 
laid down in other acts. 
1 & 2 Vict.cap.80 1838: to enforce the p~ent of special constables by 
companies engaged on public works. 
1 & 2 Vict.cap.98 1838: concerning the carriage of mails by rail. 
3 & 4 Vict.cap.97 1840:and 5 & 6 Vict.cap.55 1842: these Railw~ 
Regulation Acts were principally concerned with 
matters of safety. They empowered the Board of 
Trade to appoint inspectors whose approval had 
to be obtained before 8. new line was opened, and 
who were to report on railw~ accidents. 
5 & 6 Vict.cap.79 1842: Passenger Duties Act. 
7 & 8 Vict.cap.85 1844: Gladstone's Act. 
This latter act gave the government powers to purchase a line after 21 
years, but it applied o~ to new lines and was considerablY less in its 
scope than Gladstone had originally intended. 
--~----.--.--
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The share index and the number or-new lines planned are muoh more reliable 
gauges of the pub1io attitude to railway investment. 
A Table to illustrate the salient features in railway enterprise between 
18,26 and 1842: 
Year Capital % of Pref. Rly.Share Miles New Extensions, 
Authorised shares in Index June sanc- lines alterations 
" whole '40: 100 tioned eto. ~
.1836 22,874,998 111.1 955 29 
1837 13,521,799 3 81.4 543 15 
1838 2,096,198 7 91.4 49 2 17 
1839 6,455,797 15 79.9 54 3 24 
1840 2,495,032 31 86.4 24 
1841 3,410,686 27 83.8 14- 1 18 
1842 5,311,642 28 89.4 55 4 18 
1843 3,861,350 35 98.2 90 5 19 
1844- 20,454,000 32 121.3 805 26 22 
1845 59,479,000 4 149 2,861 76 44 
Souroes: Principal~ Lewin, Gayer,Rostow & Schwartz, G.H.Evans and R.C.O. 
Matthews (. A study in Trade Cyo1e History, Economio Fluotuations 
in Great Britain 1833-42' Cambridge, 1954) 
N.B. 1. To capital authorised m~ be added one third in respeot of 
Companies' borrowing powers. 
2. Capital authorised represents intended expenditure; for a variety 
of reasons it might not all be oa11ed (of. Matthews, op.oit. p.121). 
Pub1io opinion fU1~ endorsed and encouraged the revived interest in 
railw~ investment. Long out of patience with expensive turnpikes (railw~s 
built their own roads), intolerant of the slow, costly and unoomfortab1e 
ooaohes and the monopo1istio and unreliable services offered by oana1 and 
river navigation interests, it was now fired by a "quickening desire for 
1 looomotion". Irrational objeotions long having been disposed of, the ear~ 
1840s saw the rai1w~s remove the final reservations in the pub1io mind. 
They, for example, proved themselves safe. Queen Viotoria entrusted herself 
to a train in 1842, a matter of some importance in the formation of publio 
opinion, and the following year witnessed only three fatalities although some 
1 H.Scrivenor: The Ra.i1w~s of the United Kingdom Statistioa1ly Considered, 
London 1849, p. 23 • 
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330,000,000 passenger miles were travelled. Railways also proved themselves 
fast, cheap and reliable; in 1842 the average speed of all British trains over 
. found to be 21~ m.p.h. 2(to b d . the1r journeys was, e oompare w~th the ver,y 
uneoonomioal 1~12 m.p.h. over short stretohes by the ver,y best road ooaches), 
and in 1~3 the average fare per mile over all olasses worked out at no more 
than l~~ (a figure to be oompared with the Sd. to 10d. oommon on ooaches, 
and quite apart from the tips and meals involved in travelling by road). 
So obvious were the powers and potentialities of railways beooming that no 
town or trading oommunity felt itself to be able to do without them. 
But, as the number of projects multiplied apace, the publio at large 
found itself enabled to do far more than merely encourage. Motivated by 
greed and oonvinoed that everyone conneoted with railways must have made 
money~ fortified by their own oredulit,y and urged on by press, pulpit and 
mutual example, thousands crept through the gaping loopholes within the law 
to beoome praotical participants in a national frenzy. Com')a.nies had few 
praotical means of cheoking on the baokgrounds of applioants for their shares 
(often the respectability or otherwise of the handwriting was the only 
criterion) so that the possession of aotual assets ceased to be the qualifi-
oation allowing of speculation. The root of the evil, for such it inevitab~ 
became, was of course the negotiable character of the letters of allocation 
(from compa.I\Y to applicant) which changed hands at aI\Ything between 1/- and 
3/- per share and often more, and. of sorip issue which, in its practical 
effects, had few virtues but all the vices of an uncontrolled issue of 
currenoy. The most prudent were tempted by the prospeot of a quick profit 
1 Franois, op.cit. Vol.l, p.136. 
2 W.ld.Acworth: The Railways of England; London 1889, p.30 in quoting from 
the 1~3 Report of the Statistical Society. 
3 Francis, op.cit. Vol.2, p.137. 
4 D.Morier Evans, op.cit. p.ll. 
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with little attached risk, and the most suspicious were drawn in when a 
practice of canal d~s, that of paying interest on calls, was revived; in 
1847, when Parliament belatedly prohibited this vicious practice, 94 companies 
had adopted it A.nd an annual swn of .£1,007,86lt. interest was involved! To 
add fuel to the excitement were the drama of the committee rooms and the 
uncertaint,y of decisions there; to minister to it were the mushroom growth of 
railw~ journals of which 20 flourished during the Mania period as opposed to 
3 before and 5 after, the multitude of la~ers who could not lose whatever 
transpired, and the 'jackals' who were willing to car~ on the business of 
the Stock Exchange at a~ time or in aqy place. Once again the government 
waS completely ineffectual. It had done little to prevent the Mania, and 
what it had done was often ill A.dvised or too late; as for the Parliament~ 
committees, even when making allowance for the mass of business before them, 
they were genera~ consistent o~ in their inconsistency, an example of 
which is that 6 bills were approved in 1845 on the same evidence that had 
caused their rejection in 1844; further, not the least of the causes of the 
Mania was that companies were obliged to promote branches in self defenoe as 
they just did not know whether competition was the rule or not. But, in the 
short view, events were entirely favourable to the promoter, who was enabled 
to procure the 7~ guaranteed subscription and the ~ deposit, required by 
standing Orders before a bill could come before Parliament, without diffiou1ty. 
The bitter harvest was as yet unforeseen; this indeed was "the great chance 
2 
for all". 
1 Sorivenor: pp45f. in quoting from a House of Lords Paper for 1848. For 
fuller discussion of this matter in oonnection with the E & H Railway see 
below. 
2 D.Morier Evans, op.cit. p.6. 
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The various factors suggested above had a particular significance to 
such as Williams in that the new enthusiasm transcended the old objections to 
railw~s other than those associated with dense populations and high 
industrial development. To this time, the absence of indust~ of more than 
local significance and the scattered nature of the population; coupled with 
the presence of strong~ entrenched coastal and river navigation interests, 
had militated against railw~ development in East Anglia. Projects had not 
been laoking in 1836, but these had general~ failed to seoure the requisite 
finanoia1 backing. Of the 2,235 miles of railway open to traffic at the 
beginning of 1~5 East Anglia's share was a mere 107t, and of this total 
Norfolk could boast no more than the 2~ miles of the recent~ opened Norwioh 
& Yarmouth line. The fortunes of the so often unjust~ maligned Eastern 
Counties Rai1w~, "whose profits were ever in inverse proportion to its 
2 promises", seemingly justified the re1uotance to invest in the area. 
Authorised in 1836 to build from London to Norwioh on a oapita1 of £1,500,000, 
this oompaIlY expended £1,631,000 and eight years in getting onlJ as far as 
Co1ohester (51% miles); its dividends were understandably meagre, its working 
oosts over 50.% of its revenue, its shareholders and direotors frequently at 
loggerheads, and its services the most roundly abused in the country. The 
ba1anoe of mileage in the area of East Ang1ia was provided by the Northern & 
Eastern CompaIlY, also sanctioned in 1836. This concern was in little better 
shape than its fellow, for its mainline extended o~ as far as Bishops 
stortford on its intended w~ from London to Cambridge. Its prospeots of 
ever reaching Cambridge had seemed remote until the Eastern Counties Compa~, 
1 Norwioh, wi. th an 1841 population of 62,344, was the only really large 
oentre in East Ang1ia, but was only the 13th city of the kingdom. Its 
textile indust~ was in a state of arrested decline, now concentrating 
on quality goods and aided by a revival in looa1 flax growing. 
2 Francis, op.cit.Vo1.2, p.134o 
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having taken it on lease as from the 1st January 1~, adopted it as the 
basis for its own extensions. 
During 1844., as indicated, popular favour came to smile on even the 
Eastern Counties Railway, and therefore, by implication, on rural lines in 
general. If the E.C.R. was able to raise £960,000 for its Norwich and 
Peterborough lines and secure the approval of its long suffering shareholders 
to the raising of a similar amount for its intended Lincoln line, Williams 
could regard the prospects of his own capital issue with ever,y confidence. 
For the sake of perspective, however, it is desirable to note at this point 
that even at the height of the Mania, May 1~5, the shares of agricultural 
lines did not genera1~ attain to the premiums enjoyed ~ those of more 
favoured concerns; thus E.C.R. shares, £l4I16 called, reached no higher than 
£22, whereas £f30 paid shares of the Great Western attained a value of £210, 
and the £50 units of the York &: North Midland one of £118. 
It may be said that awaiting Williams was an abundance of wealth and 
enthusiasm and that his principal task was to dress up his project in the most 
acceptable and attractive manner possible. This was so, but the ver,y 
advantages of 1844.15 made inevitable ma~ grave problems for the future. 
The profusion of schemes implied for the ve~ near future a high premium on 
the services of ever,y kind of railway specialist, and a certain rise in the 
prices of iron and other raw materials; the willingness of the count~ to 
invest was producing a serious over-stretching of the countr,y's capital 
resources. An easy birth seemed 1ike~, but it was to be followed by a 
perilous infancy filled with dangers in which ma~ of necessity would perish. 
A wise promoter would perhaps have reckoned on such factors, but, in fact, the 
vast majorit,y, including Williams, persisted in acting and calculating as if 
the particular railway of each was alone in the field. 
§2 
Section 2: The Lynn & Ely Railw& 
A. The Launching of the CompaA¥' 
Inertia having been overcome, and strong leadership evidenced, King I S Lynn 
and neighbourhood rallied to Williams with an abundance of both vooal and 
financial support, although, for maqy, the latter was intended as no more than 
a pleasant short term speculation. There was no need for the inaoourate 
alarmism of a Mr. Blythe, that Iqnn was the only place in the kingdom of 
commensurate size and commercial importance that did not have the advantages of 
railway communication1 on the contrary, the citizens of the town had become 
2 
only too acutely aware of the dangers of being "somewhat stationary", and of 
the necessity for exertion to avoid realising by experience "the sad effects 
arising from sUPineness"~ A "numerous and highly respectablen4ga.thering of 
500 at a County Meeting of the 23rd April, under the chairmanship of Folkes and 
representative of both town and county interests, pledged itself unanimously to 
"support by every means in its power" the Iqnn & Ely Railway Compa~? Amply 
reassured by the re spectabili ty of the compaI\Y I s agent s and bankers, by 
Williams' assurance that liability was limited6(it was not mentioned that this 
did not apply until after the Act of Incorporation had been obtained), by a 
promise that calls would not be more than £5 per share and at least two months 
apart, ~nn and the gentry of the surrounding countryside lent freely of their 
purses to a project that, while "not a goldmine" , offered a 5% return as a 
certainty and lCYJ"b as a "fair promise"? 
1 lq'nn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 27th April 1844. 
2 Ibid. Folkes' re~arks from the ChaiS· 6 3 Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. 
7 Williams on the 23rd April. 
,-
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The prospectus, inviting Siibscription to a capital of £200,000, 
1 
appeared on the 20th April. A notice of the 11th May was able to announce 
2 the closing date for applications as being the 31st of the same month, 
although, in fact, the lists were fina1~ closed on the 25th May3as applica-
tions received were already fourfold in excess of those required~ A further 
notice of the 15th June stated that one third of the capital had been 
subscribed in Iqnn itself, and that ma~ had inevitabJ,y been disappointed in 
the a11ocation1 it is probable that at least a further third had been taken 
up by the 1amowners of western Norfolk and the Fenlands, a possibility 
suggested by Williams' claim that the members of the Provisional Committee, 
comprising some 43 members of which 35 were luminaries of ~nn and district~ 
7 
were investors "to a large extent". Be this as it may, the money which 
launched the Iurnn & E~ was not the money which carried it to completion and, 
for the most part, was never intended by the subscribers to be so. The 
almost dailY quotations for L & E shares on the London and Liverpool 
exchanges prior to August, 1845 indica.te an intense traffic in share transfers. 
It appears that a majority of the initial subscribers were engaged in the 
profitable practice of obtaining unregistered scrip, that "paper money •••• of 
"t" ,,8 ~,I the most tras~ descr1p 10n , at a cost of only the ~5 deposit per share, 
making a quick sale at a premium (virtua1~ guaranteed by the circumstances 
of the time), and then leaving the permanent financial bacldng of the line 
to other sources. 
1 A cop,y is retained in the Norwich Castle Museum. 
2 ~nn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald. 
3 Herapath's Rai1w~ & Commercial Journal, 25th May, 1844., p.591. 
4- lbid. 15th June, 1844, p.676. 
5 ~nn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald. • 
6 For the full list see Appendix C. 
7 Williams on the 23rd April. 
8 Select Committee on Rai1w~ & Canal Amalgamation 185413; P.P. 1852-3/xxxviii; 
question 3338, evidence of J.Hawkshaw C.E. 
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The situation was ironic. From the first Williams had insisted upon 
the necessity of strong local support to attract that balance of capital 
which the area itself could not provide; in particular he had had London and 
1 
Lancashire in mind. Equally so he had sought to exclude the pure speculator, 
an end to which all traffic estimates and promises as to likely return on 
capital had been made deliberate~ moderate~ What he had apparently not 
anticipated was speculation so near home, although a quick profit, the 
escape from risk and the sitting back to await the saving benefits of the 
railw~ was an approach fully to be expected in view of the past record of 
-the Iqnn mercantile community. Events justified the speculation. The 
initial quotation on L & E shares, during the third week in August 1844, was 
3 £2/17/6 on £1/5 paid; within ten days the figure stood at £Aj17/6. Just who 
the purchasers of the L & E shares were is an obscure problem, and one that 
be dealt with in section 6 below. 
B. The Rai1wgY in the Local View 
The immediate question is why the moneyed classes of the area were so 
ver,y anxious that a rai1w~ should be built for them. The salting of the 
mine, for this is fundamental~ what the initial local investment was, may 
partially be explained in terms of simple speculative greed, but in fa.ct, the 
reasons lay much deeper and were closely related to the everyday economic 
problems of the area. In ~nn itself the state of trade and the desire for 
4 
"fair competition with the country at large" were the root factors involved; 
the pleasure of striking an oblique blow at the Corporation and the 
excitement of being concerned in stirring events are further elements to be 
1 Williams on the 23rd April. 
2 Folkes at the County Meeting of the 23rd April. 
3 WeeklY quotation lists in the Railway Times. 
4 Blythe in proposing the resolution in favour of the line on the 23rd April. 
~ 
discerned. So much has already been explained, but the nature of the 
attendance at the County Meeting, the status of the 395 petitioners who 
sought it; and the composition of the Provisional Committee all clear~ 
indicate that the landowning community had also developed a vital interest 
in the line. 
Now, the landowners of western Norfolk and the Fens were not enjoying a 
happ'y time at this period, and in all probability had little capital to spare. 
Brief~ stated, the situation was that the landowning classes had taken 
advantage of the palmy conditions of the Napoleonic Wars to adopt a higher 
standard of living than they had ever experienced before; at the same time 
they increased their personal commitments in relation to their lands and 
2 houses and also in the provision of liberal annuities to their dependents. 
With the return of peace, and of normality in agricultural conditions, the,y 
had been found both unwilling and unable to surrender their new style of life. 
Years of intermittent dispute over the question of rentals had followed 
between landlord and tenant, the outcome of which was that neither side was 
satisfied with the situation. Ma~ estates changed hands and ma~ tenant 
farmers gave up their leases. The problem was further accentuated in the 
ear~ 1840s by the onset of a long continued depression in wheat prices, 
during which the average 66/4 per qua.rter of 1839 became the 50/1, 51/3 and 
50/10 of 1842, '43 and '44 respective~~ The average wheat price obtained 
4 
in lQnn during 1843 was even lower at only 47/10 per quarter. The loss to 
landowner and tenant farmer alike was only part~ offset by increased 
1 Iqnn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 20th April, 1844 for the full list. 
2 L.M.Springall: Labouring Life in Norfolk Villages 1834-1914, London 1936, 
p.21. 
3 Rev.H.K1tton: Statistical Tables Illustrative of the Receiots and 
Expenditure of the Norfolk County Rate, Norwich 1856, Tabl~ 85, p.105. 
The figures, supplied by a Norwich firm, refer to local conditions. 
4 White's Norfolk Directory 1845, p.523. 
Corrections line 15,page 69 
land had to pay Income and Property Tax on an assessment (1842) of 
£1,954,588, 
~ 
productivity and should be considered against the deb.ils of the v~ious 
financial burdens supporteu. by these cla33es. 
Most serious of all was the rising Poor Rate which reflected the 
deoressed wage level of A.Gricultural labourers r"g '", result of the f011 in 
corn 9rices and the high rentals paid by tenant f:lrmers~ Excluding the four 
boroughs, Norfolk Poor Law expenditure totalled £184,114 in 184-2 and £188,964 
2 
in 134-3, fisures in line with a rising trend which had continuel since 1840. 
Roughly one in twelve of the 1841 popul<_tion :)f ~12 ,664 was in receipt of 
relief - in 1842 6,889, in 1843 7,817 cases of indoor relief being recorded, 
together with 29,987 and 2~,8J+9 instances of oute.oor relief f:)r the :>ame 
years respectivelY? The figures for the first qu~rter :)f 1844 ~ere showing 
an ominous rise over those for the cl)(','esponding ;)erio,i of the previous year, 
namelY 10,~50 c:tses of relief as opposed to 9,098~ In addition, against a 
5 gross estimated rental of £1,778,422 as found by the tenants, the owners of 
18_ .. ail h f1Dd: Q,9,.,;Sii ~ .. .... e l'.M p",e..,. ;_ 6(8e 8s8eseee. ill 18l.2) 
n.nd .£49 ,856/12/1~ in church and county ra.tes (the former standing at 
.£8,3~8/16/10:i) in 1843~ the latter fisure representing a rise of some £15,000 
in only three years, :md being largeJ..y attributable to increased expemiture 
00 roads and police. Tithes were also he"vy, being levied at rates 
avcl'il3iIlB 6/6 per acre per UnllUIQ in the CAse of cultivated Ipoo, am 2/5'1 in 
8 
that of pasture; cxc.mples could be quoted of good. lend being taken out of 
cu1tivction because of thiR discrepancy? Most of the above relntes 
1 For fuller details see Chapter 3. 
2 Tenth Annual Report of the Poor Law Commissioners 1843, App.C, p.362. 
3 Ibid. App.B, p.272. 
4 Eleventh Anllur:l Report of the Poor Law6Commissionel-s 1344, ADp.B,no.2, p.167 5 'Nhite, op.cit. p.14. Ibid. 
7 Accounts & Pnpers 1846 (16) xl; AbstrRct of Returns Relative to Rates for 
the year ending the 30th September, 1,').' .. 3. 
8 R.N.BfI-coo: Report on the Agriculture of Norfolk, London 1844, p.78. 
9 Ibid. 
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specifically to Norfolk farmers and. landowners, but much the same situation 
obtained in the Fens, where there was also the hea~ burden of mortgages on 
1 
recently reclaimed lands to be shouldered by ma.qy f'armers. 
Railways of'fered relief in four main ways. Their ability to check the 
"overwhelming evil" of the Poor Rates~y the creation of' employment was still 
unquestioned; they would obviously reduce transport costs3and generally 
stimulate the econo~ of' the whole area; above all they would assist in the 
movement of livestock to the London markets. The principal reaction of 
Norfolk farmers to the situation described above had been to turn 
increasingly to a mixed econo~, a movement a.ccentuated by the developing 
practice of sending midland livestock into the county for fattening before 
despatch to the London meat markets. ~nn market statistics reflected this 
trend; whereas in 1836 22,180 sheep and 10,435 bullocks had been sold, the 
corresponding figures for 1842 were 53,665 and 16,363 respective1y~ Similar 
evidence is provided by the activities of Mr. Hudson of Castleacre, a 
principal tenant of the Earl of Leicester and a strong supporter of the 
railway. Between 1822 and 1844 he had not only doubled his crop yield but 
also increased the number of his cattle f'rom 30 to 200, and that of' his 
5 
sheep from 500 to between 2,500 and 3,000. 
The great majority of the livestock so raised found its way to the 
London markets. A Mr. Shank computed that on the 12th February 1844 
1 J. Caird: English Agriculture in 1850-1851; London 1852, P .184. 
2 So described in the Eastern Counties Railw~ Prospectus of 1834. 
3 'Shareholder' (~~ Adv7rtiser & West Norfolk Herald, 22nd March, 1845) 
calculated the savl.ngs l.n wage s, horse keeping and wear on cart s as being 
some £25 per 100 acres per annum. 
4 Bacon, op.cit. p.126. 
5 Barugh Almack: A Report on the Agriculture of' Norfolk presented to the 
Royal ~ricultural Society and print7d in seri~l form in the ~nn Advertl.ser & West Norf'olk Herald durl.Dg 1845, l.n this case the 19th April. 
11:. 
910 of 2,698 beasts and 3,065 of 20,219 sheep on sale at Smithfield were from 
Norfolk; on the 26th of the same month the county provided 1,021 .of the 2,300 
beasts on view; in each case between 16 and 20 counties shared the balance: 
The totals to be handled in Iqnn en route to London were cEl.lculated with 
confidence as a minimum of 350 beasts per week for 21 weeks of the year, and 
2,500 sheep per week all the year round; these figures took no account of the 
unknown number like~ to join the line at Downham and other stations en route 
2 
to El3r. In addition large numbers of pigs and poultry were annuall3r 
despatched from ~nn to London as well as a substantial quanti~ of dead meat. 
The great advantage to be gained by the farmers was the elimination of the 14 
day drove from Norfolk which usuall3r served to reduce the animals to a 
wretched condition; this was not o~ a source of direct loss, but also a ba~ 
on efficiency, in that means of fe.ttening sheep in 14 instead of 20 weeks 
could not be ful~ utilised as the animals were too immature to withstand the 
3 hardships of the road. A further advantage to be gained was that hitherto 
inferior pasture could be put to profitable use once the p~sical stamina of 
the beasts became a matter of lesser consequence. Anticipation along these 
lines proved well founded. In 1850 Hudson reported that the railways were 
saving him £600 per annum; the substitution of a 12 hour journey for a 12 to 
14 d~ drove had resulted in a saving of some 281bs. in the weight of each 
bullock and 71bs. (including 31bs. inside fat) in each sheep~ 
Besides these matters of fundamental importance the desire of the area 
for railways m~ be a.ttributed also to a number of lesser factors. The 1844 
1 Barugh Almack: A Report on the Agriculture of Norfolk presented to the 
Royal Agricultural Society and printed in serial form in the Lynn 
Advertiser &: West Norfolk Herald during 1845, in this case the 1 Jth April. 
2 L & E prospectus. For the basis of this computation see chapter 3 below 
3 Mr. Hammond, a leading Norfolk farmer, on the 23rd April. ~ • 
4 Caird, op.cit. p.169. 
1J:.. 1 
coach took 12 hours between ~nn and London. A railway would mean that a 
business trip to the city took only one and not three days, and this in 
padded comf'ort free from that "indescribable numbness a.bout the knees and 
joints which it was impossible to shake off by a~ change of posture"2whioh 
attended slow and expensive road travel. Freight took two days to cover the 
same road, with an overnight stop at Cambridge~ while cerriers' carts at their 
best could cover no more than 24 miles in a day~ The alternative to the road 
was to re~ on one of the score or so small boats which plied between ~nn and 
London on their 36 hour journey, but these services were often unreliable and 
disrupted by the weather. A third alternative towards London and the south 
was to make use of the Cuse as far ~s Ely, but this was to suffer from 
monopolistic rates and a slow and uncertain journey. Northwards to Hull the 
area relied perforce on the six "lumbering sloopsn5of the monopolistic ~nn 
Wharfingers and Shipping Agents - of this service it was said that it could 
6 
cost more to send goods from Iqnn to Hull than trom Liverpool to New York. 
The L & E railway offered the prospect of getting the passenger from 
~nn into London in 4* hours at a rate of no more than 3d. per mile, first 
class, and to carry his merchandise at comparable speed and cost. One Iunn 
shipowner, W.Clifton, saw the writing on the wall, and as ear~ as the Janu8~ 
of 1844 began cutting his rates dramatical~ - sheep could now be carried from 
~nn to London at no more than 1/6 per head, and caresses not on~ carried but 
also delivered at the market for an inclusive charge of ~- per cwt? But cut 
1 J.J.Coulton: Recollections of Iqnn; ~nn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 
20th November, 1880. 
2 Rev.W.E.Dickson: Railw~s and Locomotion, London 1854, p.2l. 3 Coulton. 
4 Railway Economy: D.Lardner, London 1850, p.35. 
5 Armes: Lecture of 1858. 
6 R.J.Hillen: A History of the Borough of King's Lynn, Norwich 1907 p.604. 
7 Advertised in the IQrnn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald on the 2nd and 
30th January, 1844. 
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as he might he could never compete in speed. On the other hp-nd the river 
interests and the carriers continued in their old ways, although the former 
might plead that they needed money to ensure the safety against flood of the 
river banks, and the latter probab~ could not have cut their rates without 
incurring loss. The result, however, was clear. Coals which cost 20/- per 
ton in ~nn were at 40/- in some inland districts and so remained "a positive 
luxury quite unobtainable by the poorer classes" which were n sent to bed 
1 
shivering for lack of fuel". In this latter respect there was the prospect 
of a much expanded trade for the numerous ~nn coal merchants. 
C. The Original Plan 
And what of the actual railw~ which was expected to achieve so much? 
2 Selected by Rastrick, in itself a guarantee, and so "admirably suited to meet 
3 . the wants of the landed proprietors and inhabitants of West Norfolk", the l~ne 
was to be 26 miles in length with a branch to ~nn harbour; the terminus at 
~nn was initial~ intended to be near the South Gates on the outskirts of the 
4-town, that at Ely was still a matter for negotiation with the Eastern Counties 
Compal\V. It had the "full sanction,,50f the E.C.R., and the landowners were 
6 
unanimously in favour. No engineering difficulties were anticipated, no 
tunnels were required, the terrain was flat, no private parks were to be 
violated and only two cottages were to be taken. "Responsible contractors"? 
would undertake the work for £200,000 (compare Rastrick's estimate of 
£199,892, subject to iron prices not rising - both figures of course including 
land costs), so giving an estimated cost of no more than £7,700 per mile. 
1 C.H.Grinling; The History of the Great Northern Railway 1845-1895; London 
1898, p.12. 
2 Williams on the 23rd April. 
3 Extract from the resolution adopted by5the meeting of the 23rd April. 4- L & E prospectus. Ibid. 
6 Williams on the 23rd April. 
7 'An Original Subscriber to the 1ine~: Railway Times, 18th January, 1845. 
The contractors in question were Gr~sse1 & Peto, but in the end they 
did not do the work. 
1Jr. 
With all these factors in its favour it was anticipated that the work would be 
complete within nine months of the act being obtained, and that the first 
trains would be running by Jawary 1846, almost as soon as the last oall was 
made. Estimated revenue, exoluding reoeipts from coals and sources west of 
the Quse, was initial~ £33,581/7/1; allowing the liberal proportion of 40% 
for working expenses this promised a return of some 8~ on capital. It was 
t,ypical of the cautious approach adopted by Williams that after stating the 
1 
allowance for working expenses to be ~fo he should then public~ state that, 
in view of the flatness of the terrain and the cheapness of coal in ~nn, it 
2 
was far too liberal an estimate; in the same w~ the exolusion of obvious 
,I 
sources of revenue from the traffic estimate indicated a course of moderation, .1 
although here there was also a degree of uncertainty as to the validity of the 
total estimates made. In the next chapter it will be seen that these figures 
of anticipated revenue were by no means final or accurate. In aI\Y case, 
Williams, like most of his contemporaries, seemed blissful~ u~~ware of the 
existence of depreciation costs and the need to accommodate them. 
Williams, especial~ at the meeting of the 23rd April~ made much of the 
encouraging information outlined above. Both he, in person, and the 
prospectus strengthened the case by making full pl~ of IQrnn being the best 
coastal port within 200 miles of London for the north, Scotland, Hamburg and 
the Baltic, and of the faot that the railw~ would link IQrnn ~~th the 
metropolis, the cities of Norwich and Peterborough and the towns of Manchester 
and Birmingham etc. All this was very fine as were the cheerful comparisons 
1 Prospectus. 
2 Williams on the 23rd April quoting the opinion of R~strick. 
3 All the factual information in this paragraph unless otherwise indicated is 
derived from Williams' speech and answers on the 23rd April. 
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made between the figure of £7,700 per mile and the £53,150 per mile of the 
London & Birmingham and the £4.5,790 per mile of the Eastern Counties, but 
these lines were built while the L & E was still on paper. Amongst other 
factors Williams had so far made no public mention of Parliamentary expenses 
although the figures quoted for the other lines included these. In other ways 
Williams was to discover why lines on the ground almost invariably cost more 
than those on paper. Iron prices did rise; the co-operation of the landowners 
did not preclude extortionate demands for land compensation; the as yet 
undeclared opposition of the various drainage commissions affected qy the line 
was to involve the compaI\Y in ruinous expenditure on bridges. Further, the 
eel' 
assumption that there would be a 10Q% transfer of traffic to the railway proved! 
to be unfounded in fact; the objections that the harbour branch terminated a 
full 60 yards from the nearest qu~s and on the wrong side of the Nar, and 
would therefore be expensive and inconvenient to use, had occurred to none. 
D. Changes and Additions. 
On the basis outlined above Williams was successful in attracting first 
local capital and then that from a wider field to the line. But, in order to 
sustain confidence he was forced during the autumn of 1844 to incorporate two 
expensive changes in his project, although the bill was already in an advanced 
state of preparation. The first of these represented the height of iro~, for 
it was no less than the addition of a branch to Wisbech. This also involved 
plans to double the track for the six miles between ~nn and Watlington where 
the new line was to commence. The second change, enforced by local agitation, 
was the extension of the mainliJJe to bring it one mile nearer to the centre of 
The additional cost was to be £100,000, to be raised in 4,000 £25 
units, or an increase of 5q% on what was supposed to be the cost of the 
~ 
original. The new~ created shares were first to be offered to existing 
proprietors at the rate of one new for two old, the Directors explaining 
the position by letter to each individual shareholder. A publio notice 
1 
appeared on the 16th November, the surveys were oompleted by the end of that 
month, and the final details were made publio on the 14th December~ in this 
latter notice the 17th December was cited as the last date for objections to 
be lodged - silence was to be construed as assent. No substantial objection 
was raised, and the alterations were du~ incorporated in the bill. The 
merits of the proposed changes apart, it is not hard to understand the 
reason for this acquiescence. In the first place the shareholders had no 
opportunity to meet as a boqy; second~, L & E shares were, in the November 
of 1844, standing at a premium of over 100. 
The question of the Wisbech line presents a difficult problem as to 
motive. Two local historians of the period found little in its favour:~ 
"It can o~ be nominated as a mistake. Its track is through bare 
Fen and its termination at Watlington leaves the traveller seven 
(sic) miles from ~nn and further from E~. The count~, on the 
contra~, which lies between Wisbech and ~nn is high~ populous 
and requires accommodation, whereas by the authorised line there is 
not a single village and ~nn is about 5 miles further off than 
it need be." 
Alongside this one is tempted to think of Morrison's stricture:~ 
" •• had (the legislature) not authorised the issue of shares at 
par when at a premium, by the sale of which enormous sums were 
realised, the judgement of directors would not have been warped 
and new schemes would not have been authorised by them which 
did not promise to yield an adequate remuneration." 
Some obvious~ shared the opinion on the merits of the line quoted above, for 
1 ~nn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Walker & Craddock, op.cit. p.78. 
4 Morrison, op.cit. p.58. 
II 
the premium on L & E shares did decline in the last month of 1844. 
However, it was also at this time that the ~nn & Dereham project had been 
made public and was causing much misgiving as to its worth; as this latter 
was so obvious~ connected with the L & E line it is probable that the shares 
of the latter were suffering from a strong~ declared lack of confidence in 
the former. Moreover, the issue of an additional 50% of capital could not 
but serve to dilute the market, and this at a. time when the market was alrea~ 
becoming overloaded with the shares of countless new companies. 
What were the facts of the line? As described on the 14th December the 
branch was to be 10 miles long, leaving the mt'!.inline at Watlington, six miles i' 
from Iurnn. The flat terrain and the straightness of the line suggested ease 
of construction. The absence of a~ competition gave grounds for the 
assurance that, flgain excluding coals and. other heavy merchandise, there 
1 
would be a 7% return. If the obvious criticisms were made they never saw 
the light of day. A return of 7% on £100,000, when combined with the 
promised ~ on the original £200,000, would give a yield of only just over 
7~ on the total £300,000; here is one like~ reason for the decline in 
premium. Second~, the line did ignore four large villages to its immediate 
north, name~ Wiggenh8.1l St. Mary the Virgin, Wiggenhall St. Germans, Tilney 
st.Lawrence and Terrington St.John. Thirdly, the estimEl.tes took no account 
of the expense to be encountered in bridging the already planned, but not yet 
constructed, Midland Level Drain. 
The answer to the criticisms rea~ lay in the undeclared motives of 
Williams, especial~ so in his intentions for an east to north trunk route, 
1 Estimated by Mr. Pt1res , a traffic expert, who was engaged also by the 
L & D compa~; for discussion see chapter 3 below. 
The Wisbech Branch and the form of the Lynn & Ely Mainline as Planned 
in December 1844 
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and in the development of circumstances threatening the future of the L & E 
mainline itself; once again Williams was enabled to cloak his ambitions in 
the representation of immediate necessity. Initially, however, remains the 
problematical question raised in the previous chapter as to whether Williams 
had already secretly undertaken to promote the Wisbech branch as the partial 
price of Eastern Counties Railway acquiescence in the L & E project, the 
E.C.R. intending throughout to construct its own March to Wisbech line. The 
answer would seem to be in the affirmative. The E. C • R. ne.turally de sired a 
firm connection with both Wisbech and Iqnn, and the warnings of Stephenson as 
to the l:>,ck of traffic between the latter r .. nil Ely indicated quite plainly that 
the failure of the L & E was considered as a distinct possibility. The 
Wisbech - Watlington - Iunn section of that compaDiY, however, would be 
assured of adequate traffic, however the rest of the line fared, provided that 
it gave direct access to the main E.C.R. network. Thus, the latter compaDiY 
would be enabled to achieve its purpose at considerably less cost than if it 
had to construct to Iqnn of its own accord. 
The principal factor in reconciling Iunn opinion to the branch was that 
it waS becoming increasingly obvious that Wisbech must soon have a railw~. 
Indeed, during the latter part of 1844 and the early months of 1845, a 
bewildering variety of projects concerned the town. Besides the Wisbech to 
March line of the E.C.R. there were also a St.lves & Wisbech, an Isle of Ely 
& Lincolnshire Junction, the Grand Union (Stamford to Wisbech via Deeping) 
and the East Coast Railway projects. Most alarming of all, however, was the 
proposed Peterborough & Iqnn Rai1w~ (backed by midlands' interests and 
receiving little backing in Iqnn) which would mean that traffic between 
Norfolk and the midlands and north could be carried without reference to the 
,j' 
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L & E; it ~lso meant that Wisbech would be between ~nn and its midland 
markets, and that, assuming a northern trunk route was soon to be built, 
traffic to London would be provided with an alternative route from ~nn~ 
With these various factors in evidence Williams was assured of Lynn 
support in furthering his own ultimate intentions. It is not without 
significance that the announcement of the Wisbech branch virtual~ coincided 
in time with that of the ~nn& Dereham line. In 1846 it beoame publio~ 
known that the Wisbech branch was originally intended to extend to Spalding, 
where an end-on junction would be effected with a group of companies building 
eastwards from Manchester and Hottingham2(probab~ a major renson for the 
investment of Lacy and other Manchester men); at the same time a furious 
storm was generated in ~nn over the revelation that it was intended to 
construct a spur from Narborough to Watlington (almost due west of the former) 
so enabling through traffic to by-pass !qnn. The intention was denied, but 
even today the suggestion of an earthwork leading towards Watlington is to be 
discerned at Narborough. The supposition would certai~ explain w~ 
Williams allowed the L &: E and the L & D to run into a common terminus at 
~nn so that all traffic between the two requires reversal there. 
With these essential factors in mind, the branch may be justified on 
certain independent grounds. Firstly, traffic originating west of the Cuse 
need no longer be lost to a future line to the north from Cambridge or Ely 
(the reason given for the exclusion of such traffic from the original 
estimates). Secondly, the branch provided direct connection with the 
1 This of course subsequently happened with the Midland & Great Northern 
Railw~ - see chapter 9· 
2 For details of this and other intended extensions see chapter 6 below. 
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intended E.C.R. northern extension from March by way of that compaqy's line 
to Wisbech from March (this was actual~ opened for traffic on the 7th May, 
1847). The question as to whether the actual traffic between ~nn and 
Wisbech justified a railw~ is irrelevant to the main discussion, for, as 
seen, the branch was b~sical~ an integral part of a much wider pattern. 
The decision to extend the mainline by one mile into the centre of ~nn, 
elthough expensive, was trivial, but it deserves recording as an example of 
the type of petty issue and social pressure which pl~ed not e small part in 
the shaping of Britain's railw~ network. The change of site from the 
South Gates, on the outskirts of the town and in the parish of South ~nn, 
to the centre resulted from some considerable agitation and pressure on the 
part of the inh~:.bitants of St • Margaret 's parish. There had been acrimonious 
dispute between the two sections of the town - the sort of thing that a 
promoter must seek to check in case it reached the ea.rs of distant investors, 
who might consequent~ lose confidence in their investment. As ear~ as 
the 13th April a letter had been published in the ~nn press urging that the 
1 
railway be brought as near to the waterfron:t as possible. The cry was taken 
up by the merchants and tradesmen of the town centre, the real autocrats of 
South ~nn responded by claiming bitter~, and with some justice, 
that it was invariab~ treated as an outsider by the rest of the ~nn 
community. The "little knot of self elected tradesmen of St.Margaret's 
2 
Parish~, however, c~rried sufficient social weight to win over to its views 
the committee appointed on the 28th March. When this met with the compa~ 
directors, ear~ in October, to discuss the matter, the latter agreed to an 
1 'Observer', ~nn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald. 
2 Ibid., 23m November, l~, 'An Alien of South Lynn'. 
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extension to ~ field of Mr. Bagg,e's just behind the Corn Market. The 
compa~ thus displ~ed an easy indifference to cost for the line now had to 
pass over several plots of valuable land, and it was a.lso presenting the 
Corporation with the opportunity to cha.rge, in la.ter days, an extortionate 
£19,';00 for 56 acres of very inferior land - an interesting example of conflIDt 
of interest. "An Advoc?te for the FUblic Good" (possibly Williams himself) 
issued a hR.ndbill to justify the change of site. This provoked one final 
furious outburst from "An Alien of South Iqnn" who took pa.rticular exception 
to the manner in which the issue had been settled, and especially so to the 
claim of the handbill that the shareholders would be consulted; in his view 
this was farcical as the dispute was resolved without reference to a~one 
save the tradesmen who benefited from the change of site. The writer held 
that the directors were good but liable to error; in retrospect, however, a 
decision to take a line into a town centre could seldom be wrong unless 
exceptionally and unrealistically expensive to carry out. 
Before turning to the Ely & Bedford promotion a word may be said as to 
the attitude of Ely throughout these protracted negotiations. This was 
essentially passive although welcoming. There was no question of Ely being 
concerned with its status as a port, for success in getting vessels of only 
70 to 80 tons burthen into its harbour Wi.'S a ma.tter of special mention in the 
1 press. Indeed the result of this had been that coal prices fell to only 
25/- to 26/- per ton a.nd further reductions were expected with the arrival of 
2 
other boats from Newcastle, but the obstacles to navigetion were such that 
their removal would involve a completely unjustifiable expenditure when a 
railw~ from Iqnn would serve the town so much more cheaply and effiCiently. 
1 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 25th January, 1845; extract from 
the Cambridge Chronicle. 
2 Ibid. 
§l 
This viewpoint was ab~ expressed by 'Civil Engineer' in a letter to the 
~nn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald in which he complete~ debunked the 
idea of river improvements when the railway would have every advantage! 
It is tempting to think that the Civil Engineer in question was Charles 
Burcham; if so it is an interesting example of the methods employed by 
promoters to educate public opinion. For the rest, everyone was said to be 
2 
in favour of railways to the town, and the "inhabitants almost in ecstacy 
at the idea of having a first class station,,3there - a remark following the 
agreement of March 1845 under which the E.C.R. and. L & E tentatively settled 
on a site, conveniently placed for the town, between road and railway, for 
the construction of a joint station. 
Section 3: The Ely & BeMord Compan.y 
In every important sense, this company, which came before the public 
during the August of 1844, was an extension of the ~nn & Ely project. It 
must be admitted, however, that the evidence of Williams being the principal 
promoter is far less certain than it was in the case of the ~nn & Ely and 
the ~nn & Dereham lines. Amalgamation with the L & E was spoken of from 
the first, and it was agreed that each should have two directors on the 
other's board, but, in themselves, these indica.te no more than the recogm-
tion that a common tra.ffio stream was to be served. On the other hand both 
companies employed substantial~ the same agents and. bankers, it was the 
firm of Goodwin, Partridge & Williams whioh issued the bulk of the E & B 
notices and advertisements, and it was the L & E shareholders who took up the 
bulk of the shares. In fact, the origins of the company are shrouded in 
1 Iq'nn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 25th January, 1845; extract from 
the Cambridge Chronicle. 
2 Ibid. 19th April, 1845. 
3 Ibid. 
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some myste~, and there are ma~ signs of obvious haste in its formation. 
The o~ public meeting WRS in Iq"nn, the prospectus contained no tra.ffic 
estimates, and the Provisional Committee, with only 25 names, 10 of which 
were to be found on the L & E committee, and no titled members, was one of 
1 
the shortest and lea.st impressive of the period. Unless the true promoters 
have remained complete~ hidden it must be thus assumed that there was no 
other the.n Williams, working on a sure b8 sis of support from the L & E 
proprietors and treating the whole enterprise as a natural extension of the 
work alrea~ in hand. This impression is confirmed when it is found that 
the prospectus makes bare~ aDjy mention of the a.rea actually to be served by 
the proposed new line, and that four of the six members of the first full 
board were Iq"nn men. WQy there should be a separate compaqy at all will be 
discussed in a later section of the present chapter. 
The incentive to continue the L & E mainline as far as Bedford was 
initially provided by the formation of the Bedford & London & Birmingham 
Railway (commonly known as the Bedford Railway) to construct a line from 
Bedford to Bletchley (on the London & Birmingham mainline). In time this 
project was successful, the Act of Incorporation being obtained on the 30th 
June 1845, and the actual line being opened during the November of 1846. 
The prospect of this line naturally excited the interest of ~nn, for, as 
described in the previous chapter, the town's commercial interests had long 
extended by way of the Quse to Bedford. Here was the opportunity to link 
Iqnn, and by way of the new line, Norwich, Yarmouth and all the other ports 
of East Anglia, not only with Birmingham, Manchester, Liverpool and the 
north, but also with the south midlands and the west and south of England~ 
1 For the full list, see Appendix C. 
2 E & B prospectus; a copy is preserved in the Norwich Castle Museum. 
§2. 
as well as to strengthen and extend the town's commercial connections with 
the south east midlands. Admitted~, access to the north was already 
guaranteed by the Peterborough - Blisworth line of the London & Birmingham 
Railway and the use of this route would be shorter by a good sixteen miles, 
but the advantage to be gained from the ~nn viewpoint in using the E~ 8: 
Bedford line was that through traffic would be using Lynn railways for 69 
miles instead of only the 26 between ~nn and Ely. It may also be mentioned 
that the prospectus was anxious to emphasise, for what the fact m~ be worth, 
that when the proposed link between the London & Birmingham and the Great 
Western lines was ce.rried through (as it was eventua.lly by the Oxford 8: 
Bletchley Junction Company, incorporated on the 26th Ju~, 1846) the Ely 8: 
Bedford would provide the shortest link between the e!?stern and south 
western parts of the kingdom. 
The mainline itself, as described in the prospectus of September 1844, 
was to be 43 miles in length; additional~ there was to be a branch to 
Waterbeach to give direct access to Cambridge. The whole was to take no 
more than 15 months to complete and was to be e.ccomplished with a ca.pital of 
£270,000, issued in 10,800 units of £25. Buck, the comparw engineer, was 
confident that this sum would be sufficient to procure the land and provide 
the works for double track, if such were deemed desirable. No engineering 
difficulties were enticipated, and as the steepest gradient would be no more 
than one of one in a thousand it was expected that working expenses would be 
low, although "a most liberal <'lllocation" of' 40}6 had been allowed for this. 
No traffic estimates were given, but even so a forecast of a 9% dividend was 
free~ made. This was a most suspicious figure and one to which reference 
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will be me.de in a later contex1:. It will suf"fice to say at this point tha.t 
it was f"ounded largely on mere conjecture, for, in fact, such was the hB.ste 
attending the promotion, no proper estimates had so far been mAde. Allowing 
40% for working expenses the promised return suggests 8n anticipated revenue 
of some £lr0,500. This compares with the £33,600 of the shorter L & Eline. 
The area to be served by the E & B was predomiru:,ntly rural and therefore 
unlikely to originate much traffic of its own; inevitably the bulk of 
revenue must be derived from the conveyance of through goods to Dnd from 
!(ynn harbour. As the inland treffic of the L & E would be split into at 
least three streams at Ely, and as harbour bound traffic would similarly 
combine at that point, the estimates for the two lines are impossible to 
reconcile despite the diversity in their lengths. 
Before considering the f"inancia1 aspects of this promotion it is first 
necessary to refer to the decision re~ched during the later months of 1844 to 
seek powers to build no more than the section between E~ and Huntingdon. 
The reason was that both the London & York 8.nd the Direct Northern, two of 
the companies then preparing to engage in the b~tt1e for the right to construct 
a second trunk route to the north, objected to the f"act that for some 11 or 
12 miles their own proposed routes would be closely parallel to the 
Huntingdon - Bedford section of the Ely & Bedford. Both intimated their 
intention to oppose this before Parliament. As either of the two concerns 
could outweigh the Ely & Bedford in terms of resources, and as either would 
have the advantage of representing national as opposed to merely local 
interests, the E & B directors wisely came to an agreement with the London & 
1 For discussion of estimB.tes and the compEl.l\Y' s prospects see chapter 3 
below. 
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York by which the plans for theirisputed section of line were dropped. 
Events confirmed the wisdom of this decision, for, when the E & B bill 
eventually came before Parliament, Lord Palmerston, as chairman of Committee 
I, reported that if the compa~ had insisted on the whole line he would 
have recommended postponement until the pattern of north to south lines had 
been fixed; as the Ely - Huntingdon section was not germane to the main 
issue he VJas prepared to uphold the company' s ap?licRtion~ 
Other factors influenced the directors in their renunciation. They 
had, for example, encountered some difficulty in obtaining the full amount of 
capital they required. In the end they had been successful, but, after 
attaining to a lO~~ premium in the third week in October, prices had slumped 
until during the last v:eel-:: in December the shares were being quoted at a 
small discount. The declared opposition of the L & Y and the Direct 
Northern was the principal cause of this, although some measure of the 
responsibility belonged to the landowners west of Huntingdon who for the 
most part had openly declared against the line - an attitude in marked 
contrast to that of consent shown by the landowners to the east of Huntingdon. 
In the latter case economic A.ctivity normally centred on Ely e.nd the natural 
route to London was through that city, but in the fonner instance the 
promotion of a northern trunk line offered escape from the expense and delays 
of ~nn harbour, a direct route to London, 2nd, possibly, richer pickings in 
terms of land compensation. Whatever the motives of the opposition, however, 
it was essential that confidence be restored, especially so as the slump in 
E & B shares might well have been a reason for the less marked decline in 
1 ~nn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 13th August, 1845; Directors' 
Report, E & B meeting of the 7th August, 1845. 
2 Report to the Commons, 1845 xxxix (6J:B): Railway Bills on which Reports 
b.9,ve been made at variance with Reports from the Board of Trade, p.4. 
§.2. 
L & E quotations. To this end o~ one course was possible; the decision 
was taken and the publio du~ acquainted with it on the 12th April 1&+5. 
As it hal))ened, the c1irectors were provided with a faoe saver. The newly 
projected Huntingdon & Rugby compal'\Y was found to offer a link of almost 
1 
equal value, although in view of its quite different direction it is hard to 
see how this real~ could be so. In fact, the compal'\Y in question never 
built its line, although when in the June of 1847 the Midland. Railway 
obtained powers to build from Leicester to Huntingdon by way of Northampton 
and Bedford a fair duplication~e~ssured. But by that time such develop-
ments were of little consequence to the E~ & Huntingdon (as it became as 
from April 1845) for its line was destined to be built for a mere ~ miles 
on the Ely side of Huntingdon and no further. 
The circumst0nces in which the initial capital of this compa~ was 
raised are full of interest. After a prior intimation on the 14th 
2 
September 1844, subscription to the total of £270,000 was invited on the 
3 4 21st September; only two d~s later the subscription list was closed. The 
/ 
compa~ announced a six fold application, something described as "beyond all 
5 6 precedent", and spoke of the "immense quantity" of shares applied for by 
proprietors of the L & E and others locally interested. After the allocation 
of shares on the 18th October it was fUrther announced that some of the most 
influential figures in the City of London had had to be left out? All this 
sounded most impressive, justified the compa~ts forecast that its shares 
would come on the market at a premium of Ii to It, and helps to explain wqy 
the initial premium was in fact 100%, £2 being paid for shares on which only 
I Directors' Report, compaqy meeting of the 
2 Ignn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald. 
4 Ibid., 28th September, 1844. 
5 Ibid., 26th October, 1844. 6 Ibid. 
7th August 1845. 3 
Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
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the £1 deposit had been cRlled.-- It also makes it reasonab~ certain that 
in view of the circumstances they had, by and large, accepted the opportunity 
presented to them. The facts as published, however, do not explain ~ the 
inducement of a 3~ on calls was considered necessary, or wny, eleven months 
1 later, o~ 8,729 of the 10,800 shares had been taken up. 
As suggested in ~n earlier section, the payment of interest on calls, 
an unsound practice revived from canal days, was invariab~ a sign that 
difficulty in raising the required capital was anticipated. Amongst the 94 
companies which resorted to this expedient the highest rate of interest paid 
was 5%, the great majority were at 4% and the E & H was unique in offering 
2 3~fo (the ~nn & Dereham would have been the same if Parliament had permitted 
it). The prime effect was to draw in those "who could not afford to set 
3 
aside income for 5 or 6 yea,rs until oomp1etion". Assuming that Williams 
once again considered evidenoe of local support a.s the essential condition 
for outside capital to be attracted it meant in practical terms that ~nn 
itself had to be tempted. The haste of the promotion and the opposition 
from a large section of the landowners involved, the latter probab~ 
resulting from the first in that there was no time for c9reful preparation, 
as well as the ~bsence of a~ burning local reason for the line, resulted 
in the complete absence of figures from the area between E~ and Huntingdon 
amongst the final list of subscribers1 even the Provisional Committee 
contained onlY ten local names. In short this was a Iunn railway and. Lynn 
1 xxxix (6.,), 1~5. 2 Scrivenor, op.cit. pp45f. 
3 Herapath, May 1839. 
4 Francis, Vol.2, p.150, speaks of one promotion in the Ely area and s~s 
that "not one person connected with the county through which it passes 
subscribed to the title deed". He does not name the compa~, but in 
all probability was thinking of the E & H. 
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men were left to carry the initial cost. They needed considerable tempting. 
Those who were real~ interested enough in the L & E as such and had 
maintained their financial interest had probab~ in ma~ cases little further 
capital to spare. Those who had benefited from the sale of their L & E 
allocation may well have felt that to adopt the same course again was to 
tempt providence just a little too far, especial~ so as the new line in its 
haste and lack of close~ argued figures seemed a much more doubtful 
proposition. Additionally, the line was not such an urgent necessity to the 
town as the L & E had been, and yet again, on the assumption that the Wisbeoh 
branch was in the air, some might have felt impelled to reserve further 
investment for a line nearer home. 
Whatever the truth of the matter the fact remains that, on the evidence 
of the lists of the subscription contracts~ a considerable number of the 
proprietors of the L & E did take up the E & H shares; it m~ well be that 
the reference to the six fold application refers to the balance left after 
this allocation had been offered. 
If indeed there W8.5 difficulty in disposing of the shares the reason for 
the 2,000 unsold units is clear, although a matter of deliberate policy may 
have been involved as well. Holding back this proportion, in conjunction 
with the press 'puffs' described above, would undoubted~ have the effect of 
strengthening the market in the compa~ issue; intentional or not this greatly 
assisted those in ~nn who did risk a second speculation. Alternatively 
there is the possibility that the compa.~ hoped that the money represented 
would not be needed; it ha.s already been mentioned that the capital of 
£270,000 was considered adequate for single or double track; the effect here 
1 See Section 6 below. 
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would be a substantial increase in a~ dividends paid. Final~, there is 
the possibility that the directors were holding back until such time as a 
high market premium could be exploited by a judicious issue to friends of 
the compa~. Like so much else in the early stages of the E & H promotion 
there is no evidence one way or the other, but the most like~ conclusion on 
what scattered strands there are must be that the line did not attract the 
support offered to its predecessor, that the buD{ of the capital was taken 
by distant proprietors of the L & E, and that the unissued balance is to be 
explained in terms of both difficult,y of sale and the hope that it would not 
in a~ case be required. No doubt all proprietors were pleased when the 
reduction of the capital to £l94,~OO on the abandonment of the Huntingdon -
Bedford section led to a reduction in the par value of each share to £18. 
This contributed, no doubt, to the enormous jump which the compa~'s shares 
enjoyed when the contraction of the project was announced. The April of 
1845 saw intense activity in transference of the shares and with £~5 called 
to that date they were ~hanging hands at as much as £3/12/6d, a remarkable 
change from the discount suffered o~ four months before when opposition 
to the compa~ was mounting. 
A final word may be said of the part played by the E & B line in 
Williams' overall schemes for making Iurnn the centre of a great railway 
network. Indications of haste have been observed; suggestions that the 
railway was never pushed on with the same determination 8S seen in the case 
of the L & E (and also the Iurnn & Dereham) have been made - in fact, after 
1847 the capital reserves of the E & H were actual~ used in the construction 
of the Wisbech branch of the L & E. The overwhelming conclusion remains 
that this E~ & Bedford promotion was an afterthought, hnsti1y implemented 
on the opportunity presented by the proposals for the Bedford Railway. 
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As ~nn& Ely proprietors would be the ones to benefit, both by immediate 
sale of shares if they so wished and by the additional traffic brought on to 
their own line, and as L & E shares were at a high premium in the summer of 
1844 Williams must have felt that this was a risk well worth the taking. 
Section 4:: The rvnn & Dereham Railway 
Two main strands may be discerned in this, the third of the Lynn 
railways to make its appearance during the course of 1844. Basically, it 
represented an intrinsic part in Williams' overall intention of creating a 
great east to north trunk route; in this context it should be taken in 
conjunction -,Jith the Wisbech branch, the proposal to extend this to Spalding 
to meet the group of companies building eastwards from Manchester and 
Nottingham and the abortive intention of throwing a spur from Narborough to 
Watlington, all ma.tters which have been discussed in an earlier section of 
this chapter. Secondly, the line constituted the reaction of the Lynn 
mercantile community to ". fresh 8.ssault on their security, this time from 
Norwich. 
The object of concern was the projection in Norwich, during the summer 
of 1844, of the Direct Norwich & East Dereham line with branches from the 
latter place to Falcenham and (via Swaffhrun) to King's Iunn itself. This 
project, it was argued, would "be highly beneficial by increasing the 
1 
commerce and prosperity of all classes of the County and City". Such 
increase, however, would inevitab~ be at the expense of Lynn which maintained 
strong interests throughout the whole area northwards and westwards of East 
Dereham. Moreover, the effect of the proposals would be to put Lynn at 
the end of a branch line controlled by the hostile interests of Norwich. 
1 Taken from a resolution in favour of the line :?t a Norwich meeting of 
the 7th December, 1844; Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald. 
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As this new promotion was receiving strong support in the city and as 
adequate fina.neial support seemed available from the Norwich merchants, the 
outlook for Iurnn 2.ppelU'ed bleak indeed, with the distinct possibility, quite 
apart from all other considerations, that the L & E line would be rendered 
nugatory before it '!las even begun. All trus presented a further splendid 
opportunity for Williams. Iurnn had already become extreme~ railway 
conscious, and Williams, dressing u9 his proposals by reference to the local 
advantages to be gained end emphasising the dfmgers to be averted, had little 
difficulty in intro,lucing his third and final successful major promotion. 
Probp.b~ the line had been in his mind all the time and the circumstances 
which had arisen were significant principallY in that they forced his hand. 
As with the E & H promotion there were mal\Y signs of obvious haste in the 
following months, but at the same time the impression is given that mature 
thought was behind the whole, even where major alterations had of necessity 
to be incorporated. 
To anticipate at this point it may be indicated that the Direct Norwich 
& East Dereham Compaqy proved abortive. After receiving an adverse report 
from the Board of Trade on the grounds of sparsity of traffic between Norwich 
and East Dereham it also failed to pass the Standing Orders Committee of the 
1 Commons. The advantage thus passed to the rival Norwich & Brandon Railw~ 
project which envisa.ged a branch to f)ereha.m from WymondhE'..m, a point on its 
existing mainline. The promoters of the former line he.d opposerl this on the 
grounds that the advantages would go to Brandon rather than Norwich. The 
merits and demerits of this argument are beyond the scope of this work; it is 
sufficient to say that whether it was Norwich or Brandon which benefited it 
would be Iurnn that would suffer. U1timate~, the N & B line was built. 
1 1845. xxxix (620). 
2.2. 
Authorised on the 31st July 18h·5, it 1V~s opened to goods trarfic on the 7th 
December 1846, '·.nd to pc.ssencers on the 15th February 1847. Later, in 1849, 
it was extended to Fakenham, and eventually, in 1857, to Wells-next-the-Sea. 
1 Williams' initial .9l2ns, .'Cnnounced. ~)ublicly on the 5th October, were for 
a double track line from Iornn to DereheJn by VifW of Litcham, together with a 
branch to Fakenh2.m. A capital of .£4.00,000 was sought. But then, almost 
before the ink of the first prospectus was dry, the scheme was drastically 
contracted and otherwise mod.ified. Firstly, the Fakenham brrnch was declared 
superflous on the grounds that a Wells &: Dereha.m company was shortly to be 
rloated. Obviously there was a. strong measure of agreement here, ror 
otherwise, despite the economies effected, the L &: D would not have dropped 
its own proposed branch unless assured that the line from Wells would reed the 
~nn line in preference to ar:w emanating from Norwich; it is most likely that 
a joint station was envisaged. The second alteration was that the mainline 
was now to take in SwaffhDm. This was a common sense adjustment, as Litcham, 
through which the line had originally been intended to pass, was a village 
of small consequence, whereas Swarfham was a £lourishing market centre which 
it might prove dangerous to leave unguarded on the flank o£ the line. The 
revisions naturally involved a reduction in capital to £330,000, a sum 
guaranteed by Rastrick to be sufricient for every need, but, as now only 
one line of rails was to be laid (nlthough land would. be purchased. for two), 
2 
o~ £260,000 was to be called. As a result of these reductions the original 
promise of a return on capital o£ "upw8.rds of 7~"3now became one of ~ on 
1 The announoements quoted on this page are derived rroID the Lynn At'lvertiser 
&: West Norfolk Herald, issues of the 5th, 12th, 19th 2.nd 26th October, or 
from the compaqy prospectuses, a copy of the second being preserved in the 
Norwich Castle Museum. 
2 Not specified in the prospectus, but in a letter from \'I. Willioms, the 
oomlaI:\Y secretary; Railway Times, 7th Deoember 1844, p.1448. 
3 L & D Prospectus. 
4- As fn.l. 
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an estimated revenue of £4.1,19), 35~b being allowed for working expenses. The 
ectual estimAte of receipts did not appear in the prospectus for the simple 
. 2 
re8.son that it had not then been comp~led. The 9% quoted represented little 
more than hopeful guesswork, and, as will be seen in the next chapter, was 
designed more to attract capital than to be an accurate forecast. There is 
every re[1,son to believe that the estime.te, which underwent various changes 
before the more critical eye of Parliament, was delibere.tely fixed to oonform 
to the origi~~l promise. For the rest, it Vias expected that the 26 miles of 
line would take no more than twelve months to complete. Great emphasis was 
laid on the cordial relations alrea~ existing with the Lynn & Ely compa~ -
hardly a m:-,tter for surprise in view of the common promoter. The letter's 
station in ~nn was to be used by the L & D which was also to be afforded full 
fa.cilities on the harbour branch. As for the terminus at Dereham the exact 
site depended on which Norwich compa~ was successful in obtaining its line in 
that the possibili~ of a joint station had to be taken into account; in fact, 
the bill was destined to come before pprliament ",ith two distinct alternatives 
3 
marked on the compaI\Y's plans, nnd it was Parliament which eventually decreed 
which should be adopted. 
The promotion received a cordial welcome in ~nn where it was justified 
on completely selfish grounds. ~nn , it was said, knew better than Norwich 
what its interests were~ and could not be envisaged as "the terminus of the 
1 Made public in a letter from W.Williams (compaqy secretary) to the Railw~ 
Times 7th December 1844., p.l1.t48 and other journals of the same week. 
2 Ibid. Pares' estimate was prefaced by the remark that it was commissioned 
only during the first week of October. 
3 See L & D plans in the Norfolk County Record Office, Norwich. 
4 ~nn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 19th October l~; a remark made at 
the Town Meeting of the 16th October. 
1 .2§. 
traffic", and, as it was expressed at the Town Meeting of the 16th October, 
2 
oa11ed to further the line, by the L& D "we get the benefit". Popular 
support was also found outside ~nn. The railw~ promised escape from the 
"intolerable monopoly" of the River Nar Ne.vigation, whioh for years had aoted 
3 
as an "incubus" on the economy of western Norfolk. Similarly, central 
Norfolk was "entirely destitute" of means of cheap conveyance for its gOod8~ 
even the dubious assets of water communication being lacking. The price of 
coal in the areas affected affords striking confirmation of these claims. 
Lamed at ~nn it sold at between 16/- and 18/- per ton; after carriage by 
the Nar Navigation barges, and thence from Narborough by road the price in 
Swa.ffham (14t miles from tunn) was 27/- or 28/-; by the time it reached 
Dereham (2~ miles) the price was 30/-~ What applied to coal applied to 
other merchandise, building materials, fertilisers etc., so that the claim 
6 
that the line v.rould prove an "inca.lculable boon" to tens of thousands 
rested on a solid foundation. 
Now much hinged on the Nar Navigation. Owned by the brothers, John 
and Robert Marriott, it conveyed goods over the nine miles between Lynn and 
Narborough, at which point they were transferred to the roads. From this 
the brothers made what was modestly described as a "good sum" by a member of 
the family? More forthrightly, the railw~ promoters described the business 
1 tunn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 219th October, 1844; Meeting of the 
16th October. Ibid. 4 
3 Ibid. 'Anti-Monopoly', 1st February 1845. Ibid. 
6
5 Ibid. 8th March, 1845, 'One of the Privileged of Swaffham'. 
Rai1w~ Times, 7th December 1844, p.141f-8; Letter from the L & D 
representatives, Messrs. Rooper, Birch & Ingram. 
7 By the son of Robert Marriott who waf' writing as a very old man in 1922. 
The letter was written in connection with an article on Narborough, which 
has so far not been traced, to a J.M.Hotblack who passed it on subsequently 
to the Vicar of N~rboroug~ (n~w retired). T~ writer was just old enough 
to remember the f1rst tra1ns 1n 1847, had carr1ed on the family business 
and eventually sold out in 1881. ' 
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as a "very profitable monopo~". Besides their river interests the brothers 
also owned and worked several malthouses at Narborough and elsewhere and, from 
Narborough, conducted a thriving business in coal, corn, malt and general 
merchandise. John Marriott was a formidable figure. Standing 6' 1" in 
height, delighting in physical feats (he once swam from Yarmouth Pier to the 
jetty before breakfast) and being a former wrestling champion of all England, 
he was not the man to surrender his comfortable position without a hard fight. 
At an early stage he dec12.red the intention of his brother and himself to 
2 
hinder the L & D project with "all the opposition in our power". 
For five months the battle raged through public meetings and the 
correspondence columns of the local and railway press. In essence the 
conflict centred on the validity or otherwise of the railway compa:qy's 
traffic estimates. Both parties organised traffic observations. On 
supposedly the same evidence the one settled on a return of ~, and the 
other on just under ~ as a likely expectation of return on capital~ Both 
estimates were submitted to the Board of Trade which, in the event, found 
itself unable to judge between them~ As will later become evident this was 
hardly a surprising decision, for both surveys of traffic were carried out 
under the most suspicious circumstances. 
The Marriotts' claim that the line was "unnecessary and without a:qy 
promise of return", and that it constituted an unwarranted attack on private 
5 property, apparent~ struck a responsive chord in the breasts of ma~ of the 
1 Railway Times,7th December,l844,p.1448; Letter of W.Williams. 
2 Ibid.,9th November,1844,p.1310; Letter of the Marriotts. 
3 For development of this theme see Chapter 3 below. 
4 Board of Trade Report on Schemes in the Counties of Norfolk P..nd Suffolk; 
printed in Herapath,8th March,1845,p.330. 
5 Railway Times,3oth November,1844,p.14l7. 
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landowners along the route. In the November o~ 1~, 46 out of 94 owners, 
5 out of 29 lessees, and 55 of the 129 occupiers along the line returned a 
notice of dissent to the compa~. A petition to the Commons against the 
line, drawn up in the Janua~ of 1845, was supported by 92 of those affected 
1 (46 owners and 46 occupiers). Two principal sources of motivation may be 
discerned. The first of these was personal contact with the Marriotts. 
No less than 33 o~ the 92 petitioners came from the immediate neighbourhood 
of Narborough, and the leading names of the list were those of Samuel Tyssen 
of Narborough Hall and the Rev.Allen, the vicar of the parish. Of the 
remainder the great majority came from the Dereham end of the line where it 
is suggested that hope of p1~ing off the L & D against the Direct Norwich 
& Dereham line, with an eye on future land compensation, and, perhaps, of 
escaping from dependence on ~nn harbour were the principal motives involved. 
The opposition made a great deal of noise and was not without some 
effect on the fortunes of the line, but without general support it was 
fighting a losing battle, and ultimate~ secured but one short lived victo~. 
This occurred in the Februa~ and March of 1845. The L & D promoters, 
fearful of being delayed for a full year but yet uncertein of the outcome of 
the conflict between the two Norwich companies, and no doubt disturbed by the 
fury of the Marriotts' campaign against them, decided to restrict their 
application for the coming Parliamenta~ session to the stretch of line 
between Iqnn :lnd Swaffham. This construction was to be accomplished on a 
capital of £120,000. The Board of Trade, however, rea.cted strongly against 
2 
this proposal. It approved the ultimate intention of the compa~ to form a 
1 The list was published local~ and in the national railway press on 
various dates betv;een the 4th and 11th Janua~ 1845. 
2 Board of Trade Report on Schemes in the Counties of Norfolk 8nd Suffolk; 
printed in Herapath, 8th lbrch, p.330. 
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link in f'. chain of lines bctv;een Iqnn and. Yarmouth, but held that the traf'fic 
between Iqnn and. Swa£fham was "doubtful" and certainly inadequate on which to 
base the Case for a railway; moreover, it was held that the granting of 
permission for a part of the line might well reduce the chances of the whole 
ever being completed. Thus, 
"In these circumstances it becomes our duty to report our opl.nl.on 
that it is advisable to postpone the sanction of this scheme 
until consideration shall have been given by Parliament to the 
East Dereham and Norwich lines, A.nd until the requirements of 
the whole district be ascertained together with its capabilities 
for supporting railway communication through it." 
This was a grave setback, but one that was speedi~ overcome. 
Recognising that the Board was favourable to the whole line as opposed to a 
part of it, and that lack of reliable traffic estimates large~ contributed 
to the adverse decision, the directors reverted to their original intention 
of pressing for the whole line in the coming session, and undertook that 
Pares would appear before the Commons committee with figures to substantiate 
their estimates, and. at the same time to demonstrate the degree of self 
1 
interest concealed in those of the Marriotts. 
With this the opoosition collapsed and was heard no more. The approval 
of the whole line indicated by the Board of Trade dealt the final blow at an 
edifice alrea~ crumbling both of its own accord and as a result of the 
determined undermining by the railway compaI'\Y'. First, the Direct Norwich & 
East Dereharn, encumbered with an unfavourable report from the Board of Trade 
and losing ground to the Norwich & Brandon, drew in its horns and dropped the 
proposed extensions beyond Dereham. It also came to terms with the L & D, 
even to the extent of a joint station being established at Derehe~~ and so 
1 Iqnn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 22nd March 1845. 
2 Ibid., 14th December. l~. 
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deprived the landowners of the opportunity of playing one compaI\Y off against 
the other. Second~ there was the death of Samuel Tyssen of Narborough Hall 
1 
on the 1st March 1845. Tyssen had been a very rich man, owning as he did 
mal\Y fine works of art and a collection of coins and medals which were said 
to have cost him some £20,000. The significance of all this is that the 
Marriotts had actual~ indemnified their supporters against all expenses of 
2 
opposition, after having very "earnest~ solicited" individual landownera to 
join their fight. But, as 'Shareholder' (almost certainly Williams or one 
of his close associates) pointed out, opponents of a bill were liable to 
costs once they had put their name to the official opposition, and if he 
himself were risking £5-6,000 he would require "something more than the bare 
word of the interested party as an indemnity"~ The writer could not be in 
error for he had been told the facts by several of those concerned. It is 
suggested that Tyssen was, in fact, the financial backer behind this offer of 
indemnity, and that with his death, and with the time~ letter from 
'Shareholder', the Marriotts found themselves virtual~ deserted. Fina1~, 
it appears that the Marriotts allowed themselves to be bought off. In a 
later context the name of Marriott, a coal dealer of ~nn, is found as a 
shareholder in the ~nn & Dereham, and it is also significant that, although 
the bill was unopposed before Parliament, seven of the 48 clauses in the Act 
of Inoorporation referred to the River Nar nnd were in effect protective 
clauses for the navigation interests. In view of this survey of the causes 
of col1a.pse in the opposition, the claim of 'Anti-Monopoly' tha.t "very few 
unsolicited and of their own accord raised their voices against" the 1ine~ 
would indeed appear to be a sound assessment of the situation. 
1 See Wall Plaque in Narborough Parish Church. 
2 ~nn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 22nd March, 1845. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid., 1st February, 1845· 
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The effects of the opposition on the financing of the line were, in 
fact, less than might have been expected. As with the E & B before it, 
the inducement of a 3~ interest on calls (to commence after t~e act had been 
1 
obtained) proved a sufficient bait. Applications were invited on the 19th 
October; the allocation was made on the 11th November, when it was announced 
2 
that a four fold application had been received. A Parliamentary return of 
August 1845 showed that, in fact, all but 290 shares had been taken up~ a 
figure that probab~ represents forfeited allocations and nothing more. 
The investment pattern was much the same as that of the two previous 
promotions. The Provisional Committee, in all 44 members, contained names of 
30 local men; as before, it m~ be assumed that the majority of these sought 
and obtained an initial scrip issue. However, ana~sis of the list of 
subscribers incorporated (clause 3 of the Act of Incorporation) shows that 
onlY 3 of these retained a financial interest by the Ju~ of 1845, name~ 
Everard and Wry1ey Birch of IQrnn, and P.?rtridge of Thetford. It also shows 
that 16 were subscribers in either or both of the previous promotions at the 
time of incorporation, 12 being subscribers to all three, and including the 
two Iqnn men named above. Of the landed interest it m~ be said that it 
disp1~ed a somewhat cool attitude towards the line throughout. t Ant i-
Monopo~t was indeed moved to comment that "the inhabitants of agricultural 
districts" were "not generally much alive to the value of rai1w~ property as 
4 
an investment". Such an attitude would be understandable in this case. 
The farmer would gain whether the line were built by Norwich or ~nn interests, 
1 In fact, as will be shown in the next chapter, Parliament refused to 
allow this promise to be made good. 
2 Iqnn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald. 
3 1811-5 xxxix (bAS) 
4 Iqnn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 1st Februa~ 1845. 
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and was doubtless~ rendered cautious by the sUbstantial support which the 
Marriotts were initial~ able to claim. In fact, the latter, on the 15th 
1 
March, published a list purporting to show that o~ seven Norfolk residents 
were at that time shareholders, name~ H.C.Pr.rtridge, a solicitor of Thetford, 
Everard , Whiting, a surgeon, e.nd. Cooper, an oil and colour merchant, all of 
Iornn, Birch of Wretham Hall (also of Lynn), Lock, a farmer of Barton Bendish, 
and E.Pindar, a shipowner whose address was not given. Four of this group 
remained by the Ju~ of 1~5. The implication contained in this list was 
refuted on the grounds that the proprietors had not then all registered, a 
situation which was to app~ until the compa~ had safe~ obtained its act. 
In this reluctance to register with the compa~ is to be found the principal 
effect of the opposition on investment. The decision to contract the line 
to the Lynn - Swaffham section, and the seeming solidarity of the Marriott 
cause made non-registration a matter of simple precaution until the future 
was clear. In conclusion, it must be remembered in respect of local 
investment that the total capital involved in Iornn lines was, with the 
L & D but without the L & E extensions, well over £600,000, and that those 
who sought a genuine investment would have already committed their resources 
by the time the Iornn & Dereham was offered to them; further, it is reasonable 
to assume that the W1sbech branch was an intention known to ma~ in the 
october of 1844, and that some at least would prefer to reserve their 
investment for the shares of a line already at a premium rather than risk 
it in a compa~ whose future was still problematical. 
I Iqnn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 1st February 1845. 
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Section 5: Williams and the work of a promoter:-
In tracing the formation of the three Iurnn railways to the form in which 
they came before Parliament, direct references to the work of Williams have 
been few in number. However, it must be recognised that it wa.s to the 
comprehensiveness of his outlook, and to his drive and purpose that the 
successes so far noted are entire~ to be attributed. The Provisional 
Committees were empty shadows, no more than devices to propagate an image of 
respectability. It is to be especially remarked that he was able to father 
three projects, occurring side by side and each subject to considerable 
modification, without being smothered by the mass of detailed and laborious 
work necessitated by the Standing Orders of 177~ and 1840 (originally 
concerned with roads and canals) which governed the whole procedure of 
railway incorporation. 
The system was slow, tortuous and costly. Throughout it tempted 
dishonesty. Initially, detailed plans and notices had to appear in the 
London Gazette; the surveys involved were frequent~ conducted in winter 
conditions and at a time when the surveyors and engineers engaged were 
preoccupied with the business of the forthcoming session. Haste was 
.t. I inevitable, and repet~ ~on a usual consequence; certai~ this was so in the 
cases of the three lines under discussion. This was to be followed by the 
compilation of the prospectus, a hazardous task in that it must be convincing 
without being fulsome and must anticipate objections without suggesting them 
by denial. Previously, the Provisional Committee had to be mustered. 
Here the aim waS to enlist as ma~ titled dignitaries as possible, and to 
back these with an array of public figures and men of substance; ideal~, 
I Cf.Clifford, op.cit. Vol.l, p.83. 
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the majority would come from the neighbourhood of the line, although a 
minority, by their addresses, would indicrrte a wider field of support. 
Naturally, there vlere abuses open to the unscrupulous promoter -
misrepresentation of intention to the members, the use of the names of 
non-existent persons, the use of names without permission etc: - but as far 
as the evidence goes iVilliams eschewed sudh practices. Indeed, willing 
members were rarely lacking. Those seeking an early allocation of scrip, 
M.P.s desirous of pleasing their constituents, and landowners eager to 
placate their tenants or hopeful of substantial land compensation were only 
too anxious to be recruited. The matter was felt to be of great importance 
in the attraction of capital. Williams, in stressing that the L & E was 
not "a bubble scheme for the interests of the few", cited the membership of 
2 
the Provisional Committee as "the best guarantee of sincerity". In this 
case the list contained 11 M.P.s and titles and wc.s headed by the Earl of 
Leicester. In contrast, the E & B committee comprised only 25 names of 
which none was of great significance; the already guaranteed support of the 
L & E proprietors would sufficiently explain this rather unusual feature. 
Finally, in different circumstances again, the L & D committee list was felt 
to require considernble attention, 35 members including seven titled figures 
and M.P.s, and 26 Iurnn and Norfolk men eventually being included. 
Following these early stages there was a cumbersome mass of routine 
work to be accomplished. By the end of the November which preceded the 
application before Parliament, detailed notices had to be served (inviting 
a response of 'assent', 'dissent' or 'neuter') on all landowners, tenants 
1 Cf.Frnncis op.cit. Vol.2, p.127. 
2 Williams on the 23rd April 1844. 
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and occupiers along the proposed route; ~imilarly, plans had to be deposited 
with each Clerk of the Peace. By the 31st December detailed Books of 
Reference had to be deposited in each parish. The whole system involved 
frantic bursts of energy followed by lengtqy periods of waiting. When a 
compa~ was conceived as late in the year as was the ~nn & Dereham the pace 
was tremendous, and it is hard~ surprising to find that the plans of this 
line were deposited in Norwich at 6.30p.m. on the last possible day of 
1 
acceptance. Unexpected difficulties were apt to arise. In one instance 
Williams encountered difficulty in getting plans lithographed in London, so 
intense was the pressure of such work there. He set up a compa~ press in 
Lynn itself. Eight days before one particular set of plans was due the press 
exhausted its supp~ of lithograph paper. Fresh supplies were ordered to 
arrive in Lynn on the Saturd~ before the crucial Tuesday, but these failed 
to arrive. Enquiries revealed that the paper was detained in Ely, from 
which place it was fetched by carriage on the Sunday. Mond~ saw the 
printing of the plans, and Tuesday a triumphant Williams driving down High 
2 
Street to loud cheers and waving the plans in his hand. 
One other aspect of the promotions merits brief attention, namely the 
source of the money expended on statione~, the printing of the prospectus 
and surveyors' and engineers' fees before a single penqy had been received in 
deposits. It w~s customary to raise loans by letters of appeal to prominent 
persons - most like~ the same ones would later be a.pproached to become 
members of the Provisional Committee - and eventua.l~ to repay the money 
so raised in either cash or in scrip issue~ however, as suggested in the 
1 So endorsed on the plans examined in the Norfolk County Records Office 
Norwich. 
2 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald 15th Febru~ 1890; Personal 
Recollections of a Lynn Sexagenarian. The writer was Thew who h"d 
actua1~ been employed in the press described above. 
3 G.H.Evans, op.cit. p.18. 
in 
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previous cha.pter, it would :tppear the.t the yromoters of the Lynn railw8.ys, 
especially so Everard, had been prepared to spend their own money in such 
matters as the employment of Rastrick. The expenses were undoubted~ heavy, 
but the blessing of cheap postage in the distribution of the nrosnectus 
~ J: 
represented one alleviation - before 1840 it cost, for example, 9d. to send 
a letter from ~nn to Wisbech, a mere 16 miles away. 
Finn.lly, why 1'.'81'e there three separate companies projected by one and 
the same nwn to ~)crve the same town and with the declared intention of 
ama1gf.mation n.fter completion? Fundamental~, the reason must be that each 
line constituted the response to a separate stimulus. 
been united and then had failed because of the ,:,.'eakne· s of one of them the 
consequences for ~nn would have been serious indeed. Second~, the late 
introduction of the E & B and then the L & D schemes precluded a~ guarantee 
that their respective bills could be prepared in time for the 1845 session. 
To take the risk implied might he.ve meant that all three were delayed a full 
year. Third~, Williams had had to act with extreme caution. At first he 
had to reckon with the view prevailing in ~nn that the town could only have 
one railway; only as threats to the town multiplied and the national 
enthusiasm for railways mounted had he been able to expand his proposals. 
Further, there was the risk that the Eastern Counties Company might have 
taken exception to the formation of a large concern so close to its own 
territory, and the attitude of Parliament to monopolies was another matter 
requiring close study and careful handling. Yet another consideration is 
that the lc.nded interests of west and central Norfolk had little concern for 
their Fenland counterparts, and therefore might have been expected to offer 
more active support to lines 2oparent~ restricted in their individual scope. 
--~ .. --~-..... . 
------~ 
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Finally, it is not being cynical to remark that Williams f personal profits 
would inevitably be higher f'rom the legal business involved in the f'ormation 
of three comp.'1nies, than they would be f'rom that of' one united enterprise. 
Section 6: Where did the capital come f'rom? 
This is a mo st dif'ficul t que st ion to answer as neither ban!cs, the 
archives of' the British Tre.nsport Commission nor the office of the Lynn firm 
of solicitors descended from Goodwin, Pf'rtridge & Williams hElve alliY records 
bearing on the ID2.tter. Reports of compa~ meetings hnve proved to be 
profoundly irritating. Even Y;hen a proprietor spoke or questioned the 
board he is only too frequently in these reports described as 'a proprietor' , 
and rarely is a clue to identity given; similarly, letters to the press were 
almost invariably written over a pseudo~. The problem is further 
complicated by the rate at which shares changed hands. The capital account 
for the period up to the 31st Deoember, 1848 showed £64-7-6d. as having been 
reoeived in tra.nsfer fees. As the fee in question was 2s.6d. per 
transpction this indioates that 515 blocks of shares had changed hands 
during the previous three and a half years. Of these ohanges there is no 
record at all. 
The most positive lead comes from the Subscription Contracts deposited 
in connection with the 181+5 bills~ These ere not complete records as 
Standing Orders required evidence only that 75% of the oapital sought had 
been subscribed. The full lists are given in Appendix D, and only a 
summarised form is included here. The most interesting feature to be 
observed is that of geogra!>hica.l distribution. 
1 Accounts & Fa.pers 1845 (13) xl, a.nd 1845 (317) xl for alphabetical lists 
of subscribers to the 1845 bills for sums of over .£2,000 and under 
£2,000 respectively. 
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The IQrnn &: Ely 
Total capital: £300,000. Amount traced: £232,215. 
The number of individual subscribers for each area is given in brackets. 
Norfolk 1 LiverpoOl ~ Manchester Lancashire 
£22,700 (28) £20,450 (43) £24,375 (9 ) £9,950 (5) £21,000 (14) 
West Riding Hull London Re st of Britain 
£17,245 (17) £26,795 (31) £4.6,425 (29) £4.3,475 (31) 
The dispari~ in the average individual investments as between areas is to be 
particularly noted. General~ the shares were issued in blocks of £3,750 or 
£1,875 which does suggest that some of the larger investors were willing to 
go much further, but mal\Y exceptions were made for Iqnn, Norfolk and Hull 
where subscriptions of as little as £50 were allowed, or converse~ in the 
case of Sheppherd of ~nn as much as £J,875. This indicates the eagerness 
of the promoters to obtain local support, but the facts are hard~ in keeping 
with the claims concerning the extent of this referred to in earlier sections, 
unless, as suggested, mal\Y of the original applications for scrip were purelY 
speculative in character. Folkes is seen here as holding o~ £900 of the 
shares although he was the chairman of the compal\Y; W.Everard had subscribed 
£3,000, Cresswell £2,000 and J.B.Whiting £1,500. Sugars, the contractor who 
subsequent~ built the stations on the line held £950 of shares. Further 
detailed comment is reserved for Apoendix D. 
The Ely &: Huntingdon 
Total Capital: £194,400. 
~ 
£2,500 (1) 
West Riding 
Norfolk 
£2,375 (3) 
Hull 
-
2 Amount traced: £132,015. 
Manchester Liverpool Lancashire 
£41,175 (20) £14,500 (12) £13,875 (15) 
London Rest of Britain 
£19,500 (15) £31,465 (20) £6,425 (9) 
1 Including north Cheshire. 2 In the original £25 units. 
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These figures indicate some considerable exhaustion of local resources, if 
not a positive reluctance to come forward. Heavy reliance had to be placed 
on industrial sources, and maqy of the individuals concerned were obviouslY 
those large scale capitalists who had been partlY or totally disappointed in 
their applications to the ~nn & ElY. This is particularlY suggested by 
reference to the Manchester and London lists where not onlY do a number of 
names reoccur but the investments are shown to be for the most part in units 
of £2,000 or more. To be noted amongst the individuals are Buck, the 
engineer of the ElY & Huntingdon, with £1,250 (in the Manchester list) and 
such large scale investors as Masterman, a London banker, who was to have 
£116,000 involved in the projects of 1846, A.Liebert, a Manchester merchant, 
with £46,985 in 1846, and S.Schwabe, a Manchester textile manufacturer, who 
1 had £71,075 invested in the schemes of the following year. 
The LYnn & Dereham 
Total Capital: £270,000. Amount traced: £198,250 
~ Norfolk Manchester Liverpool Lancashire 
£13,750 (11) £6,750 (7) £9,000 (6) £4.9,950 (27) £15,500 (9) 
West Riding Hull London Rest of Britain 
£15,750 (19) £1,750 (2) £57,550 (25) £28,250 (19) 
In this case there was no definite pattern as regards the amount of investment 
allowed; thus Lloyd, a private gentleman of London, was able to put in £15,000, 
and Lacy of Lancashire £10,000. The great variations in individual 
subscriptions clearlY suggests that by the time this third promotion was 
presented to the public there was little room for choice in the acceptance of 
applications. The very poor response from Iqnn and Norfolk is to be 
particularlY noted. 
1 Accounts & Papers 1846 (473) xxxviii. 
ill 
Summary 
Total Capi tala £764,400 Amount traced: £562,480 
~ Norfolk Manchester Liverpool Lancashire 
£48,950 £29,375 £74,550 £74,400 £50,375 
West Riding Hull London Rest of Britain 
-
£52,495 £28,545 0.35,440 £78,150 
These relative totals provide a clear rebuttal of G.H.Evan's view 
that local capital would predominate in areas far removed from London and 
the major industrial centres; The massive obligation owed by Lynn to 
distant commerce and industry is only too clear, and this is to be 
considered against the great eagerness of the looal communities to have 
railways provided for them. In the course of this work attempts will be 
made to indicate the major alterations in the balance and nature of the 
investment patterno It will be seen that the principal trend was for 
Manchester capital to assume increasing dominance, so much so that 
ICrito' of Lynn, writing in 1862, could claim without fear of contra-
diction that it was "the men of Manchester who made our railways for us"~ 
1 Op.cit.p6. For further refutation see S.A.Broadbridge in the Economio 
History Review,Vol.VIII,Noo2,p210,'The Early Capital Market; The 
Lanoashire & Yorkshire Railw~'. He also ~uotes E.Doble (the Eastern 
Counties Railw~ and Economic Development - unpublished PhoD.thesis, 
London,1939) to show that less than one third of the E.C.R.'s 1836 
capital originated from looal sources o 
2 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald,15th February,1862o 
Chapter 3 
Deceptive Foundations 
Section 1: Railway Bills and Parliament: 
Schemes for the construction of several hundred miles of new rail~ in 
the eastern counties were laid before Parliament at the outset of the 1~5 
session! Of the situation in Norfolk and Suffolk the Railway Department of 
2 
the Board of Trade felt constrained to report: 
"We cannot but remark on the extent to which Railw~ speculation 
has gone for the construction of lines in this district, and the 
improbability of the Legislature sanctioning at present more than 
a small proportion of the projects we have enumerated." 
The prophecy was sound. Of the 2,81~ miles of new line authorised in 1~5 
onlY some 180 concerned the eastern counties as a whole, and of this total the 
three Iqnn companies claimed 85 miles; the total share of Norfolk and Suffolk 
was just over 100. Just~ did the editor of the ~ Advertiser & West 
Norfolk Herald claim~ 
" ••• no town in the kingdom has been so successful in its applications 
to Parliament in this or a~ previous session." 
undoubted~ (in his view) 4 
"a circumstance to be attributed alone to the zeal, ability and 
perseverance of J.C.W111iams Esq. under whose able direction 
they have been placed." 
The promoter in question rio~ deserved such praise. Lack of adequate 
transport facilities within the areas of the three lines and the absence of 
opposition from other companies, either existing or proposed, in the 
neighbourhood of Iqnn help to explain his success, but primarily this was the 
consequence of the very thorough preparation which lay behind the three bills 
1 For the full list see Appendix E. 
2 Report on the Schemes for Extendill8 Rai1w~ Communications in the Counties 
of Norfolk and Suffolk, March 1845. 
3 Editorial of the 26th JulY, 1845. 
~ Editorial of the 28th June, 1845· 
.:!:::!:t 
and of the convincing nature of the evidence amassed on their behalf. 
However, as five years after authorisation the lines concerned were not 
onlJ still incomplete but also bankrupt with bailiffs riding on eve~ train, 
it is pardonable to question the real value of the scrutiqy undergone by the 
bills during their progress through Parliament. Circumstances that could not 
be foreseen in 1~5, and in particular mistaken policies on the part of the 
companies' directors, played an important part in this later failure, but the 
essential weakness was that the companies, in their authorised form, had been 
founded on fundamental miscalculations which Parliament allowed to pass 
unrecognised. Thus, as early as 1847, Herapath could write of the East 
,r 
Anglian Railways Compaqy (formed in that year by the amalgamation of the three 
hitherto independent concerns) that after "exceeding all expectation in 
magnitude of cost ••••• it bids fair to fall sad~ short of original expectation 
in regard to its profitable return"; while 'Quiet Observer' could truthfully 
comment that "maI\Y have erred in construction costs but few so badly in 
traffic estimates"~ 
It was on these estimates of cost, likely revenue and return on capital 
that Parliament principal~ relied in assessing the merits of a new project, 
although the bona fide intentions of the promoter, his ability to carry the 
project through, and the national and local advantages to be derived from his 
line were other matters for close consideration. Parliament's task, as the 
watch-dog over public investment, was no easy one. Confronted with an 
overwhelming mnss of business and deafened by the subjective clamour of 
promoters, investors (who had their deposits to lose), opponents (who in the 
1 Editorial, 20th November, 1847, p.13l1. 
2 Herapath, 16th December, 1848, p.1296. 
1 
r, 
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event of the failure of their application were liable ~or costs) and o~ 
communities anxious for the benefits of railway communication, it was in 
essence being asked to judge a problematical future in terms of an imperfect~ 
known pre sent. Unless great care were exercised Parliamenta~ committees 
were apt to be at the mercy of carefully primed witnesses, who "for an 
adequate consideration could express a ve~ decided and o~ course competent 
opinion in reference to a new line or the resources of a town in the 
neighbourhood"~ and of skilled counsel who at fees of atVthing ~rom £200 to 
2 £300 per d~ had eve~ incentive to be extremely convincing in their cases. 
Indeed, Williams' own success lay partly in the fact that he was able to brief 
some of the leading counsel of the d~; Mr.Talbot Q.C., for exemple, who after 
appearing against the ~nn & Ely to the cost of that compa~ (see below) then 
led with striking success for the ~nn & Dereham, was able, because of his 
skill in railway matters, to earn some £12,000 per annum during this period~ 
It was because o~ the dangers inherent in such subjective presentation that 
heavy reliance had to be placed on seemingly objective figures. 
The figures concerned, however, served o~ to deceive. Quite apart 
from the facts that these estimates were compiled by the promoters themselves, 
end then examined by committees which had no absolute means of checking their 
truth and which were virtual~ without comparable precedents on which to draw, 
they were ill-conceived in their own right. 
Not even construction costs, including all expenses necessary to put line 
and plant in running order, were susceptible to accurate forecast, although 
such were usually presented to the nearest pen~. Although ma~ months must 
1 F.S.Williums; Our Iron Roads, London & Derby 1883, p.72. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
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elapse before the first contrac~could be placed, existing prices were used 
as the base, the possible inadequacy of initial surveys was ignored, and 
possible technical advances (e.g. larger locomotives requiring heavier track) 
were overlooked. In particular it was land costs in which prophecy invited 
painful rebuttal. Landowners had already learned the effective means of 
extortion, and the Land Clauses Consolidation Act of May 1845 (8 Vic.c.18) 
further strengthened their hand, for they knew that few companies dared 
countenanoe the delay involved in resorting to the arbitration procedure laid 
down in the act. In this and construction costs in general neither Parliament 
nor promoter had learned from the experienoe of most of the 1836 companies. 
The former continued to accept the figures given it, and to authorise capital 
barelY exceeding the estimate as if prices could never change, and as if 
landowners would natural~ be content with prices actuallY related to the 
value of their properties. 
Even more forcible objections may be laid against the estimates of 
revenue, purporting to show what could be expected in terms of existing road 
and water traffic. The dubious value of such calculations has alre~ been 
indicated in that on supposedlY the same evidence the Iunn & Dereham estimated 
a return of ~ on its line, the Marriotta one of under 2.% (see chapter 2). 
Allowing that dailY activities and the nature of sooial patterns can be 
reduced to figures only in retrospect, as foreoasts of such are invalidated by 
the impossibility of foreseeing the intangible consequences of imposing the new 
and untried on the old, serious internal weaknesses in the ooncept of the 
estimates remain. The method of their compilation was the obvious oase in 
point. The so oalled traffio experts - suoh as the Mr.Pares employed by 
Williams - relied prinCipallY on Parliamenta~ Returns (where these existed), 
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on stamp Office Returns (restricted in their application) and above all on the 
evidence and opinions of local tradesmen, merchant s, farmers, innkeepers and 
coachmen. Very often a traffic census was held to supplement these sources, 
but such was usual~ short in duration, confined to the most favourable months 
of the year, and incomplete in its coverage. Taken in a year of growing 
prosperity it had little application to a year of depression, or, in rural 
areas, to seasons of bad weather when harvest yields might be down a full 25~ 
On broader grounds the revenue estimates were founded on the facile assumption 
that virtual~ all existing traffic would transfer to the railway, and so 
ignored both the time necessary to develop a line's potential and the possible 
opposition of road and water interests entrenched within the area; the 
possible effects of other railw~s were also general~ ignored unless such 
were held to constitute a positive benefit. Two further fundamental 
weaknesses were that the estimates were based on a scale of rates still to be 
sanctioned (the L & E bill, for example, was recommitted after the second 
reading for the purpose of fixing maximum tolls), and that no account was taken 
of the wealth of the area and the associated problem of ensuring flexibility in 
charges as the means of developing maximum traffic. Final~, the whole was 
too much influenced by what had happened in favourable circumstances elsewhere. 
Working expenses were estimated as a percentage of anticipated revenue. 
Needless to s~ they were based on current wage levels and coke prices etc. 
and rested on a pure~ theoretioal concept of the eventual establishment. 
They ignored such problematical issues as the quality of the materials and the 
mechanical efficiency of the rolling stock that were still to be purchased. 
Depreciation oosts were hard~ if ever specified. It followed that if these 
1 Caird; English Agriculture in 1850-51; London, 1852, p.52l. 
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or a~ of the estimates proved erroneous then the return on oapital would be 
affected, and that this, in the nature of things, would be to the eventual 
detriment of the shareholder. The matter was serious. On the estimates 
were based both the fact and the financial content of the Act of Incorporation, 
an indioation to all that the project was to be considered sound. But once 
work was begun, such is the specialised nature of railw~ equipment, 
completion alone could prevent the loss of thousands of pounds whatever 
exoessive oosts or diffiou1ties were enoountered. If on completion the 
revenue estimates likewise proved defective, then the situation was serious 
indeed. 
The criteria of assessment were themselves suffient~ weak to just~ 
condemnation of the whole system, but unfortunate~ the matter did not end 
there. All might have been reasonab~ well if there had been some degree of 
oonsistenoy in their app1ioation, and a series of c1ear~ defined principles 
against whioh the,y might have been set, but neither existed in 1~5. Both 
were in fact promised by the short-lived committee of the Railw~ Department 
of the Board of Trade (Lord Dalhousie's Committee of the 'Five Kings') which 
between August 1844 and Ju~ '45 endeavoured to achieve a rational ordering of 
a ohaotic situation. Suggested by the Select Committee on Railw~ Procedure 
as an expedient means of dealing with the rising flood of rai1w~ applications, 
it was entrusted with the task of advising Far1iament on the merits of eaoh 
individual bill, subject o~ to the reservation that all its decisions were 
"without prejudioe to the olaims of private persons", the judgement of which 
was "altogether reserved to the Houses of the Legislature": It was this 
committee which laid down the principles of assessment enumerated above, but 
15th Report of the Select Committee on Railway Procedure, March 1844. 
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at the same time it offended deeplylby disturbing the unfounded assumption of 
the established companies that by their acts of incorporation they had been 
iDVested with a perpetual monopoly within their particular territories; now 
eaoh project was to be judged strictly on its merits, although it was 
reoognised that existing companies could usually build and run a line more 
oheaply than could a new concern. The board did some valuable work - it. 
part in discouraging the foolhar~ contraction of the L & D line has alrea~ 
been discussed - but not infrequently its advice was disregarded; of the 93 
bills recommended by the Board for acceptance o~ 73 became law - 6 of the 19 
2 put forward for rejection were actually aocepted. Behind this m~ be 
discerned the same elements that, having successfully transferred the onus of 
judgement to the Commons, rendered impossible in the House calm objectivity 
and consistency alike. 
For this are principally to be blamed those M.P.s anxious to please their 
constituents in railw~ bills as in all else, the 157 members with an aggregate 
railway investment of £291,000 (these were, of course, the mouthpieces of the 
established companies), and, above all, the law,yers of the House who, in oommon 
with their parasitic brethren throughout the country, were waxing fat on 
conditions of unbridled enterprise, oomfortable in the knowledge that they 
need not suffer from a~ of the inevitable repercussions of excess. Nothing 
better illustrates the attitude of this last group than its suocess in 
engineering the defeat of a proposal to reduoe Parliament~ costs by allowing 
oounsel for lines to address committees only in opening their oases, and not, 
as was the practice, at both the beginning and end of the evidence~ 
1 In its very first report, that on the proposed lines in Kent. 
2 Lewin; Railway Mania & Aftermath 
3 Proposed by the Seleot Committee on Railw~ Procedure, 17th March, 1~5. 
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Bearing in mind that no birr-could proceed until 5% of the capital figure 
to be sought (collected in deposits) had been lodged with the Court of Chancer,y, 
and until Subscription Contracts alleged~ proving subscription to 75% of the 
1 
capital had been presented, and assuming that the Standing Orders Committee of 
the Commons had been sate~ passed (here a number of bills failed on grounds 
total~ irrelevant to the instrinsic merits of the line proposed), the 
principal instrument of examination was one of the Commons' committees 
appointed to scrutinise each bill atter its second reading. 
These all important committees had been established early in 1845 on the 
recommendation of the Select Committee charged to devise some practical means 
2 
of dealing with the 240 odd railw~ bills pending in the forthcoming session. 
Each committee comprised five members and was assigned a particular 
geographical area. In that committee members were to be complete~ 
disinterested in the area within their purview, jobbery and the open canvassing 
of the Speaker by interested parties were eliminated, but on the other hand the 
system bred its own evils. Charged with the responsibilit.y of hearing the 
proof of the preamble to each bill (i.e. demonstration of advantages to be 
gained and substantiation of the estimates), and then considering individual 
clauses (in cases where there were rival schemes a decision had to be given as 
to which should be allowed to proceed), lack of local knowledge, by placing 
a premium on interested evidence, proved an immediate disadvantage. Moreover, 
the artificial divisions on whioh the system was b~sed did not necessari~ 
represent natural railw~ units, while preoccupation with limited areas tended 
1 B,y questioning the validity of the London & York Subscription Contracts in 
1845 Hudson was enabled to hold that scheme up for a year, but in general 
terms such were so adaptable to sucoessful fraud as to be perfect~ useless _ 
and in fact they were recognised as being so and abolished, but not until 1859-
2 Report of the Select Committee on Railwa;y Procedure, 28th February 184.5. the 
system applied also in the Lords, but o~ if the bill were opposed ther~. 
~ 
to preclude an overall view of the developing situation. Inevitably, 
multiplica.tion of committees, in the absence of clearly defined principles, 
produced a wide diversity of standards; that what would satisfy one committee 
would not necessarily satisfy another was clearly demonstrated when the E & H 
was permitted to pay ~ interest on calls without the practice being called 
into question, but the L & D was not. This laok of oonsistenoy applied 
equally to larger and far more important matters. Thousands of pounds were 
squandered on PRrliamentar,y costs and actual construction "mainly from that 
uncertainty of the legislation, from having no definite principle whatever 
1 
laid down as to whether competition or not was the rule"; moreover, six bills 
rejeoted in 1844 were passed on virtually unchanged evidenoe in 1845. 
Indeed, "uncertainty" was the only certain factor on which a promoter could 
count when bringing his bill before Parliament. 
Section 2: A Critical View of the Assets on whioh Williams based his Case 
With this "uncertainty" and lack of absolute standards of assessment in 
mind it becomes necessary to take a hard look at the various sources from 
which Williams expected his railways to derive their revenue, and in part iou-
lar to emphasise the weaknesses which neither Williams nor Parliament 
deteoted. It will be found that without a major exoeption appearances 
flattered to deoeive and that beneath each apparent source of promise l~ 
hddden hazards. Recognising that all three estimates ~ be treated as a 
unity in that each centred on ~nn as the natural focal point of all the 
areaS served, attention naturally turns first of all to the harbour of that 
place. 
1 Select Committee on Railway & Canal Amalgamation, P.P.185z/3 xxxviii, 
lOlA, question 79, evidenoe of S.Laing,M.P. 
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A. wnn Harbour 
Despite fluctuations the volume of trade handled in Lynn Harbour was of 
impressive (limensions: 
Year Coals Imported Other Goods Year Coals Imported Other 
-
1831 160,531 cha1drons 69,492 tons 1839 187,718 chald. 109,707 
1832 184,365 " 82,225 " 1840 189,506 " 105,271 
1833 185,545 " 76,190 " 1841 256,094 tons 109,560 
1834 163,458 " 52,146 " 1842 243,252 " 86,797 
1835 169,457 " 84,613 " 1843 237,213 " 94,390 
1836 186,091 " 97,920 " 1844 198,775 " 122,695 
1837 201,867 " 95,556 " 1845 302,463 " 141,935 
1838 178,249 " 108,021 " 
N.B. 1. A cha1dron of coal was 25 cwt. See Ap;Jendix A. 
2. General Imports rose steep~ in 1844 and 145 large~ because of 
the timber brought in in connection with the construction of the 
Norwich & Brandon Railway. 
Source: W.Armes; The Port of King's ~nn, Appendix, p.56. 
During the crucial period of 1843 to '45 exports, most~ of agricultural 
produce but also of 100a1 manufactured goods, wool and sand, avereged 67,000 
1 
tons per annum. This figure was liable to fluctuation with the state of the 
harvest, but since 1840 had been enoouraging~ steady; it is to be remembered 
that in seeking to dispel the gloo~ picture of ~nn trade deliberate~ painted 
by Williams, Self, the chief opponent of the L & E concept, had said that 
between 1841 and 143 exports of corn had not varied more than 1,200 quarters, 
2 
and were actuallY up if flour were taken into account. 
The content of this trade and the defects of the harbour against which it 
was conducted need no further elaboration. It was confidently expected that 
the former would continue to comprise imported coals, building materials, 
manufactured goods, timber, wines and beers, together with exported 
1 Admiralty Preliminary Inquiry into the Norfolk Estuary Bill, p. 32. 
2 ~nn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 28th March, 1844. 
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agricultural produce, and that the latter would be remedied by the Norfolk 
Estuary proposals. However, althoush the fact was not appreciated, the whole 
pattern for the future was in considerable doubt in that the structure of the 
existing trade was such as to render the railw~s' dependence on the harbour 
peculiar~ ill-founded. The warning signals were the clear~ marked 
predominance of the coastal traffic over the foreign, and of the import trade 
over the export. 
Arrivals at wnn _~~lt3-18J...a 
Coastwise 
No .. Tonna-fie No. 
1843 2241 194,521 11 
1844 2251 182,384 
1845 2826 253,919 
1846 2193 182,678 
1847 2526 222,068 
1848 2049 188,476 
Colonial 
Tonnafie 
2,864-
Foreign Ports 
British SP.iM ~.o_r~~ILs...1'!.iJ2!. 
No. Tonna-fie No.. Tonnage 
71 
120 
110 
123 
80 
131 
13,058 
18,613 
17,439 
19,991 
14,385 
20,375 
106 
183 
162 
149 
167 
110 
6,618 
IJ+,994 
16,404 
10,761 
15,320 
7,618 
N.B. The sudden decline in the volume of coastal trade between 1847 and 
1848 was the first positive sign that north to south railw~s were 
beginning to threaten the harbour's trade. 
Coastwise Colonial Foreign Port s. 
No. Tonnage No. Tonnage No. Tc?"IlEa~e 
1843 1084 62,623 2 438 25 3,714 
1844 1042 67,788 
1845 1178 67,664- The colonial and foreign sailings for 1843 on 
1846 956 56,862 were in ballast o~. 
181 ... 7 868 48,481 
l8J-t-B 858 40,212 
Source: Admiralty Preliminary Inquiry into the Norfolk Estuary Bill, April 
l8J ... 9, p. 64 Append.ix 4. 
The declining volume of trade evidenced as ear~ as 1846 mere~ 
illustrated the working out of possibilities that should have been obvious 
in 1845, but the promoters l~dallowei their judgement to be ooloured by the 
optimum conditions obtaining in that year, and persisted in seeing their 
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lines against the background of the pre-railway era. In particular it was 
the coastal trade that was vulnerable under changed circumstances. This was 
conducted in small vessels averaging o~ 81 tons burthenj as the D~ boats 
1 
registered at ~nn in 1845 averaged 115 tons and were obvious~ the most 
frequent visitors to the harbour there, the great majority of the craft 
engaged must have been ve~ small indeed. Moreover, the greater number of 
them were laden in one o_irection o~, although, whenever possible, the coal 
keels were utilised for the carriage of corn in the outward direction. 
Together, these facts seem to indicate that the whole system was bare~ an 
economical~ sound proposition. When confronted Yf'ith the competition of the 
north to south railways which could carry, at comparable rates, superior bulk 
more direetly, and with far less intermediate handling, it was clear~ fore-
doomed to failure. This applied particularly in coal, but almost equally so 
to the export of the barley that was so "highly prized"~Y the brewers of 
Lancashire and Yorkshire and sent to them by way of Hull. The foreign trade, 
in itself quite inadequate to support the ~nn railways, laboured under 
similar circumstances. The small ships engaged - they had an average burthen 
of about 110 tons - would without doubt have a greater value to their owners 
if diverted to those ports which offered greater opportunities for obtaining 
an outward cargo. 
Under such circumstances the ~nn railways would of course still obtain 
much of the freight traffic coming into the area, but they would have lost 
their monopoly at the point of ent!"'J and would have to coronete with such lines 
as those from Ely to Norwich and from ~ondham to East Dereham for what was 
offered. Williams was sincere in believing that ~nn could be transformed 
1 Admiralty Preliminary Inquiry, p.~, Appendix 4. 
2 '¥bite's Norfolk Directory 1845, p.519. 
~ 
into a major port, and during 184b the L & E actual~ introduced a bill into 
Parliament for the construction of docks there in furtherance of that end, but 
the overall situation was such that o~ the e~tablishment of extensive 
industries within the general area of Norfolk and the Fens could render the 
intention practical; for such development there was neither reason nor 
incentive save the sectional interests and needs of a small town and three 
minor railway s. It is also to be remembered in this general context that eVen 
if the harbour trade was maintained at its 184-5 level the imports were to be 
disseminated over a. wide area, much of which (especially so north Norfolk) was 
outside the range of the three railways. 
One other aspect of harbour activity deserves mention. Some 195 fishing 
smacks (average 6 tons burthen) were registered at IQrnn~ and apart from local 
consumption of fresh oysters, cockles, smelt and cod, 72 baskets a week, or 
. t 2 65 tons a year, of shr~ps were sen to the London markets. Here was the 
nucleus of a remunerative traffic, a fact realised in later years when the 
E.A.R. directors made vain efforts to interest their shareholders in the 
development of the indust~ into competition with that of Yarmouth (where 
half a million pounds was invested); but, quite apart from the refusal 
encountered, nature itself too~ a hand. Silting in the Wash had already 
dealt a death blow to the sole fisheries, and by 1860 incursions of starfish 
3 had large~ destroyed the once profitable oyster beds. 
B. The Volume of Traffic on the Ouse 
In its final estimates the L & E compa~ set a value of £16,000 on the 
conveyance inland of coals and slates etc., and a further £4,000 or so on that 
1 Admiralty Preliminary Inqui~ 184-9, Appendix 4. 
2 White's Norfolk Directo~ 1845, p.519. 
3 Hillen, op.cit. p.785. 
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of general merchandise of the type then monopolised by the river. Calculated 
at the rate of 1d. per mile this suggests an expectation of 4,800,000 ton miles, 
which divided by 26 to represent the length of the route implies that each year 
about 200,000 tons of freight were carried between ~nn and Ely. The evidence 
against which this assumption m~ be checked is of necessity scattered in 
nature. The only definite tonnage figure is that supplied by Armes who said 
that each year 10,000 tons of coal and general merchandise were despatched 
1 by way of the Quse to Bury St. Edmunds. This, however, represents only a 
marginal traffic and one which was to be lost to Ipswich as soon as the 
railways of that town were developed. Illuminating but imprecise are the 
revenue figures of the various navigation interests involved. In opposing 
the L & E bill the Eau Brink Commissioners claimed an income of £11,720 per 
annum, of which £3,610 was derived from a tax of 5d. per ton levied on all 
up-river traffic~ The South Level Commissioners had a toll income of about 
£2,800~ The conclusion to be drawn from these figures is that at least 
175,000 tons of goods passed up the river each year, an average of some 465 
tons per day to be distributed between the various tributar,y routes. This is 
seen to be a by no means unlikely figure when it 15 recalled that in 1844 a 
total of 321,470 tons of coals and other goods had been landed at, or passed 
through, ~nn Harbour, and that the L & E prospectus had claimed a likely 
coal traffic of 150,000 tons per annum along its mainline. The ~nn Corpora-
tion tolls levied on up-river traffic, calculated in small pence payments and 
4 
excluding coals, averaged no more than £140/-/6 per annum thus tending to 
confirm both the overall predominance of coals and the SUbstantial accuracy 
of the above calculations. But, by comparing the L & E estimate and the 
1 The Port of King' s ~nn, p .14. 
2 Herapath, 26th April, 1845, p·594; evidence of C.Pemberton, treasurer to the 
Eau Brink Commission before the Commons Committee on the L & E bill. 
3 Herapath, 26th Apri1,1845, p·594. 
4 Guild Hall Book, Vo1.14, p.765j minute of the 21st May. For details of the 
__ --Jj:t~o'""l-l~s aee Ao.uelldix A. 
; 
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total volume of traffic available, it will be seen that the former was 
assuming a, virtual 100% transference of patronage from river to rail, a 
development that for a variety of reasons was not destined to take place. 
Moreover, the whole traffic case of the L & E rested on the ill-founded 
confidence that the volume and character of Iornn' s harbour trade would 
remain unalt~;red. 
There was, however, a brighter side to the picture. There were several 
indications that the river interests had never developed the full potential of 
their traffic, and that there was remaining a substantial balance of trade to 
be taken from the roads, a much easier proposition from the railway standpoi~ 
In this there is above all the unequivocal testimo~ of Armes that, while the 
river could not possibly accommodate all the local trade~ ~nn Corporation had 
never used its powers to develop the river potential to its f'u1lest~ 
Substance is lent to this contention by the facts that the central lifting 
leaves of the 1821 bridge over the Eau Brink had been opened only once~ and 
by 1845 were firmly embedded in grave11 the special acclaim given to the 
Arrival of an 80 ton vessel at Ely is not without significance~ The most 
probable reason for this situation was that when the river was high, and 
therefore suitable for larger craft, the Drainage Commissioners were 
6 
apprehensive and only the millers pleased. The Eau Brink Commission, an 
example of the former, might indeed derive some £3,600 annually from tolls 
(although one fifth of this went to the Commissioners of NaVigation) but its 
primar,y concern remained drainage, its principal income the £7,032 yielded 
by its Drainage Tax of 6d. per acre? 
1 Op.cit. p.12. 2 Ibid. p.6. 
3 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 4th October, 1845. 
4 White's Norfolk Directo~ 1845, p.517. 
5 Lynn Advertiser & West6Norfolk Herald, 8th January ,1845; extract from the Cambridge Chronicle. Ibid. 22nd February 1845; Barugh Almack 
7 Herapath, 26th April, 1845. • 
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Down-river trPcffic was almost exclusively agrioultural in oontent. 
Provided that ~nn remained the natural outlet of the area for suoh, and 
remembering that some of it derived from tributary streams so that the extra 
handling involved left no advantage in using the railway, there was no reason 
w~ the L & E should not capture a worthwhile share. The volume to be 
contended for m~ be judged from the 1~3 figures of down-river traffio 
1 
entering Lynn: 
Wheat 
Barley 
~e 
~. Bushe11s. 
73,006 
8,185 
3,560 
7 
1 
5 
guts. Bushells. 
Malt 20,573 
Oats 6,280 
Peas 86 
2 
7 
4 
Beans 
Seeds 
~. Bushells. 
15,476 
821 
6 
6 
How the L & E would fare in diverting traffio from river to rail was 
really an open issue, although few, in 1845, would have been found to sub scribe 
to the view of 'A.B.' (referring to L & E prospects) that "the water carriage 
now existing will monopolise the goods traffic on which the income has been in 
2 great measure oa1cu1ated". Rather was it the commonly held opinion that 
the L & E provided the "cheapest, shortest and best approach from the 
interior of the county,,3 and that it would inevitably capture the vast majority 
of the traffic. Indeed, the Drainage Commissioners themselves forecast 
heavy loss and a consequent inability to maintain essential drainage works 
without levying heavy Drainage Taxes. Likewise, few gave much for the 
chances of the Nar Navigation, that "intolerable monopoly"~ in its forthcoming 
conflict with the L & D line_ Portents might have been found, however, in 
the continued p~ent of dividends by some northern canals despite direct 
railway competition. In fA.Ct, canal and river interests alike had been 
1 Bacon, op.cit. p.8. 2 Railway Times, 27th July, 1845, p.830. 
3 Ibid. 20th July, 18h4, p. 797; 'One Who Means to Hold'. 
4 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 1st February, 1845; letter of 
'Anti-Monopoly'. 
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overcharging for years, and now had room to reduce their rates to a level 
at which even the railways could not compete. When to this is added the 
innate conservatism of farmers and rural dwellers in general it is not 
surprising to find that the Quse navigation remained a rival of the railway 
for man;y years, and that even the Nar No.viG2.tion was enabled to survive 
until 1885· 
It might be added at this point that, '.'lhereas the defeat of the navigation 
interests was largely dependent on the provision of cheap and convenient 
services by the railways, and that victo~ was to be delayed, the rout of the 
road interests in all I).re8S was certain to be almost immedia.te. The "fine 
rampart roads" radiating from ~nn, even if they were "better than those of 
most other counties"~ 1',ere of themselves not enough. Even if practical 
opposition had been possible the local Turnpike Trusts were too poor and 
scattered to provide it. The combined balance in hand of the three Lynn 
2 
trusts at the end of 1844 was no more than £].,095/8/5; the ~nn - Norwich 
road, in competition with the L & D, contained an eight mile section between 
Narborough and Swaffham which was maintained o~ by the parishes through 
which it passed; ma~ of the smaller trust roads would not in aqy case be 
affected by rail competition. The coach services and the freight vans which 
plied within the district a.nd linked it with Norwich, London, Cambridge and 
the midlands, were generally too few, too poorly loaded a.nd in too maI\Y hands 
for an effective fight to be made; the multitude of carriers' carts with their 
maximum speed of 24 miles per day could be discounted as serious opposition 
1 White's Norfolk Directo~ 1845, p.507. 
2 Accounts & Papers, 1846; Abstract of the General Statement of the Income 
and Expenditure of the Several Turnpike Trusts in England and 111' 1 
. lIa es (1st Jnnua~ 1844 to 31st December 1844), pp.68-9. 
.L,?U 
except in districts adjacent to the market centres - their inevitable role was 
to work in co-operation with the ra.ilway and to confine independent 
activities to a.reas beyond the reach of the lines. 
C. The Contribution to be made by the Towns 
Not even in the status of King's ~nn as a market centre could reallY 
solid grounds for confidence be justifiablY found. SUperficially, it might 
seem that nothing could go wrong, and" indeed, in terms of the pre-railway 
age there was little that could. But, once again, a close study reveals 
a far from certain situation. Without alW doubt the trading statistics for 
the ~nn markets seemed entirelY favourable. During 1843 no Ie s s than 
107,267 quarters of wheat and 784,672 of barley were sold within the town; as 
1 
the average prices were £2/7/10 and £1/8/8 respectivelY these transactions 
alone had a value of close on £1,400,000. Still more impressive were the 
stock figures, which did not include livestock driven past ~nn, that sold on 
the grazing grounds outside the town or that sold at the free market of 1843, 
the first of its kind in ~nn, at which no count was taken. 
Stock Sales at lpnn Markets 1836-1843 
Year SheeE Pigs Bullocks Horses 
-
1836 22,180 22,121 10,435 194 
1837 22,245 18,995 14,052 166 
1838 22,580 26,339 17,127 239 
1839 40,418 17,718 24,338 589 Source: 
1840 45,680 21,986 16,330 415 Bacon, op.cit.p.126 
1841 52,343 25,415 15,369 849 
1842 48,523 26,717 14,938 540 
1843 53,665 25,172 16,363 240 
These figures serve to confirm onlY one advantage to be derived by the 
railways and no more, namelY that there was every expectation of a profitable 
1 White's Norfolk Directozy 1845, p.523. 
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return from the carriage of livestock towards the London markets. For the 
rest it is to be remembered that the bulk of the corn would, under existing 
circumstances, leave by ~nn Harbour; if this were not the case much of it 
would never come to ~nn at all. A large proportion of both produce and 
livestock also derived from areas which the railw~s could not reach, and 
another portion would find its way more convenientlY either to one of the 
other railw~s of the area (e.g. the Norwich - ElY line) or to one of the 
outer terminal towns of the ~nn railw~s; this latter development would 
automaticallY follow a~ decline in the status of ~nn Harbour. 
The position was complex and one raising several issues affecting both 
freight and passenger revenues. For example, how near to a railway did one 
have to live before using it became an advantage. In this sociological 
considerations playa major part. Walking cost nothing, the use of the 
carriers' carts very little; the better off usuallY had their horses and 
private conveyances. The matter is complicated further by the conflicting 
claims of individual towns. IdeallY, from Williams' point of view, the 
situation could have been expressed in terms of triangles with Lynn as the apex 
and the two lines from it bisecting the respective bases. Thus, the further 
away from Iornn the wider the area from which regular traffic was to be 
anticipated. The concept is disturbed, however, by the siting of individual 
stations, by the presence of other railw~s and above all by the projection of 
similar 'triCl.ngles' from the other ends of the lines. For example, Dereham t s 
'triangle' would be at its narrowest where J.ornn's was widest; it would therefore 
be cheaper to ride or walk into the former than to journey by train to ~nn; 
indeed, as Dereham was to have its own railway to Norwich and to a London line 
reasons for maldng regular journeys to IQrnn were few. Moreover, the crushing 
ill 
poverty of the labouring classes (to be dealt with in a later section) the 
mar'ked reluctance of country dwellers to undertake even short journeys exoept 
for pressing necessities, or some gala occasion such as ~nn Mart, and the 
fact that most of those who regular~ visited ~nn for more than five or six 
miles out were possessed of private conveyances, are all factors casting dark 
shadows on the revenue prospects of the three railways. There was another 
aspect which could not have been foreseen. The coming of railways coupled 
with the end of the turnpike roads resulted, in Norfolk at least, in a great 
increase in the number of travelling salesmen and in the volume and variety 
of articles stocked in country town and village shops alike; there is abundant 
living evidenoe that right until 1918 ma~ natives of the area, even when 
living no further than eight or nine mile s from ~nn , visited the town no more 
than once or twice a year. It followed, assuming these factors to be 
recognised, that it must be the prime concern of the ~nn railways to provide 
such complete facilities and such attractive fares and services as to 
establish the habit of travel from the outset and to settle every open issue 
prompt~ and decisive~ in favour of ~nn. 
to damage that might never be repaired. 
Failure to do this could lead 
Reference to the actual areas involved shows how very pressing these 
matters were. Nowhere was the situation more fluid than at Dereham, the 
1 
centre of the 'Garden of Norfolk', a distributing centre for a large area. 
Long the centre of a tug-ot-war between ~nn and Norwich the rivalry was now 
to be perpetuated when each secured the projeotion of a railway to it. On 
balance Norwich tended to have the best of it, a conclusion tenuously reached 
on the simple evidence that that city had more carriers' and van servioes 
1 W.White; Eastern England from the Thames to the Humber, London 1865, p.212. 
b 
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to Dereham than did ~nn - it would also seem that this tendency, if indeed 
it existed at all, had been accentuated by the opening of the Lowestoft to 
Reedham canal in 1833 and the consequent gain by Norwich of direct access to 
the sea. Only the opposition of landowners had prevented the Wensum from 
being deepened and straightened as far as Dereham2so clinching the matter 
firm~ in favour of Norwich. The ~nn & Dereham would overcome the handicaps 
imposed by the Nar Navigation, and the lack of reasonable road services to 
Dereham, and would thus reduce the issue to a straight fight between two 
railways until either the Direct Norwich & Dereham compaqy was sanctioned or 
until the L & D matured its own schemes for extending through to Norwich; 
Armes had opined that Dereham would turn to ~nn rather than continue to draw 
its trade at high rates from Norwich3- the moral for the L & D board, 
cheap fares and rapid services, was obvious. 
The principal intermediate towns may be brief~ dismissed. Swaffham, 
a "handsome and thriving market town,,40f 3,358 inhabitants, possessing, 
according to White, one of the best markets in the kingdom for cattle and 
corz?, was the centre for the extensive Breckland and, until 1875 when it 
gained direct rail communication with the Norwich - E~ line, was comp1ete~ 
within ~nn's economic orbit. Ironical~ enough, however, because of the 
factors already indicated, the town's expansion after 1845 was largely at the 
expense of ~nn, and therefore also to the direct cost of the L & D itself 
in terms of passenger revenue. Nearby Downham Market, midway along the 
L & E mainline, was of rather less significance. A "neat am clean market 
1 See Appendix F. 2 Bacon, op.cit. p.7. 
3 ~nn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 16th October, 1844. 
4 White's Norfolk Directory 1845, p.384. 
5 Ibid. 
bst. 
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townnl(population 2,953), its activities were restricted by the comparative 
lack of bridging points over the Quse, and even by 1845 its twice weeklY 
markets had suffered severelY from the competition of Iqnn, Wisbech and 
2 Swaf'fham. Folkes described a station there as being "e. great agricultural 
benefit"~ but in truth the town was little more than the focal point for the 
rural communities on the east side of the Quse - an area limited even more in 
that, when more than seven or eight miles out, ~nn to the north and Ely to 
the south proved more convenient for most. 
Ely was likely to be of little direct use to either the L & E or the 
E &: H. With a population of only 6,825, with only one main street and that 
only partially paved, it was indeed within ~nn's sphere, but partially as a 
result of the fact that larger craft had to terminate their journeys up the 
Quse at Littleport,four miles out, the town's interests had turned increasingly 
towards Cambridge and London. The town's importance was as the centre of the 
populous I~le of Ely, a richly soiled area noted for its fruit, vegetables 
and butter; these products mostly found. their way to London4and the possibility 
that the situation would in a~ w~ change was remote - the same applied to 
the cattle and sheep raised in the area. The town's manufactures of tobacco 
pipes, earthenware, and oil from flax, hemp and cole seed were primarily 
intended for local consumption, and were, in a~ case, unlikely by their ve~ 
nature to make al:\Y significant contribution to railway revenues. A rather 
similar situation, that of a terminal town looking away from the Lynn railw~s, 
will be recognised in the case of Wisbeoh, although, as previously described, 
1 White's Norfolk Directo~ 18lt-5, p.6l3. 2 lb' ~d. 
3 IGrnn Advertiser &: West Norfolk Herald; At 
April, 184lt-. 
the Town Meeting of the 23rd 
4 A Guide to the Ely & Peterborough Railw~ (anoI\YIllous) 
internal evidence written in or about l8lt-8. 
- probably from the 
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the line to that place was to be judged more as a matter of strategic gain 
than as a source of revenue. It remains to comment, however, that the two 
principal centres along the E & H route, name~ St.Ives and Huntingdon itself, 
promised to be of neither real nor strategic value to the compa~. Both 
were small market towns, the former being within the sphere of the latter, 
which would be more like~ to patronise the direct route to London to be 
provided by the London & York than the railw~s to ~nn. 
D. The Agricultural Situation: The Soil 
Subject to the various limitations outlined above, and to those imposed 
by certain human factors to be described in the next section, it may be said 
with confidence that the agricultural potential of the districts to be served 
by the ~nn railways, and therefore the revenue to be derived from the 
carriage of the produce, was enormous; it remained o~ for the railways to 
provide every possible facility needed. In particular was this true of the 
Fenlands. Here, farming appeared more prosperous eve~ year and continued to 
promise even further expansion! By 1845 some 680,000 acres were under 
cultivation~ and a further extensive area was utilised as pasture~ The whole 
was "rich in the products of farm and dai~"~ the best farming methods were 
the common rule, and general drainage had "no insurmountable obstacle to 
contend with"~ Adequate drainage, reflected in an improved climate and 
the decline of ague, had caused a sharp rise in land values; land once worth 
£7 per acre was, in 1845, fetching £45, and £40 was being given for that 
6 
which had once changed hands for a barrel of beer; other examples could be 
1 W.White; Eastern England from2th: Thames to the Humber, 2 Vo1s., London 1865, Vo1.l, p.257. M~ller & Skertchley, op.cit. p.178. 
3 Caird, op.cit. p.178. ~ W.White, op.cit. p.240. 
5 Caird, op.cit. p.179. Bacon, op.cit. p.18. 
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multiplied indefinite~, as that of one property valued at £5 in 1800 now 
being worth between £70 and £801- all this despite heavy rentals and high 
mortgages. Improved methods had gone hand in hand with improved soil and 
were producing an 1I['.bundant luxuriance,,2 of all kinds of crops. In the 
Norfolk Fens six quarters of wheat per acre and ten of barley were normal, 
as opposed to yields of three and four respective~ in other parts of the 
county~ But, overall the Fenland wheat yield averaged between seven and 
eight quarters per acre, while that of Chatteris Fen was described as being 
quite "extraordinary" at some twelve quarters per acre~ Moreover, the black 
soil was so rich that cropping was possible year after year~ O~ on the 
coast was there a partial exception to an otherwise complete~ favourable 
picture, for there the soil was a silty loam, too stiff for greenstuff's and 
susceptible to damage by horses - in this area, where drainage was in a~ 
way inadequate, money was liable to be lost~ For the rest, the 'islands' of 
Southery, Hilgay, Shrub Hill, Feltwell and E~ - the latter with an l~l 
population of 61,600 - were utilised principal~ for the raising of sheep 
and cattle for the London markets; although the natural railhead for much of 
this livestock and of the produce in general would be Ely, the L & E could 
still reasonably expect a substantial share on both its mainline and the 
Wisbech branch. 
Direct competition from the Ouse and marginal rivalry from the Norwich _ 
Ely line had to be overcome by the L & E in cornering Fenland produce, but 
the L & D had a rather easier task, having to ensure o~ that the produce of 
1 Walker & Craddock, op.cit. p.18. 
2 Darby, op.cit. p.209, quoting from Clarke's 'Fen Sketches', 1852, np.244-5. 
3 White's Norfolk Directo~ l8~5, p.34. ~ 
4 Proceedings of the Royal Agricultural Society Vol.VIII 1847, p.l05, 
J.A.Clarke 'On the Great Level of the Fens'. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Caird, op.cit. p.183. 
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central Norfolk was made to flow towards Iurnn rather than Norwich; in this 
connection the support given to the formation of the compaI\Y by the farmers 
of the area was not vdthout significance. Norfolk was, in agricultural 
terms, an immensely rich county. Over the whole there were some 1,186,393 
assessable acres, with an asses:,ed rental (1843) of £1,928,422 and a gross 
estimated rental of £1,957,822. Excluding the four boroughs the latter 
figures still stood at £1,778,422 and £1,787,822 respectively~ Some 200,000 
acres of open fields and commons had been enclosed since 1771, and much of 
the remaining uncultivated land had been improved of recent years by planta-
tions. The whole county was "celebrated for the diversity and high culture 
of its soil"1 Caird, in a rather superficial view, might consider that the 
best and the worst in farming were to be seen there~ but the truth was that 
Norfolk farmers cared little for outward appearances, and that hedges and 
ditches tended to be neglected in as much as they wasted time and land~ 
"Good drilling and good ploughing (were) the 'rules' of the county", and in 
"the permanent improvement of the soil" the Norfolk farmer was surpassed by 
none~ Cl~ing and marling were regular features of the culture, and 
artificial manures were applied to virtually every crop~ In the immediate 
area of the L & D, where the soil had been enriched "beyond belief" ~ a four or 
five course rotation was followed and yields were constantly on the increase. 
Between 1822 and 1845 Hudson of Castleacre had doubled his yield, and the 
8 
results of Mr. Overman of Weasenham were hardly less striking: 
1 White's Norfolk Director,y 1845. 
2 Ibid. p.13. 
3 Op.cit. p.163. 
4 Barugh Almack, Iurnn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
7 L.M.Springall; Labouring Life in Norfolk Villages 1834 - 1914, London, 1936, 
p.ll. 
8 Barugh Almack. 
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Wheat Oats Barley 
7 years to 1839 25 54 31 Bushels per aore 
7 " "1846 
2 " "1848 
29 54 47 " " " 36 68 45 " " " (3 years to 1849) 
From every side the districts through whioh the L & D was to pass were 
high~ acclaimed. The area near Iqnn was "highly cultivated"; the Nar Valley 
comprised excellent meadows and pasture, West Bilney, East Winch, Narborough 
and Pentney were "hard to drain, but good light soil", Ce.stleacre and. Rougham 
2 
were "rich ani prolific", the chalk lands between Swaffham and Holkham 
improved beyond all other districts~ and Derehnm the "centre of one of the 
most highly cultivated districts in the kingdom"~ As Bacon described the 
overall situation it could be reckoned thnt the average yield per acre was 
something between 12 and 18 tons per annum on light soils, and as much as 24 
on heavier la.nd~ these were statistics of most immediate interest to the I(ynn 
& Dereham compaqy. In addition, livestock farming w~s eve~here developing, 
6 
an "enormous increase" being recorded in cattle, sheep and pigs. In fact 
both the quantity and quality of such had risen, and this at a time when the 
staple crops were uroving more certain, and more productive, than ever before. 
E. The Agricultural Situation: The Human Element 
The great limitation on the revenue possibilities of the various 
agricultural activities outlined above wa.s that, livestock apart, they 
represented traffic that would be essentially seasonal in character; the 
carriage of clay, fertilisers and manures was likev'ise restricted to certa.in 
1 White's Norfolk Directory 1845, p.505. 
3 Caird, op.cit. pp.162-3. 
2 
Brcon, op.cit. p.16. 
4 Iqnn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 20th August 1845; report on the 
first ordinary meeting of the L & E shareholders, directors' report. 
S B2con, op.cit. p.112. 
b Ibid. p.lll. 
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periods of the year. However, the 140,000 or so people resident on the 
lands invo1vedl represented a potential~ vast consumer market for articles 
that would ha.ve to be conveyed from without; in particular these were coals, 
building materiD.ls, manufactured goods and groceries. Likewise, this 
extensive population seeming~ offered the possibility of more than satis-
facto~ passenger revenues, even if individuals could be persuaded to do no 
more than make fairly regular journeys into one or other of the terminal towns. 
All promised well, but such anticipations of revenue took into account 
neither the imagined poverty of the upper classes nor the ve~ real and 
crushing hardship of the great bulk of the labouring population. Such factors 
could not but be· reflected in railw~ receipts in that the former tended to 
restrict their expenditure on oapital equipment, building projeots and so on, 
and in that the latter could muster a purchasing power of o~ negligible 
proportions. 
For a proper understanding of the situation it is important to identify 
the causes behind this attitude of mind which led the upper crust of the 
community to bewail its poverty, and which partially explains its alrea~ 
noted reluctance to make a permanent investment in the ~nn railw~s. As 
the constant background in the 1840' s was, of course, the depressed state of 
the corn market, a subject thoroughly discussed in explaining both the 
conception of the railways and the growth of a mixed farming econo~ within 
the areas unQer consideration. Against this, each section of the farming 
community had its own particular problems. The key to the overall situation 
VIas the attitude of the tenant farmers of whom, in 1811-5, 7,452 worked some 
1 The figure given by the E.A.R. chairman, Bruce, in 1860 was 95 490 in terms 
of the 1851 Census (Railw~ Times, 11th August 1860, pp. 892-6; meeting 
of the 9th August, 1860). If the lines had been built in full the figure 
would h:we been near~ IJ+O ,000. The basis of the computation apnears to be 
those living within 3 miles of the line. L 
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2O}b of Norfolk's arable land; the proportion of Cambridgeshire and 
Huntingdonshire Fenland worked in this way was ~rob?b~ much the same, or 
perhaps a little higher. In both areas the constant complaint was of the 
level of the rentals. Those of Norfolk averaged, in 1844, some 2~- per 
acre, but on the former marshlands were 30/-, on some particularly good 
2 
arable 50/-, and on the best pasture as much as 60/-. By 1850 the position 
had slightly worsened. Fenland rentals remained virtual~ unchanged at 
between 27/- und 40/- per acre~ but the average Norfolk figure had risen to 
4 25/6, a 12O}b increase on the 11/6 of 1770: however, over the same span of 
80 years productivity had increased only 33%, or from 24 to 32 bushells 
average yield per acre~ These figures may indeed represent sweeping 
generalisations and be divorced from the actual reality of the soil, but 
they do at least provide a framework for the undoubted bitterness which 
existed between landlord and. tenant at the time. 
In one important particular this bitterness was not without sound 
foundation. The rent levels of the period had been attained during the 
profitable days of the Napoleonic Wars when the corn prices obtaining had 
excused almost any dem[lnd. The return of peacetime conditions had found the 
landowning community, now joined by maI\V townsfolk not in direct touch with 
the pulse of the countryside, firm~ wedded and committed to a scale of 
household establishments, payment of annuities 6And other aspects of a high 
standard of living ~uite unjustified by the post-Napoleonic slump in prices. 
It neither could nor would contract its requirements, and consequently 
1 Bacon, op.cit. p.133. 
3 Caird, op.cit. p.182. 
from Young. 
5 Ibid. p.474. 
2 Ibid. p.39. 
4 Ibid. p.lI-74. The 1770 figure was derived 
6 L.M.Springall, op.cit. p.2l. 
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rentals remained high, although some reduction could not be avoided, 
despite the abolition of Income and Property Tax in 1816 and the nominal 
protection afforded by the 1815 Corn Law. Soon, the landowners developed 
their own grumbles, of the Poor Rates, of tithe exactions and of the' 
closeness of their tenants o The smaller landowner farming in his own 
right (some 60% of Norfolk land was freehold,and in 1844 there were 5,229 
occupiers employing labour,2,710 not doing so)lShared the first two of 
these burdens while coping with fluctuating but generally falling corn 
prices, the onset of which decline causing the failure of many small 
freemen who had to this time survived the costs and problems of enclosure. 
Whatever the reality of the figures, however, the facts were that 
landowner and tenant alike were finding matters not so easy as before, 
and the latter could only see that his rental in no w~ reflected the 
current market situation. 
In 1844 Bacon wrote that:g 
"(the rentals) •• are estimated to be fully equal to the highest 
and palmiest days of agriculture and nothing but a period of 
alarming distress,in the struggle through which numbers will 
be swept oft,will cause any reduction." 
In 1851 Caird visited Huntingdonshire and found:~ 
"Near Godmanchester and the neighbourhood of Huntingdon. eothe 
farmers,though not complaining quite so loudly as those of 
Cambridgeshire,declare their inability to go on with the pres-
ent rents and priceso One third of them,it is said,must give 
up their land if prices do not improve; and the rest,who feel 
that their only remedy,supposing low prioes to continue,is in 
increased production,declare that they will not l~ out their 
capital unless the landlords reduce their rents 25%." 
There remains, however, much evidenoe to demonstrate that all this was 
muoh more an attitude of mind than a refleotion of actual hardship. Most 
suggestive of this is an inoident recounted by Caird when describing his 
1 Baoon,op.o1t.p133o 2 Ibid.,p40. 30P.Oit.p572. 
visit to the Fenlands:! 
"No reduction of rent of aqy importance has yet taken place; and in 
one instance where a representation by a body of tenants was made 
to the landlord on the subject the o~ reply they received was a 
notice to quit to the man whose rL:'U1le stood next on the list." 
Here is an indic8tion of an actual waiting list for the lands which the 
tenants in possession claimed they could not farm without some relief; in the 
same way it is to be noted that whereas B~con, writing in 1844-, found 8 and 
12 year leases to be the most common in Norfolk with a steady tendency towards 
the lengthier periods; Caird, in 1850, rE'corded that it was the 12 and 21 year 
agreements which had then become the most frequent~ Moreover, it cannot be 
overlooked that the development of livestock farming and the intense 
improvement of the soil were both matters requiring considerable capital 
expenditure. Caird wrote:~ 
" ••• the systematic management and improved cultivation which have 
been produced by the capital and enterprise of West Norfolk are 
not surpassed in aqy district in the kingdom." 
In similar vein Bacon specified the skill and capital of the tenant~ as being 
amongst the principal factors explaining the tremendous progress made in 
Norfolk farming~ It is also to be remembered that the landed interests of 
west Norfolk had had the capital necess~ to act as a bait when the ~nn 
railways first came before the public. 
On balance the evidence quite clearly indicates that matters were in no 
w~ as bad as they were made to seem. It suggests more a farming community 
which had been rendered oautious and depressed in that large scale capital 
expenditure had so far failed to produce quite the returns expected. 
Undoubtedly a few, probably the smaller men, were feeling a real pinch, but 
1 Op.cit. p.182. 
3 Op.cit. p.165. 
5 Op.cit. p.410. 
~ Op.cit. p.35. 
Ibid.pp.162-3. 
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the rest had little cause for fear. After all, behind all the constant talk 
of figures lay the solid realities of soils that were amongst the best in the 
kingdom, an equable climate and a more than plentiful sUPQly of cheap labour, 
the average cost of which in west Norfolk, for example, was no more than 26/7 
per acre per annum; and was a factor which did much to offset the effect of 
high rentals. 
This low level of labour costs, to be attributed only pe.rtly to the 
widespread employment of women a.nd children in the fields, reflected both the 
"high and artificial state of the upper and middle classes and the deprivation 
2 
of the lower". The condition of the former classes h~.s been sketched, thftt 
of the latter may be briefly described as poverty stricken, demoralised and 
depraved; the id.eal relationship between the two, in which the latter would be 
"aided by their care and kindness, guid.ed by the example, benefited by their 
chance conta.ct with persons of birth, education and station" would be 
indirect~ civilised~ was little in evidence. In the ill-spelt words of 
Fred Roof, "the worken classes were little better than slaves, they were worked 
4 from there Cradles to there Graves", and tlnever thought of any thing else but 
5 
what there bed and there work a.nd there food could give themlt. Fundamentally 
of course it was a matter of wages. These varied from place to pla.ce, but in 
the Norfolk of 1850 averaged no more than 8/6 per week, a rise of only 6d. 
1 Bacon, op.cit. p.145. 2 Ibid. p.126. 
3 Accounts & Papers 1843 (510) xii.I; Report of the Special Poor Law 
Commissioners on the Employment of Women and Children in Agriculture, p.240. 
4 F.Roof (edited Lilias Rider Haggard); I Walked by Night, Being the Life and 
History of the king of the Norfolk poachers, London & Redhill 1935, p.92. 
5 Ibid. p.30. 
Note on Fred Roof, the poacher. 
Born in Pentney about 1860 his evidence of conditions in the 1840's was based 
principal~ on the memories of his grandparents; alone this would be suspect 
but what he says bears out the contentions of Bacon and others and his comme~ts 
on the 1880 and '90's, compared with reports of the '40's, show that 
conditions had little changed over 40 years. 
J.44 
since 1770 (the national average was 9/7, an increase of 2/4 since the latter 
dateJ; in 1850 the farmers were talking of a possible reduction to o~ 7/-. 
2 
To this must be added the average £5/6/1~d. that a strong and willing man 
might earn at harvest, but this was like~ to be soon swallowed by accumulated 
needs and simple pleasures. In the Fens the average wage was generally 
3 between 9/- and 10/- per week, but on the south side of Huntingdonshire the 
actual rate was as low as 7/-~ The situation wes gross~ aggravated by the 
sharp rises in cottage rentals since 1770, increases not matched by 
proportionate gains in wages, either in actual terms or those of purchasing 
power. Cottage rentals varied from 60/- per annum to as much as 100/- over 
the area50f the three ra.ilways, and these figures in general for small, over-
crowded, poor~ maintained two roomed dwellings where "children were herded 
like pigs in a sty •• the thicker they slept the warmer they were, and that was 
6 
a lot of trubble with vermin, and not the evell eye". Even as late as 1865 
White felt compelled to remark "East Anglia is not yet by aDi1 means a model 
district as regards rustic dwellings"? It was not as if income was assured. 
'Piece rates' were common, and thus much depended on age and ability; in mn~ 
parts single men were paid less than married men, and all, especial~ the day 
labourers who could never be absolutely sure of employment, were liable to be 
turned off in bad weather. Virtual~ throughout the area wages needed some 
form of supplementation8from the Poor Rates. 
Women and children, those who did not find employment in the big houses, 
or in the case of the former as dressmakers, joined the men in the fields for 
9 
ten or more hours 11 day. The women, mostly to be cripryled ,-'ith rheumatism 
1 Caird, op.cit. p.474. 
4 Ibid. p.175· 
7 op.cit. p.221. 
9 Accounts & Papers 1843 
2 Bacon, op.cit. p.145. 
~ Ibid. 
Springall, op.cit. p.2l. 
~ Caird, op.cit.p.467. 
Roof, o:).cit .p.21. 
(510) xii.I, p.240. 
1 145 
by the age of 50, fared different~ in different parts of Norfolk, although 
everywhere wages varied with the task and the season; they could earn, for 
example, 10d to 1/- per day at Snarehill, 7d. to 8d. at Swaffham, one third 
of the man's rate at stratton - genere.lly they could :nake 8d. to 10d. per day 
2 
when threshing, and 1/- to 1/2 during the harvest season. Children joined 
their elders for 3d. to 6d. per dey3at an age of ten or eleven if not before~ 
this being at the expense of their education and the result of a pressing 
sense of urgency on the part of their parents, an urgency which excluded the 
consideration that the wages to be earned would br'rely cover the cost of the 
clothing that would be ruined. It is indeed surprising that, thanks to the 
work of the two great education societies, so ma~ Norfolk and Fenland 
ohildren were able to read and write to some small extent, but in the eyes of 
ma~ of the gentry even this was going too far as it was teaching the young 
to be discontented with their station in life~ But in this the last word 
is best left to Roof~ 
"You will hear man;y an old man say he went to work at seven year 
old, and did not know a letter in the book. There was good 
reason for that. If they had 1erned aqy thing at school they 
went to work in them days so young that they never practized 
rending or riting, and so forgot all that they had lerned. Wen 
they were done with the day they were only too ready to e[-!,t there 
megre tea and get them to bed, haven been on the farm from six in 
the morning till six at night. There were no limited hours for 
youngsters then, the men did not favour them, there was the word 
2.nd the blow - I"nd most~ the blow came first. All the lerning 
they got was starved and worked out of them." 
A measure of the poverty of the labouring classes was to be found in the 
. staple diet of most. Wi th bread at l~~. per loaf, meat 5d. per pound and 
butter a shilling a pound? this was of the simplest nature and based on 
1 Accounts & Papers 18434(510) xii.I, p.2l6. 
3 Ibid. Ibid. p.2l8. 
6 Roof, op.cit. p.25. 
7 Caird, op.cit. p.476. 
2 
5 Ibid. 
Ibid. 
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weak tea, potatoes, cheese and bread; by and large meat wP"s f"!. rarity and even 
in the better off households never appeared more than once or twice a week 
1 however careful the household management. At plrces such as Carbrooke meat 
was an impossibility and the diet was almost exclusive~ of potatoes, bread 
and tea; at Tuttington it was bread and potatoes on1y~ For near~ all meat 
was a harvest luxury or the result of an individual farmer's generosity in 
allowing a group of labourers to buy a pig from him. Again to quote Roo~ 
"scors of famleys were brought up on potatos, turnips and bread, with what 
was callRd Pork Lard and Treackle, with 8 change of herring". 
Other measures of poverty and degradation were not lacking. Such were 
seen in the prevalence of poaching, in the fect that between 1836 and 1843 
Swaffham Gaol housed no less than 2,654 prisoners~ and above all in the growth 
and results of the infamous gang system originated at Castleacre (within the 
immediate L & D zone). Here, gangmasters wielded unlimited powers, even to 
the extent of determining the shops at which their employees would spend their 
miserable wages; indeed, often it was the 6angmasters themselves who owned or 
had part interest in the shops in question. Under the system gangs of men, 
women and children were organised to work in fields often miles away from 
their villages. The day's labour was divided into quarters, each paid at the 
rate of 2d. Unfinished work or termination through adverse weather meant no 
pay at all for a (].uarter although the gcmgmaster received his full contract 
price from the farmer, and the overseers, employed by the masters, received 
their 12/- to 15/- per week'. This represented sweated labour at its very 
worst, ::md was only made pOSSible by the extent of the prevailing poverty, 
1 Accounts & Pepers 1843 (510) xii.I, p.22l. 
3 Op.cit. p.92. 
5 Accounts & Papers 1843 (510) xii. I, p. 221ff. 
~ Ibid. p.24-1-
Bacon, op.cit. p.155. 
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and, in the case of Castleacre, by the ff'ct that the village remained open 
amidst an extensive area of enclosures; the drifters and the dispossessed 
found refuge in such a place but thereby rendered themselves an easy prey to 
the unscrupulous. The nature of the mixed gangs, and such fp.ctors as rough 
sleeping conditions in ba.rn or on haystack, all sexes ~.nd ages together, 
stimulated gross immorality and further confirmed the lower classes in 
depravity and demoralisation. 
The side effects of the gang system were equ8.lly vioious. Neighbouring 
landowners, knowing tha.t cheap labour would be 'provided by the remaining 
overdrowded open villages, allowed their own cottages to fall into disrepair~ 
and refused to build new ones; thus, cottagers were driven away, and the Poor 
Rates reflected, or so it was hoped, the advantage that had been gained. It 
might also be mentioned at this point that an equally short sighted method of 
obtaining the same end, reduoed Poor Rates, was to divide the surplus labour 
of a parish between the farmers according to the size of their individual 
farms; this merely prevented good farmers from cutting their oosts and 
2 disoouraged maximum effort on the part of the workers. 
To round off this dismal sto~ should be mentioned the ease of obtaining 
cheap and potent beers, an obvious means of escapism for the depressed. There 
was hardly 8. villP.ge without its beerhouses (in addition to the normal inns); 
an act of 1830, designed to stimUlate domestio barley oonsumption, had allowed 
any householder to open such an establishment on the payment of two pounds and 
the presentation of three other householders as sureties; in its main purpose 
the act was a.n unmitigated suocess, and an 1834 act to oheck the less desirable 
1 Acoounts & ~~ers 1843 (510) xii.I, p.22lff. 
2 Caird, op.oit. p.5l5. 
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results remained a dend letter~ These less desirable results were, of course, 
incitement to drunken behaviour, petty crime and immorality, and a direct 
discouragement of whatever thrift was possible to the poverty stricken. 
Nothing is perhaps more indicative of the mental attitude of the Norfolk 
labourers of the time than the manner in which they were accustomed to settle 
their arguments; contestants had their legs tied to a table and then fought 
until one was beaten, or simply they kicked at each other's legs until one 
2 fell to the ground. 
There were few features to alleviate the general depression. A number 
of landlords conscientiously undertook their obligs.tions under enclosure of 
maintaining their cottages and exercising a general supervision over the 
welfare of their tenants, but this does not seem to hr.ve been the eeneral 
rule. The usual practice of such landlords ,vas to lease or otherwise make 
over small allotments, usually of wasteland, to their labourers v;ho then could 
grow what they liked in their ovm time. This was undoubtedly "the most 
beneficial system that can be found for the poor"~ but one that \,;as restricted 
in its 'potential ap~)lication by both lack of suitable land Qnd the d.emands 
already made on the time of the labourer. For the V1?st majority either the 
actuality or the demoralising fear of the fo.te that befell Roof's father was 
the;)ressing reality. The elder Roof "worked forty year on one f:.>rm as a 
Labourer, and never got any hie;her", this for a "mere pi tt::mce" of 9/- per 
v:eek; "no doubt he was a good man, but Good as he was wen he could '."ork no 
more he was not wanted any more"; "there WB.S no Old Age Pension then, so the 
Pr.rish I think o.lowed him 2/6 a week, and :poor mother had to go to work in 
the fields. Did the parson help them - no he told them to be contented 
1 Soringall, op.cit. p.23. 
2 R~of, op.cit. p.lO. 
3 Accounts & Papers (510) xii.I, p.220. 
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with there lot, and make the most of what they had got". Finally he 
1 finished in a pauper's grave. 
Escape from the general misery was virtua1~ impossible. Emigration was 
no answer because it was a costly affair; Roof's uncle, a shepherd of Westacre, 
was tra.nsported for sheep stealing in his efforts to raise the money to take 
him to America~ Between 1835 and '37 3,300 had indeed left the county 
(mostly for Canada)~ but the 1841 Census Report, in a preface dated August, 
l843~ shows that between the 31st December, 1840 and the 10th August, 1843 
only 117 had left. By 1845 a single ship of 400 tons, making one journey per 
annum, sufficed to carry the emigrants of Norfolk and many other plMes to 
Quebec~ Fear of unemplqyme nt, the distance of the area from industrial 
centres, and above all the dread of losing Settlement (since 1834 principally 
a matter of birth and parentage) bound the Norfolk and Fen1and labourers to 
their misery amidst unchanging poverty and a steadily increasing population 
which served to both ag.;ravate and perpetuate the existing situation. It 
was to be regretted that the Poor Law authorities had not seen fit to continue 
their initial efforts to transfer suitable families to Lancashire and Yorkshire 
where agents were maintained to advise on vacancies in the mills. This scheme 
had been stimulated by the demand for child labour created by the minimum age 
and maximum hours clauses of the 1833 Factory Act, and had involved families 
with children of permitted working age being given free transport and £3 to 
£5 to reach the mills, where a three year contract was guaranteed to the 
father, but the completion of the new workhouses by 1839 and a series of good 
harvests had caused it to lapse~ Equolly regrettable was the failure of the 
1 Roof, op.cit. p.4-
3 White's Norfolk Directory 1845-
5 See annual notice in the ~nn Advertiser & West 
9th March, 1844. 
6 Springall, op.cit. p.30. 
! Ibid. p.8. 
p.138. 
Norfolk Herald, e.g. 
• 
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Norfolk (tnd Fenland Unions to copy immediately the ex:",mple of Docking, 
within their number, in extending Settlement to all its p1:'.rishes, so promot-
ing greater mobility of labour, fuller employment and lower Poor Rates; some 
years were to pass before this practice W[;,S adopted on a large scale. 
Such a ~opulation as that which has been described could be expected to 
provide labour for the railways but little else. Its ca9acity for travel 
wes inhibited by both its poverty and its deeply ingrained parochialism, as 
well as by the fact thnt hitherto travel had been completely outside their 
mental horizons. Roof never saw his father's parents as they lived "maI\Y 
1 
mile s away" at RouiPrun j but Rougham was unde r ten mile s Flway from Pentney 
where he himself lived. Even in the 1860' sand '70' s It some of the young 
men ••• were contented enough if they could go to a fair once a year, or Lynn 
2 Mart" • The capacity of the labouring classes for buying such things as coal 
v:ill require no further comment. It now remains to exe.mine what the three 
companies made of the situation outlined in this section when they came to 
prepare their estimates of cost and revenue. 
Section 3: The Companies' Estimates: The Revenue3 
It will be seen in this section how superficial observation and a 
complete lack of understanding of railway econo~ characterised the calcula-
tions of Williams and his fellow ~romotersj the major changes made in the 
content of the estimates will be seen to further illustrate the fundamental 
unreality of their nature. Yet, it was largely on the strength of these that 
Parliament sanctioned the three lines, seeing only an area of bustling trade, 
1 Op.cit. p.10. 2 O~.cit. p.30. 
3 The related ~uestion of construction estimates is reserved for ~ r t 
'l c. sepa a e 
sect on and discussed in the context of the actual bills. 
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great agricultural potential and dense population inadequate~ equipped 
with transport facilities. 
The only detailed revenue estimate published was that of the Lynn & 
E~ company. This appeared in the prospectus to represent "existing trafficR 
and to show the return that such could be expected to yield on the £200,000 
then sought. It is wortqy of reproduction in full: 
Passengers by coach and other public conveyance 
at 2d. per mile 
Local passengers by gigs etc. etc. 
Total of existing passenger traffic 
Parcels by coach 
Horse and carriages 
Conveyance of mails 
Cattle etc. 
BeastS: 350 per week for 21 weeks at 1d. per mile 
Sheep : 2,500 per week for 52 weeks at id. 
per mile 
Carcpses, pigs and poultry 
Manufactured goods, groceries and general 
shop goods 
Corn, malt, wool & other general merchandise 
except coal 
Total of existing traffic 
Add 10Q% on passengers 
Deduct 4Q% on annual working expenses 
Net annual profit 
£. 
6,985 
2,794 
9,779 
1,164 
436 
702 
796 
3,520 
616 
2,991 
3,793 
23,801 
9,779 
33,581 
13,432 
20,148 
s. 
6 
2 
9 
4 
11 
12 
5 
16 
14 
10 
17 
9 
7 
10 
16 
d. 
8 
8 
4 
5 
8 
6 
o 
o 
o 
4-
6 
1 
8 
5 
These figures were given a most impressive pedigree! They were the work 
of Mr. Pares, the traffic expert, and a oommittee of fifteen local tradeemen, 
merchants and agriculturalists, all of whom were described as being most 
anxious for the truth. Recourse had been had to expert opinion - e.g. 
1 ~nn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 27th April, 1844; report on the 
County Meeting held in ~nn on the 23rd April. 
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that of Hudson of Castleacre, Burgess and Porter on all agricultural 
matters - and a special indebedness to innkeepers was acknowledged. All 
items had been unanimous~ agreed, the lowest common estimate having been 
adopted in all cases, but, even so, despite the earlier warning of Robert 
Stephenson that the line could never p~ (for which see chapter 1), the 
committee "were unanimous~ of the opinion that the amount is very much 
1 
underrated" • Certain deliberate exclusions were cited to give substance 
to this attitude of moderation, adopted, so Folkes claimed, to discourage 
the London speculator. The prime example was that of coal, omitted on the 
grounds that the traffic was variable, and was in an,y case to be wrested 
from water competition; also excluded was traffic originating from the west 
of the Ouse as this would eventually fall to one of the lines alrea~ under 
consideration in that area. Moreover, Rastrick and others declared that in 
view of the flat terrain, the absence of major works and the cheapness of 
fuel in IQrrm, the estimate of 40;6 for working expenses was extreme~ liberal, 
and most unlike~ to be approached in actual practice. 
At the public meeting of the 23rd April Williams quoted Pares as s~ing 
that the likely passenger increase would be one of 400,% rather than the 10Q% 
actually shown (the amount normally allowed by Parliamentary committees). 
However, as the rise had been calculated in terms of second class fares 
(2d. per mile) whereas the principal increase must inevitably derive from 
third class traffic (ld. per mile) the table did in fact conceal something 
like a 170% increase in terms of actual passengers if not in receipts. 
Throughout the ts.ble the tacit assumption that all traffic, private and 
public, would transfer to the railway is to be noted, and, in view of the 
1 Prospectus. 
• 
ill. 
factors enumerated in the previous section, the difficulty of reconciling 
the figures with the facts will be appreciated. 
Further lliscussion of these elaborate calculations is unnecessary, as 
after serving their primary purpose of attracting capital to the line they 
were completely abandoned. With the inclusion of the Wisbech branch and the 
raising of the capital requirement to £300,000 an amended revenue estimate 
of ,£43,000 was compiled; this was in fact the one which cn.me before 
. t l Parl~amen • This implied an expectation of £9,500 from the branch, or a 
return on c~pitn.l of 7% after the deduction of working expenses. For the 
whole of the company's system the anticipated profit was now set at £25,800, 
that is ,£20,200 from the mainline and .£5,600 from the branch. This meant 
a likely return of 8-!% on £300,000. So far so good, but the startling 
factor was that noVi coals ani slates had been included at a total value of 
£16,000, leaving .£27,000 to be derived from passengers and other sources 
which on the original estimate, for the mainline alone, had been given a 
value of £33,581. Moreover, other internal changes became evident before 
the Commons' committee. Now it was to be 122,000 sheep per annum on the 
line at an average toll of 3d. per head (at first the company had said 2d.) 
giving a total expectation of only £1,680 compared with the £3,520 of the 
first reckoning. Some compensation was found in the c~rriage of beasts. 
The rate remained unchanged, but the 350 per week for 21 weeks had now 
become a weekly average of 170, an overall increase of 1,149 per annum. 
But even so, it all boiled down to the fact that to accommodate the coal 
traffic nearly all the individual estimates had, in this second version, 
to be substantially reduced. 
1 Reports on the L & E bill before Committee I, 21st-24th April, 1845 
from the first availsble issues of the ~nn Advertiser & West Norfolk 
Herald, Herapaths, the Railway Times and the Railway Record. 
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How can such chanGes be expl:--.ined D:way? Honest miscalculation is of 
course a possibility in that objective and accurate assessment were beyond 
reach, but the evidence points to a very different conclusion, eVen when 
remembering that the ['.I!lended figures were little more likely than the 
original to prove correct. Above all, it is too much of a coincidence that 
the profit remained at between 8 nnd l~~. Williams, intent on the Wisbech 
branch from tile first but knowing that in the April of 1844 such would be 
opposed, and realising the weakness of the branch except as part of a trunk 
route, had in nIl probability included the mineral traffic in the first 
estimates but then raised other figures (which no one could verify) to Cover 
the apparent exclusion of such. PQrliament might well have been expected, 
despite the defects of its examination, to uncover ihis device, but 
meanwhile the Wisbech branch had been safe~ launched. Neither could a~ 
shareholder complnin of the outcome. lnitial~ promised a certain 5% 
return with possibilities of from 8 to 107~ on the original mainline, he now 
had a positive promise of ~ together with the knowledge that the Wisbech 
branch was necessary to the fulfilment of his original expectations. At 
best this was misrepresentation of the truth as Williams saw it, at worst it 
was pure deception. Either way it proved eminent~ successful, and, in 
the spirit of the times as reflected in the L & E share quotations of 
between 5 and 6 on £2/10 paid (June 18~5), was condoned by those most 
immediatelY affected. 
The E & H prospectus read: 
"The promoters have considered it unnecessary at this late time 
of the year to incur the delay which must attend the obtaining 
of 'l. detailed amount of traffic for, on looking to the sources 
from WIllCh traffic must inevitab~ be concentrated on the line, 
• ~ 
and to the facts that the line must, from its position, for 
ever remain free from competition, and that the estimate for 
its construction (including every expense) does not exceed £6,300 
per mile it appears perfectly evident that the income of the pro-
posed line must ensure to the subscribers an ample dividend. A 
calculation of traffic h..«s, however, been prepnred in the usual 
manner, ~nd shows, 8fter deducting £40 per cent for working 
expenses and maintenanoe (a most liberal ellocation in this 
ca.se), a. return of £9 per cent on capita.l." 
Ignoring the iroI\Y in the implied contrast between the "detailed amount of 
traffic" and the "calculntion of traffic obtained in the usual way", it 
follows from the anticipated return of 9% on £270,000 that a revenue of 
something like £40,500 was expected (i.e. by tnking 9% of £270,000 and making 
that equal 60% of the revenue). After contraction of the scheme to the 
E~ - Huntingdon section ~lone, the revised cost was fixed at £191,000 and 
the revenue at £23,000; thus, allowing for working expenses of ~o%, the 
return on c~pit~l would be one of between 6 and 7%. However, during the 
committee he~ring the question of the working expenses w~s closely 
scrutinised ~nd the figure reduced to between 30 end 35% of revenue~ so 
improving the prospect for rates of dividend. All this, of course, 
involved no more than the manipUlation of figures divorced from reality. 
There were two fundamental objections to this revised estimate. Much 
W8S made of the fact that 50,000 people lived within three miles of the line, 
but it was not recognised that a full quarter of these lived in or near the 
two terminal towns and would have little use for the railway; moreover, E~ 
and Huntingdon were market towns in their own right and there was little 
apparent intercourse between them. Secondly, even if £12,000 be allowed 
as the revenue originating from the L & E line (comparison with the L & E 
1 See the proceedings before Committee I; ~nn Advertiser & West Norfolk 
Herold, 26th April, 1845: Herapath and the Railway Record on the 
10/17/24th May, 1845· 
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estimates shows this to be a most liberal allowance in that E~ would 
represent the junction of four lines with the ~nn line) it would still 
leave £11,000 to be derived from local sources. In view of the limitation 
suggested above, together with the facts that the Huntingdonshire labourer 
was even poorer than his Norfolk counterpart (for which see above) and that 
local traffic would be almost entire~ agricultural and therefore seasonal in 
nature, this £11,000 assumes major proportions. It is also to be remembered 
that the halving of the project had robbed it both of its more v81uable 
sections in terms of population etc. and of its value as a through route 
(at least until the Rugby & Huntingdon line should be built), but neither of 
these considerations were reflected in the revised figures. Finally, the 
E~ - Peterborough line and the Wisbech branch of the L & E itself would 
inevitab~ compete with the E & H for traffic to the midlands even assuming 
that an extension beyond Huntingdon becrune a reality, while the imminent 
construction of ~ northern trunk route through that latter town would to a 
large extent relieve the dependence of the entire area of the E & H line on 
rqnn Harbour. However, it was on the bflsis of the figures quoted, the fact 
that transport facilities in the area were "inadequate", and because the line 
waS in itself complete and integral not depending on a~ future extension 
(sic)lthat Parliament allowed the project to go through. 
In the c~se of the ~nn & Dereham line no traffic estimates were made 
public until the 7th December 1844, a full six weeks after the publication of 
the revised prospectus during the third week in October. Prior to this the 
investor had had to satisfy himself with such comforting generalisations as 
that appertaining to double track "which on account of the extensive general 
1 Report of Lord Palmerston from Committee I. 
ill 
traffic expected to fnll upon the line it has been thought advisable to 
. 1 provl.de". Indeed, it wns not until the last days of October that Pares 
was commissioned to draw up the traffic estimates, a further indication of 
the haste that has already been observed as attending the promotion. Pares 
2 then took four weeks to prepare a set of singularly worthless figures, name~: 
Passengers 
Merchandise, coals, grain, line etc. 
now by land 
£21,882 
£14-,311 
£36,193 
This total excluded the Nar traffic, "of which there is a ve~ large 
quantity", as the Marriotts had flat~ refused to divulge the extent of 
their river traffic; it will be recalled that they had even gone to the 
lengths of withdrawing all or some of their brrges during the period of 
Pares' survey. The company chose to assess this unknown quantity at £5,000 
per annum, a figure it claimed to be underrated~ The total anticipated 
revenue was thus fixed at ~+1,193, which sum, after the deduction of 40.% in 
working expenses, left a profit of £27,715/16/- per annum, or a return of 
7tfo on oapital. It was at this stage, however, that the compa~ decided to 
confine its initial construction to single track, so reducing the capital 
sum to be c[l.lled to £260,000 and thereby increasing the like~ dividend to 
one of ~. If demands on the line developed to the extent anticipated so 
that at a later date double track was ne~sitated it was held that "the 
revenue from such traffic will provide an ample dividend on the additional 
cost" • 
1 Prospectus. 
2 Railwny Times, 14th Deoember, 1844; letter of W.Williams whioh includes 
Pares' report and shows the oommissioning date as late October and the 
date of submission as the 30th November. 
3 Railway Times, l4-th December, 1844; letter of W.Wil1iams from which all 
the f~ctua1 matter of the paragraph is derived. 
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The Marriotts had little difficulty in tearing these figures to shreds. 
1 
"Hope never told a more flattering tale than Mr.Pares" wrote 'Watchman', 
but "who cares if the ha.rd earned savings of thousands are sacrificed by a~ 
indiscretion so that their withers are unwrung?". According to 'Watchman' 
2 (who in all probability was one of the Marriott brothers) the Nar traffic 
was overestimated a "mere 500%", and as for the passenger estimates the 
three dnily conches between IQrnn and Dereham already loaded "miserably", and 
indeed, "it would take 30 of the present coaches averaging ten pnssengers 
each dnily to carry his estimated number along the line, Sund<'ys included". 
The Marriotts had already held their own census to substantiate these claims. 
Men were place,1. at IQrnn, Swaffham and Dereham, "the places most favourable to 
the scheme", and credi -~ was given for all fnrmers' gigs and market carts, for 
3 
all existing passenger traffic and for one third of the Nar revenue. 
~ssengers were doubled and fares calculated at a higher rate than that of 
the Norwich ~ Ynrmouth line (where fares were of necessity relatively low); 
working expenses ,~re estimated at a much lower level than 40,%, at a rate 
more in keeping \'1i th the experience of the Norwich & yp_rmouth compa:qy. The 
results showed un annual profit of no more than £6,380, or a return of only 
£1/18/8 per cent. The L & D compa:qy responded by first ?roducing Pares' 
figures, and secondly by casting doubt on the method of the Marriott s' survey: 
ttwe must content ourselves 'l1i th expressing our surprise that they have been 
able to show aqy dividend at all, as, from what we heard of the manner in 
I Railway Times, 18th Jnnuary, 181+5. 
2 Ibid, ::?5th Jnnuary, 1845; 'A Friend to the Railways' claimed that the 
identity of 'Watchman' was obvious to all and that he had said that he 
would hc.ve "n. slice from the loaf of' every poor :;;>erson in the neighbour-
hood" - this fits the Marriotta exactly. 
3 Ibid, 30th November, 1844, p .1417; n. report of the Marriott s' census • It 
will be noted that this was a full week before the open pUblication of the 
L & D figures am it is to be assumed that prior notice of the latter had 
been given to comp~l'\Y shareholders so I)rovoking the Marriotts to publish 
their alr,[ldy prepared details. . 
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which their tr~ffjc observc.tions were taJ::en, we had not expected so favour.:lble 
1 
a result". As related in the previous chapter, however, the Board of Trade 
found itself Ul1.'lble to decide between the riv::cl est=-r'!ltes. 
The outcome was inevitable. Pares' estimate was influenced by the 
undue haste of its composition ~nd by the pressing fear of the Norwich 
promotions which had inspired it. The Marriotts faced great personal loss 
and to that extent were purely subjective in their attack, but they did 
succeed in underlining the chronic weakness of the compa~'s c~se. That the 
latter was completely unrealistic there could be no reasonable doubt; the 
absence of a~ substantial tr~ffic stream between ~nn end Norwich, the 
decline of Norwich textiles, the competition to be anticipated from that city 
through the V(ymondham - Dereham line, and the rivalry to be encountered from 
the Ely - Norwich line were all factors that had been given insufficient 
weight. Thus, when the Marriotts had been effectively silenced and the bill 
had come before Committee K the compa~ had been obliged to recast completely 
its estimates. Pares was again responsible, but this time bad settled on a 
total revenue of o~ £32,889, a figure £3,304 down on the original even 
before the Nar traffic had been added. However, as the compa~ had evinced 
its willingness to drop the Fakenham branch and confine itself to single 
track, so reducing capital requirements to £270,000, and as working expenses 
had now been fixed at an estimated 35% of revenue, a return of 7~ from an 
2 
annual profit of £21,337 was deemed assured. As there could be no question 
as to the public utili~ of the line (even though, with one exception, all 
the witnesses called were ~nn men) in an area devoid of cheap and reasonable 
1 Railway Times, 7th December, 1844, p.l448; letter from the L & D 
solicitors, Messrs. Rooper, Ingram & Birch. 
2 Herapaths, 14th June, 1845 and the ~nn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald 
of the same date. 
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transport facilities, and a.s the-revised estimates were seemingly based 
more securely in fnct than the first set had been, the bill was destined 
to pass without serious challenge. 
Section 4: The Construction Estimates 
The question of the construction estimates may be briefly dismissed. 
Calculated to the smallest detail, related to current prices, and backed by 
convincing evidence of the lack of engineering difficulties, they were 
accepted virtually without question, although, as will be seen in the next 
section, Parliament forced on the companies additional expenditure which was 
not balanced by aqy authorised increase of capital. The L & E estimate was 
one of £248,826 with a further £51,174 for land to construct and put into 
running order 37 miles 56 cha.ins of railway (mainline, Wisbech and harbour 
branches and a short extension beyond Ely); this excluded only the cost of 
the two cottages that would have to be taken. This low estimate of only 
£6,700 per mile was rendered feasible by the flat terrain, the absence of 
tunnels and of gradients of aqy severity, and by the confidence of the 
engineers that the line would in no way interfere with either drainage or 
navigation; in this last respect ~~strick had actually been over the route 
with BruneI, the Bedford Level engineer. The only point left really vague 
was whether or not these estimates included the cost of double track 
throughout, Durrant, a compaqy surveyor, expressing the willingness of the 
compa~ to l~ such if the Board of Trade desired it~ Whatever the fact of 
this the most striking feature was that the £300,000 authorised left little 
or no room for either mistake or manoeuvre. Naturally the L & E, like all 
companies of the time, was permitted to borrow on mortgage or loan a sum 
1 Proceedings before Committee I, derived from the ~nn Advertiser & West 
Norfolk Herald and the various national railway journals, the 24th April 
on. 
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equal to one third of the authorised capital after 5q% of such had been 
aotual~ paid in, but it was never an auspicious start to effect completion 
already saddled vdth heavy interest charges, for so doing upset the 
calculations of return on capital from the outset. Seven years were 
allowed for completion, n1though the compaqy anticipated that the first 
trains would be running wi thin eight or nine months of the act. 
The cost of the 25 miles of the E & H line was accepted as being 
£194,096; no major works, no gradient of more than one of 1 in 200, nor 
curve with a radius less than ~ mile were necessary~ To cover this a 
oapital of £194,800 was authorised and seven years were allowed for 
completion. 
The Iurnn & DerehDlD. estimate W[l.S one of £239,857 plus £30,142 for the 
200 acres of land required; so giving an average of just under £10,000 for 
each of the 2&J miles authorised (27 if the northern alternative at Derebam 
had been taken); these 8~ended figures are to be compared with the original 
capital sought of £330,000 which would have provided double track (the 
foundations for which were still to be laid) and the branch to Fakenham. 
The engineering circumstances of the line were shown to be particularly 
favourable. The section as far as Swaffham would be almost dead level, 
and from thence the line would be carried over easy gradients, none being 
more severe than one of 1 in a 100 over a distance of li miles, so that 
recourse to assistant engines would be unnecessa~. No curve would have a 
radius of less than 20 chains~ On such evidence the estimate of construc-
tion cost was accepted and a capital of £270,000 sanctioned. Five years 
1 Palmerston t s Report to the Commons, Railway Record, 31st May, 1845. 
2 Herapath, 14th June, 1845· 
3 Ibid. 
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were allowed for completion; t~was in Committee K and is to be compared 
with the seven years granted to the other two companies in Committee I. 
Thus, Parliament sanctioned the construction of some 85 miles of 
rai1w~ on an authorised capital of £764,4,)0, an expected average of £9,000 
per mile. Two final comments ought to be made. The difference between the 
aggregate capital authorised and the aggregate estimates was in itself 
insufficient to cover the costs of obtaining the acts; this was a serious 
matter of which more must be said in a later chapter. Second~, the compan-
ies would have to be a great deal more fortunate than, for example, the 
Great Western &~.ilway which had paid £6,300 per mile for land alone~ or than 
the Eastern Counties which was even then (1044 and '45) expending some 
£13,039 per mile in building from Bishops Stortford (on the Northern & 
2 Bastern) to Brandon. In fRct the ~nn lines were to cost something like 
£2$,'00 per mile to construct, a striking comment on the f~llacy of the 
£igures discussed above. In this P1>rliament cannot be entirely excused for 
it had, if it had cared to recognise them, several precedents on ~hich to 
draw - the South 'R'estern had spent some £18,500 per mile on works and stations 
alone, the ~reat Western £40,000 per mile~ and almost without exception the 
lines of 1836 had SUbstantially exceeded estimated cost. 
section 5: The PDssage of the Bills and Further Seeds of Bankruptcy 
A brief study of the actual passage of the three bills, apart from its 
intrinsic inte:oest, serves three main purposes. It confirms, by displaying 
the absence of other facto!'s, the prime importance of the estimates discussed 
above, and then illustrates how these ver,y estimates were flouted in that the 
1 Annual Register 1844, pp.70-l. 
2 Lewin, op.cit. (quoting from Grot&), p.8S. 
3 AnnUal Register 1844, pp.70-1. 
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companies were committed both by themselves and by Parliament to expenditure 
far in excess of anticipation; final~ it serves to bind together the various 
strands of which this chapter has so far been composed. 
The details of passage ~nd the various points of procedural interest 
which arose may be convenient~ reduced to tabular form: 
The L & E 
Pre-ParliamentarY Stages 
Prospectus 
Petition to the 
Board of Trade 
w.e. 
1.2.1845 
House of Commons (1845) 
Standing Or(1ers t 
Conn:c:i ttP.'. ~~ 
First Reading 
Second Reading 
Committee Stage 
Third Reading 
House o..f Loz:ds 
First Reading 
Second Reading 
Committee Stage 
Third Reading 
Royal As sent 
28th Feb. 
(Sub-com.4-) 
'+th March 
lOth March 
2lst-24oth April 
Group I 
30th May 
6th June 
12th June 
17th June 
24-th June 
30th June 
8 s: 9 Vic.c.lv 
The E & H 
w.e. 
w.e.12th April 
7th April 
240th l\pril 
23rd April & 
w.e.loth May 
Group I 
30th May 
6th June 
13th June 
19/2lst June 
240th June 
30th June 
The L& D 
19.10.1841.-
(final form) 
40th April 
(Sub-com. 2) 
7th April 
21st April 
9th June 
Group K 
23rd June 
23rd June 
1st July 
Unopposed 
11th Ju~ 
21st Ju~ 
8 & 9 Vic.c.xlvii 8 & 9 Vic.c.cxxvi 
_ ..... __ ._------- -------
N.B. 1. Although the preamble to the L & E bill was proved on the 24th April 
the bill was in fact recommitted for the purpose of fixing maximum 
tolls. 
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N.B. 2. The E & H bill came before the Commons' committee twice as on the 
first occasion the second reading had still to take ulace. The 
committee agreed to proceed, however, on the submission of Austin 
that the E & H was not a new line but rather the continuation of 
a former one: the second. meeting was thus pro forma to ratify 
the decision reached on the first occasion. 
3. Austin, Smith, Baggerle,y and Sergeant Wrangham represented the 
L & E; Austin, Birch and Clarke the E & H; Talbot Q.C. the L & D. 
Sources: H~;nsard and the national railway journals. 
The chief incidents in the progress of the L & E bill arose from the 
claims for compensation put forward by the Eau Brink, the South Level and 
Midland Level Drainage Commissioners (claiming locus standi as landowners): 
Their case w~s simp~ that without the river tolls they would be unable to 
maintain essential drainage works, except by recourse to a crippling Drainage 
Tax of 9/- to 10/- per ~cre on their lands; if their works did fail the 
railway itself would in places be inundated to a depth of three to four feet. 
Ver,y proper~, Lord Palmerston, as chairman of Committee I, although express-
ing willingness to hear further evidence, disallowed this claim, finding no 
reason to depart from the usual practice in such cases; in alV case the 
OPPOSition did not just~ bear on the contents of the preamble to the bill. 
This was a just decision, e5pecia1~ so as the compalV had been able to 
demonstrate that the principal motivation of the commissioners was the fear 
that with ~ loss of river tolls they would be unable to meet the interest 
charges on an outstanding debt of some £48,500, contracted to the Exchequer 
Commissioners and others during the course of recent river improvements~ 
Thwarted in this main attempt the river and drainage interests then 
turned to the means of securing adequate protection for the works and 
1 lierapath, 26th April 1845, p.594 and the ~nn AdVertiser & West Norfolk 
lIera1d of the same week reporting on the proceedings before Committee I. 
2 Principa1~ the Eau Brink Cut (1821), the straightening of the Cuse between 
Littleport and E~ (1827), and the beginniIl8 of the Midland Level Drain. 
I 
1§2. 
navigation which to that point they had chosen to represent as virtual\y 
doomed. In this the L & E showed itsel~ extreme~ co-operative. All 
existing dra.inage ,,'orks, [lnd those planned (e.g. the Midland Level Drain) 
were gua.rnnteed, as were all haling rights along the banks o~ the various 
rivers and dr~ins; n.ll railway works were to be at least 100' ~rom the South 
Level Drain to preclude vibration and the creation o~ unequal pressures 
1 (clause 49 of the act). MaI\Y other similar exemples could be quoted. Only 
in the matter of bridge specifications did the companY suffer reverse, 
although the ultim~te seriousness of this was not appreciated at the time. 
The issues at stake were principal~ the modes to be adopted of crossing the 
Cuse (at the Ten !.iile Hivcr) just to the south of Downham, and the Sixteen 
Foot River (Midland Level Drain) on the Wisbech branch. Rastrick argued in 
vain that in each cn.se 3 wooden three span bridge would be complete~ sa~e 
and would impede neither navigation nor the ~ree ~low of water. Walker, 
the Chief Engineer of the Midland Level Commission, argued othervJise, f:lnd 
insisted that both bridges be built to the specifications already agreed 
between the company and the Bedford Level Corporation for the crossing of 
2 
the latter's waterways. The committee upheld Walker, and the company was 
committed to the construction of a single span of 110' over the Midland 
Level Drain, and to one of 121'6" over the Quse (clause 27). Each was to be 
at a minimum height of 10' over the banks at the point of crossing. 
Rastrick's immediate renction was that these requirements would increase the 
cost of ee.ch bridge from £2,000 to £4,000, but in point of fact the marshy 
ground at the approaches to these two bridges combined with the lengthy 
1 As required by Josiah Human, engineer to the South Level Drainage 
Commission. 
2 Name~ permanent, substnntial iron structures. 
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embankments necessitated by the minimum height clauses was to involve the 
compal\Y in the expenditure of mal\Y thousands, and plunge it far down the 
road to b~nkruptcy. In this last respect it is to be particular~ noted 
that these enforced changes were accompanied by no alteration in capital 
requirements; neither compal\Y nor committee saw fit to suggest such. 
Apart from this on~ some minor and belated opposition from the Eastern 
Counties and Northern & Eastern ruffled proceedings. This arose principally 
from the continued uncertainty os to the exact site of the Ely terminus. 
The Eastern Counties, :1nxious that the L & E line should not run parallel 
with its own for a mile or more outside the city, dared not let the matter 
slip aI\Y longer [-'nd proposed before committee that the L & E should in fact 
make use of E.C.H. metals in its approach to its terminus. L & E imputations 
that this was simp~ a device to render the ~nn line liable to charges under 
the Six Mile Clause were denied. Eventually amicable agreement resolved 
the issue. The two parties undertook to submit the whole matter to the 
arbitration of the Board of Trade and to accept its decision as binding 
(clause 21), the final outcome being that the L & E was to make use of 
E.C.R. track over a distance of 1 mile 31 chains between E~ North Junction 
and a joint station within the city. Thus, the compaI\Y was spared some 
expense, but the amount was in no way equal to that which had already been 
forced upon it. 
The Ely & Huntingdon bill was unimpeded by al\Y serious challenge. 
Crowther of the Northern & Eastern, after appearing too late to be heard in 
the Commons, opposed the bill in the Lords on the grounds of competition 
within a six mile triangle produced by the intersection of the E & H and 
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the N &: E lines! This being re jected virtually out o-r hand Crowther claimed 
locus standi as a landowning interest, although the land in question was no 
more than a strip a few feet wide. In this too he was rebuffed, the 
oommittee invoking the principle that likelihood of inju~ must be establish-
ed before he oould be admitted to oppose the preamble. Tnis Crowther oould 
not do, fear of competition being his real motive, and so the E &: H triumphed. 
However, to ease the passage of the bill and to ensure future good relations 
with its neighbours, the E &: H did agree private~ to the insertion of 
olauses in the act guaranteeing that no Northern &: Eastern land would be 
taken without the consent of that oompa~ (eventual~ this was embodied in 
olause 22); it was also agreed that representatives of the two oompanies 
should meet to devise some formula -ror the division of reoeipts within the 
disputed area, although a reoord of such did not find its way into the act. 
The final form of the act also included some 21 sections dealing with the 
rights o-r the various river and drainage boards affected by the proposed 
line, in all cases the results of previous agreements. Thus, lands taken 
were to be subject to Drainage Tax (31), the cost of new drainage works 
affecting the railw~ was to be shared (~), compensation was to be paid by 
the compa~ for a~ interruption of navigation, the compa~ being obliged to 
er,tect a~ works deemed necess~ to avert the reoccurence of such inj~ (35) 
and so on. No question was raised as to the p~ent of 3~ interest on calls. 
The passage of the ~nn &: Dereham bill was even less eventful. Mr. 
Press of Hingham appeared before the Commons' committee (K) to protest against 
the valuation put by the oompa~ on his land, but this matter was settled 
outside the oommittee room. There was, however, rather more than met the 
1 IQnn Advertiser &: West Norfolk Herald, 28th June, 1845. 
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eye in this as the Committee' s report to the Commons showed that J+B/94 
owners, 24/29 lesecs and 74/129 occupiers were still registered as dissenters 
1 
to the bill. The withdrawal of Mr.Press, followed by a public notice that 
2 
the petitions of landowners would be settled by referees, strong~ suggests 
that Press was in fact engaged in putting a test case on behalf of ma~ 
others, and thnt the compa~ had seen fit to concede his representation; it 
is to be recalled in this that the Marriotta had created a definite 
organisation to oppose the line, and it is probable that this was still 
functioning and combining to meet the Parliumenta~ expenses incurred by 
their single representative. By this timely concession the L & D undoubtedly 
secured an easy passage for its bill, but this was to be at a heavy price 
paid later in terms of land compensation. Once again, however, neither 
Parliament nor company suggested a~ alteration of estimate or capital 
authorisation. Nothing more was heard of the Marriotts themselves3althOUgh 
their influence was to be discerned in a group of seven protective clauses 
specifying such matters as compensation for a~ obstruction of the Nar (25), 
and the manner in which that river must be crossed (24). The compaI\Y was 
obliged to adopt the southern alternative of the two routes shown on the 
plans for entering Dereh~m; to this date the issue had been left open until 
the fate of the Direct Norwich & East Dereham line be known; as it transpired 
this concern had failed on Standing Orders and was postponed until the 1846 
session. It was now for that compaqy to make a~ alteration in its plans 
necessa~ for effecting the proposed end-on junction with the Lynn line~ 
1 Rnilway Record, 21st June, l8~5· 
2 ~nn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 12th July, 1845· 
3 Talbot announced their complete withdrawal, Herapath, 14th June, 1845. 
4 The agreement on this had been announced by W. Williams, Herapath, 
7th December, 1844, p.144B. 
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The matter of the payment of ~% interest on oalls was raised by Mr. Ric¢ardo , 
a oommittee member, who objeoted to the whole practice on principle. 
Williams protested in vain that other companies had been allowed to adopt 
this practice, but was told that if he persisted he must be prepared to submit 
the whole issue to the House during the third reading of the bill. This 
Williams declined to do; as it was expected that the first trains would be 
running within twelve or fifteen months of the act being obtained he dared 
not risk alliYthing that might cause the delay of the bill until the 1846 
session. 
As a final summa~ of this section it m~ be pointed out that in effect 
the three companies had been authorised to construct 85 miles of line on an 
initial capital of £764,400 (with powers to borrow a further £2~,000) 
basical~ at the instigation of a town of no more than 18,000 inhabitants. 
Superficial~, the combined revenue antioipation of £99,000 seemed well 
within reach, even a somewhat moderate estimate, and Parliament unquestion-
ing~ accepted the like~ returns on the authorised capital as being ~ 
for the L & E, 6 to 7% for the E & H, and 7~ for the L & D. In this there 
was yet one final iroI\Y. Frequent references had been made at all stages 
to the Norwich & Yarmouth line where conditions were held to be ve~ similar, 
but at the end of the boom year of 1845 that compaI\Y was able to pay a half 
year dividend at the rate of no more than 5% per annum: 
Section 6: The l§nn Lines in the Larger Pattern 
To this point sufficient has been said to show that even within their 
own territories the ~nn lines were based on ve~ insecure foundations. 
Even if these elements of insecurity had been recognised, and they were not, 
1 Scrivenor, op.cit. p.72. 
~====-::-:-:-:-~------------
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there still remained the second justification that the three were to ~orm 
the essential pivot of a wide network of railways. Parliament was not 
unaware of this aspect, but, during the 1845 session, by passing some and 
rejecting other lines, rendered it impossible of realisation, and by the 
same token added further to the burdens which Williams' companies were 
alreaay doomed to shoulder. Indeed, the events of the 1845 session, 
inconsistent and unplanned, served to radical~ alter the situation in which 
Williams had first conceived his projects. 
The me.tter is best approached by briefly listing the individual projects 
involved, and by tracing the effect that each might be expected to have on 
the future of the I(ynn lines. 
First may be specified: 
The Eastern Counties Compagy Cambridge & Huntingdon line: 
Authorised on the 8th August 1845, and opened on the 17th August, 
1847 from Cambridge to St.Ives (13* miles) where a junction was 
made with the E & H and joint use made of St.Ives station. 
This line not on~ displaced the original intention of the E & H compaqy to 
construct a branch from its own mainline to Waterbeach, but also had the 
effect of further restricting the value of the E & H in that traffic derived 
from the trun.1.c route at Huntingdon (authorised in 1846) and the intended 
(but abortive) Rugby & Huntingdon line would now have reaay access to 
Cambridge and beyond without the necessity of travelling over more than six 
miles of E & H metals. Indeed, this must be held as a major reason, 
although such was never official~ stated, wqy the E & H was never built in 
its entirety. As it was, the E & H compaqy Undertook with the Eastern 
counties to commence its construction with the Huntingdon - St.Ives section 
in order to connect the latter's line with the London & York as soon as 
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this w~s opened: this, of course, was making the best of a ve~ unfortunate 
situation. The section in question was in fact built at excessive cost, 
but o~ to find itself complete~ isolated from the remainder of the ~nn 
system; the outcome was that, in 1849, the line was leased to the Eastern 
Counties at a rental of no more than 25/- per day despite the fact that 
it had cost £125,000 to construct. 
The Norwich & Brandon Company; Vlymondham & Dereham line: 
Authorised on the 31st Ju~, 1845, opened to goods traffic on 
the 7th December, 1846, and to passengers on the 15th Februa~, 
1847. (Extended to Fakenham on the 30th March, 1849). 
Despite the most strenuous efforts of the L & D company and of Lynn 
Corporation this line was successful. Coupled with the withdrawal of the 
Wells & Thetford bill (it was because of this bill that the L & D had dropped 
its own Fakenham branch) and the failure of the Direct Norwich & East Dereham 
it represented a fatal blow to the concept of developing the L & D as an 
integral part of a great trunk route. Now, the obvious and most direct 
line between the midlands, the north and Norwich was that from Peterborough. 
The existence of the branch also contributed to the abandonment of the 
Direct Norwich & East Dereham project in the following year, and by the same 
token fatally prejudiced the chances of the 1846 applice.tion of the L & D 
itself to extend direct~ to Norwich (for which see chapter 6). Likewise, 
the branch adverse~ affected the prospects of the Wisbech line. Nearer 
home, from the viewpoint of ~nn itself, the W,Ymoruli1am - Dereham line meant 
that the farmers of central Norfolk now had a more direct route to London 
than that offered by the L & D and the L & E in conjunction; it also meant 
that Norwich merchants had the fullest opportunity to compete with Lynn 
merchants in the long disputed central areas. 
ill 
The Ipswich & Bury Compagy 
Authorised on the 21st July,1845 to construct between the towns 
named. The line was opened on the 30th November,1846. 
This company was born of the aggressive intention of Ipswich merchant 
interests and reached right into the heart of ~'s southern preserves. 
It was to cause the L & E to embark on a project to extend to Bury from 
Ely. The bill for this (in the name of the Ely & Bury Company) was 
entered too late for consideration in 1846 and failed in 1841. A second 
danger to ~ arose in 1846 when the Ipswich & Bury was authorised to 
construct a line from Haughley Junction (north of Ipswich) to Norwioh, 
this branch was eventually opened on the 7th November,1849. In that the 
Ipswich company merged with the Eastern Union in July,18471this would mean 
that there two lines competing for the London to Norwioh traffic, the 
E.U.R. (handing over to the Eastern Counties at Colchester) having a nine 
miles advantage over the Norfolk Rai1w~ and Eastern Counties route (124 
to 115). The E.C.R. at Co1ohester was to endeavour to hinder the Eastern 
Union by using dirty trains at awkward times in connection with the 
latter's servioes, but even so it had to aooept the traffic offered to it. 
The danger to Lynn was that onoe physical connection was established 
between the two routes at Norwich (as it was in 1851 by the opening of the 
one mile seotion between Trowse Upper and Lower Junctions) much traffio 
deriving from central and north Norfolk would be attraoted to Norwich and 
the Eastern Union route instead of towards Lynn and Elyo If anything the 
danger was to be aocentuated in 1854 when the Eastern Union was taken over 
by the E.C.R.,for then operational convenienoe became the dominant 
oonsideration without referenoe to the particular needs of the E.A.R~ 
1 There had been the closest liason from the first,the E.U.R.having six 
representatives on the I & B board,and being empowered to purchase the 
Norwioh extensiono 
2 See chapter 8. 
.... "'-----------------'" 
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Various other lines threatened the 2JIlbitions of Lynn 2nd the future 
prosperity of its railways, and were to do so with increasing success once 
railway operation had been placed on G. regional rather than parochial basis. 
The Norwich & Yarmouth project, authorised in 1845, to construct from Reedham, 
on its mainline, to Lowestoft, together with the improvements effected by the 
Lowestoft Ha,rbour and Railway Act of the same year, gave central Norfolk an 
alternative ~)ort to Lynn as far as convenience Wo.3 concerned. It is also to 
be noted that during the 1811-5 session the London (~: York had virtually won its 
fight~ althoush actllal incorpor:o.tion -'13,S delayed until 18\.6. This victory 
paved the Vlay for the E & H to come to terms with the northern line and to 
revive its concept of a Bedford extension, but nt ~~he same time it represented 
a major defeat for the Eastern Counties, and therefore an indirect setback for 
Lynn, in that Hudson's intention of rnDkil16 the London - Ely line a part of the 
second great trun.1c route to the north wp,s thwarted. There can be no knOwing 
what developments might have ensued in north-'."est Norfolk if it hr-)l been 
brought into close proximity to such a line. 
Section 7: Conclusions 
The passage of the three railway bills was a hollow victory for all 
concerned. With their estimates unsound, with powerful rivals entrenched on 
three sides and with their ambitions nullified even before a start had been 
lU3.de in their implementation, Lynn railways faced a bleak future. Not that 
this wes recognised at the time. Parlirunent t s blessing confirme,l the 
confidence thc.t was already paramount and which clearly foresaw a bustling 
1 The Direct l;ol,thern failed on Standing Orders; the Cambridge ~ Lincoln y!Q,S 
rejected because of errors in its surveys; the ;::.C.~'{. · .. ithdrew its Ely _ 
Lincoln project in favour of G. Midland ::t.:;.D'.'lo.y proposal to extend from 
Swinton (Yorkshire) to Lincoln v:ith a branch to March - this Vl2.S c1cfeo.tea .• 
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expanding ~rm served by three lucrCLtive r~.ilv.'o.ys. This "\'10.5 not to be 
however. What hred been conceived as the nucleus of a flourishing system of 
lines centred. on ~nn had already become c. mere a..9pend.age to the regional and. 
national systems. Williams saw the danger quicker than most and laboured. 
hard. in the next two yea.rs to extend. the L & D to Norwich, the E & H to Bed.ford., 
the Wisbech line to Spalding and the L & E mainline to Bu~ St.Ed.mund.s, all to 
no avail. He might ho.ve thousht that after all it would have been better to 
concentrate on one project in d.epth rather than several not so, but even this 
would. have made little difference for the entire concept of his railways was 
to a certain extent false. That is to say that they erred. in principle 
rather than content, for after all each of his lines could. be logically 
d.efend.ed as means of either consolidation or expansion for the trad.e of Lyrm. 
Again, neither he nor Parliament, nor anyone concerned, can be blamed., for 
knowled.ge and. experience can never be cheap, and. both these had. yet to be 
gained.; it was inevitable that prospects for 1855 a.nd. '65 should. be judged. in 
terms of 1845· That the latter should be a year of unique prosperity merely 
heightened. the delusion and increased. the temptations. 
The fund.amental error was that to Williams and. thousand.s like him a 
railway was something to be used. as an instrument in the service of a particu-
lar community. Such Vias, of course, true, but only partially so. What was 
not recognised was that a railway must live in its own right, that not only 
must it be self supporting, but that it must fit in with others of its kind. 
and. with the convenience of those it sought to serve. In terms of expansion 
it is the r~ilway that will d.ictate and not necessarily its creators. Thus, 
a sound railway econo~ does not necessarily conform to the eXisting economic 
pattern of any particular locality, and attempts to make it do so might well 
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lead to the failure of the one, and then of the other. 
From the very beginning of the railway era this potential conflict of 
interest was in evidence to a greater or lesser extent, but at the same time, 
however slowly and spasmodically, it was being unconsciously resolved. The 
decisive factor was that rarely were ::he majority of investors in a line the 
natives of its locality and the pressures brought to bear by these were 
inevitably in the interests of the railway as such; amalgamation of companies 
was an inevitable consequence, one which further divorced parochial interests 
from the railways which so often they themselves had conceived. This was 
certainly to be the case y:ith the Iqnn lines, but at the stage of events 
narrated in this chapter local interest still prerrominated, and was of course 
responsible for the )assage of the bills through Parliament. MaDiY of the 
investors at this stage were still local men fired with parochial ambition, 
while the rest, affected by the national enthusiasm for railways as such, were 
still individuals yet to meet together; if doubts crept into their minds the 
answer was simply to sell their shares at the high premiums still obtaining. 
The Iqnn railways were to fall bankrupt. From what has been said in 
this chapter this was perhaps inevitable, but then they recovered and the 
L & D and the L & E still operate today. The paradox may readily be explained. 
As conceived within local horizons and with the understanding of the pre-
railway era they were bound to fail, and the story of their independent 
existence is one of dismal ruin. But then, first by lease to the Eastern 
Counties, and then by amalgamation into the Great Eastern, salvation was found. 
Meanwhile IQrnn continued its long drawn out decline in relative importance, but 
survived as an important local centre benefited by the railways and using them 
as a basis for new departures in the econo~ of the area. It is certain 
ill 
that it was its railways which enabled the town to survive the critical 
period between the collapse of its barbour trade and the evolving of a new 
pattern of activity. In other words the railways effectively shielded ~nn 
while it found its level in the new age. Tha.t this should be so owes much to 
the fact that the railways in question were no longer small, uneconomic units 
struggling against irresistible economic forces, but rather elements in a 
comprehensive network controlled by interests that cared little for ~nn or 
a~here else as such, but o~ for the profitable operation of their railw~ 
system. 
There is one other aspect however. There was inevitably a.n interim 
period before the full effects of the railw~. age on the old parochial system 
were felt, and this wa.s a period in which railways could be used to achieve 
local ends, even if o~ partially so. In certain respects existing patterns 
could be modified in preparation for the onset of external forces. To this 
end cheap and rapid construction, intelligent rates and services, the provision 
of adequate facilities, good public relations and a keen appreciation of what 
was going on around were all equally essential. Unfortunately such presumed a 
degree of that experience and foresight of which as yet there was so little. 
This last section is intended both to round off what has gone before and 
to serve as an introduction to the detailed study of bankruptcy that now 
follows. In the next chapter the details and mechanics of the principles 
outlined above will be followed through in their application to the lines of 
Lynn. 
Chapter 4 
The Failure of the Estimates (I) 
(1845-184-8 ) 
Note: For the sake of convenience the title of the East Anglian Railw~s 
Company has been used throughout this chapter, although the three 
compe,nies covered by it retained their individuality until the August 
of 1847. 
Introduction: 
By the close of 1848 the buoyant optimism of 1845 had given way to a 
gloom bordering on sheer desperation. The lines, to Ely, Dereham and Wisbech 
had been completed in form, although not in terms of facilities, but as yet 
the E~ & Huntingdon reached no further than over the 5 miles between 
Huntingdon I"lnd St.lves, and in that the funds of that company had been 
diverted to effect the completion of the ruinously expensive construction of 
the Wisbech branch it was like~ to remain so confined. These 67~ miles had 
1 
cost £1,247,446 and the end of capital expenditure was still not in sight. 
A 5% debenture debt of near~ £300,000 hung over the company, and the original 
capital of £7~,400 (intended to cover the construction of 85~ miles) had been 
swollen to include two creations of guaranteed preference shares, £119,899 at 
&.% and £70,873/105. at 7%. Against this traffic receipts for the half year 
just ended had yielded no more than £18,968, of which all but £7,134 had been 
claimed by working expenses. Apart from interest payments, a host of contract 
debts had yet to be settled, further plant was urgent~ required and the first 
loan repayments were shortly to fall due, but available reserves e.mounted to 
no more than the £976/11s. cash in the bank. Further creations of cE~pita1 
seemed out of the question for the £25 shares had sunk to a quotation of only 
1 Herapath, 10th March, 1849, p.254; statement of accounts to the 31st 
December, 1848. 
179 1 
~, and doubts were being expressed as to whether they were worth even that; 
E & H £18 shares were down to £2/17/6 and even the £3/10 6% preference stock 
had fallen to £2/2/6. The situation, further exacerbated by deep ~~tional 
depression, was doubly serious in that if recovery were to be effected certain 
vital developments and extensions hnd to be implemented without delay. Hopes 
had been raised during 1847 that the Eastern Counties would take the lines on 
lease and guarantee a fixed minimum return, so solving all the companies' 
problems, but the negotiations had been conducted in such an arrogant manner 
by the struggling concerns and with such duplicity by the Eastern Counties that 
success had been precluded from the outset. Now, a public declaration of 
bankruptcy was only a step away and the future seemed to be without a~ 
comfort. Already Herapath had sarcastical]~ congratulated the compa~ on 
2 having spent so much for the public benefit at its own unmitigated loss, an 
unnecessary comment which, understandab~ so, had had a "positive~ harmfu1 M3 
effect in depressing the value of compa~ shares. 
Section 1: Directors, Shareholders and Accounts 
The fundamental causes of the dismal situation outlined above are to be 
found primari~ in the events prior to amalgamation in the August of 1847, and 
involve above all else the consequences that stemmed from the nature and 
defects of the ear~ leadership, and in particular from the sinister role 
played by Williams and the companies' solicitors. An ear~ decision that eaoh 
board of six should contain two representatives from each of its partners meant 
in effect that the number of individuals involved as directors was only twelve. 
1 Herapath, 16th December, 1848, p.1296; letter of 'Quiet Observer'. 
2 Ibid., 6th November, 1847, p.1264; in the first of three articles. 
3 Ibid., 16th December, 1848, p.1296; letter of 'Quiet Observer'. 
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The names ~pecified in the individual acts) of these were given to the 
proprietors at the initial compa~ meetings, a practice not really objection-
able in itself as prior to these meetings scrip might have changed hands 
several times so that the promoters would not know who Vlould appear, and in aI{Y 
case the proprietors Vlould for the most part be strangers to each other. By 
and large the proprietors were satisfied that the men chosen were for the 
1 
most part "locally resident" and all of "great respectability". In making 
his choice Williams was first concerned to obtain men who would be amenable to 
his influence without the inhibiting necessity of himself having to participate 
in active management, and secondly to find those who would trust him implicitly 
without feeling the need for close observation of his activities. Men he 
knew on the social level were the obvious choice, because of both their 
personal relationships with him and the fact that they were resident in ~nn 
and thereby easier to manage. It was possibly because of the need for such 
compliance that J.Shep)herd of Jqnn, with an investment of £10,375, was 
excluded. 
Thus, as chairman of the Jqnn & EJs' was Folkes, despite the facts that 
his holding was one of only £900 and that, although undoubtedly a man of the 
world, his pr[wtical business experience was limited to the management of his 
2 
own estates. Partridge, vdth £500 (the minimum qualification) in the ~nn & 
Dereham, appeared doubtless to hold a watching brief for the partnership he 
had with Goodwin and WilliQIDs, although in fairness his 1846 subscription of 
£4,400 to the Rugby & Huntingdon 1ine~ potentially a great benefit to the 
East Anglian, should be mentioned. Cresswell and Everard, with subscriptions 
1 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 26th July, 1811-5. 
2 For the composition of individual boards and details of 
compa~ by company see Appendix D. 
3 ;~ccounts & Papers 1846 (473) xxxviii. 
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of £2,000 and £3,000 respective~, were naturally included as members of the 
'inner group' of l81j-lj .• Seppings, a Iornn shipowner, and two Lynn merchants, 
Ingle and Sell, were also included, although it is interesting to note, and 
suggestive of direct encouraeement by Williams, that none of them had appeared 
. 1 
amongst the Subscription Contracts presented in support of the 1845 b~lls. 
The Lynn complement of eight was made up by the ardent liberal and highly 
respected surseon, J.B.Whiting, who at least made up for lack of practical 
experience by a subscription of £5,000. The four from outside Lynn were 
Sir Henry Roddam Calder, a Hull bnronet, T.Abdy M.P. of Essex, Francis 
Reynolds, a London merchant, and Henry Lacy, a gentleman of Ke~on House near 
Manche ster; [,,11 of the se had been members of one or more of the Provisional 
Committees of 184}~. The first three of these men had started with initial 
investments of £1,250 each, although later Calder admitted to having bought 
and sold ma~ hundreds of the three companies' shares prior to becoming a 
director; in that when £25 shares were being nuoted at £4. he claimed he had 
sustained a loss of £5,000 by being a director2it may be surmised that his 
final stake was something like £6,000. Henry Lacy, the sale representative 
of the very substantial northern interest in the lines, merits special 
consideration. 
Chairman of the Iornn 8: Dereham and the Ely & Huntingdon boards, a 
member of the Iornn & Ely directorate, and subse~uent~ the first chairman of 
the combined East Anglian, Lacy stood out as the most active and deserving of 
all those listed above. His pre-eminence was justified not only by a stBke 
of £13,750 in the compan;y (1845), to which may be added £4,800 in the Ely & 
13 
1 Accounts & P:cpers 1845 (625-) xl, and (317) xl. 
2 Herapath, 19th June, 1849; meeting of the 16th June. 
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Huntingdon 18~6 extension capital am.f:5,200 and £6,500 respectively 
subscribed to the abortive Ely & Bury and Rugby & Huntingdon projects of that 
year, but also by previous practical experience in the field of transport; 
. I 
in fact, "his previous great experience of coaching was relied on". The 
nature of this remains undetermined, but it is tempting to think that like 
ChapJ..;rin and others he had had the foresight and courat;e to bow to the 
inevitable and identifY himself with the new age. Certainly he had the 
courage to hold fast when troubles set in and several of his colleagues sold 
out rather than attempt to weather the storm. Throughout he endeavoured to 
set a stabilising example by maintaining an unaffected faith in the ultimate 
future of his lines. He deserved a better fate than failure, and it can 
only be regretted that his previous experience proved inadequate for the 
conduct of railway affairs. 
Two general observations may be made on the composition of the three 
boards. Firstly, because the majority were ~nn men, the offices were in 
~nn and three constituted a quorum, the local directors, under Williams' 
direct influence, were going to hold a dominant position. With the excep-
tions of Folkes and Whiting, the ~nn group did possess suocessful business 
experience, but only such as had been gained within the security of the town's 
monopoly and on the foundation of long established family concerns. Secondly 
should be noted the low financial stakes, a faotor which, amongst other 
things, rendered less likely that degree of constant caution which would 
probably have derived from really large personal holdings. In fixing 
directors' investment qualifioations, as a general rule, so 10w,Parliament 
had erred most grievously, and oontributed directly to the general loss of 
1 Herapath, 16th December, 1848, p.1296; letter of 'QUiet Observer'. 
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confidence in railway securities which had become manifest by 1847! The 
first possibility that could arise was that having gained a place directors 
could unload large holdings at a premium, and yet still retain their seats~ 
As seen Calder specifical~ denied this practice in his own case, but a 
large question mark must hang over Everard and Cresswell who resigned their 
seats in 1847· Another possibility was the development of a dilemma such as 
that which the East Anglian board faced on the creation of preference shares 
during 1~7; public confidence could have best been boosted by large scale 
purchase on the part of the directors, but in fact o~ a minority contribut-
ed simp~ because, or so it was claimed, to do so would have involved the 
prior sale of original shares which would in itself have undoubted~ "pulled 
down the market"~ 
Chronic errors of judgment were committed by these directors, and in 
particular did they saddle the compaqy with an almost impossible burden of 
capite.l debt. The key to this lay in their relationship with the companies' 
solicitors. Examination of this will. show why after saying of the first 
boards in 1~9, "all their faults had arisen from ignorance of railway 
4 
matters", Henry Bruce, chairman of the East Anglian from 1848 to 1861, could 
amend his judgment (1859) to speak "with shame and indignation" of those 
"proceedings of earlier da;ys" when the proprietors had been truly robbed by 
"
.. ·t 1 charges and worse,,5. J.n:LquJ. ous aw It should be added, however, that 
genuine suspicion attaches o~ to Folkes, Everard, Cresswell and Seppings, 
although even here, as suggested in the first chapter, there is a strong 
1 See a pamphlet of 1848: 'In Answer to a Letter of George Carr G lyn t by 
John Whitehead of the London Stock Exchange, p.5. 
2 Cf. Williams, op.cit., p.6. 
3 Herapath, 19th June, 1849; Bruce at the meeting of the 16th June. 
4- Ibid., 3rd March, 1849; meeting of the 28th February. 
5 Railway Times, 19th March, 1859, pp.324-7; meeting of the 11th March. 
v 184-
case to indicate that they were fundamentally the dupes of Williams more than 
aI\}Tthing else. Lacy and Self were certai~ above suspicion, the latter 
continuing to serve on the board throughout Bruce's period in the chair. 
The question, incapable of settlement either way but with the balance of 
evidence perhaps favouring the charitable view, is therefore one of deciding 
between a verdict of culpable negligence or positive fraud. 
It is clear that the central role played by Williams was in no w~ 
diminished in the first two years after the acts of incorporation had been 
obtained. With his partner s, Goodwin and Partridge, and a second firm of 
solicitors, the Messrs. Rooper, originally retained by the Lynn & Dereham, he 
continued to hold the reins of power and provide the principal motive force 
when matters of major importance, for example extensions of the system, had 
to be decided. The two firms of solicitors, acting in close association, 
performed the functions of compa~ agents, they lent money to the companies, 
received the calls on shares and exercised a general control "without paying 
1 a~ attention to the directors of the d~". This was facilitated by the 
fact that of these directors four, Everard, Cresswell, Seppings and Folkes, 
were close personal associates of Williams and sufficient in number to form 
a majority amongst the members of the boards who could afford regular 
attention to the companies' affairs. B,y the ve~ smallness of their 
investments these four owed more to Williams than they did to their 
proprietors whose constant~ shifting composition and general lack of cohesion 
precluded any serious challenge to external control. Unhappily the integrity 
and genuine sincerity of Lacy were outweighed by his inexperience in railw~ 
matters, and this prevented him from comprehending the realities of a 
1 Herapath, lOth Ju~, 1858, p·7l2 ; an editorial comment on the legal 
proceedings being undertaken by the E.A.R. against its former solicitors. 
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situation, obtaining until the August of 184.7, in which he and his co-
directors were tolerated as mere figure-heads as regards the formulation of 
policies, but were made the principal instruments, and thereby the potential 
scapegoats, in their execution. Perhaps unobjectionable in itself this 
distribution of power was rendered reprehensible by the fact that it was used 
by the solicitors to cover their peculation and gross over-charging against 
the companies. 
First suspected o~ in 1849, when an auditors' report questioned the 
massive total of the solicitors' charges and recommended that the accounts be 
re-opened and examined~ it was 1853 before active investigation, the prelude 
to 1ege1 proceedings, began. An amazing picture was then revealed. It was 
found that in the matter of receiving calls no regular accounts had been kept, 
that financial transactions were passed on to the railway offices on mere 
slips of paper, that what books there were were full of discrepancies and 
false balances, and that despite the huge sums involved there had never been 
a formal settlement between the solicitors and the companies~ In short the 
Iornn & Ely and the Iunn & Dereham had no means of knowing the proper amounts 
to be credited to individuals, the most glaring discrepancy coming to light 
being that of a payment of £13,291 to the solicitors appearing in the 
compa~'s books as £1,051. While no dividends were being paid, and because 
the rai1w~ accounts were in such hopeless confusion, there was little danger 
of either imminent discovery or eventual retribution. In respect of bond 
issues it was found in 1853, amongst other irregularities, that shortly after 
the amalgamation had taken place two bonds were issued, each of £3,000, in 
1 Herapath, 17th November, 1849, p.1157; meeting of the 23rd August, 1849. 
2 Ibid., 10th Ju~, 1858, p·700; Bruce at a special meeting of the 6th July. 
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the names of the L & E and the-r-& D respective~ (both legal~ extinct), but 
when the first joint accounts were compiled only one of the bonds had been 
1 
credited to the oapital account. 
But, even though ma~ more similar examples could be cited, suoh 
fraudulent gains were only incidental to the massive and systematic over-
charging of the companies in such matters as Parli~~enta~ Expenses and land 
conveyance. Conscious of the need for some degree of concealment the 
solicitors ensured that £21,184 of the former appeared in the new East 
Anglian joint accounts as two items of £9,262/6/1 and £11,92~10/2 under the 
heading of Permanent Way and Works. Even more blatant was the inclusion of 
bills totalling £21,000 in the figures presented to the Board of Trade prior 
2 
to amalgamation, although the work represented in them was in fact not even 
due to be done, and in the case of investigation of land deeds in conneotion 
with the E & H extension to Bedford and the proposed Eastern Counties lease 
3 
was never done. The new~ formed board, free of Williams' influence as will 
be shown in a later seotion, suspected nothing and met the demands, just as 
in 1849 it was to meet further bills without questioning their contents. 
The former payment proved to be a grave error, for in 1858 the Vice-
Chancellor ruled that submission to the Board of Trade (although the purpose 
had been no more than to establish that 50.% of the capital of the three 
oompanies had been paid in and properly expended - a condition of amalgama-
tion) in fact constituted proof of settlement, and therefore refused the 
East Anglian plea that the books be re-opened. 
1 Herapath, lOth July 1858, p.700; Bruce at the special meeting of the 
6th Ju~. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid.; Bancroft from the floor. 
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Four factors explain how the solicitors were enabled to get away with so 
much. Of these, the relationship between Williams and the directors, 
inexperienced and trusting, has been explained; the second is rather more 
open to doubt, but offers a very attractive possibility, and one that would 
exonerate the 'inner group' of everything but a charge of negligence. The 
secretary of the ~nn & E~ and the ~nn & Dereham was a W.Williams. No 
fami~ relationship has been established between him and J.C.Williams, but if 
there were such a great deal would be explained. It may well be significant 
that as far as can be ascertained the fraudulent practices of the solicitors 
were not extended to the E~ & Huntingdon, the one compal'\Y of the three of 
which W.Williams was not the secretary. 
The third factor requires extended treatment, because it concerns the 
chronic confusion that then existed throughout the accountancy systems of 
nearly all railway companies. The East Anglian was not alone, nor was 
dishonesty necessarily involved, in the production of balances which had "no 
1 
more effect than a sheet of waste paper". Lack of authoritative guidance 
was the cause, for section 115 of the Compal'\Y Clauses Consolidation Act of 
1845 had done little more than enjoin that: 
" •• directors shall cause full and true accounts to be kept of all 
sums received or expended on account of the compa~ by the directors 
and all persons employed by or under them, and of such matters and 
thil~S for which such sums of money shall have been received or 
disbursed and paid." 
At the time when the practical problem of translating a new medium of 
transport into meaningful figures was necessa.rily at its most acute such 
general (lirections as these left the way wide open for a va.st range of 
individual practices, with the immediate results that comparison between 
1 Quoted by Williams, op.cit. p.59 from the 'Times'. 
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companies and the possibility of'lLearning from the mistakes of others were 
precluded~ Indeed, directors, with the best of intentions, often found it 
difficult to make one set of accounts comparable with those that had gone 
before so that the progress of 8 single compa.:qy could not be accurately 
measured. Until governmental imposed audits were instituted in 1849 there 
was no check on content. Prior to that regular audits were conducted, but 
by elected representatives of the shareholders (the holding of one share 
qualified the individual for election) who were usual~ total~ unqualified 
for the task and who might be self interested, the friends of the directors 
or mere speculators, while persons "eminently well qualified as auditors to 
consider the general truth and fidelity of Railway Accounts (were) not lL~ely 
to possess the technical knowledge which would render their supervision of 
2 Parliamenta~ or legal costs a sufficient protection against abuse". Often 
such auditors had to work on books that were unintelligible, sometimes 
incomplete and occasionally fraudulent, and almost invariablY were given such 
a short time that little more than the addition of figures and the comparison 
of book totals against the vouchers passed to them by the directors was 
possible~ the Select Committee heard of one oase where the auditor was given 
a single day to examine a 200 page ledger containing solicitors' bills to the 
4 
extent of £80,000 (the compa~ was not speoified but could well be the East 
.Anglian in ;llmost every respect). Such audits were "moonshine as against 
dishonest directors"5(or in this case directors misled by dishonest solicit-
ors), and valueless for the proprietor of the best companies, but even so 
great faith was placed in them, this arising largely from an exaggerated 
1 Seleot Committee on the Audit of Railway Accounts, Sess.Papers 1849 (421) 
3rd Report, p.v. 
2 Ibid., p.xvi. ; Ibid., Minutes of Evidence, Q.2334. 
~ Ibid., Qs.2334-6. Ibid., Q.2548. 
1 i 
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respect for the characters of the directors as individuals, "a transient 
1 
security at best". Great difficulties intervened if the individual proprietor 
wished to conduct his own personal investigation into details of the accounts. 
Parliament had decreed that these must be open at all reasonable times, which 
of course allowed the times for inspection to be most inconvenient and often 
restricted to a couple of days before the meeting and in the absence of 
directors and others qualified to answer direct questions on their contents~ 
the East Anglian, and many others, further decreed that once approved accounts 
could not be reopened. If by chance a proprietor did discover a matter 
needing redress he was obliged to pit his own against public funds, and place 
himself at the mercy of the Supreme Courts of Law and Equity which were 
il'IVariably slow and costly am sometimes completely ineffectual~ 
To provide a basis for further discussion and a foundation for 
subsequent sections the detailed accounts of the East Anglian's expenditure 
are now set out in the form in which they were presented to the proprietors 
for the period to the 31st December, 1848. It may be assumed that, as 
in the February of 1848, the directors presented them with "clean hands and 
clean hearts"~ To this point receipts totalled £1,248,422/19/11. 
1 Third Report of the Select Committee on the Audit of Rai1w~ Accounts, 
184-9, p.xii. 
2 Ibid., p.ri. 
3 Ibid., pp. x-xii. 
4 Herapath, 19th February, 1~8, p.201; Bruce on the 16th February, 1848. 
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Capi tal Expendi ture to the 31st December,18481 
Since the 30th June Total 
Advertising,printing and stationery 274 11 0 4,502 8 6 Debenture stamps,commission on loans 
and bankers' charges 105 16 0 3,441 10 7 ottioe sa1aries,rates,rents,taxes 278 14 0 3,892 4 5 General office expenses,trave11ing 
expenses,postage etc. 263 17 10 4,759 0 11 Engineering and surveying 861 11 10 21,761 1 5 Preliminaries and Parliament 296 7 3 12,618 18 10 
Direotion and audit 20 0 0 3,820 0 0 
Law costs 490 7 7 3,268 8 3 Land and compensation 7,914 4 10 262,797 18 9 Earthworks,bridges and stations 4,316 5 1 516,077 19 2 
Sleepers,rai1s and chairs 10,390 19 6 221,502 2 7 Carriages, wagons and trucks 8,449 12 7 56,075 16 4 
Locomotives 4,462 1 2 19,519 4 11 
Stores and expenses at the yard 1,781 18 5 7,289 18 2 
Saoks,tarpau1ins and covers 263 18 11 790 8 2 
Interest on debentures and 6~ 
preterence shares at £14,323/16/7 
_ deduct revenue profit to 30th 
June,1848 of £9,087/7/8 8,636 9 10 13,872 18 9 
Interest Account 101 5 10 25,041 8 6 
Fire Insurance 81 16 1 
:Briok Yard 599 1 1 
Brioks 1,003 19 4 2,628 17 10 
Due by insolvent parties whose 
shares are transferred in trust 12 12 3 310~~ 12 3 
£89,438 6 3 £1,247,446 8 6 
Cash at :Bank 216 11 2 
£1a2~8a~22 12 11 
Special Notes. 
!. Advertising,printing and stationery. It is evident from this triple 
item that the cost of advertiSing cannot always haTe been the serious 
drain that it has been represented to be. The expense 1~ in covering 
as many as possible of the mushroom growth of rai1w~ journals during 
the 'Mania' period (14 twioe week1y,2 daily and 4 monthly as compared 
with 3 before and 5 after). Some of these existed on advertiSing alone 
and were said to haTe incomes of £12,000 to £14,000 per week (cf. 
Francis,Vo1.2,p148 and Morier Evans,op.citoplO)o But the fact that 
from the 25th October,1845 the 'Rai1w~ Gazette' charged only 5/- for 
6 lines and under,£3 per co1umn,£1/15 per half column or £7/10 per page 
is very hard to reconcile with these tigures,and even more so with 
Francis' claim (Vo1.2,p150) that some advertisements cost £700 each. 
1 Herapath,10th Maroh,1849,p254,presented at the meeting of the 28th 
February, 1849. 
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B. Legal or Law Costs: This can refer only to legal business over and above 
that connected with land conveyance and parliament. 
Revenue Account for the six months ended 31st December, 1848 
Receipts: £18,968/7/11t· (for details see later section) 
Expenditure: 
Repairs of permanent wa:y 
Wages - locomotive department 
Coke, coals, oil, tallow, grease, turps., 
white lead etc. 
Wages of clerks, porters, guards, police 
gate-keepers, pointsmen 
Salaries viz. management, audit officer, 
and proportion of secretarial and 
accounts offices 
Passenger Duty 
Rates and taxes 
Gas and wItter rent 
Compensation 
Printing and statione~ 
Travelling and general expenses, 
post and petty disbursements 
stores and wages at the harbour branch 
Cartage 
Balance 
1,477 0 10 
1 ,Ill+- 10 11 
2,784 1 4 
2,972 5 9 
748 6 5 
1 .. 18 6 11 
232 8 5 
54 11 4 
25 6 9 
542 6 5 
94 17 1 
483 1 1 
239 3 7 
7,134 6 at 
£18,968 7 lIt 
Puncher justly complained of the accounts for the previous half year to these 
1 
that capital and revenue expenditure was "all jumbled together" so as to be 
completely baffling. It is obvious that his grumbles had borne no fruit. 
It will be observed, for example, that rents, rates, taxes, statione~, 
general office expenses and salaries had been charged to both accounts 
without a~ apparent distinction, that interest charges which properly belong 
to the revenue account appeared under capital expenditure as did also the 
expenses of the Stores' Yard, and that the amalgamation of such items as 
advertising, printing and statione~ precluded a~ check on individual heads 
1 Herapath, 29th September, 1848. 
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of expenditure, and especial~ so on such matters as solicitors' charges. 
That no confidence could be placed in the balance of revenue shown only 
became real~ a:)[>arent with the report of the committee of inquiry in the 
1 
autumn of IBl+9. Then it was found that an "unnecessary large amount of 
stationery" had been purchased and distributed indiscriminately to capital and 
revenue, that an undue quantity of office furniture had been acquired (until 
the December of 1846 this had been shown as a separate item, but thereafter 
was included under General Office Expenses, itself part of a composite group), 
and that the maintenance of three Iqnn offices after amalgamation was both 
unnecessary and highly costly. In particular reference to the accounts of 
December, 1848 and the apparent revenue profit shown it was pointed out that 
in a "very badly keptll stores t Account items to the value of £7 ,289 had been 
purchased and then that half had been distributed without distinction between 
the two accounts, that locomotive repairs to the extent of £230/16/4 had been 
charged to capital as also had been an item of £230/1/11 for clothing which 
properly belonged to the revenue account. Thus, the relationship between 
revenue receipts and working expenses was far worse than it ~1)peared. This, 
however, was a common feature of the time. Moon of the London & North 
Western Railway admitted that "if the capital account were closed the compa~ 
2 
would never pay another dividend", while an even more significant comment was 
made by L.M.Wolfe before the 1849 Select Committee, "as soon as the capital 
accounts are closed we shall then be able to see the real state of mal\Y of 
these companies. 3 (At present) Nobody knows the real state". The principle 
that the capital account should be closed with the completion of the line for 
1 Printed in Herapath, 19th November, 1349, pp.1158-9. 
2 Kirkaldy & Evans, op.cit. p.lOO; also compare Morrison, op.cit. p.60. 
3 Minutes of Evidence, Q.2350. 
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which it was intended was one that few could afford to face before traffic was 
fully developed - it might be added, however, that in terms of facilities 
'completion' is a concept a.lmost incaprble of definition. 
Nowhere did these accounts contain a valuation of comparw property or arw 
prOVision for depreciation. In fact hardly arw comparw, not even the London 
& Birmingham, boasted 9. depreciation fund at that time; and in 1849 the East 
2 
Anglian positively asserted that such was unnecessa~, a foolharay decision 
dictated by financial nece~sity rather than clear thinking. An expenditure of 
nearly £1,500 during the latter part of 1848 on the repair of permanent way 
barely two years old should have been su:fficient warning , although at the best 
of times oak keys lasted only five years, and at up to £10 per thousand with 
3 
some 7,000 used per mile this constituted a major item of replacement; 
4 
creosoted larch sleepers lasted o~ 21 years, and wagons and trucks twelve 
5 years or less. In addition the comparw courted the risk of falling behind 
technical advances. Progress in locomotive design, for example, generally 
meant greater efficiency and economy, but almost invariably heavier track -
the Liverpool & Manchester had opened in 1829 with wrought iron rails of 35 
1bs. to the yard, yet by 1854 the weight ratio throughout the count~ had 
6 
risen to between 44 and 84 1bs. per yara. Such progress also involved rapid 
deterioration in the capital value of locomotives; the 'Times' gave one such 
example in December, 1848 when reporting the sale of an eighteen year old 
locomotive of the Renfrew & Paisley Compapy, which had cost £750, for a mere 
7 
£13· 
1 Select Committee on the Audit of Railway Accounts, L.M.Wolfe, Q.2350. 
2 Herapath, 19th November, 1849; Report of the Committee of Inqui~, 17th 
November. 
3 Williams, op.cit. p.234. 4 Ibid. 5 Head, op.cit. p.78. 
6 Dickson, op.cit. p.49 7 28th December, 1848. 
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Exception could also be taken to the fact that these complex accounts 
were open for inspection in Iqnn for only two or three days before the 
meeting. Occasional demands that the half-year~ accounts should be printed 
and circulated well in advance, as was done by the Great Western for example, 
were rebuffed by a variety of subtle pleas; in the November of 1847 it was 
argued that to accede to the request would further reduce attendance at 
meetings and that extra clerks would have to be employed, whereas the compa~ 
then had "no more cats than caught mice"~ The demands were not pressed. 
Similar arguments were employed to counter suggestions that the figures be 
broken down to show the exact state of each of the three sections of the 
company's system. As with a sta.tement of powers, the presence of which 
could be reaso~~b~ expected with each set of accounts, the board had good 
reasons for fighting shy of such requirements. The incomplete state of the 
E & H (which in 1846 had raised oapital to extend to Bedford) and the diver-
2 
sion of its funds to the Wisbech branch of the L & E were matters best kept 
quiet. The directors also had to combat a growing suspioion, common to the 
original shareholders of both the L & E and the L & D, that it was the other 
section which was dragging the fortunes of the joint enterprise so low. 
This diversion of capital was of course involved with an important question of 
moral principle, and also served to render the companw aooounts even more 
useless as a means of estimating the real value of a compaqy's stook1 the 
practioe, however, was not uncommon. 
Final~, the most important of all the omissions was a~ reoord of out-
standing liabilities in either the aooounts or the company's books. This 
1 Herapath, 6th November, 1847, p.1254; meeting of the 3rd November. 
2 Clear~ stated in the report of the Committee of Inquiry, ibid., 19th 
November, 1849. 
3 Select Committee on the Audit of Railw~ Acoounts; minutes of evidenoe, 
Lewis Mort1nke, a former share broker, Q.2327. 
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goes far to explain the reckless expenditure of the el'trly boards. At the 
February meeting of 1849 Bruce told the proprietors that when he came to office 
he had been assured that there was a surplus of £115,000, and that this would 
suffice for the completion of the E~ & Huntingdon, all other works then in 
hand and the provision of the extra sidings and traffic facilities still 
required. But in fact over £250,000 had been needed, and even at that stage, 
I 
February 1849, further liabilities were still coming to light. Thus, despite 
further creations of capital, the lines as a whole were still far from 
complete, and relative~ urgent matters such as the installation of the 
Electric Telegraph were having to be left in abeyance. In their report of 
August, 1849, the auditors recommended as a matter of urgency that a detailed 
list of liabilities be prepared at the end of each half year, and o~ then 
was the matter taken in hand. 
To explain this situation one has to turn to the report of the committee 
of inquiry. This confirmed the honesty of the directors in finding that all 
capital had apparently been devoted to its proper purpose, and concluded that 
all "mistakes do not appeFl.r to be by design but arise from the imperfect 
2 
system of accountancy". Here was a fundamental cause of all the mischief, 
misleading figures and false confidence. The system was imperfect and 
3 difficult to follow, and there were too maqy books - the end prOQuct was a 
hopelessly inaccurate representation of the overall situation at aqy given 
moment. Of course the audits had been little more than the usual trusting 
formality. As ear~ as November, 1847, FI. shareholder had compl~ined of his 
inabili~ to make aqytbing of the accounts and presumed that the auditors had 
1 Herapath, loth March, 1849, p.254; meeting of the 28th Februa~. 
2 Ibid., 19th November, 1849. 
3 Ibid., 13th August, 1849; the auditors' report. 
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done little more than total up the figures; Lacy, who could be surprising~ 
ingenuous at times, "believed" that the auditors had seen all the vouohers 
1 
but he had not "interfered or overlooked". 
The fourth and final factor in explanation of the chronic failure of the 
first directors concerns the natuI~ of their relationship with their share-
holders, and in particular the absence of aI\Y pressure from that direotion. 
It might have been expected that even at an early stage exception would have 
been taken to the extent of the Pl'lrliamentary Expenses and land charges. The 
Iunn & Ely, Ely & Huntingdon and Iornn & Dereham acts of l8L .. 5 had cost the 
companies, as far as either the directors or the shareholders knew, sums of 
£15,565, .£15,191 and Ja3 ,304 respectively~ which when added to the costs of 
£28,421 incurred in the various additional bills of 1846 and '47 involved a 
total ex~enditure of over £12 ,000 as shown in the accounts, but in reality one 
of nearly £100,000. Included were of course the fees of both Houses, of 
Parliamentary Agents, of counsel, of copy and shorthand writers and mapmakers, 
as well as the expenses of witnesses and compnI\Y officers while in London~ 
but when it is considered that none of these items, with the exception of 
counsel's fees, could amount to more than a few hundred pounds, even allowing 
for the fact that witnesses to the Iornn & Dereham preamble had to be maintained 
in London for over a month, and that therefore the bulk must have gone to the 
solicitors themselves it is curious that no strong opposition was raised. It 
might of course have been felt that the £44,060 apparently expended in securing 
the acts of 1845 meant an average of no more than £514 per mile, and that this 
in no way compared with the £650 of the London & Birmingham, the £1,000 of the 
1 Herapath, 6th November, 1847; meeting of the 3rd November. 
Z Ibid., p.1254; Lacy on the 3rd November, 1847. 
3 Cf. G.Morier Evans, op.cit. pp.16-l7. 
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Great Western or the £4,806 of the Brighton line, but a~ such argument 
ignored the fundttmental questions of revenue anticipation and the ability of 
the companies to shoulder the burden on non-productive capital expenditure 
involved. In this light the East Anglian may be said to have paid dear~ for 
it s act s, for after all the cost s of the l8}+-5 group, even at the level 
published, represented one eighteenth of the entire caorital sought and the 
equivalent in estimates of nenr~ five miles of construction. When one lone 
voice was raised in criticism of the size of the pprliamenta~ Expenses it was 
silenced with the excuse that these must be high as there were three companies 
2 involved - it has alrea~ been suggested that one reason for there being three 
companies was to achieve this ve~ situation. But such was part of the price 
to be paid for devotion to the principles of 1aisser faire and for the 
optimistic greed of the 1~5 subscribers who, in their blind confidence, were 
for a time unbelievab~ trusting. It m~ be added here that much the same 
trust was required to swallow the charges exacted in connection with land. 
conveyance, the whole subject of which is considered in the next section. In 
this the solicitors were fortunate for all land negotiations were con(lucted 
under the terms of the 1845 Land. Clauses Consolidation Act (8 & 9 Vic.c.18) of 
which it has been truly written that "no modern statute has brought such grist 
to the legal mi1l"~ For the leea1 representatives of compan;y and landowner 
alike this act abounded vlith opportunities for the creation of profitable 
difficulties (a charge eventually to be levelled aeninst Williams)~ although, 
1 See p.19 of the 1st Report of the Select Committee on Railway Acts Enact-
ments, Sess.Paper~ 1846, xiii, and also the Annual Register l8)~,", pp.70-l. 
Higher figures st~11 could be quoted as, for example, the £14,414 per mile 
of the Blackwall Railw~ (Williams op.cit. p.83). 
2 Herapath, 6th November, l811-7, p.1254; Lacy from the chair at the meeting of 
the 3rd November. 
3 F.Clifford: A Histo~ of Private Bill Legislation, London, 1885, p.524. 
4 Herapath, 19th Februa~, 1&+8, p.201; Copeland at the E.A.R. meeting of the 
16th Februa~. 
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in the absence of these, the simplest land conveyance could still be made to 
yield a handsome return. 
But such charges were accepted, and difficulties mounted all vathout 
serious challenge from the shareholders who were, of course, as misled by the 
half year~ accounts as the directors themselves. Signs of restlessness first 
became apparent in the latter months of 1847, this being coincidental with a 
severe fall in the value of railw~ securities at large, but it ~as not until 
181,1.8 with the obvious failure of the traffic estimates that n major stand was 
taken ag[l.inst the "lamentable mismanagement" of the compaDiY" s affairs; In 
the summer of 1848 five sroups of angry northern propl~ietors drew up identical 
2 
memorials to the board, claiming that: 
"That the extraordinarily small traffic and consequent depreciation 
of stock is mainlY to be attributed to the resources of the line 
not having been developed; that a greater amount of practical energy 
is required and that the only w~ in which the railw~ can be rescued 
from its present critical position is by the appointment of some 
gentlemen to the directory who will take an active share in its 
management. " 
Under~ing such complaints was the growing recognition that in no w~ did the 
existing board represent the pattern of investment in which, as discussed in 
the previous chapter, the northern counties were a.ssuming an increasing 
dominance. To February, 1848 at least matters had been left almost entirelY 
in the hands of Lacy, a situation that had obtained since the August of 1847 
when, finding discretion to be the better part of valour and weakened by the 
reduced St~tu8 of Williwms (see chapter 6), Folkes, Cresswell, Everard and 
Seppings had all stood down from the board~ Mounting misfortune had meant 
that the interests of ~nn as a community must inevitably be subordinated to 
1 Herapath, 19th November, 1&~9; Cope on the 17th November. 
2 Ibid, 30th August, l8!-l-8, pp. 924-5; reported at the meeting of the 16th 
August. 
3 Herapath expressed it in such words in answer to 'Distant Registered 
Shareholder' on the 22nd Janu~, 1848. 
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the interests of the railway as such, and as controlled by elements ~ho cared 
little for ~nn except as one source of revenue. The transition to this 
situation as reflected in the changing composition of the boards was, however, 
only slowly effected, and was not complete until the February of 184.9. Until 
that date the discussion of events in subsequent sections of this and the next 
chapter must constantly take into QCcount the 8radual emergence of the 'new' 
men from the status of a small but high~ critical preS3ure group vdthin the 
compa~ to eventual dominance, at which latter stage recovery began. That 
Bruce and Wheeler (for whom see below) were enabled to attend a meeting of 
northern shareholders (representing £82,000) in the summer of 1848 in connec-
tion with the complaints set out above and yet come aw~ with a vote of 
1 thanks, really runounting to one of confi(lenoe, was a clear sign that the 'new' 
men were 8.t last gaining the upper hand, and that neither Lynn nor the 
solicitors could a~ longer regard the railway as their own respective private 
property. 
On amalgamation the board had been fixed at ten, 8,nd so vrith the 
resignation of the four ~nn men there were two vacancies to be filled. One 
the compa~ made no effort to fill, and if it had not been for a Mr. Birch who 
raised the matter the proprietors would have foregone their first opportuni~ 
of exercising their right of initiative in choice. Significantly they chose, 
on the nomination of Birch, Henry Clay, a Hull M.P. Rnd "a Ijentleman of 
"2 capital, a man of business and of great industry • The other vacancy had 
been filled by a compazw nominee, name~ Henry Bruce, who, unlike Clay, had 
been an original subscriber. 
1 Herapath, 30th August, 1848; meeting of the 16th August. 
2 Ibid, 6th November, 1847, p.125~; meeting of the 3rd November. 
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The elevation of Bruce was the decisive point in the compa~'s histo~, 
for it was he vlho as chairman was to prove its saviour .. It was no accident 
that after assuming the chair in the August of 1848 he permitted the appoint-
ment of a committee of investigation, comprising himself, one director and 
five proprietors, to conduct an impartial inquiry into the compaqy's affairs .. 
A former West India merchant, his first great asset was that he was retired 
and able to devote the greE~ter part of his time to railway business.. His 
second asset was a tireless energy. A third point in his favour was his 
enormous vie2.lth1of which D. substantial portion was invested with the East 
Anglian; initially allocated £1,250 in the L & D and £1,500 in the L & E he 
had, by the August of 1845, increased the former holding to £7,750~ and then, 
in 1846, had further extended his interest by subscribing £9,380 to the 
extension schemes of that year. His fourth attribute was that alrea~ he had 
gained, at the expense of some hard knocks, practical experience of railway 
politics. It was he who, more from misplaced zeal than a~ defect of 
character, had been associated with the infamous 'Chaste Petition' of 1845 
which, by throwing doubts on the validity of the London & York subscription 
contracts, had caused pgrliament to delay a decision on the choice of company 
to build the second trunk route to the north until the following session .. 
Acting e.s vice-chairman to the rival Cambridge & Lincoln Bruce had taken up, 
and then presented as a petition to Parliament, the doubtful rese~ch of a 
Mr. Croucher (described by Herapath as well known in certain electioneering 
cases)3and his even more disreputable assistants purporting to demonstrate 
"the fictitious and irresponsible character of a large :portion of the 
1 Besides his E.A.i. holding he had subscribed elsewhere to £32,750 in 18L1-5, 
and to £29,240 in 1846. 
2 ~nn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 23rd August, 1845; L & D meeting of 
the 20th August. 
3 Op.cit., 23rd August, 1845. 
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subscribersnlto the London & York line - to its credit the Direct Northern 
had refused to accept the filth that had first been offered to it, but Hudson, 
Bruce's chairman, had had fewer scruples. Disinterested investig~tion at the 
2 instigation of Parliament revealed just a little fire behind the smoke, but 
not sufficient to justify a~thing but the rejection of the petition. 
Threats of prosecution - not implemented because such would constitute a 
breach of privilege3- and fulsome apoligies filled the air for a time, and a 
Parliamenta~ committee on the question castigated Bruce for acting "without 
taking the most ordinary means of inqui~"4 and for abusing the right of 
5 petitioning. There the matter had been allowed to drop except for one final 
blast from Herapath who took strong exception to Bruce's a.ssumption in 
proposing the vote of thanks to the L & D board at a meeting of August, 1845, 
6 
and advised him to retire from public life for a while. Fortunate~ the 
advice was not tal<:en, although it might help to explain why Bruce's promotion 
was delayed until 1847, and why then his advancement to the chair was so rapUL 
In the Februa~ of 1848, when Bruce became vice-cha.irman, the proprietors 
showed belated signs of stirring, and unseated Partridge and Ingle, replacing 
them by Carden of Manchester and Wheeler (of whom nothing is known). This 
sacrifice failed to appease the shareholders or avert the memorials from the 
northern shareholders, with the result that in the August Abqy was replaced 
by H.Tootal of M~nchester (original~ allocated £1,250 in the L & D), and 
Lacy, pleading a damaged ankle and bereavement for recent non-perfonnance of 
duty, made way for Bruce as chairman, although for the time being continuing 
to serve on the board. In the Februa~ of 1849, however, Lacy, Reynolds and 
1 Select Committee on the London & York Subscription List, House of Lords 
2 Se~sional Papers 1845 (480)'3ApP7ndix 4, p.133'4tra~script of the petition. 
Ibl.d., App.4, pp.136-8. 6 Ibl.d., p.135· Ibl.d., Report ,p.iv. 
5 Ibid. 23rd August, 1845. 
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Calder all stood down, apparently without being given the option of doing 
otherwise for the same meeting carried a resolution that the vacancies be not 
filled. This left Whiting and Self of the originals and the o~ representa-
tives of IiYnn. Finally, in August, 1849, Tinker of Hyde (in Cheshire), 
Chadwick of Manchester, Flint of Hull and Bates of Leeds came on to the board 
which, coupled with the resignation of Whiting, completed the period of 
reconstruction. The work of this board ~~11 be considered in following 
chapters. 
Why the proprietors should exert themselves during 1848 is easy enough to 
under-stand; what is more difficult to ap;>reciate is why they ha.d remained 
docile and acquiescent for ·so long. While it may be rather harsh to judge 
them "timorous, credulous ani ignorant"; a description that has been applied 
to the railway shareholders of the 1840s in general, fear of exclusion from 
lucrative projects, lack of understanding and unfounded confidence in 
eventually enormous returns are faotors not to be entirely discounted, but the 
real reasons lie rather deeper. It must be remembered too that individual 
proprietors who developed misgivings could, until the latter part of 1846 at 
least, sell their holdings at a comparatively small loss at a level often 
still above par. In the case of the East Anglian explanation must first be 
sought in the nature of the relationship between the boards and the 
proprietors, and here the first consideration is that compa~ meetings were 
invariably badly attended. At an early stage London offices had been deemed 
2 
an unnecessary expense; the offices were thus to be found in ~nn, an awkward 
town to reach and one far removed from the great majority of the shareholders. 
1 R.S.Lnmbert: The Railway King, London, 1934., p.117. 
2 I(rnn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 2nd August, 181+5; L & E meeting 
of the 29th July. 
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Even so, all general meetings were held in London at the London Trvern, 
Bishopsgate. This meant that proprietors who wished to inquire into detail-
ed matters to be raised at a general meeting had to make two journeys, one of 
them at least awkward, and both time consuming. The crucial discussion on 
the terms of the Eastern Counties lease offer was attended by only 42 
proprietors, Puncher's motion, in the August of 1848, that the accounts be 
not accepted wnS considered by a meeting of only 25 and rejected 16 to 9. 
Well might Puncher bemoan the fact that "to the great supineness of the great 
bo~ of shareholders may be attributed the present unhealthy state of railw~ 
propert;' 
Both circumstance and design confirmed the early boards in a rather 
autocratic attitude. However, although subsequently charged with ignoring 
suggestions and not taking the proprietors into their confidenOe~ the large 
number of extraordinary general meetings does testifY to a degree of willing-
ness to hear all views on really important matters. For the rest ma~ 
problems had to be settled without delay and could not wait for a meeting 
which few might bother to attend. In most cases, but with the exception of 
certain important matters connected with the Eastern Counties lease which 
will be considered in a later chapter, the boards were straight forward in 
their dealings with the proprietors. Some boards were much given to the 
creation of fraudulent votes and the engineering of proxies, but it seems 
in the case of the East Anglian and its predecessors such practices were 
eschewed, although they were not above placing controversial matters at the 
end of an agenda to be discussed when maqy had left and all were tired. 
1 In a letter to Herapath, 2nd September, 1848. 
2 Herapath, 19th February, 1848, p.201; Copeland at the meeting of the 
16th February. 
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onlY once, the Eastern Counties lease terms being considered, were proxies 
emplqyed by the board under the procedure laid down by seotion 77 of the 
I 
Compa~ Clauses Consolidation Aot; on this oooasion the board itself was 
split. Only once were teohnical grounds invoked to silence unwelcome 
oriticism, the occasion being Puncher's proposal that all future capital 
issues be for completion as opposed to extensions, the grounds being that 
as he w~s only a scrip holder he was not entitled to move a resolution: 
All these various factors lend support to the general theme being 
advanced that even the first boards of the three companies were genuine in 
their desire to see the lines brought to successful completion, and that all 
irregularities and dishonesty arose from ignorance skilful~ exploited by 
Williams, who took care at all times not to intrude too obviously or forciblJ' 
in affairs. Certainly the directors as such gained little advantage from 
their position. Copeland might grumble that "it was a good thing to be a 
director of the line as people took off their hats to him as he passed~but 
the hard facts were that the majority of the directors lost heavily in pooket 
and gained only in abuse. As for direct reward, to the end of 1848, the 
fifteen or so individuals involved had shared no more than £3,820 in feee, 
and from this was to be deducted the annual £10 paid to each of the auditors; 
nothing at all had been received in 1848. Earlier, on the 29th July, 1845, 
the L & E board had turned down a vote of £500 cheerfully accorded by the 
4 proprietors. Whereas the later directors took office to safeguard their 
1 By which proxies had to be collected at least 48 hours before the meeting 
at which they were to be used. Fraud was possible, however, in that the 
same act (section 10) was no more specific than to s~ that the Shareholden 
Address Book should be open for inspection "at all convenient times" _ . 
this could mean anything. 
2 Hera.path, 19th February, 1848, p.20l; meeting of the 16th February. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 2nd August, 1845. 
1Q.2. 
investments the earlier ones had been primarily concerned with bringing 
benefit to IQrnn, confident in their abilities to make the line pay and 
prosper themselves either directly or indirectly. But they were out of 
their depth in the railway world and for two years or so lived in a fool's 
paradise shared by the ordina~ rank and file proprietors. 
Section 2: The Preliminaries of Construction 
A combination of directors' fol~, the greed of local vested interests 
and sheer ill luck destroyed the possibilities of cheap and rapid construction 
before a single line had been laid; thus the East Anglian lost its opportunity 
of making itself the erbiter of the local econo~, and its intended 
relationship with IQrnn proved impossible of realisation. All this had been 
determined, ~lthough the fact was not recognised, by the olose of 1845. 
severe. 
The first setback oocurred with the ehPeRiI shortage of draftsmen and 
skilled teohnioians which obtained until the 30th November, the date on which 
all plans for the bills to be considered during the 1846 session had to be 
1 
submitted; even after this date the position still remained difficult, SO 
that prior to the Christmas of 1845 little had been done except the staking 
out of the intended routes and the opening of negotiations for land on the 
"1 t" 2 init~a sec ~(ms. The delay so imposed was a cause of annoyance, but at 
least the costly error of employing enterprising amateurs, particularly 
schoolmasters, at a~hing from six to fifteen guineas a day~ was not 
committed. Empowered to delay construction until satisfied in respect of 
bridge specifications, and not wanting the railw~s at all, the Bedford Level 
4 Corporation and kindred bodies "really persecuted" the companies, so causing 
1 Railway Gazette, 28th Februa~, 1845, p.457; E & H meeting of the 26th 
Februa~, the engineer's report (dated the 17th December). 
2 Ibid. 3 Williams, op.cit. p.5l. 
4 Railway Gazette, 5th December, 1846; Lacy. 
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further delay. On the E & H plans were actua1~ approved in good time, but 
in the February of 1846 further details were demanded; Buck, the engineer, 
submitted these at once and by a personal meeting with representatives of the 
Bedford Level fina1~ succeeded in settling the matter; but not without yet 
more valuable time having been consumed. The manoeuvres of the river 
2 interests put the ~nn & E~ back by three full months, a most serious matter 
when a fifteen month construction estimate was involved. A further source of 
delay to the E & H, perhaps a consequence of the haste in which the project 
had been conceived, was the necessity of application to the Board of Trade for 
authorisation of diversion beyond limits in the Huntingdon area to facilitate 
operational efficiency, and to avoid the construction of earthworks involving 
200,000 cubic yards of soil. The application was submitted on the 19th 
November, 1845, but it was the 30th January before permission was granted~ 
The immediate consequences of such del~s were easy to see. For the 
L & E and the L & D it was September before the staking out of the initial 
4 
sections in the vicinity of ~nn could begin, October before the first tenders 
for materials could be invited (e.g. for 80,000 larch or Baltic timber 
sleepers): December before construction contracts could be advertised~ 
January and February before definite orders for materials could be placed, 
February and March before such could begin to arrive in Iornn harbour (an 
interesting condition of the tenders was that deliveries should be to the 
harbour) in aqy appreciable quantities~ and April before the initial 
1 Railway Gazette, 28th February, 1846, p.457. 
2 Ibid., 5th December, p.671; Lacy on the 2nd December. 
3 Ibid., 28th February, 18lr6, p. 457; E & H Meeting of the 26th February. 
4 ~nn Advertiser & West Norfolk Hera1d'62oth September, 1845. 
5 Ibid., 18th October, 1845. Ibid., 27th December, 1845. 
7 Ibid., 28th February, 1846. 
W-
oontraotors' agreements were signed. Progress on the E & H was even slower; 
in Februa~, 1846 it was still not known when either delive~ or contractors' 
agreements could be signed, and it was in fact late spring before either were. 
The principal long term result of these delays was that failure to get off to 
a flying start meant that the E & H was never to be built. Placed third in 
the scale of priorities by a ~nn dominated directorate its surplus funds 
proved too tempting to be ignored when the W1sbech branch exceeded estimate, 
while the primary requirement of the Eastern Counties when entering lease 
negotiations in the latter part of 1846 was that all but the Huntingdon and 
st.lves section should be abandoned; this section wruld provide a through link 
between the Eastern Counties' own Cambridge & St.lves line (opened on the 17th 
August, 1847) and. the G-reat Northern trunk route authorised during 1846, the 
remaind.er would have constituted a rival to both the Cambridge & St.lves and 
the Ely and Peterborough lines of the E.C.R. When the discussions ended 
abortively during 1847 the East Anglian promise of contraction was of course 
rescinded, but by then the money had gone. 
Increased cost of rails was yet a further consequence of delay. 
Following their usual pattern in the latter stages of a major cycle iron 
prices had risen steeply~y the time the three boards were in a position to 
place their orders; instead of the £1 per ton estimated, £12 per ton of rails 
had to be paid, an increase on the total anticipated cost of .£60,ooo~ A 
bewildering variety of rail patterns required proved a further factor in 
increasing manufacturers' Charges~ In addition, the great demand for labour 
resulted in a 25% increase in its costs between the spring of 1845 and that 
1 G-ayer, Rostow & Schwartz, op.cit. p.309 and p.539. 
2 Lacy on the 16th February, 1848; Herapath, 19th February 1848, p.201. 
3 Cf.Francis, op.cit., Vo1.2, p.229. 
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1 
of 1846. No compuqy could have avoided these extra expenses - Peto told 
the 1&+6 Select Committee that if the Norwich & Brandon line had been built 
in 1846 rather than in 1844 and '45 it would have cost £17,000 per mile, not 
£13,000, for "I paid for rails about £5/15 per ton, whereas I run paying now 
2 
about £10/15 to £11 a ton" - but the ~nn boards exacerbated a bad situation 
by a policy of bulk buying rather than spreading their requirements over 
several months in the hope that prices would drop. Moreover, probab~ as a 
consequence of the haste pursuant to the belated engagement of skilled 
assistants, too maqy rails were ordered, and were in fact still being 
3 delivered in 1849 at heavy loss to the compaDiY. 
The worst obstacle of all, however, to both rapid and cheap construc-
tional possibilities proved to be the avarice of the local landowners who 
exploited the eagerness of the companies to commence their works to the ve~ 
fullest extent. As Francis wrote of railw~s in general " •• (with) what 
unjust demands and impure claims they had to deal, and with what sad and 
selfish treatment it was their lot to meet"~ In effect it meant that the 
goodwill of the community had to be purchased in hard cash, a situation that 
had arisen from four main sets of circumstances. 
The first of these was the impossibility of obtaining an objective 
assessment of value in such imponderables as the effects of severance of a 
property, and the consequences of a railway on drainage am visual and aural 
amenities. A Select Committee having reported that existing rentals had 
1 S.C. on Railway Acts Enactments, 1846; evidence of Peto, Q.3553. 
2 Ibid., Q.3552 • 
3 See Section 3 below. 
4 Op.cit., Vol.l, p.255; also compare Jeaffreson & Pole, op.cit. p.270, 
and. Williams, p.496. 
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little relevance to severancel ana that this and drainage questions were 
incapable of exact settlement~ a wide variety of practices existed, but 
always with a prem:i.um on bargaining skill. Settlement might be re3ched on 
the basis of the marketable value of a property plus a percentage for 
3 compulsory purchase; country houses were often taken at the equivalent of 30 
to 35 years' net rental, or at 20 to 26 years in the case of town dwellings~ 
Compensation for severance varied in almost every case, and could, incident-
ally, result in quite substantial additional construction expenses as in the 
csse of the L & E which had to expend £5,000 on additional occupation 
crossings along its mainline. Additional compensation mieht be paid if an 
owner was left living !~.longside the railway, although a person whose lands had 
not been touched and yet who was in similar circumstances received nothing~ 
The second factor was the undoubted bias of the legislature in favour of 
the l~ndowner, considerations of public benefit being relegated to second 
place. Not only was this reflected in actual 1ecis1ation, but in the 
individual demands themselves, for what landowner could fail to derive 
encouragement from a Select Committee which declared itself~ 
" •••• of the opinion that many cases occur in which it is necessary 
to consider the land etc. not merely as a source of income, but 
as the subject of expensive embelliShment, and subservient to the 
enjoyment am recreation of the proprietor", 
and which he1d7 
" •••• that a very unfair view is taken of the injury done to 
1Jro1)rietors, and of the com~)ensation due to them". 
.. ~ 
1 Select Cornmi ttee of the Lords on Compensation for L8.nds taken for or 
injured by Railways; Sess.Pnpers, 1845 (153) x. p.3 of the report. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid., Minutes 
4 Ibid., Report, 
6 Report, p .h·. 
of Evidence;5evidence of John Duncan, Qs.36,42,43. 
p.4. 7 Cf.Francis, op.cit., Vo1.2, p.95. 
Ibid., p.5. 
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The committee's conclusions were that as the primary motives during the enr~ 
stages of a compa~ were speculative gain - the public being the beneficiaries 
only in the long run - railwa;y companies ought to pay rl".ther high rates for 
I 
their land; indeed, 5q% of the original value plus severance and drainage 
2 
compensation should be regarded as the absolute minimum. 
These sentiments were implicit in the Land Clauses Consolidation Act of 
1845, and especia~ so in the procedure for negotiation which it laid down. 
Disputed sums of under .~50 were to be settled by two J.P.s (section 22), but 
where larger sums were involved, and no -;?rivate arrangement could be reached, 
the landowner had the option of toing either to arbitration or before a 
special jury (23), each party to nominate one arbitrator in the former 
instance unless both were agreed on one man (25); settlement by jury became 
obligatory after three months if not successfUl~ determined by arbitration 
Opinions of these arraneements naturally varied with cases. The 
East AnGlian maintained that arbitrators (to be J.P.s - section 24) were 
invariably on the side of the landowner~ and therefore, ensured (either by 
prior intimation or simple delay until the three months of arbitration hnd 
expired) that all disputes were settled by juries (it will be recalled that 
Press had withdrawn his opposition to the L & D on this understanding - see 
chapter 3 above). Whether or not the decisions of the juries subsequent~ 
caused [1. chcnge of mind is unfortunately not recorded. John Duncan, 
solicitor to the Eastern Counties, had earlier expressed a confirmatory view 
when he told the Select Committee that juries were genera~ very favourable 
to the companies, and often mr.-de awards in close approximation to the 
2 1 Report, pp.3-4. Ibid., p.3. 
3 Herapath, 6th November, 1847, p.1254; Directors' Report, 3m November, 1847. 
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original estimatest on the other hand, however, John Swift, solicitor to the 
Grand Junction R~ilway, held that the "reasonable prejudice of the jury is in 
favour of the lElndowners" and preferred arbitration: Such conflict of 
opinion serves to emIlhasise the lack of general criteria, and variety of 
practice according to locality. The landowner had the advantage of choice of 
procedure, and was strong in the knowledge that by adopting delaying tactics 
to ensure a jury a compa~ was o~ adding to its own difficulties in another 
direction. All in all the landowner could not have been in a better position, 
enjqying "eve~ sort of protection you can conceive"~ So strong was their 
position that when demands for excessive compensation were coupled with 
threats of opposition before Parliament ma~ companies found it desirable, 
, 4. 
and probably cheaper than employ~ng counsel, to reach prior agreement at 
almost any cost - the probability of such an arrangement between the L & D 
and the Marriotts may be cited as a case in point. This practice was much 
more common in 1836 than in 184.55 and later years, but even so there could 
6 
be "no doubt that (it) was done by every railway compa~ more or less". 
Two particular sections of the 184.5 act may be cited additiona1~ as 
being particular sources of delay and expem e to companies. Section 85 laid 
down that in cases of defective or disputed titles, or where settlement as 
regards compensation had not been achieved, the land could not be entered by 
the company until the purchase money, as claimed, or as independent~ 
assessed if the owner could not be found, had been deposited at a bank of the 
owner's or his representative's choice and the company had undertaken to pay 
5% per annum interest on that sum until such time as the matter had been 
1 The East Anglian certai~ does not appear in Sess.Papers 184.9 (69) Li.93: 
All Appointments made by the Board of Trade or the Commissioners of Railways 
in Questions of Disputed Cowpensation, a return30f Q~pires. 2 Report of the Select Committee;minutes of5evidence,Q.4.5. Ibid.,Qs.4.78,4.79. 4.Ibid.,Evidence of,John Swif~. Ibid.,Evidence of John Duncan,Q.56. 
6lbid.,~.57. To this extent ~t would seem the 184.5 Act had improved the 
situat~on. 
~ 
final~ settled and the deposit on the then agreed purchase amount lodged. 
B,y the December of 1~7 the East Anglian was being obliged to pay interest on 
I 
some £80,000 under this section of the act in addition to the litigation costs 
involved, both items being to the detriment of the public service~ Section 
92, requiring that a compa~ might be obliged to take the whole of "a~ house 
or other building or manufactury" if an;y part of the premises were taken, was 
one which proved a particular~ prolific source of litigation3and therefore 
of profit to the solicitors representing companies and landowners alike, and 
typified the tenor of the entire act. 
Given such circumstances and protection the field was wide open for the 
placing of most outrageous claims against the railw~ companies. Thousands 
of known examples could be quoted, but one actual instance described before 
the Select Committee of 1845 will suffice to illustrate the attitude 
encountered a hundred times along the East Anglian lines~ 
Q.353 
Answer: 
Q.354 
Answer 
Q.355 
Answer 
"There is an instance of a railway projected upon which one party 
had 8 acres and !s of land; the value of it was easi~ to be 
ascertained. The party objected.Mr.Brunel is concerned and he 
said to me last night this party s~s he is willing to come to an 
amicable arrangement. He asked, 'What do you want for it?' He 
replied, 'I want £15,000 for it'. That is for 8 acres of mere 
agricultural land." 
"Is that not for injury to the residence?" 
"No. I hc.ve been upon the line and I do not think that it is 
worth £2,500 for the fullest compensation of all kinds. I could 
not see the house along the line." 
"Is there to be an embankment?" 
"No; it is almost dead level. That is the sort of exorbitent claim 
that railw~ proprietors are often obliged under certain circum-
stances to comp~ with." 
The phrase "under certain circumstances" needs little interpretation - it 
points simp~ to the average railway compa~ which could afford neither lost 
1 Herapath, 19th February, 1848, p.201; Direotors' Report, 16th February. 
2 The Secretary's Report at the same meeting. 
3 Clifford, op.cit., p.5~· 
* Evidence of E.Driver, a land surveyor. 
213 
time nor the ill will of the neighbourhood. 
The East Anglian's land cost estimates, ba.sed on two independent and 
disinterested surveys conducted by two gentlemen well acquainted with local 
1 land values and agreeing within a few hundred pounds, totalled £101,250 and 
covered the land for 85t miles of track, station room and harbour accommoda-
2 
tion (35 acres). A further £20,000 was subsequent~ added in respect of 
additional purchases at the harbour and near various individual stations3such 
as Swaffham. Hopes that the absence or pacification of declared opposition 
would show the figures to be realistic proved complete~ fatuous. By 
December, 1847 the L & E alone had spent £118,858 on land and compensation 
and had lodged a further £24,773/4/3 in deposits; the respective figures of 
the L & D were £53,039/3 and £18,63~1~4, those of the E & H, reflecting 
restricted construction, £10,319/7/8 and £l8,505~ By the following December 
the overall total had reached £262,797/18/9 and constituted the second largest 
single item of expenditure. Not o~ wa.s this total 150% up on the original 
estimates but was also for only 67~ miles, not 85!. The average per route 
mile thus was in the region of £3,960, although the inclusion in the overall 
total of land for stations and harbour accommodation makes exact computation 
impossible. However, taking the figure in its relationship to actual track 
provided it offers a fair comparison with the £2,200 per mile of the 
Newcastle & Carlisle, the £3,000 of the Grand Junction, the £4,000 of the 
South Western, the £6,150 of the Manchester & Leeds and the £6,300 of the 
5 Great Western. A reasonab~ low figure in real terms the East Anglian 
average compares bad~, however, when respective traffic potentials are taken 
1 Herapath, 19th Februa~, 1848, p.201; meeting of the 16th February. 
2 ~nn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 2nd August, 1845; L & E meeting of 
the 29th Ju~. 
3 Herapath, 6th November, 1847, pp.1253-4; Directors' Report 3rd November. 
4 loid., 19th February, 1848, p.201. 
5 Figures derived from the First Report of the Select Committee on Railway 
Acts Enactments, p.19, and the Annual Register 1844, PP.70-1. 
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into account. In addition, certain items of compensation were recurring, 
as, for example, the provision each year of free coal to the inhabitants of 
Fentney in acknowledgement of the fact that the L & D crossed the common 
there. The same line runs adjacent to the Narborough vicarage grounds where 
once resided the outspoken and implacable opponent of the railway, the 
Rev.Allen; the incumbent there still receives a small annual sum from British 
Railways, although a recent vicar, resident 20 years in the parish, admitted 
to having no precise idea of w~. The hostility of Allen and the content~ 
of the previous paragraphs, however, suggest the reason. 
A convenient microcosm of the relationship between company and landowner 
is afforded by the records of the negotiations between the L & E and ~nn 
Corporation. Here, the gains to be derived by the community d.id not avert 
a reprehensible and incredibly shortsighted display of sheer cupidity. 
There is a local but unconfirmed tradition that at one place the L & D 
diverted its line rather than accede to a particularly outrageous claim, but 
true or not, no such possibility was open to the L & E in coming into the 
centre of ~nn, and to the harbour. The corporation lands involved were 
quite undeveloped and of poor quality, but, in 1845, suddenly assumed great 
value in the eyes of their owners. On the 8th Janua~, 1846, on receipt of 
a letter from Williams requesting the immediate possession of a field near 
1 
the harbour, the General Purposes Committee resolved ths.t first £21,300 (a 
sum determined on the 3rd Janua~ after £22,000 had been proposed I'Ind 
2 
rejected) must be placed by the company in Gu~rneyls ~nn bank, ~nd interest 
at the rate of 5% per annum must be paid on this until a final purchase price 
1 Minutes of the General Purposes Committee, Vol.3, 8th Janua~, 1846, p.2~. 
2 Ibid., p.262. 
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was agreed; this of course was the procec1.ure authorised under section 85 of 
the Land Clauses Consolidation Act. Although the £21,300 was to be 
prejudicial to neither party it remained a preposterous demand for a vacant 
field of inferior quality, and, most understandabJy, Burcham, a member of 
both council and compaQY, refused to agree. But argument was too costly in 
time, and on the very next day Everard ap!>eared for the L & E to agree, 
interest to be paid until the date on which the conveyance was eventualJy 
1 
signed; tha.t the compaQY was to receive the rent s, if al\Y, of the field was 
poor compensation in this grossJy unfair arrangement. The Corporation next 
set about a proper valuation, but in no obvious haste. On the 14th January 
the committee flatly declined to fill in a schedule sent by the compaQY 
requiring details of the claims to be made in respect of this and other 
lands~ and not until the 19th was lllr.Locke of Barton appointed. to make an 
3 independent assessment. On the 6th March, at a meeting of the full council: 
5 final terms were agreed, and then accepted. by the compaQY on the 25th. The 
original d.emand for a single 35 acre field had not stood up to independent 
valuation, for now 55 a.cres, 2 rood.s and. 13 perches in the parishes of South 
~nn and St.Margarets plus the 1 rood. and. 34 perches of Echo Road (to be 
6 
demolished. to make way for the station) were to be sold. for £19,300. This 
was high enough in view of the nature of the land, and the compaQY had reason 
to be thankful onlY in that a proposal that £20,000 be required from the 
compa~ had been rejected, a strange departure from the attitude hitherto 
displayed? However, in that the compa~ was to provide all road.s and fences, 
1 Minutes of the General Purposes3Committee, Vol.3, 8th January, 1846 p.266. 2 Ibid., p.269. Ibid., p.270. 
4 The Guild Hall Book, Vol.l4, minutes of the 6th March, 1~6, np.795-6. 
5 General Purposes Committee, 25th March, 1846, p.798. -
6 The Guild Hall Book, Vol.14, 6th Maroh, 1846, p.798. 
7 Ibid., pp.795-6. 
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pay the costs of conveyance and compensate individual tenantslit may be seen 
that the Corporation's apparent generosity was not entirely without ulterior 
motive. A source of considerable dispute in later years was the further 
agreement that under no conditions would the company infringe upon or diminish 
the existing Corporation or private rights on the Fleet (a small creek off the 
harbour now filled in and the site of the bus station) or the Nar. 
On the 17th September, 1846, consequent upon the slight deviation of the 
mainline sanctioned in the summer of that year, another £1,333/4/6 was tRken 
for 3 acres 30 poles in South ~rul, as well as £l,18~5 for various oddments 
2 
excluded from the initial u6reement. With surprise it may be noted that on 
the 14th May the Corporation had actua~ waived its rights to a portion of 
the compensation due to the owners and users of South ~nn common, although 
it hastened to add that this was not to be considered detrimental to its 
3 
rights as the Lord of the Manor, and indirectly secured its compensatiun in 
the September trn.nso.ctions which follow,=rl. So far the incidents recorded 
might be regarded perhaps as no more than examples of shrewd business 
negotiation, but the Corporation's attitude in other directions was one that 
beggars description, and confirms the shortsighted cupidity alrea~ suggested. 
Without exaggeration it misht be suid thut lifnn's commercial future 
hinged on the provision of a footbridge (at least) over the lower stretch of 
the Nar, otherwise known as Sandringham Bau, to effect direct communication 
between the singular~ ill-sited harbour branch and the harbour it was 
supposed to serve. Carts were needed a~ay in moving goods from ship to 
train, but without a bridge such had to make slow and expensive detours 
1 Guild Hall Book, Vol.lJ+, minutes of the 6th March, 1846, pp.795-6. 
2 Ibid., 17th September, 1846, p.806. 
3 Ibid., 15th May, 1846, p. 799. 
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through the centre of the town. Yet, the concession allowing the compa~ to 
build a small footbridge (presumab~ wide enough for carts) was granted with 
the maximum of bad grace and only on condition that it be removed on demand. if 
it ever proved an obstacle to navigation; a nominal rental of 1I- per annum 
1 
was to be paid by the L & E. In the November of 1847 the conditions were 
shown to be more than a mere formali~ when the Corporation demanded that 
stages erected over the Sandringham Eau in connection with the said bridge's 
construction be immediately dismantled as they constituted a serious naviga-
2 
tional obstruction. There were to be legal proceedings if the compa~ 
refused to comply - it did. The same issue arose aga,in in November, 1848, 
3 
and. once again the compalJiY gave way, this time with the rather pathetic 
assurance that "it was their desire that every accommodation possible on their 
4 part should at all times be afforded to the merchants and shipowners" of Lynn. 
Not until 1853 did the corporation come to its senses and permit a substantial· 
swing bridge to be built; it should be added that all the previous protests 
were on behalf of nothing but the Marriotts' slow and expensive barges which 
served an area to be reached more cheaply and efficiently by the Lynn & 
Dereham line. The bills of 1847, so vital to both town and railways, 
produced nothing from the Corporation but promises of support and a committee 
to oppose the bills failing the insertion of a~ protective clauses deemed 
necessary. Many other incidents of similar nature could be cited, but 
perhaps none so positively'hurtful to the railways as the imposition in l84Q 
of a levy of 4d per ton on all ships entering the harbour. This, meant to 
cover the Corporation contribution to the Norfolk Estuary Cut, properly 
1 Guild Hall Book, 26th Februa~, 1846, p.792. 
2 Ibid., 15th November, 1847, pp.850-1. 
3 Ibid., Vol.15, 9th November, 1848, p.36. 
4 Ibid., 1st Janua~, 1849, p.38. 
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belongs to another context, but better than a~thing else may be said to 
typif.y the attitude of the ~nn Corporation at this crucial stage in the 
town's history. 
There has been a recent tendency to play down the seriousness of land 
1 
costs to the railw~ companies of the 1840s, and this may well be justified 
in the cases of ma~ of the larger companies, but in this Cl'tse, as in so ma:mr 
others, the facts must speak for themselves. Fundamentally it waS a. matter 
of degree. The 1845 committee reported, not surprising~ in view of its 
general attitude, that the total spent on land was not prohibitive and 
represente.d "but a small proportion of the sum required for the construction 
of a railwayll~ although in the following year the Select Cormnittee on Railway 
Acts Enactments was commenting that the buying off of opposition had 
considerably swollen total expenditure; and a later committee of 1852/3 
heard evidence to the effect that land had been a large item of waste, 
"incredible sums" having been paid for it to avert 't' 4 oppos~ ~on. After all, 
the land involved was for the most part a strip only a few feet wide, a.nd, 
by and large, the value of adjacent properties tended to rise steeply with 
the coming of a railway~ Even allowing for the fact that in their 
inexperience the directors of the East Anglian lines purchased some 60 to 
1 See, for example, J.Simmons: The Railways of Britain, London, 1961, who 
quotes from (p.54) H.Pollins in Economics xix (1952), 406: " • • while 
individual landowners m~ have done well out of the sale of land to railway 
companies - and may even have blackmailed the companies on occasion - the 
latter nevertheless spent the bulk of their money on the more legitimate 
side of their business. British railway companies would have gained if 
land had been cheaper; but this would not appreciably have reduced their 
difficulties". 
2 Report, p.4. 3 First Report, p.16. 
4 Select Committee on Railway & Canal Bills Amalgamation 185413; minutes of 
evidence to the Second Report, evidence of S.Laing M.P., Qs. 87-88. 
5 See the First Report of the 1846 Committee on Railway Acts Enactments, p.8. 
219 1 
70 acres too much (including 42 for the abortive dock scheme of 1847) 
expenditure still equalled one third of the original capital, howbeit for a 
restricted line. There can be no mitigation in assessing the importance of 
land costs to these lines; they were in their effect a crippling burden and 
a permanent millstone around the neck of the compa~. 
Section 2: The Lines on the Ground 
A. General Considerations 
By the December of 1848 the lines still lacked adequate siding 
accommodation, and several of the bridges and stations existed o~ in a 
temporary form, but alrea~ £527,386 had been expended on bridges, stations 
and works, and a further £221,502 on sleepers, rails and chairs, (although 
some £21,000 of these totals proper~ belonged to P~.rliamenta~ Expenses) 
so giving an overall average under these headings of £11,000 per route mile 
(compared with an estimate of £5,000), a total cost to that date of £16,000, 
2 
and a final possibility of £25,000. Track, works and stations had cost 
£8,000 per mile, which might appear reasonable at first sight when compared 
with, for example, the £12,000 of the Newcastle & Carlisle, the £32,280 of the 
3 
Brighton line or the £41,400 of the Manchester & Leeds, but not so when the 
relative ease of terrain and the ability of the revenue to repay the costs are 
taken into account. Certain aspects of the excess were unavoidable, but 
three mistaken policies "under the lamentable miSmanagement"4of the first 
directors must be recognised as making a substantial contribution. 
The first of these, a1rea~ indicated in another context, was the 
1 See chapter 6 below. 
2 Herapath's second article on the E.A.R., 13th November, 1847, p.1287. 
3 The Annual Register 1844, pp.70-71. 
4 Herapath, 19th November, 1849, p.1158; Cope on the 17th November. 
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reckless policy of bulk buying at a time when iron prices were at their peak 
and the estimates had just been completed in haste. A typical example of the 
harmful consequences of this was found in the 1846 contract with Bailey 
Brothers of Liverpool for 6,000 tons of iron rails, to be made to specifioa-
tion and delivered at ~nn; iron prices in Liverpool at that time were between 
£6/10 and F:l per ton, but the contract price for the finished rails was to be 
£12/2/6 per ton. In the Februa~ of 1849 these rails were still being 
delivered although no longer needed. To the previous December £72,49~l&l2 
had been paid on the contract (including interest on deferred payments), 
£1,572/2/3 was owing on deliveries, and a further 110 tons (value £1,430) 
were still to come, although each delive~ constituted a "heavy loss" to 
1 the compaIliY. 
Just as the policy outlined above had added £60,000 to the rail 
estimates, a further £60,000 had been added by the foolhar~ decision to 
2 
make an additional 25 miles of the system double track. From the outset 
this had been intended for the I(ynn to Watlington section, but early in 184-7 
it was decided to extend the second line throughout the length of the L & E 
mainline, and also to make the E & H section double track. The former was 
to be doubled in anticipation of an extensive traffic consequent upon the 
lease to the Eastern Counties, the latter at the direct request of that 
compaIliY3which envisaged a prolific flow along its own Cambridge & St.Ives 
line to the E & H and from thence to the midlands (Via the ltt~e, &: Midland 
~M;i,!l@aeB) and the north (via the Great Northern). Such decisions were 
1 Herapath, 19th November, p.1158 ; Cope reporting from the Committee of 
Inqui~, 17th November, 184-9. . 
2 The decision to double the L & E line was a~~nounc("!d on the 3rd November, 
184-7; the estimated cost on the 16th Februa~, 1848. 
3 Herapath, 19th Februa~, 184-8, p.20l; meeting of the 16th February. 
* In the end,because of financial difficulties,only lO~ miles of the L & E 
line were in fact doubl~ 
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entirely unjustifiable. Quite apart from the facts that the lease was not 
realised and that in the event traffic proved meagre, it would have been onlY 
common sense and sound business to have first tested the situation in the 
light of actual operating conditions, for then, if d.rcumstcnces warranted it, 
double track could have been provided within three or four months against the 
promise of an assured return. The presence of the powerfully entrenched 
Quse navigation interests, from which traffic still had to be wrested, should 
have given rise to a cautious approach even if nothine else (lid. The folly 
stands out even more starkly when it is considered that on the L & D the same 
question had arisen, but had been solved by laying single track over works 
that could take double, until the traffic potential had been fairly assessed 
in the light of experience. 
The third error of the directors W3,-; the failure to make economy of 
construction a positive and pri:-l~~.ry aim. When, in November, 1847, Lacy was 
so incautious as to boast that "the works throughout are of the best and most 
substantial kind and are not surpassed by those of any line in the kingdom"; 
he left the company wide open to the charge of having adopted "a.n expensive 
policy", and to the sneer that "we may infer cheapness of construction has 
2 
been abandoned for handsome structure~ and expensive workmanship". The 
truth, howeVer, was not where it appeared to be even though the estimated cost 
3 
of works and bt'i~.'''cs had been exceeded by £180,000. As will be seen a large 
acute 
portion of this excess had arisen from eftPe~8 practical difficulties in 
building the major bridges to the specifications enforced by the Drainage 
Cor.unissioners. As it wC.s the final bridges were solid ani made to last. 
1 Herapath, 6th November, 1847, p.1253; meeting of the 3rd November. 
2 Herapath' s first article, ibid., 6th November, 1847, p .126lt-. 
3 Ibid., 19th February, 1848; Williams at the meeting of the 16th February. 
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Perhaps they could have been made more cheap~, but to do so would have 
represented false economy. The same applies to the stations, except that 
here a more simple structure than that generally adopted could have been used 
as the base for subsequent development. In themselves the stations were 
solid structures of local carstone comprising a station master's house and a 
fair~ full provision of offices, waiting rooms and storage space. The 
fault l~ in that the traffic potential of each still had to be tested. The 
East Anglian itself had to close stations at Sporle and West Bilney by the 
l870s, and the fine station houses there still remain visible as a monument 
to wasted capital. Fine, solid gatehouses were also built in large numbers, 
although here, despite the fact that the gatekeepers were also linesmen, 
econom;y could have been effected by detailing, in many cases at least, the 
staff of nearby stations to go along the line and operate the gates, so 
reducing the number of houses that had to be built. In contrast to such 
possib~ unnecessary expenditure, however, were three examples of false 
economy, all arising from the desire to advance opening dates. The first two 
of these were the stations at ~nn and Wisbech, both opened as temporary 
wooden structures. The former lasted until the l880s with its single island. 
platform (200' along each face), a booking office, two cloakrooms, a clerks' 
room and storage space and at the time had the advantage of being built in no 
more than two months, but maintentl.nce costs must inevitab~ have been high, 
and this apart, the company would have done better to have economised else-
where for the sake of its public image if nothing else. The third example 
was that of the temporary wooden viaducts erected along the E & H and on the 
Wisbech branch. Some of the former exist unchanged to this d~, but others 
the Drainage Commissioners were not prepared to accept and forced replacement 
by permanent structures from 1849 onwards. This policy of lavish expenditure 
m. 
in one direction, economy in another, was of course total~ unsound and a 
major contribution to the compa~ts problems. All that might be said in 
defence of the directors is that they at least avoided the wild excesses 
which led the Eastern Counties during the same period to expend £81,500 on 
Ely station (built on a marsh.y swamp), £93,234/17/5 at Peterborough and 
1 £55,659/4/3 at Cambridge. 
B. The Individual Contracts 
Actual construction was expected to cause little difficulty, especial~ 
as throughout the com~anies maintained a rigorous supervision over the works~ 
But, serious and unforeseen engineering problems connected with certain major 
bridges and atrocious Vleether conditions delayed completion, and combined to 
increase the cost of labour to such an extent that several of the contractors 
bec.?me finG.ncially embarrassed or actually bankrupt, a situation further hast-
ened by the exaction of £100 per week after the dates scheduled for completion 
urder the penalty clauses of the individual contracts. That too much labour 
was employed is a possibility to be examined in a hter section, that the 
employment of small local contractors without substnntie.l reserves to see them 
through difficult periods was a mistaken policy must reme.in an oren question. 
The Construction of the IQrnn & Ely mainline and branches: 
The first contract3to be signed was that of the 7th April,1846 between 
the L & E and Messrs. W.S.Simpson of Downham and C.Briggs of Ferry for the 
1 Second Report of the Select Committee on the Audit of Railway Accounts,1849, 
Appendices, p.376 A, Report of the Committee of Inquiry to the Shareholders 
of the Eastern Counties Railway,1848. 
2 Cf.Dickson, op.cit. p.25 for general comments on this, for the particular 
cases see annual Parliamentar,y returns showing the numbers employed by each 
company on construction - e.g.A & P,1847(579) Lxiii-10l shows that the L & E 
had 5 inspectors and.2 engineers on the si~e, the L & D 7 inspectors, 1 
supervisor and 1 eng~neer, the E & H 1 eng~neer, 1 supervisor and 1 
insnector - these for the 1st May ,1847. 
3 Th~~s contract is still extant in the T~·nn office of I' B 
... L\1 me S srs. ant oft , Broadley 
and Ward, for further particulnl's see Appendix G. 
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oonstruotion of the mainline between ~n and Denver and the harbour 
branoh, in all 13 miles 126 yards. The tender aooepted amounted to 
£48 , 347-10-8d. , and the indenture speoified a BUll 0!'t;,.~i6-8d. to be 
paid to the oontraotors; it is to be assumed that the differenoe 
represented the balanoe to be held by the oompany until the works were 
oompleted and the one year's free maintenanoe required performed. Fro II 
this balanoe were to be deduoted any fines or the £100 per week penalty 
for non-oompletion on and after the 31st August,1846. The indenture 
required that the best materials be used, detailed speoifioations for 
fenoes, gates and bridges were given, and suffioient labour was to be 
employed or else the oompany would make good the deficienoy and deduot 
the oost from the balanoe of payment still held. No bricks in excess of 
need were to be made on the site, at no time were stores and plant, 
all material on the site being deemed the property of the company, to be 
removed from the works. The oontractors were rendered responsible for 
fenoing all the works, for temporary roads, for cOllpensation for any 
damage done by them, for any acts of trespass by their employees, and for 
the provision of special police. No trees were to be removed. If in 
default in any single particular the contraotors were to be liable to 
the seizure by the oompany of all plant on the works, and also to any 
further costs that the oompany might seek to recover through legal aotion. 
As further sections controlled the employment of labour (see p.290 below) 
it would seem that nothing was being left to chanoe. In effeot the use 
of the best materials was assured, the contraotors were barred from 
making any private transactions at the possible ex;ense of the company, 
and were prevented froll aooepting other work until this was complete. 
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After the initial delays already noted work was pushed on with great 
despatch, a circumstance du~ noted in numerous reports primari~ designed to 
catch the eye of the stock market. By August the temporary station at Lynn 
(actually built by J.Sugars of ~nn as were all the stations), the station 
houses, and all track, gatehouses and drains were ree.dy for the errival of 
1 the first engines in September. On the 27th October the line was opened as 
far as Downham with the rundng of the usual ceremonial train. A year later, 
November, 1847, the line's "excellent order" was reported, as was a regular 
and increasing traffic; the double track, so far on~ to Watlington, 'Was 
2 described as a great advantage. But, like all the other secticns of the 
East Anglian, this was gross~ inadequate in terms of facilities; tv:elve 
months after the opening Valentine was reporting the current provision of 
3 
sheep and cattle pens at Iqnn. Meanwhile the completion of the harbour 
branch had been held up by the del~ in bridging the Nar4(near the South 
Gate) which, coupled with severe weather conditions had prevented the carriage 
of earth to form the embankments along the branch. In the July of 1845 Lacy 
ha(~ boasted of the "extraordinary progress" being made in planning the branch 
. 5 
and obtaining the land requl.red, but even so it was the May of 1848 before the 
first coal trains ran. By that stage, however, burdened with extended labour 
costs and the loss under the penalty clause - also, in the case of Simpson, 
deeply involved in the ruinous ~isbech branch - the contractors had become 
"embarr assed,,6and unable to ~rovide the year's free maintenance which the 
1 Railway Gazette, 29th August,1846, p.19S; L & E meeting of the 27th August. 
2 Herapath, 6th November,1847, p.1254; Valentine on the 3rd November. 
3 Ibid. 
4- Ra.ilw~ Gazette, 28th February, 1846. 
5 Iqnn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 2nd August, 18J+5. 
6 Herapath, 17th November, 1849, p.1l58; Reply of the directors to the 
Co~nittee of Inqu~ (dated the 18th August, 1849). 
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contract demanded. This now fell to the compa~ and proved a source of great 
1 difficulty and expense. Despite this, however, the work must have been well 
done, for subsequently Simpson was awarded the relapsed contract to complete 
the ~nn & Dereham line after the bankruptcy of the contractor there, and, in 
later years still, it was he who obtained the contracts for the ~nn & 
Hunstanton ana the West Norfolk Railway constructions~ 
Contract No.2. placed with Messrs. Gregson for the Denver to Ely section 
had a miserable histo~ ending with the bankruptcy of the unfortunate 
contractor. After prolonged difficulties in fixing the sum this contract was 
actually placed at a figure below estimate3(somewhere in the early summer of 
1846) and construction got off to a flying start. Trouble came, however, 
with the bridges over the Ouse and the Wissey. Empowered by the L & E act 
4 
"to regulate the height and span" as they saw fit the hostile Drainage 
Commissioners made their specifications as onerous as possible. On his 
initial inspections Rastrick had found six to eight bridges constructed at 
5 bank level and with openings of no more than 20' to 30'. On these his 
designs had been based. Such precedents, however, did not prevent the South 
Level Commission and their partners from demanding in the case of the Cuse 
bridge a 10' clearance over the banks and a viaduct of 150 yards comprising 
seven arches of 30' and one of 121'6" (instead of the 40' proposed for the 
6 
central span); simi1ar~ over the Wisse,y, a mere 30' wide, there was to be a 
10' clearance over the banks, seven arches of 30' and one of 70' (again in 
lieu of the 40' intended); in this instance, however, the compa~ had gained 
1 Herapath, 17th November, 1849, p.1158; Beply of the directors to the 
Committee of Inqui~ (dated the 18th August, 1849). 
2 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 15th February, 1890; Thew. 
3 Railway Gazette, 29th August, 1846, p.195; Valentine, 27th August. 
~ Herapath, 19th Februa~, 1848, p.201; Bruce on the 16th February. 5 Ibid. 
Herapath, 19th November, 1847, p.1254; Valentine on the 3rd November. 
.m 
a little ground, for the initial demand of the oommissioners had been for a 
1 
span of no less than 102'. The olearanoe involved in orossing these two 
rivers meant the provision of a hea~ embankment three furlongs in length to 
avoid excessive gradients between them, and long approaoh embankments on the 
far side of each. In these embankments lay the real cause of the trouble, 
expense and delay whioh then ensued. The foundations first laid were 
2 immediate~ swallowed in the soft alluvial soil and peat; expensive pile 
driving, trenches and layers of brushwood were all tried without success. 
Eventual~, in near desperation the engineers resorted to the even more oost~ 
expedient of laying down an 18' to 19' layer of gravel and dry san~ soil~ 
This served at last to press the moisture out, and construction was enabled 
to proceed. 
The bridges oomplete, work was pursued with "redoubled energy"~ but only 
to encounter a savage winter of frosts and pouring rain whioh imposed del~ 
after delay and completed the ruin of the contractor. But even so the line 
was opened throughout to E~ on the 26th Ootober, 1847, and rail communication 
between ~nn and London was at last established even if twelve months behind 
estimate. The unfortunate contractor left some fine work behind him. The 
first Fen winter passed without slip or mishap~ while the Ouse bridge, with 
its massive bowstring truss, showed a deflection of no more than i" during 
. 6 exhaust~ve tests. The line was complete, but the manner of its construotion 
had had a serious effect on public confidence in the compa~ as an investment; 
the decline in value of compa~ stook was acoentuated by the destructive gibes 
1 Herapath, 19th February, 1848, p.20l;4Directors' Report, 16th February. 
2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. 6 Valentine, 26th February, 1847. 
5 Valentine, 19th February, 1848. Valentine, 3rd November, 1847. 
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of Herapath who, in the first of his three articles in the November of 1847, 
made great p1~ with the fact of a tempor~ speed restriction over the bridges 
(imposed until the track on the embankments had had time to sett1e)lin 
suggesting that the line might collapse under heavy engines, "we do not add 
2 
weighty trains, because we do not see exact~ whence the traffic is to come". 
The Wisbech branch, built by Simpson and Bennett~ cost £170,000 instead of 
the £80,000 
compaD\Y who 
estimated~ and "was 
formed the 1ine"~ 
made out of capital not belonging to the 
Staking was completed by the end of August, 
1846, but actual construction did not commence until the summer of the fo110w-
ing year. Until then the cost of the mainline had prevented a start being 
made, but \'!hen the Eastern Counties "said that unless the branch wa.s made the 
6 
lease to them of the Anglian lines could not go through" the compaD\Y's hand 
was forced; fortunate~ the embargo placed by the E.C.R. on the E & H at the 
same time released the necessa~ capital. The Eastern Counties wanted the 
branch so as to effect a link between Iornn and its own Wisbech and March line 
and so afford facilities for the development of traffic between Lynn and the 
midlands - obvious~ the Norfolk Estua~ Scheme was being included in this 
calculation. The fear that the mainline of the L & E might fail lingered on 
(see chapter 1) and the branch offered an insurance against such an eventuality; 
so determined was the E.C.R. to have a foot in Iornn that in 1845 it had 
actually threatened to construct its own Wisbech - lqnn line ~ a threat tha.t 
might still be implemented, and so revive the dangers of 1844 which had 
1 Herapath, 6th November, 1847, p.l254; Valentine's Report on the 3rd November. 
2 Ibid., p.1264. 
3 Iornn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 15th February, 1890; Thew. 
4 Bruce at the meeting of the 28th Februa~, 1849. 5 Ibid. 
6 Bruce on the 17th November, l~9. 
7 Lynn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 2nd August, 1845; L & E meeting 
of the 29th July. 
------
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precipitated the formation of the L & E. To this extent the L & E board had 
been trapped by circumstances, but there was, in apparent justification, a 
more positive side. This was, of course, the carefully nurtured concept of 
a great east to west trunk route which was now coming nearer realisation with 
the commencement of the L & D works and the authorisation on the 16th July, 
1846 of both the Manchester, Buxton, Matlock & MidlandsJunction Railw~ and 
the Ambergate, Nottingham, Boston & Eastern Junction Railw~. To bridge the 
remaining gap the East Anglian itself during 1847 sought to obtain authorisa-
tion to extend from Wisbech to Spalding where it would make connection with 
the latter of these companies. But, the former was obliged to restrict 
construction to the lIt miles between Rowsley and Ambergate, and the latter, 
by an 8.ct of 1850, to suspend. all construction save that on the section between 
Colwick and Grantham; with the result that the E.A.R. was left with a ruinously 
expensive branch so badly situated in relation to the villages of the area 
through which it passed that it could not even cover its own working expenses. 
The· onlY practical advantage derived was that by the branch and the running 
powers obtained over the E.C.R. lines from Wisbech to M?rch and St.Ives 
physical connection could be made with the E & H section. This, however, was 
not sufficient to prevent Bruce from later claiming that he "could not imagine 
2 
why the line had ever been built". He, of course, had not been a member of 
the board at the time the decision was taken; if he had been it is probable 
that he would have taken a firm stand against the Eastern Counti es (as indeed 
a minority had wished to do) and would have prevented ambitious intentions 
conditional upon the success of two other independent and unrelated concerns. 
1 For further discussion of these matters see chapter 6 below. 
2 On the 28th February, 1849. 
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Finally commenced in the August of 1847 the branch was expected to be 
complete by the end of December, but in fact was not open for traffic until 
the 1st February, 1848. A short extension linking the East Anglian station 
with that of the Eastern Counties was rea~ by the middle of the summer. 
Failure to realise the estimates in either time or cost was once again the 
fault of the Drainage Commissioners and. their specifications, this time for 
the bridges over the Quse and the Midland Level Drain. Indeed, by the 
November of 1847 all the culverts and the minor bridges were complete, the 
embankments had been consolidated by ballast trains, track was laid and 
ballasted to within a ~ mile of Wisbech station and all the stations and 
1 
gatehouses were rea~ for a December opening; onlY the two bridges were "some 
2 
months" off completion, although in the case of that over the Cuse the coffer 
dams for the piers were finished, the foundations of the west pier were above 
low water mark and rea~ to receive stone, and the east pier had been erected 
3 to ground level. By the February of 1848 the piers for both bridges were 
ready and above high water mark and the difficulties of construction were 
over: but rather than risk a repetition of the delays that had occurred on 
the mainline temporary wooden structures were erected to allow for a February 
opening - the same was done in the case of Wisbech station. This was a 
costly and completely unnecessary procedure. The Eastern Counties negotia-
tions had failed and there W3S absolute~ no advantage to be gained in 
respect of the trunk route concept. That enormous expense was incurred to 
hasten the opening of a line that could not even pay its w~ is not the 
least of the mistakes made by the ear~ directors. 
1 Herapath, 
2 Ibid. 
4 Herapath, 
February. 
6th November, 1847, p.l254; Engineer's Report, 3rd November. 
3 Ibid. 
19th February, 1848, p. 201; Engineer' 5 Report of the 16th 
The Ely & Huntingdon 
The ~~ mile section of this compa~'s line which survived the complioa-
tions of r9.ilwoy politics and depredation of capital was in a~ oase the first 
that was to be commenced. This followed an agreement with the Eastern 
Counties in the November of 1846 that the section would be oompleted within 
two years of the act and in time for the opening of the line from Cambridge to 
St.lves; it wa~ also agreed, on the suggestion of the E & H, that the latter 
station should be joint~ financed, a considerable saving to that compa~! 
After this most auspicious start both land and construotion oontract were ob-
tained within estimate~ and final~ construotion began in the first weeks of 
1847· Completion by the 1st M~ was intended, but it was in fact the 17th 
August before the line was opened, the same day as the opening of the line 
from Cambridge. Meanwhile, at the request of the E.C.R., the line had been 
taken forward a quarter of a mile to bring it to the 'Views' in Huntingdon 
where readier access to the Great Northern would be obtainable~ These five 
miles had cost £130,000, or £26,000 per mile. The luxury of double rails 
explained part of this, but the ohief cause of the remarkable cost was the 
series of heavy wooden viaducts (single track) necessa17 to take the line to 
and fro over the twisting course of the Ouse outside Huntingdon. 
To anticipate, this very ex~ensive line proved a heavy drain on the 
resources of its owners. Separated from the parent body it was from the 
outset worked on lease by the Eastern Counties~ But so poor was the return 
that in 1849 that compa~ gave notice of suspension of all services as from 
the 1st October. The rental paid by the E.C.R. has not been ascertained. 
Such was the state of the East Anglian books that in the February of 1848 
1 Railway Gazette,5th2December~1846,p.672; Announced at the E & H meeting of 
the 2nd December. Ibid. Herapath,26th June,1~7,p.755. 
4- Ibid.,6th November,p.1254; meeting of the 3rd November,1847. 
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Bruce himself had to ad.mi t, "I have been unable to determine the rent paid in 
this case": Laoy was to have settled the details at a private meeting with 
Waddington, Vioe-ohairman of the E.C.R., but a damaged ankle made him unable to 
keep the appointment, and there is no record of a~ subsequent meeting being 
arranged. The Eastern Counties made good its threat and the East Anglian 
was reduced to the employment of a horse drawn tram seating 60 passengers; 
this provoked a remarkable oomplaint from the Railway Commissioners that the 
minimum speed of 12 m.p.h. as required by the act of 1844 was not being 
observed. This was not resolved when the Eastern Counties, no doubt fearful 
of complete closure in case of future developments in the area and perhap~ 
alarmed by news that the Great Northern was contemplating a lease of the 
E.A.R., consented to resume freight workings. The dangers attendant on the 
mixing of horse and steam were too obvious to be ignored, however, and so 
from the 1st Janua~, 1850 two dai~ passenger trains in eaoh direction were 
2 
resumed. The E.C.R. had offered a rental of 251- per dayi whether or not 
this was the finalJ,y agreed figure is not known, but in view of' the alterna.-
tive of' having practicalJ,y no income at all there is no reason why it should 
not have been. A new junction with the Great Northern line in 1851/2 
improved matters, but there was no substantial improvement in the situation 
until 1866 when the Midland. Bailw8\Y (which had taken over the Kettering, 
Thrapston & Huntingdon line - authorised in 1862 - in 1863) negotiated running 
rights with the Great Eastern over the old E &: H and E.C.R. lines to Cambridge. 
Subsequently, in 1878, the E & H section was considerably raised in status 
by becoming the first part of' the Great Northern and Great Eastern Joint line 
to Black Carr Junction near Donoaster. 
2 
1 Herapath, 19th February, 1848, p.201. Ibid, 24th August, 1850 828 ,p. • 
~ C.J.Allen: The Great Eastern Railw8\Y, London 1955, p.~5. 
The Hfnn & Dereham 
The first seotion of the L & D, the 8i miles between runn and. Narborough, 
entrusted to a J.Walker, was oompleted, despite adverse weather, between the 
February of 1846 and the 27th October, the same day as the opening of the 
L & E to Downham Market. A year later the line was reported to be "in a most 
perfeot state" with a suooessful servioe in full operation: Most remarkable 
of all the contraot was oompleted within estimate, a oiroumstanoe whioh led 
the youthful Valentine to point to the faot as evidence of how well the 
estimates had been made and that the exoess oost of the L & E was entirely the 
fault of Parliament; these olaims were perhaps justified, but unfortunately 
they led on to the boast that "I" shall oomplete the line within estimate~ 
Valentine was to have ample oause to repent of this rashness in the d~s that 
followed. 
The second contraot was awarded to Messrs. F~ and Frost and. covered the 
8 mile section between Narborough and Swaffham. Taken at a sum below 
estimate the oontract was implemented during tm August of 1846 with the 30th 
June, 1847 as the intended date of completion~ Bad weather intervened~ 
however, to foroe the actual date back to the 31st July, and it was the lOth 
August before the first regular trains ran through to Swaffham, and the 26th 
October before the tempora~ terminus at Sporle could be brought into use. 
This section, however, exceeded estimate and oontinued to be a souroe of 
expense for several years. The trouble l~ in the extensive chalk cuttings 
outside Swaffham and round the aotual station whioh proved far more diffioult 
J 
1 Herapath, 6th November, 1847, p.1254; Valentine's Report on the 3rd November. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Railw~ Gazette, 29th August, 1846, p.19Sj Valentine on the 27th August; 
L & D meeting. 
4 Herapath, 6th Maroh, 1847, p.302j Valentine on the 26th Februar,y. 
~ 
than expeoted and whioh for years oontinued to need the "greatest care"! 
Moreover, as in so ma~ plaoes along the E.A.R. lines, the goods aooommodation 
h . 2 at Swaffham, incomplete at t e open1ng, soon proved to be completely inadequate 
and subsequently required more expensive exoavation to provide extra sidings 
space. The only oompensation was that the chalk so removed was taken up for 
Fen road improvement s and so became a source of revenue. But to the 
contractors the ohalk meant ruin and bankruptcy~ so once again displ~ing the 
folly of contracting for such work without adequate reserves to cover the 
costs of labour when unforeseen diffioulties occurred. 
F~ and Frost had virtual~ completed their work when overcome by debt, 
~ but Messrs. Berwick and Burrows, who, on the 7th Janua~, 1847, contracted for 
the Sporle to Dereham section, were far from completing their work when 
overwhelmed. In this case the reason is rather hard to disoern unless it was 
that too much labour was emplqyed (for which see section 2, chapter 6 below). 
Originally intended for completion by the 31st July, 1~7, summer came with a 
forecast of an autumn opening, then in the February of 1848 it was to be the 
early summer, but ultimately, after a government inspection on the 29th August, 
it was the 11th September, 1848 before the first regular service began. The 
Norfolk Railway had reached the town am commenced its services on the 15th 
Februa~ of the previous year, and had thus gained an enormous initial 
advantage for Norwich in the competition that existed with ~nn for the 
Dereham trade. The L & D board were of course large~ to blame for this in 
having delayed the placing of the contract so long, but contrnctors' 
bankruptcy also contributed by bringing all work to a halt for three full 
1 Valentine on the 17th December, 1849. 
2 Valentine on the 3rd November, 1847. 
3 Herapath, 17th December, 1~9; report of an East Anglian meeting of the 15th 
4 Herapath, 6th March, 1847, p.302; Engineer's Report, 26th February. 
.ill. 
monthsl in the end the compa~ had had to finish the work itself at heav,y cost 
2 
and to the complete overthrow of the estimates. There remains only one 
possible clue as to the nature of the constructional difficulties, but at the 
same time it begs the question of why ten whole months were wasted in the final 
stages. On the 3rd November, 1~7 Va~entine reported that to that date 
336,000 of 501,000 cubic yards of earth had been moved, and that 250,000 out of 
429,000 had been placed for embankments; eleven of the 23 bridges were oomplete 
(six more were to follow in the next two weeks), all culverts were made, » 
miles of track had been laid and ballasted and all stations and gatehouses had 
been oovered and were but a month from comp1etion~ The possibility suggested 
here is that Sheer weight of earth m~ have been the oause of much of the 
trouble - it will be noted that there was an excess of 72,000 cubic yards 
whioh would have to be removed by the contractors, and this alone m~ well 
haTe involved considerable expense. If this is so the fol:lJr of employing 
small contractors on small sections receives further emphasis, for a few miles 
away at Narborough (part of the seoond contract and one that also ended in 
bankruptcy) may still be seen the evidence of deep digging to find. the earth 
used in some of the high embankments there; the 72,000 cubic yards could have 
represented a considerable econo~ there if only one contractor had been 
responsible. Also, it must be added, the state of completion indicated by the 
report of November, 1847 leaves nothing but wonder that the directors could 
possib~ have taken so long to completion. 
Bridges, contractors' bankruptcy, weather, rising prioes, ill timed 
contracts, greedy landowners and foolish bulk buying thus all p1~ed a part in 
1 Herapath, 
Inquiry. 
3 Herapath, 
17th December, 1849;2rep~ of the directors to the Committee of 
Ib:Ld. 
6th November, 1847, p.1254; Valentine on the 3rd November, 1811-7. 
~ 
making the East Anglian lines so expensive that even the most sanguine 
estimates of revenue could not be said to be sufficient to support the weight 
of capital that had to be incurred. wqy should so ma~ adverse factors 
combine against three such lines? The answer must be that mismanagement 
invited misfortune; sounder direction would have meant a closer awareness 
of the true situation and modified plans. The failure involved the econo~ 
of the whole of west Norfolk for because of their expense and laggard~ 
construction the lines could no longer hope to dictate the economic pattern 
of the future. 
.ill 
Chapter :2 
The Failure of the Estimates (II) 
Section 1: The Failure of the Revenue Estimates to December,1848 
A. Summary Table of Opening Dates 
October 27th 
" " 
King's Lynn to Downham Market 
King's Lynn to Narborough 
L&E 
L&:D 
lot miles 
8i " 
1847 
August lOth 
" 17th 
October 26th 
" " 
1848 
February 1st 
May 
September 11th 
Stations 
Narborough to Swaffhaa 
Huntingdon to St.lves 
Swa.t'fham to Sporle 
Downham Market to Ely North Jnc. 
Watlington to Wisbech 
Completion of the Harbour Branch 
Sporle to Dereham 
L&D 
E&:H 
L&:D 
L&E 
L&E 
L&E 
L&:D 
~ 
" 51 " 3 It 
l4t It 
9i " It " 
9 " 
1. L &: E mainlinea Lynn,Watlington,Stow,Downham Market,Denver,Ouse Bridge, 
Hilg~ Fen,Littleport 
Average distance between stations: 3~ mls~ 
2. Wisbech Branch: Magdalen Gate,~tiddle Drove,Smeeth Road,Emneth 
Average distance between stations: 2t mls. 
3. L &: D mainline: Middleton,East Winch,Bilney,Narborough,Swaffham, 
Dunham,Fransham,Wendling,Derehaa 
Average distance between stations: 3 mlsg 
N.B.There was also a temporary terminus at Sporle 
from October,1846 to September,1848. 
There were no intermediate stations on either the Harbour Branch or 
the E &: H line; later the latter was slightly extended at the 
Huntingdon end and the original terminus was renamed Godmanchester. 
Notes on the present situation: 
1. Renaming in modern timetables: Watlington is now I:.'[agdelan Road 
2. Stations closed: Bilney,Ouse Bridge,Denver,Huntingdon (East), 
Godmanchester,Magdalen Gate, under existing closure 
plans Stow,Hilgay and St.lves are either closed or 
to be closed. 
1 On the 1st May,1848 there were 1,321 stations along 4,523 route miles 
an average of Y.t miles apart - see Lardner,op.cit.p146g For further ' 
details on the stations see Appendix J. 
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Lines in contact with the E.A.R., opened prior to December, 184.8: 
El,y to Norwich (53:i miles) 15th December, 1845, E.C.R. and Norfolk Railway 
Ely to Peterborough (2&!miles) 14th January, 1847, E.C.R. 
Cambridge to St.lves (13~ miles) 17th August, 1847, E.C.R. 
March to Wisbech (7i miles) 3rd M~, 1847, E.C.R. 
March to St.lves (19 miles) 1st March, 1848, E.C.R. 1 
Wymondham to Dereham (ll~ miles) 15th February, 1847, Norfolk Railway 
B. The Figures 
Although aqy discussion of East Anglian revenue returns and working 
expenses is vitiated by the erroneous nature of the accountancy and the absence 
2 
of such essential statistics as train, ton and passenger miles, it remains 
clear that to the close of 1848 traffic was falling far below expectation and 
working costs proving disturbing~ high. At first the proprietors were kept 
complete~ in the dark. O~ in the February of 1848 were they informed that 
to the end of 1847 a net profit of £5,225/16/8 had been realised since the 
first openings, and that since the completion of the ~nn & El,y line gross 
3 
overall receipts had averaged £423 per week. 
When set against the then capital expenditure of £1,062,741 these palt~ 
sums were disastrous in their implications, but the directors were not 
deterred from seeking to present them in a totall,y favourable light. In the 
first place they advanced some highly dubious figures purporting to show that 
for the 40 route miles involved working expenses amounted to less than £200 
4 per week: 
1 Opened to freight traffic o~ on the 30th November, 1846. 
2 This of course applies to virtual~ all companies, for the Railway 
Regulation Act of 1840 required little more than a weekl,y statement of 
revenue by classes. 
3 Herapath, 19th February, 1848, p.200j Directors' Report, 16th Februa~. 
4 Ibid., Bruce in repl,y to a shareholder's question. 
~ 
£ s d 
Stations' Department 49 1 6 
Goods' Department 36 1 1 
Locomotive Department 37 0 0 
Coke, oil and grease 48 10 9 
Carriage Department 13 6 11 
Secretarial Department 9 5 0 
£12.2 ~ .2 
Little comment is necess~. The confusion then obtaining between capital and 
revenue accounts has alrea~ been discussed at length, and it need onlY be 
indicated here that these figures are utter~ incompatible with suoh features 
as the interest charges on debenture stock, the wages of a staff of near~ 180 
1 
men (some of them earning as much as 19/- per week), an engineer's salary of 
2 £1,000 per annum, a secretar,y's of £600 and the continued existence of the 
three iDdividua1 compa~ offices in ~nn, all these being in addition to the 
actual running costs of the trains themselves. Questions of depreciation and 
major overhauls were ignored altogether. But on this basis Laoy declared that 
receipts had "more than defrayed expenses· (while the additional benefit of a 
3 
fully trained staff had been secured), and that on completion the "exceeding~ 
moderate" costs would make the East Anglian one of the oheapest to run in the 
4 
entire kingdom. Others were not so sure, but, of course, had no means of 
confirming their doubts. Copeland pointed out that whereas the gross revenue 
of the East Anglian at its existing level would be about £22,000 on 40 route 
miles, the North British Rai1w~ was expending ~,OOO per annum in maintaini:ng 
5 
and operating its 81 mile system; comparisons ma.Y not be pushed too far, but 
the imp1ioation here was startling enough. Herapath went further, hazarding 
2 1 See below. Announced on the 16th February, 1848. 
3 Herapath, 6th November, 1847, p.1254; 3rd November. 
4 Laoy on the 16th February, 1848. 
5 At the meeting of the 16th February. 
~ 
a guess that receipts in fact barelY if at all covered expenses, and claiming 
that in his view this was "a part of the country incapable of supporting a 
1 
railway, especiallY when constructed on expensive principles", although 
subsequentlY he gave the lie to this by becoming a shareholder in the compa~ 
he had done so much to run down. The difference, however, was to be found 
in the management, not in the count~side. 
The alleged profit received further bolstering. It was said to obtain 
despite the growing severity of the national depression, incomplete arrange-
ments, winter openings and the fact that the lines were not strategicallY 
2 
complete, but in no case was a~ attempt made to relate these various factors 
to specific lines or periods of time. A proprietor's plea for greater detail, 
showing the returns of each individual line, was rebutted by the subtle appeal 
to econo~ to provide such would involve the employment of extra clerks. 
Indeed, at this stage, the directors displayed such coyness in a~thing 
appertaining to a separate revenue account that even the profit claimed was 
placed to an accumulative section of the capital a.ccount; Copeland did not 
3 
allow this to pass without comment, but his was a lone voice and nothing was 
done - not until the August of 1848 was a~hing approaching a reasonable 
revenue account produced. FinallY, circumstances, past and present, were 
evoked in attempts to portr~ a bountiful future. In the November of 1847 
Lacy spoke with satisfaction of the 170,000 passengers who had already used the 
lines~ although this of course was probablY more a reflection of natural human 
curiosity than a solid ba.sis for confidence. In the following February he was 
1 Op.cit., article of the 13th November, 1847, p.1287. 
2 Directors I Report, 16th February, 1848. 
3 Herapath, 19th February, 1848, p.200; At the meeting of the 16th February. 
4 Ibid., 6th November, 1847, p.1254; 3rd November, 1847. 
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engaged in telling the sharehOlders that since 1841 an average of 244,000 tons 
of coal had been landed each year in lUnn, and that 8afo of it went inland. in 
the direction of their lines~ the implication was that here lay a prolific 
source of revenue that could easi~ be wrested from the navigation interests 
(comments on the 5% pilferage to which water freight was subject were added for 
good measure), but as events were to show this was to be something more easi~ 
said than done. 
In fairness to the directors, ~owever, it should be remarked that despite 
the lowness of the actual figure claimed as profit there was one very solid 
ground for self congratulation. Four months after the initial openi~ s to 
Downham and Narborough Lacy had Quite bluIi; ~ stated that the purpose was not 
so much to gain a profit as to test the qualities of men and machines, and to 
2 
prepare the staff for the more general o:->ening. The mistaken nature of this 
policy will be eX.<l,mined below and it is suffic ient to say here that in all 
probability the remark was genuine and not meant to cover up for disapnointing 
initial results. The whole concept rested on the assumption that there would 
be no long delay before all the !'lections .. '.'ere in fact ready, but in that the 
opposite had proved to be the Cll-se it was a matter for satisfaction that it 
could be believed that a profit had actual~ been achieved, however erroneous 
the foundations of such belief. But then 1848 should have shown results more 
positive and concrete altogether for in that year all the remaining sections 
'were opened to traffic and there was the full twelve month period over which 
the capabilities of the mainline of the L & E might be tested; moreover, 
I Herapath, 19th Pebruary, 1848, p.200; 16th February, 1848. 
2 Ibid., 6th Ma.rch, 1847, p.301; Directors' Report, 26th February, 1847. 
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beoause of the initial over-staffing it could be assumed that little time, 
effort or money would be wasted through inexperience. It was further to be 
hoped that as the bulk of the staff and the plant had alrea~ been conoentra-
ted on the first sections to be opened working expenses would not rise in the 
same proportion as the additional revenue }roduoed by further extensions. 
The year, however, proved to be one of disaster, leaving 'Quiet Observer' for 
one to see nothing ahead but a "miserable prospect", and. of the opinion that 
while many companies had erred in their oonstruction estimates few had ever 
been so complete~ inaocurate in their revenue estimates~ 
East Anglian Traffio Returns for 1848 
Table 1: 1st January to the 30th June: refers to 40 route miles, exoept for 
week 5 of June when the total was 51. 
Week 1 \Veek 2 Week .2 Week !to Week 5 
£ s d .£ s d £ s d £ s d .£ s d 
January 460 0 0 450 
° 
0 432 17 0 410 3 3 
February 431 13 0 425 11 10 472 10 4 642 1 0 
Maroh 540 14 2 487" 2 4 442 9 10 453 10 5 464 0 1 
April 474 3 11 447 5 4- 465 4- 4- 483 17 0 
May 4-81 3 2 521 19 8 512 8 8 498 6 2 
June Not published 604- 15 1 636 5 5 565 16 9 548 8 0 
The above figures2were incorporated in the grand total of receipts to the 
end of June, 1848 and therefore cannot be subjected to detailed examination. 
The conveyance of passengers, merchandise and mails were lumped together to 
give a grand total since October, 1846 of £20,295/10/11t, to whioh was added 
£102/17/6 from the rent of surplus lands. After deduotion of working 
expenses a balanoe of £9,087/7/8 was left, whioh, by deducting the £5,225/16/8 
claimed as profit to the end of 1847, suggests that over the six months in 
question a profit of £3,86~11 had been made. Bad enough in itself even 
1 Letter to Herapatb, 16th Deoember, 1848, p.1296. 
2 Published week by week in Herapath's and other leading railw~ journals of 
the period. 
lli. 
this profit must be doubted if attention is turned to the curious figure of 
40 route miles on which it is based. This total is constituted by the L & E 
mainline and. the L & D line as far as Swaffham. No mention was made of the 
E~ & Huntingdon section, although the explanation might well be that that 
line was on lease to the E.C.R., and that as late as the Februa~ of 1848 the 
1 
rental had still to be arranged. For practical purposes it m~ be assumed 
therefore that for the moment the E & H had been written off as a source of 
immediate revenue. Much harder to explain is the absence of the Wisbech 
branch which in fact had been open since the 1st Februa~, but which was not 
shown in the above table until the last week of June. The o~ suggestion 
that can be made is that the branch was losing money heavi~ (evidence for 
this was given in the previous Chapter) and that the directors saw fit to 
conceal this fact from their shareholders as long as possible; it is note-
wort~ that the first week of inclusion involved a drop in total receipts of 
onlY £l7 on the figure for the previous week, possiblY an opportunity for the 
Wisbech branch to be slipped in without undue notice being taken. As is 
clearlY apparent on the attached graph the weeklY figures follow a slight 
upwards trend; there are major peaks in the last week of Februa~ and. in the 
second and third weeks of June. The former may be confidentlY ascribed to 
the holding of Lynn Mart which then, as now, brought thousands into the town 
to join in the general festivities. The latter peak is to be assooiated 
with the completion of the harbour branoh in May, this in the sense that only 
then were the works sufficientlY consolidated and the bridge over the Nar 
complete in a form that allowed for the passage of heavy coal trains. 
Indeed, between M~ and. August were concentrated five sixths of all the goods 
1 This beoame evident at the meeting of the 16th Februa~. 
his ankle and. had been unable to keep an appointment made 
week with Waddington, the E.C.R. chairman; a new date was 
arranged. 
Lacy had damaged 
for the previous 
still to be 
~ 
traffic that had passed along the L & E since October, 1846, and similar~ 
1 
three quarters of the overall total on the Swai'fham line. 
Table 2: WeekJ,y Receipts from the 1st August 1848 to the 31st December 
The total milage given was 51 miles until the second week of September; from 
then the total was 67t miles and included both the final section of the L & D 
and the E & H which by this stage had been abandoned by the E.C.R. for lack of 
traffic, services being provided by the owners in the form of a horse drawn 
oarriage. 
Week 1 Week 2 Week 2 Week !t: Week 2 
£ s d £ s d £ s d £ s d £ s d 
July 605 16 11 628 11 11 652 8 11 633 11 3 
August 620 8 1 548 6 2 567 6 3 520 8 6 579 10 1 
September 631 13 4- 807 3 10 710 11 8 684 15 2 
October 726 6 5 865 9 11 817 5 5 706 19 6 
November 743 3 8 739 2 8 716 14- 10 620 18 2 657 4- 2 
December 668 10 0 653 0 11 724- 9 8 
Reference to Graph B (p.245) will show that after the peak reached in 
the October section, as a result of harvest traffic and in particular the 
movement of barley to the malt houses, there was a steep drop in the average 
receipts per mile, indicating that either the L & D was not attracting traffio 
or that all three lines were suffering declining receipts. The latter is the 
more like~ explanation, for, as shown in a previous chapter, this was the 
period of the year when the average labourer's wage tended to drop and when 
activity of all kinds, both social and economic, was at its lowest ebb of the 
year. This was to be expected, but was serious in that the general revenue 
level was such that there was bare~ a reserve to tide the compa~ over the 
slack season; it must be assumed that trains ran to much the same timetable 
and that staff remained at a fair~ constant level. The September peak m~ 
be explained perhaps by the coincidental opening of the L & D at a time when 
1 Herapath, 2nd September, 1848, p. 925; Valentine on the 30th August. 
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Graphs displaying the pattern of East Anglian Traffic Receipts in 1848 
Graph A: Weekly totals Graph B: Average receipts per mile 
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harvest wages had swollen the labourers' resources, so allowing for some 
satisfaction of their curiosity and interest in the new transport; a feature 
not to be repeated in subsequent years. That still left the December peak 
caused by the massive trade conduoted annually between Norfolk and. London in 
Christmas poultry, but again this was hardly sufficient to compensate for the 
long periods when little moved along the lines. 
There can be no disputing the fact that to this stage receipts were 
overall very bad ind.eed. A rough average of £630 per mile per annum com-
pared very badly with the national figure for the year of £1,936~ 'Quiet 
Observer' made some very telling comparisons with the railw~s of the "most 
dreary parts of the kingdom,,3by taking the 21 weeks to the 20th Ootober, 1848 
during which total revenue was £l4,116 (that is £670 per week or £247 per 
mile), and found the average per mile attained on the East Anglian had been 
exceeded by such companies as the Kendal & Windermere (£4.02 per mile) and. the 
Belfast & Bal~ena (£291), the latter despite the "miserable state of 
commerce in Ireland" and only having been opened in the April of that year. 
That something was seriously wrong was borne home increasingly to the 
directors as the year progressed, but they tended to l~ the blame either on 
matters beyond their control, such as national depression and free trade, or 
on purely oircumstancial events. At no time did they really get to the 
roots of the failure and examine their own policies with a suffiCiently 
critioal spirit. In respect of the first half of 1848 they pointed out that 
receipts had increased 4q% to an average per week of £600 as against an 
1 A further factor of importanoe may have been the commencement of the LOndon 
social season involving the movement of large quantities of baggage private 
conveyanoes, servants and families. ' 
2 Derived from Lewin; The Ra.ilw~ Mania & Its Aftermath.,p.114. 
3 In a letter to Herapath's, 16th December, 1848, p.1296. 
ID.. 
increased train milage of o~ 2~. They insisted that the "line must not 
be judged from the receipts of the last half year" and sought to justi~ 
themselves by reference to the Fen floods of March and April which had kept 
the farmers off the land until May, to the unfavourable winter conditions 
which had attended the opening of the Ely line and the Wisbech branch, to the 
national depression and to the continued shortage of rolling stockl(somehow 
they did not seem to consider that this was their fault). But even so it 
had to be admitted that the bulk of local produce was not coming to the 
lines; and shareholders were warned that it alw~s took longer for agricult-
ural lines to develop their traffic than a~ other kinar. Similar excuses 
were brought forward to explain aw~ the "disappointing results,,40f the 
seoond half of the year. In particular it was now the IIpeculiarly depressed 
state of agriculture" and the bad harvest, the del~ed date of the Dereham 
opening, and, again, lithe want of carrying plantll~ Lucrative anticipations 
were, however, not to be abandoned, although it was felt that the resources 
of the line s were only to be ascertained by working over a period "exceeding 
6 
that which is ordinarily assigned to the development of railw~ traffic" 
(usually assessed at 3 years). 
Before turning to consideration of the man;y and various factors whioh 
really explained the failure to this point it is useful to take the analysis 
of the 1848 returns one stage further. This is possible beoause the receipts 
for the latter half of that year were presented to the shareholders in a more 
1 Herapath, 2nd September'21848, p.925; All speoified at the meeting of the 
30th August. Ibid. Statement of Bruoe. 
3 Herapath, 19th February, 1848, p.201; Direotors' Report, 16th Febru~. 
4 Herapath, lOth March, 1849, p.254; Direotors' Report, 28th February. 
~ Ibid. 
Ibid. 
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detailed form than hitherto; The revenue for that period was oomprised thus: 
£ s d 
Passengers lO,7~9 17 4i 
Goods and cattle 7,210 17 0 
Mails 88 8 0 
Milage, demurrage of wagons and 
sheets 115 10 5 
Rent of surplus land. 165 19 6 
Looomotive power and wagons while 
employed by contractors 637 15 8 
£18 z268 1 lli 2 
From this total was to be deducted £11,8341~3 in working expenses (for 
details of whioh see below), so leaving a profit of £7,13416/st. Of the 
overall total actual train operation had yielded £l8,049/2/4i, of whioh 40.3% 
had been oontributed by freight traffio and. 59.7% by passenger workings as 
oompared with overall national proportions of 42.5% and 57.7% respeotivelY~ 
The discrepancy would not be serious were it not for the fact that by its 
very nature and the economic circumstances of its area the East Anglian had 
primarilY to depend on freight transit, the people of the area being few and 
poor. Here then was a major weaknes~ which must now form a part of a 
separate study. 
c. !bY the Traffic had failed to develop 
(I) External Factors:-
It must first be recognised that the deep depression of 1647/8 
inevitab~ had serious repercussions on the econo~ of Norfolk and the 
1 From the accounts presented to the shareholders at the same meeting. 
2 Figures from Lewin, the Railway Mania & Its Aftermath, who had in turn 
taken them from reports to the Board of Trade. 
Year pass.ReCeigts % of total Freight rec. 
184.6 ~, 725,21 62.4 £2,840,353 
1647 £5,148,002 60·5 £3,362,884 
1848 £5,720,382 57.5 £4,213,169 
1849 £6,277,892 53.2 £5,528,606 
% of total 
37.6 
39·5 
42·5 
46.8 
Mil;te 
313 387~ 
51294' 
594~ 
Rec.pr.ml. 
£2,412 
£2,195 
£1,936 
£1,987 
~ 
Fenlands, its incidence being coupled with the deficient harvest of 1848 and 
general agricultural depression. From the railway viewpoint this meant that 
the purchasing power of the community was diminished and that as a consequence 
fewer goods would be moved and fewer people would travel; harvest failure 
implied that the seasonal peak on which so much reliance was perforce plaoed 
would be lower than usual. This becomes evident by particular reference to 
1 
the goods handled at I(y'nn Harbour. 
other goods Arrivals Town Dues 2 Coals imported Groats 
(Tons) imported .aai 
..,8Rli (tons) £. s d £ s d 
184.5 302,463 141,935 2,841 4211 14 3 646 5 0 
1846 208,392 120,468 2,171 3262 10 2 435 1 4 
1847 264,671 107,948 2,493 3473 15 0 458 16 4 
1848 232,831 8?,386 2,037 3220 9 0 375 7 4 
Other important factors besides the depression were, however, involved in 
this decline in 1848. In particular the Peterborough-~-Norwich line of the 
Eastern Counties Railway and the Wymondham - Dereham branch of the Norfolk 
Railway had made it possible for traders in general to avoid the dangerous 
and expensive use of I(y'nn Harbour whenever they desired. The area still 
bound to the harbour had great~ shrunk and now comprised little more than 
the north-west section of Norfolk and the western area that was within 
roughly f{teen miles of lQnn. Salvation for the harbour and as a consequence 
the railway lay in the Estuar,y Cut and the provision of docks, both wet and 
dr,y. These needs were clearly recognised but two vicious circles had been 
created in connection with them. In the first the lQnn Corporation was Boon 
to impose an additional harbour toll of 4d per ton on all Visiting ships to 
1 statistics derived from the Admiralty Prelininary Inqui~ into the Norfolk 
Estuary Bill, April, 1849; columns 1 and 2 are from Appendix 4, p.64, the 
remainder from Appendix 5, p.65. 
2 See Appendix A. 
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finance its own contribution to the Estu~ Cut; inevitab~ this had the 
ef~ect of ~urther alienating trade. In the second the L &: E had already 
obtained an act (1~7) authorising it to raise capital for the construotion of 
a dock at ~nn, but could not implement the project for lack of capital: 
FUrther capit~l could not be raised while public confidence remained so low; 
confidence could not be bolstered without an improved revenue, but the latter 
was unlike~ until ~nn's facilities had been substantial~ improved. Bruce, 
for one, was in no doubt concerning the vital importance of the harbour to the 
East Anglian. In the ear~ part of 1849 he was conducting negotiations with 
a Hull steamship company for a regular passenger and freight service in 
connection with the trains, and investigating the possibilities of a similar 
link with Newcastle and Leith; if these discussions proved fruitful "they 
would no longer be told their line ran into the sea" and "still less that it 
2 
fell into the ',Vash". But without Iqnn Harbour flourishing there would be an 
uncomfortable element of truth in Herapath's sneer of 1847, "In all you have 
about 100 miles of railw~ (sic) running here and there, yet scarcely 
"3 anywhere • 
So far the causes cited are beyond dispute, but there yet re'llains the 
high~ emotional question of the effects of Peel's free trade budgets of 1842 
and '45, and in particular of the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846. The 
subject was naturally enough argued at an emotional level because of the 
fundamental importance of the corn trade to the area (especially so in view of 
the lack of a~ significant industr.y), and because the champion of the 
protectionists, Lord George Bentinck, was well known as a person to his ~nn 
1 See chapter 6 above. 
2 Herapath, 2nd September, 1848, p.925; At a meeting of the 30th August. 
3 Herapath's first article on the East Anglian, 6th November, 1847, p.1264. 
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constituents who gave him a public ban¥quet in 1~6 on his having "hurled 
1 Peel from office". As late as the June of 1849 (and then again in the 
2 
August of 1850) Bruoe was speaking of the unprecedented depth of depression 
in the agriculture of Norfolk and Cambridgeshire and blaming it on free trade. 
On the former occasion he also said of it that ·so far as it had gone it had 
aoted most prejudicial~ to the trade of the port of ~nn", although he did 
add, and later years were to proTe the wisdom of this, that these conditions 
might not last as farmers would probably be stimulated to greater enterprise 
and a demand for artificial manures1 he was speaking particular~ of develop-
ments since the February of 1849 when the nominal ~- per quarter duty had 
become operative, but the implication of his remarks was to be extended to 
cover the whole period since 1846. 
The essence of the protectionist case was contained in a speech delivered 
by Bentinck to the Iornn electorate during the course of 1847, its content 
subsequent~ being printed and wide~ distributed in pamphlet form~ Bentinck 
argued that two good harvests would be required to restore the corn trade to 
its natural condition (the harvest of 1846 had been bad, that of 1847 was still 
to come), "and then we shall see wheat during a series of years average in 
this count~ no more than 45/- a quarter, at which prioe •••• the agricultur-
alist, with tithe, poor rate, land tax, malt tax and hop duties, cannot live". 
Only protection or a revision of taxes could give the agriculturalist the same 
footing as the Manchester manufacturer. He went on to point out that "we 
1 ~nn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 15th Februa~ 1890· Personal 
. , 
Recollections of a Iornn Sexagenar~an. 
2 Herapath, 24th August, 1850, p.828; Meeting of the 21st August. 
3 Herapath, 16th June, 1849, p.596; Special meeting of the 13th June. 
4 There were in fact two pamphlets concerned with virtua~ the same arguments: 
'Address of Lord George Bentinck to the Independent Electors of the Borough 
of King's runn' - Iornn, 1847, and 'Speech of Lord George Bentinck - House of 
Commons 20th Ju~ 1847 - on Sir Robert Peel's Letter to the Electors of 
Tamworth' - London, 1847. The quotations above are taken principally from 
the former. 
Ifjjlii __ ~_""""'~-===~=·=;:;;;';========:=:===~~~S."""."~ ..""."",,:,.,,,,, .""' .. -'-'-'-~":",,:,,,:-"'---::"':"""::' .. -.-.-.. -... -.-
~ 
protectionists" had forecast the current depression, and that the manufao-
turers had been the first to suffer by the exchange of sure customers at hoae 
for the vague chance of new ones abroad; meanwhile the European oountries took 
British gold for their corn and used it to foster their own industries. 
Finally reference was made to the vexed subjeot of price fluctUations whioh 
were proving so disruptive of a balanoed farming econo~. Here figure 15 were 
taken at random without aqy reference to prevailing conditions, the whole 
being intended to show conclusive~ that the farmer, and therefore trade in 
general, had been better off under the sliding scales of 1828 and 1842 than at 
a~ time since repeal of the Corn Laws. Under the former scale the highest 
price obtained had been 8~4 in 1839, the lowest the 38/6 per quarter of 1835; 
in 1843, under the revised scale of 1842, there had been no wider fluctuation 
than that between 65/8 and 45/-. In 1844 the gres.test change in one month 
had been that between 49/8 and 57/7, in one week 52/2 and 57/7, but since 1846 
conditions had deteriorated serious~. During the course of 1847 one month 
had seen a change from 8~10 to 102/5 (the maximum for the year so far) and 
1 
prices had been down to 45/1. 
In the light of cold and retrospective logic these arguments oannot be 
allowed to stand, however convinoing they may have seemed to those who wanted 
to be convinced at the time. In the first place he was arguing from the 
particular to the general, for the circumstances of the 1847/8 depression were 
quite unusual in both their coincidence and severity and were directly related 
to causes quite beyond the scope of Bentinck's case (for discussion of these 
factors and their relationship to railway investment see chapter 7 below). 
Admitted~ the export of gold to p~ for foreign corn constituted a major 
1 These figures are representative of a whole mass of statistios quoted by 
Lord Bentinck in the two speeches which the pamphlets represent. 
ill 
cause of the slump, but this represented a transient situation only and one 
from which industry was strong enough to recover in the next years without 
a~ substantial change in the agricultural situation. To press the point as 
Bentinck did was to revert to the by now discredited premises of the 
Mercantilist ~stem and its associated concepts of national self suffioiency, 
for he seemed to assume that Britain could only remain rich while others 
remained poor - he apparent~ chose to forget that Europe as a whole had 
shared in the great boom of 1845 with results high~ beneficial to British 
trade. 
In essence Bentinck's case was the outcry of a pampered child 8udde~ 
made to stand on its own feet as did its industrial brother. It was entirely 
selfish, failing to recognise both the national benefits to be deprived fro. 
oheap bread and the fact that British farmers just could not meet the needs ot 
an ever growing population. The whole argument was redolent of selt pity. 
Bentinok made much of tithes, but these had been related to corn prioes since 
1836, of Poor Rates, which were rising again but to nowhere near the pre-183~ , 
level (in a~ case intensive cultivation would on the whole serve to diminish • 
1 
these), of taxes on land, malt and hope etc., but these were all related 
direct~ or indirectlY to actual production and could be recouped to a large 
extent by increased yields arising from more efficient methods and by the 
further development of livestock farming. Moreover, rai1w~s were now 
offering cheaper transport than ever before and extending the range of 
potential markets; they were also making possible the profitable use of 1andl 
hitherto deemed inferior. These and other factors were indeed alrea~ l~ng 
1 ~.E.Fussell, 'High Farming' in the East Midlands and East Anglia, l~o-
1880, Economic Geograpqy, Vo1.27, No.1, January, 1951, pp.86-7, provides 
evidence for this contention; see chapter 9, section 2 below. 
~ 
the foundations for the golden era of 'High Farming', which in itself' showed 
how little the British farmer had to fear from free trade in corn provided 
that he was prepared to readjust himself and move with the times; the real 
threat was to come some 30 years later with the opening up of the America.n 
prairies and the technical developments allowing for the importation of New 
Zealand and Australian meat and dair,y produce. 
But to argue in this wise is to take the Ions term view when speaking of 
an area such as this which, if a~hing, wa.s over-dependent on corn. If the 
importation of foreign corn (to the extent that in 1851 one quarter of the 
1 
corn consumed in this count~ was of foreign origin) did depress prices 
further than was alreadJ' the case, the consequences could indeed be serious 
for the whole area, until of course suitable readjustment, especia~ by the 
adoption of a mixed arable and livestock econo~, had been made. In the 
following table of wheat prices the second column is derived from the 
researches of a Norfolk clergyman in 1856~ the figures were provided by a 
Norwich firm and were represented as being true for the area in general. The 
third column, derived from a Pa.rlia.menta~ return of 1878/9~ gives the nation-
a1 average for each year, but with the exception of the last three years is 
identical with the figures of the secOnd~ 
1 Clapham, op.cit. Vol.2, p.2l8. 
2 Statistical Tables Illustrative of the Receipts and Expenditure of the 
Norfolk County Rate; Rev. H.Kitton, Norwich, 1856. 
3 Accounts & Papers, 1878/9, lxv, p.438. 
4 The table is continued in Appendix H. 
;¥ - --- --_. ~-- -------
~ 
Norwich National Highest Lowest Wheat imported 
Year average average week~ aVe week]y av. in cwts. 
-
1sq.3 50/1 50/1 61/2 45/5 4,073,853 
1844- 51/3 51/3 56/5 45/1 4,762,667 
1sq.5 50/10 50/10 60/1 45/- 3,777,411 
1846 54/8 5418 62/3 45/1 6,207,894 
184.7 69/9 69/9 102/5 49/6 11,511,305 
1848 50/6 50/6 56/10 46/10 11,184,156 
1849 44/3 W3 49/1 38/9 16,663,305 
1850 40/3 40/3 WI 36/11 16,202,312 
1851 39/5 38/6 43/6 35/6 16,518,701 
1852 39/10 40/9 45/11 37/2 13,261,161 
1853 45/7 53/3 73/7 43/3 21,300,197 
As may be seen from the graphs on pages 256 and 257 (which show the prioe 
variations in barley and oats as well as in wheat) there was indeed some 
degree of correlation between rising imports and falling prices, but in that 
between 1849 and 1851 imports remained at a steady level while prioes 
continued to fall, yet in 1853 both increased substantially, it would seem 
that the abundance or otherwise of the individual harvest 19a.s the key factor, 
and not free trade in corn as such. This view is rather confirmed by the 
rise of both prices and imports in 1847, and by the situation in 1853 when 
the sharp rise in the volume of imports coupled with the increase in prioes 
indicates a deficient harvest in 1852, although the discrepancy between the 
Norwich and national averages indicates a more productive yield in East 
Anglia than elsewhere. It also seems clear on the evidence of these years 
that the effect of repeal when coupled with high harvest yields and the work 
of railways in making prices national rather than local in character was to 
oause some considerable reduction in the range of price fluctuations within 
aI\Y one year. 
From the national viewpoint lower corn prices and a restriction of the 
fluctuations in them were entire~ benefioial, but to the wheat farmer of 
East Anglia the former meant inevitab~ a period of anxiety and enforced 
:::"7"' 
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economy, although not one of desperation. To the tenant farmer, hampered 
by high rentals unrelated to current prices, the difficulties were even more 
severe intensifying the problems obtaining as early as 1845 and described, 
largely through the investigations of Caird, in chapter 3 above. Duri1l8 the 
period of readjustment the railw~s were to play a vital part (for which see 
chapter 9, section 2), but during its early stages they were bound to suffer 
as reduced amounts of fertilizers and other farm materials were bought within 
the area, and as farmers in general had to restrict their personal expenditure 
on manuf~ctured goods and travel; reduced wages that further contracted the 
purchasing power of the labouring classes is a matter that will be discussed 
in a later context. But even so the future remained full of promise. More 
livestock within the area would eventually mean greatly increAsed revenues, 
and the subsequent growth of the farmers' prosperity could not help but be 
reflected in all classes of receipts. There still remained, however, the 
problems associated with dependence on ~nn Harbour. These too were 
eventually to be overcome, but meanwhile the railw~s would continue to 
suffer from them. 
(II) Internal Factors 
Nationn.l depression in general, and local agricultural depression in 
particular do much to explain the seriously disappointing revenue returns of 
1848, but there remains the fact admitted to by Bruce that the bulk of the 
1 
trade within the lines' areas was still not coming to the railways. OnlY 
in 1849 and 1850 was it fully appreciated that the reasons for this l~ 
~argely with the companY itself; then, some could be easilY rectified, but 
1 Herapath, 2nd September, 1848, p. 925; Bruce on the 30th AUgust, 1848. 
· .. ~ 
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others that had arisen from the mistaken policies of the first boards 
were to prove harder to redeem. 
Of the latter catego~ perhaps the most serious was the policy of 
piecemeal openings without reference to either strategic or economic entities. 
This applied particularlY to the first sections, those between Lynn and 
Downham Market (L & E) and Narborough (L & D), where traffic, restricted to 
pure~ local movement between ~nn and a series of small, scattered villages, 
barely, if at all, covered operating costs. The intention behind this has 
alrea~ been explained, but commendable as this was a considerable advantage 
was being given to the railw~s' competitors, particularly so to the river 
navigation interests. There was "one circumstance which render(ed) this 
line of railw~ peculiar", name~ that it served an area which was "alrea~ 
well, and perhaps naturallY, supplied with the means of intercommunioation" 
in the form of rivers and drains, straight, convenient and adapted by long 
1 This and a deeply ingrained conservatism, manifested in re1uotance usage. 
to change established ways, amongst the Norfolk ana Fenland peoples made it 
imperative that the East Anglian lines should oome before the pub1io in a 
form and manner suoh as to constitute an irresistab1e impact on the 100a1 
economies. This implied strategical~ purposeful sections, a sufficiency 
of plant to deal with ever.y possible type of traffic offered, and a rational 
rates' structure. As it was the lines opened in sections without signifi-
cance, with a grossly inadequate amount of plant and with rates still the 
subject of opinion and experimentation. Then for twelve months (in the oase 
of the L & E) rail and river were allowed to exist side by side without the 
1 Herapath's second article on the East Anglian, 13th November, 1847, p.1287; 
he was speaking speoifioally of the ~nn & ~ line. 
• 
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former being able to offer a single major advantage to either farmer or 
merchant; for aqy journey of 12 miles or more at least two modes of transport 
were required, together with the additional costs and del~s arising from the 
extra handling of goods. This situation not o~ allowed the Ouae river 
interests plenty of time in which to set their house in order and prepare for 
cut rates and other methods of competition, but also permitted the locali~ 
to get used to the railw$Y without actual~ coming to use it. Thus it was 
that during 1848 the now completed L & B felt the full force of its Mnumerous 
natural competitors" with their "natural advantages" and low rates:' Bruce, 
in the February cf 1849, admitted to the fact without recognising the cause, 
but could only hope that soon "coal owners and farmers would see and find it 
2 
to their advantage to place their traffic on the line" - For some consider-
able time to come, however, they didn't, so giving rise to Bruoe's subsequent 
oomplaint of the slowness with which agricultural distriots changed their .. 
habits~ a point further developed in the directors' rep~ to the Committee of 
4 
Inquiry in the second half of 1849. 
For the second major weakness, the general inadequacy of faoilities and 
rolling stock, the directors must bear a heavy and direct share of the 
responsibility- To the latter stages of 1848 the oompa~'s operations 
presented a pathetio spectacle of poverty, unpreparedness and feebleness 
culminating in the necessity to abandon normal goods traffio in the autumn of 
1848 in order to acoommodate the harvest movement~ This was hard~ 
surprising in view of the facts. In the Februar,y of 1848 Valentine was 
1 Herapath's second article, 13th November, 1847, p.1287. 
2 Herapath, lOth March, 1849, p.254; Meeting of the 28th February. 
3 Ibid., 16th June, 1849, p.596; Meeting of the 13th June. 
4 Ibid., 17th November, 1849, p.1158. 
5 Ibid., 2nd September, 1848, p.924; Bruoe on the 30th August. 
• 
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describing additional goods accommodation at most stations as absolute~ 
essential; and it was the August before he oould announoe (the first fruits 
of Bruce's regime) the provision of suoh essential faoilities and aids to 
effeotiTe operation as an engine shed at Iqnn (engines standing in the open 
would inevita.bly require higher maintenam e oosts and be reduoed in their 
availability), goods sheds, oattle pens and sidings at Downham Market 
(supposedly to be a major source of cattle traffic), Narborough and Swattham 
(where great expense was incurred in further excavation of the chalk), of 
sidings at St.Germain, Denver, Hilgay and Sporle (the temporary terminus of 
2 
the L & D), together with extra accommodation at the harbour station. The 
1ack of such faoilities as these in praotical terms meant long del~s in 
transit and probably prolonged exposure to the weather; it is partioular1;r 
notewortqy that these additions were rendered neoessary by the miserable level 
l 
of traffio already obtaining, and this gives added point to the signifioanoe ot . 
Valentine's remark in the February of 1848 that if extra faoilities were 
provided tla very large and remuneratiTe traffio as yet wholly untouched will 
be brought upon your railways"~ But reotifioation of suoh a oompletely false 
start took time and money, neither of which the oompa~ had to spare, 80 that 
as late as the December of 1848 Herapath oould still write that so far 
. 4-
"scarcely anything appears to have been done in goods traffio"; as indioated 
something was in fact being done but maqy months must elapse before it oould 
yield a measurable return. 
Most serious of all, however, were the .A ..... deficienoies of the 
harbour branch. So grossly inadequate were faoilities and so small the 
1 Herapath, 19th Februar,y, 1848, p.200j Valentine's Report delivered on the 
16th February. 
2 Herapath, 2nd September, 1848, p.924; Valentine's Report delivered on the 
30th August. 
3 Report delivered on the 16th February, 1848. 
4- Op.oit., 30th December, 1848, p.l34B. 
• 
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wbartage space that until the latter part of 1848 no more than 50 tons could 
be handJed in a d~1 a year later the figure had risen to 400 tons~ In 
addition carts had to be used to COnTey goods between the waterfront and 
railhead at such expense that ma~ potential customers were left with no 
advantage in usitl8 the railway. The o~ real solution to this problem was 
a railbridge over the intervening River Nar near its point of entr,y into the 
OUse, but so far only a footbridge was being constructed (for the attitude of 
~nn Corporation to this see chapter 4 above), and the present day swing 
bridge was not to be installed until 1854, the same period as the valuable 
Boal Quay in close proximity to the harbour station. Meanwhile Bruoe 
t empori sed , and in the summer of 1848 succeeded in his bid to take over the 
carting establishment concerned, with a resultant saving of 1/- per ton to 
3 those who used the harbour branch. Finally, as has alrea~ been shown, the 
actual branch itself was not fit to take hea~ coal trains until the ~ of 
1848· This eased the situation but still left the bulk of the ooa1 traffio 
on the river. 
The general situation was little better as regards the rolling stock 
which was deficient in both quantity and quality. Services were commenced 
with no more than four ti~, four wheeled, locomotives, "whose quality oannot 
4 be exceeded", provided by Messrs. Sharp Brothers of Manchester. The last 
independent accounts of the L & E showed £4,029/15/7 as having been expended 
on locomotives, so indicating a cost of a round. £1,000 each. Subsequentl,y 
six more of the same type were added, all by the middle of 1849, together 
wdth an experimental light engine which was speoia~ designed to reduoe 
1 Herapath, 17th November'21~9, p.1158; Directors' Rep~ to the Committee of 
Inquir,y. Ibid • 
.3 Herapath, 2nd September, 1849, p. 925; Bruce on the 30th August. 
~ Ibid., 6th March, 1847, p.301; Directors' Report, 26th Februa~. 
1 
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running costs. The latter was not purchased until 1849, but meanwhile the 
accounts for the first part of 1848 showed a fUrther £4,607 on locomotives, 
those for the second half £4,,462. There was almost certainly' some over-
lapping here, but the figures demonstrate quite clearly the extent to which 
l.ocoJllotive costs were rising; by 1861 15" cylinder engines suoh as these were 
costing some £1,900 each together with an additional £500 for the tender~ 
hod 
!rhe result of this was that the large companies .\began to make their own 
engines, but small and poor concerns such as the East Anglian were obliged to 
go short of motive power to the direct detriment of traffic development. 
Mechanioal power was extensively supplemented both here and elsewhere by 
horse shunting at stations, but this could do little to alleviate the 
difficulties of a system that could put o~ eleven locomotives on its 62 
3 
route miles even when all were in working order. This happy circumstance 
1 
"as likely to be realised only on the rarest of occasions as reference to the . 
high expenditure on locomotive repairs and maintenance (see section 2 below) 
rill confirm. It is little wonder that services were few and poor and that 
normal freight had to be suspended to accommodate the harvest traffic in 1848. 
Admittedly no compaqy could afford to keep expensive capital equipment in 
eXcess of its known needs, but this was a case of equipping at a level far 
below the accepted potential. It was an unsound position not only because 
it prevented the proper development of traffic but because it also placed 
undue strain on the existing stud which in a~ case possessed all the defeots 
inevitable in the yet infant science of looomotive construotion. 
1 C.Langley Aldrioh, Looomotives of the Great Eastern Railway, Wiokford, Ju~, 
1955, p.37, st~tes that the E.A.R. handed 10 locomotives over to the G.E.R. 
on the amalgamation of 1862, but in Februa~, 1849 Valentine mentioned 
quite speoifioally that the oompa~ possessed 11. The discrepancy oonoern8 
the experimental engine whioh the compa~ could not afford to adopt. 
2 Head, op.oit, p.67. 
3 The Ely & Huntingdon section was worked by Eastern Counties power. 
• 
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Passenger rolling stock was initially confined to eight first class 
carriages, seven second and ten thirdl - a distribution in keeping perhapi 
with the proportion of national travel by classes, but one hardly in keeping 
2 
with the known circumstances of the area. ~ 1~9 there were 59 in all. 
These were still too few for full and completely effeotive servioes to be 
maintained. Probably it was again high costs that were at the root of the 
shortage. First class carriages were costing some £500 eaoh by this stage, 
3 
and those of the lower classes certai~ not less than £200 each; force of 
necessity was obliging all oompanies to provide "handsome and commodious 
4 vehicles", some with cushions and all with lamps, for the second class 
passenger, and since the l~ act money could no longer be saved to the same 
extent on third class conveyanoes. 
No exact figures on the number of goods vehicles in service are available 
for 1847, but in view of the general circumstances discussed and of the faot 
that "considerable additions" during 1848 a.nd '49 brought the total to 517~ 
it appears that it oan hardlY have exceeded 300 even at the most liberal 
estimate; to the 31st August, 1847 total expenditure on all kinds of rolling 
stock had been £33,572. Allowing for 30 oarriages at an average £350 eaoh 
6 
and. an average £120 for vans, wagons, horse boxes etc. the actual figure 
suggested is o~ 191 for the first part of the year at least. Once again 
the quali~ as well as the quantity m~ be held as a matter of doubt. As 
early as 1851 76 goods vehicles had to be substantially repaired, 40 bullock 
1 Herapath, 6th March, 1847, p.301; L & E meeting of the 26th Februa~. 
2 Ibid., 17th November, 1849, p.1157;4Bruoe on the 23rd August. 
3 Diokson, op.oit., p.86. Ibid., pp.81-82. 
5 Valentine on the 28th February, 1849. 
6 Fo1101t'ing Dickson, p.86 who, speaking of 1854, gives the cost as between 
£100 and £150. 
~ 
wagons repaired and substantially strenethened, and 78 other units of rolling 
Of ° d l stock mod~ ied and ~mprove • There may of course be some overlapuing in 
the se figures, but they do suggest that one fifth of the whole fleet had. to be 
renovated in one year althoueh only two to five years' old. On a total 
capital expenditure, to December, 1848, of £56,075/16/4 on rolli~ stoc~ this 
was a deep~ disturbing factor. Finally, in cond.emning the quantity of stock 
as inadequate (a situation th~t would be exacerbated by mechanical failure 
and lack of availability on the evidence given above) it is to be remembered 
that at a~ given time a substantial proportion of East Anglian stock would. 
be on 'foreign' territory - a conclusion supported by the high level of 
demurr:lge j]ayments made to the compal'\V ; it is unlikely that this absence would 
be balanced by the wagons of other companies working into the 'E.A.R., for 
inward traffic to Iornn was largely local in origin. SecondlY, to avoid 
excessive handling and to minimise the risk of theft, it was at that ti:!~e the 
2 
common practice to run small single consignment wagon load.s; this mayor may 
not have served its purpose, but it certainly wasted wagon space and contri-
buted. to exces~Jive wagon mil(l.ce for a poor return. 
Nothing, however, bore more directly on successful railway operation than 
the Speedy ir.lplel1ent<lti..on of ~ sourrl structure of t'3.tes and fares. Broad1:f 
speaking the achievement of such derived from the empirical art of discovering 
what rate each class of traffic would bear, and, by offering reduced rates, 
bringing in the lowest possible strata of traffic that could be carried at an 
operational profit. With these had to be reconciled. d.ec i.s i.ons on the basis 
of freight charges, for example whether to plaoe prime emphasis on wagon space 
1 Herapath, 19th Maroh, 1851, p.340; Meeting of the 7% Preference Shareholuers 
~.!arch, 1851. 
2 Cf.Lewin, Early British R:dlwa;ys and Kirkaldy & 1vans, op.cit. p.34. 
Addenda. to rage 266 
The top paraeraph should ends 
••••• when a.cting as carriers in their own right~ 
Footnote 3 should oontinues 
•• subject only,from l845,to the "Maxirrrum Rates Clause" which laid down 
that oompanies acting as carriers in their own right must charge "something 
less" than the aggregate tolls (i.e.use of the road,use of carriages and 
for the provision of locomotive power) they could demand from a third party 
carrier for each service separately (cf.W.T.JackmanJThe Development of 
Transportation in Modern England,l962 ed.,pp576f.). not until after 1854 
were fixed maximum rates for the companies as the carriers regularly 
enforced. 
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occupied, the need of handling or :l.ctual weight, and the eff~cts of lines, and 
rivers etc., in competition (e.g. a rival r:li,sht h[;.ve a shorter route so that 
L reduced milage rate might have to be considered from certsin localities or 
for specific items of traffic). But in the end local economic circumstances 
had to be the arbiter, for only trunk routes, free from an~y kind of 
1 
cOr!lpetition, could char~e ·:.ith impunity. Companies were left .... Iith 0. fr.irly 
free hG-nd in that Parlia.ment did little more in the individual acts of 
incor:;:>or~~tion than lay down the maximum charges which the companies -;:ere 
2 
entitled to "dem~md o.nd receive for the use of the RG.ilway"; the cost of 
conveyance and terminal charges were in effect left to the discretion of the 
3 
companies. 
By and lurge, by 1846 the general principles leading to success had been 
recognised. Sir Samuel Morton Peto told the Select Comnittee of that ye~r 
4 
on Rnilway Acts Enactments: 
"I urn at present constructing a line in an agricultural district and 
in conversation with the directors have told them several times that 
unless they make their rates of fares upon the line ve~ low they will 
eet scr.rcely any trasfic; if they put it as low as we did between 
Norwich and Yarmouth they will have a very large traffic, but not 
otherwise." 
More succinctly Robert Stephenson told the same committce~ 
"You increase your income by diminishing your fares to a certain 
point, and beyond that point if you go on diminishing your fares 
you diminish your income." 
1 Acworth, op.cit. p.28. 
2 Quoted from the E.A.R.Ama1gamation Act, 10 & 11 Vic.c.cclxxv, 22nd J~ 1847. 
3 Parliament in fact considered the carriage of passengers and goods as 
analogous to carriage by road, i.e. by a third party. In that companies 
becrune carriers of their ovm accord they were in effect left with a 
completeJ.y free hand. 
4 Minutes of Evidence, p.242; quoted by Morrison, op.cit. p.28 fn. 
5 The return fares for the round journey of 40 miles between Norwich and 
Yarmouth v:ere in fact 3/6 first class, 2/6 second and 1/3 thin"! - this in 
6 1845· 
Also quoted by Morrison, op.cit. p.28 fn. 
W. 
!he principles were clear enough, but their imDlementation demanded courage 
and a high degree of sensitivity to the local economic pulse. In a~ 
structure flexibility was the prime prerequisite. Another aspect, appertain-
ing particular~ to freight traffic, was a wide diversity of classes to ensure 
that each class of traffic could be carried at economic rates - a well known 
example of this is the difference between the space and handling involved in 
1 
the movement of baled hay and the same weight of loose hay. In this, it may 
be said, the East Anglian was awake to the situation for its Rates Book was a 
2 fUl~ comprehensive document; others were not so aware of the situation, for 
in 1852, for example, the London & North Western Railway could contain its 
3 
divisions within a two page booklet. 
Evidence as regards the implementation of these principles during the 
ear~ years of the East Anglian's operations is scanty, but points to a 
somewhat inhibited recognition. To its credit the compa~ adopted a policy 
4 
of moderate fares as 1ike~ to bring in the most money, and made ear~ use of 
the cheap excursion train, the first such, running to London, on the 12th 
June, 1848 with between 400 and 500 passengers packed into 17 carriages. 
Allowed for normal service trains to charge maxima of 3d., 2d. and l~. per 
mile to each of the classes for the use of the line, the all inclusive levels 
for 1848 stood at 2~., lid. and lid., so being in line with the rates of the' 
5 
Eastern Counties system. The question arises, however, were these rates 
really sufficiently low. A rise in first class travel was reported in 1849 
with the additional comment that the directors had favoured this class from 
1 See Pratt, op.cit. p.122. 
2 See the 184.7 edition in private collection in King's IQrnn, a.nd Appendix I. 
3 Pratt, op.cit. p.182. 
4 Herapath, 6th November, 1847, p.1287; Lacy on the 3rd November. 
5 Ibid. 
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the first. The disproportionate provision of first class accommodation in 
the initial carriage fleet mentioned above lends fUrther weight to the 
suggestion. Moreover, there is no mention at this stage of the reduced rate 
market tickets which were to prove so successful in later years. This 
relative lack of courage implied above arose orobably from [1 variety of 
causes. The first was the not uncommon and lingering conception that the 
railways were a dignified replacement of the stage coaches and therefore 
orimarily for the benefit of the upper classes. A second nossibility is that 
the high cost of first class carriages involved a certain degree of subsidisa-
tion from the two lower levels. In the third place e cut in fare levels at 
a time when the overall financial situation was so grave nrobably called for 
more courage and prescience than even Bruce possessed. Last of all, linked 
\',ith the previous suggestion, was possibly a very understandable reluctance 
to abandon the picture created by the 1844 estimates of huge passenger returns. 
The estimates seemed to have envisaged pa.cked trains with the occupants paying 
an average 2d. per mile. But, as early as the July of 1~5, Pares, the same 
traffic expert enlisted by the L & D and the L & E, had told Committee X on 
the Cambridge & Lincoln line that an estimated average of 9 pA.ssengers per 
carriage in an agricultural area was too high and that 7 would be nearer the 
2 
reality. Moreover, fares in 1844 had been generally higher than they were by 
l848~ Finally, the estimates had been made without taking into account the 
'Parliamentary Trains' required by Gladstone's Act of 1844. These involved 
at least one train a day over each section of line on which the third class 
fnre was no more than ld. per mile. Such trains were exempt from the traffic 
1 2 Herapath, 27th August, 1849; Traffic Report by Mr.Pares on the 23rd August. 
~nn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 28th June, 1845. 
3 Herapath, 6th November, 1847, p.1287; Laoy in I'lnswer to a shAreholder's 
question on the 3rd November. 
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tax, but where, as in this cp.se ,70rking expenses were so very high they 
could represent a source of loss, both in themselves and. as a rival to the 
other services where the third class fare, subject to tax as part of the 
general 5% levy on receipts, was l~. per mile. 
The three major reasons for the East Anglian's failure to make a decisive 
impact have now been discussed; two more remain. Of these the first, the 
effects of neighbouring lines in drawing off traffic, is incapable of exact 
definition for simple lack of aqy precedents to form a basis of comparison. 
It must be assumed that the W,Ymondham line took a substBntial share of central 
Norfolk trade before the L & D reached Dereham, but nothing more definite can 
be said. The question of formal relationships with neighbouring companies 
was still one that had to be broached. Discussions on the dovetailing of 
services, the division of through bookings and the acceptance of the other t 8 
trains were bound eventual~ to bring ve~ considerable benefits to the East 
Anglian and its area, but the consequences of their absence are impossible to 
define. In fact, to the end of 1848 the matter had received no serious 
attention at all and fair~ easy and unquestioning relationships would seem to 
have developed with the neighbouring companies at Dereham, E~ and Wisbeoh. 
Not until the E.A.R. fell foul of the E.C.R. by seeking to lease itself to the 
Great Northern Railwsy did aqy serious issues arise; then, after the E.C.R. 
refused through bookings and placed other frustrnting obstacles in the w~ 
of the ~nn lines, formal agreements did become necess~. 
Finally a word should be said of the station sites, of which full details 
are provided in ATJnendix J. In that the East Anglian lines had followed the 
typical Victorian pattern of going by the straightest line possible between 
termini maqy of these were ill situated from the viewpoint of the villages 
270 
they nominal~ served. This was particular~ true of the Wisbech branch 
where there was the additional difficulty that several of the approach roads 
were so bad as to be impassable for cart traffic during the winter months~ 
Furthermore, with the exceotions of Downham Market and SW8.ffham, none of the 
intermediate stations had a~ significance as meeting ~oints between streams 
of traffic. These points would h["ve mattered little if the concept of the 
cross country trunk route had been developed, but in the ;,bsence of this they 
became a major handicap. 
The foregoing section seeks to explain the initial traffic failure to the 
December of 1848. It will have been observed, howeVer, that there W?s 
nothing permanent in the situation. Iqnn Harbour was to be improved, the 
depression would end, and energetic management could put matters to rights 
within the compa~. 
Section 2: The Working Expenses 
That working expenses during this ~eriod should in all probability 
constitu~ some 85% or more of receipts was not in itself an intrinsic weakness; 
the real cause of anxiety was the low traffic return. About half the 
expenses of railway operation result from the traffic as a whole, and are 
fixed and unavoidable. Beyond that point expenses do not rise in proportion 
to increased traffic. In fact it has been estimated that if it costs £X to 
2 
move y traffic units, £3x will be expended in moving 5y. This general 
considerc.tion, however, does not preclude the possibility that money wes 
wasted in opel~ation, and it is i'.:ith this aspect that the present section must 
be concerned. 
1 Bruce on the 23rd August, 1849. During 1849 the comn["~ took [l mnjor p~rt 
in the impc'ovement of the Fen roads. 
2 Sir W.M.Acworth; Element~ of H.~ilw8y Bconomics, rev.ed.,Oxforo, lQ32, p.54f. 
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Only one det~iled stc>tement of operrtionnl exren:iture ,.~ s issued during 
the period under review. It concerned the second half of 1848 and read as 
follo"IS: 
1 
3xpenditure to be set f1painst rev:znue, 1st Juq, 1848 t~tA~~ember, 1348 : 
Repairs to pennanent way 
tinges of the locomotive department 
Coke, coals, oil, taJ.low, grease, turps., waste 
white lead 
Repair and alter(!tion of rolling stock 
Clerks, porters, euards, police, gatekeepers, 
point smen etc. 
S::tlaries; viz. mflnagement, audit officers, and 
proportion of secreta~'s and accountant's 
offices 
Passenger Duty 
Rates and taxes 
Gas and water rent 
Compensp.tion 
Printing and stationery 
Travelling and genera.l eXDenses, postage, petty 
disbursements 
Stores and wages at Harbour Branch 
Cartage 
Balance 
Total working expenses 
Specia.l Notes: 
2 
£ 
1,477 
1,114 
2,784-
647 
2,972 
748 
418 
232 
54 
25 
542 
94 
1 ... 83 
239 
7,134-
£18,968 
£11,8.2~ 
s d 
0 10 (A~ 10 11 (B 
1 4 
14 5 (c) 
5 9 (D) 
6 5 (E) 
6 11 (F) 
8 5 
11 4 
6 9 (G) 
6 5 
17 1 
1 1 
3 7 (H) 
6 8t 
7 lIt 
1 2 
A: It has been estimated that at this time the cost of replacing one mile of 
track, after allowing for the scrap value of the old rails, was £300. The 
accounts show no realisation of such scrap value, and the figure quoted for 
repairs therefore may be taken as representing the eguivalent of some three 
miles of renewal, or roughlY 4% of the actual track tallowing for double 
lines) in use at the beginning of the half year. The uniform construction 
of the locomotives and the low level of treffic tend to preclude the 
possibility that this was because of the need, experienced on ma~ lines 
elsewhere, for heavier track, and confirm the earlier Argument that some 
at least of the original construction was defective in quality. 
1 As presented to the shareholdel'S at the meeting of the 28th February, 1849. 
2 As by L<~>rdner, op.cit. pp.43f. 
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B. ProportionRllY the wages of the locomotive department are subst2ntiallY 
higher than those of any other, so providing an indication of the nremium on 
skilled Ip.bour in an area such as this - for further consideration see below., 
C: See the urevious section for comment on the high level of exnenditure on the 
renair a~d alteration of rolling stock at this earlY stage of the company's 
hi~tory. It is also to be remembered that heavy expenditure on locomotive 
reoairs had been improperly charged to the capital account; the extremely 
limited availability of the locomotives is indicated by the fact that for 
the oueration of eleven locomotives there were only 5 drivers and 5 firemen 
(see below). 
D: It is to be assumed that the police in this list were ?ctual1y the signalmen. 
E: The reference to the proportions is further evidence of the unreliability of 
these accounts as a true representation of working costs. 
F: Passenger Duty was levied at the rate of 5% on gross passenger receipts, but 
after excluding the revenue from the ld. per mile 'Parliamentary Trains'. 
Passenger receipts as a whole had yielded £lO,749/17/4~; the duty paid when 
multiplied by 20 gives a figure of £8,366/18/4. It therefore follows that 
the yield from the 'Parliamentary Trains' was £2,483/l9/~, so indicating 
(although having to ignore the possibility of half fares) the equivalent of 
590,160 passenger miles. Overall this is a low proportion, and may be taken 
as further confirmation of the acute poverty of the agricultural labourers 
of the area, as well as partial justificntion of the directors' declared 
preference for the upper class travellers. 
G: This reference to compensation remains an obscure matter; it ~robably refers 
to the provision of free coal to those who had rights on Pentney Common, 
although it m~ be a belated reference to the death by running down of the 
Watlington gatekeeper during 1846. The former is to be preferred, as the 
Thomas Mickleson involved in the latter contributed to his own death by 
iIDfudentlY hurrying across the line to be at his post before the train came 
u~. 
H: As the carting establishment to provide conveyance between ship and railhead 
had only recently been acquired this item could be expected to rise in 
subsequent accounts. 
Items in the general contexts of wages and administration provide the 
most direct suggestions of unnecessarily large expenditure. "Erroneous ideas 
2 
of the future traffic" having been entertained by Lacy, the lire s were 
initially heavily over-staffed, although the intention of training employees is 
1 See Parliamentary Papers, 1847 (240), lxiii.183, 'A Return of the NUmber and 
Nature of Accidents, 1st July to the 31st December, 1846'. 
2 Herapath, 17th November, 1849, p.1159; Directors' Reply to the Committee of 
Inquiry. 
= 
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to be recalled. The following table affords a striking comparison between 
the periods of liberal hopes and expenditure and of the subsequent realistic 
1 
econoIItY'. 
Staff Returns of the East Anglian Compaqr at various dates between May, 1~7 
and June, 1851 
N.B. The first column gives a composite total for the L & E and the L & D. 
1st May, 1847 1st May, 1848 30th June. 1851 
Secretarie s 1 1 2 
Managers 2 
Engineers 1 1 
Superintendants 3 8 
Storekeepers 1 1 1 
Accountants 3 3 1 
Draftsmen 10 2 
Clerics 20 28 36 
Foremen 1 1 2 
Drivers 4 5 5 
Firemen 4 5 5 Guards 2 6 5 Art:if'icers 42 26 19 
Switchmen 3 7 2 
Police 9 36 2 
Porters 11 27 50 Messengers 1 2 
Platelayers 2 37 16 
Labourers 59 133 81 
Inspectors or Timekeepers 
-
-1t 
-
TOTALS 177 331 231 
Stations open 8 22 24 
Route miles open 211 56 67 
AverDge staff per mile 8 6 ~ 
National Figures (1841 for Great Britain and Ireland. 1848 and 1851 for 
E!!filand and Wale s ) 
Route milage 3,305t 4,252 5,200 
Stations open 1,040 1,321 1,669 
Staff employed 47,218 52,688 51,979 
Avera~e ~r mile 14- 12 
.2. 
1 Returns of the NUmber and Description of Persons employed on each of the 
Rai1woys in England. and Wales, Accounts & Papers, 1847 (579 )lxiii.101; 
1849 (249),li.101; 1852 (153),x1viii.395. 
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There need be no surprise that both local and national averages should 
decline over the period illustrated. This is simp~ a reflection of economdes 
that became obvious with experience of operation, and of the fact that office 
and general administrative staffs need not increase in direct proportion to 
actual extensions of milage. The 5Q% or more discrepancy between the East 
Anglian and the national figures in turn reflects the nature of the line on 
which traffic was light and where there was no call for large terminal 
stations and extensive goods' depots. The opposite obtained in the case of 
such a compaqr as the London & North Western Railway, which, in 1861, empl~­
ed 10,266 men to operate 360 route miles, an average of 28 per mile~ The 
1847 and 1848 figures are also part~ inflated by the overlap in some cases 
between actual operating staff and those engaged partially in construction~ 
This is seen in the East Anglian in the sharp decline between 1848 and 1851 
in the employment of artificers, superintendants, platelayers and labourers, 
a trend foreshadowed in individual classes (especial~ draftsmen) during the 
previous twelve months; in fact the engineer's department was reduced by 5~ 
during the January and February of 1848~ 
There are, however, certain features whioh suggest a most definite lack 
of positive econo~. Most obvious is a top-heavy hierarcqy of administratio~ 
as exemplified by the continued existence of the original three compa~ 
offices in ~nn, a situation persisting until at least the end of 1850. To 
the close of that year effective control was in the hands of a clumsy 
1 Head, op.cit. p.1l2. 
2 Accounts & Papers, 1847 (579),lxiii.10l, show, for example, that on the 1st 
May, 1847 the E & H was employing 1 engineer, 1 superintendant and. 1 
inspector alongside the contractors' men, the L & D 1 engineer, 1 superin-
tendant and 7 inspectors, the L & E 2 engineers, 1 clerk, 30 artificers, 
20 labourers and 5 inspectors. Some of these are not included in the above 
returns, e.g. the engineers, but others especial~' the artificers, certainlY 
were. 
3 Herapath, 19th February, 1848, p.200; Announced on the 16th February. 
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hierarchy comprising 5 directors, 3 heads of department, an engineer, a 
1 manager and a secretary, all for 67 route miles of line, of which 5 were in aqy 
case operated by another compa~. With this divided responsibility effective 
and economical operation must have been a virtual impossibili~. It is not 
surprising to find that with the appointment of the experienced Wentworth Clay 
as General Manager in 1849, following the dismissal of his predecessor in the 
2 December of 1848, that considerable economies were effected. The 1851 list 
of staff gives some idea of where there had been waste in previous years. 
The axe fell heavi~ on the higher officers of the compa~ as control was 
centralised and simplified. At the lower levels reductions were made in 
eve~ possible way, and it would seem that as plate13yers and labourers and 
their families alrea~ aoted as gatekeepers, now porters' duties were extended 
to signalling and other responsibilities hitherto performed by the now much 
diminished police. 
The wages paid by the compaIij" cannot be directly ascertained, but there is 
a very interesting letter of 1850, the subject of extensive editorial comment 
3 in Herapath's Journal, whioh proposed a reduction from 19/- to 17/- per week. 
The clas~es in receipt of the 19/- rate were not specified, but it m$Y be 
reasonably assumed that it referred particularly to the skilled artifioers, 
enginemen and. to perhaps a minority of the clerks. The overall picture 
emerging from the accounts is that over the six month period £4,835/3/1 was 
paid in wages to approximately 300 men, an individual average of £13 or just 
10/- per week. The figure can only be a rough estimate as this WRS a period 
of progressive staff reductions, and as an undisclosed amount of the wage and 
~ Herapath, 3rd August, 1850, p.752; letter of 'Veritns'. 
Ibid., 19th November, 1849, p.1159; Directors' Reply to the Committee of 
3 Inquiry. 
Ibid., 15th December, 1849; Letter of 'Inquirer'. 
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salary payments derived from the-capital account. However, the average 
suggests a week~ wage for the unskilled classes of between 8/- and 9/- per 
week, a sum entire~ commensurate with the local agricultural labourers' rate. 
The higher rate belonged to the skilled minority, and reflected the difficul-
ties experienced in obtaining such men in an area so far removed from the 
great mining and industrial centres, this being especially true at a time when 
the mushroom growth of railways placed a high premium on stilled engineering 
labour of all kinds. That this higher rate had obtained from the outset is 
largely confirmed by Herapath's own comments: "As to a man's living better now 
on 17/- a week than formerly on 19/- a week, we doubt it much", for "if 17/-
will do they should never have paid 19/-"~ Herapath resisted the proposal to 
cut wages, arguing that it was better to reduce staff, and to the remainder 
2 
"pay so that the men can live, and have something to live for". In this he 
was at one with the very experienced Head of the London & North Western who 
later was to deccribe cheap materials and discontented workers as the worst of 
all menaces to the safe and profitable operation of a railw~~ It is to the 
credit of Bruce and the reformed board that they apnear to have recognised the 
truth of this principle and acted accordingly. 
One other aspect of operational costs wort~ of brief discussion is that 
of fuel consumption by the locomotives. This was a matter that throughout 
the latter part of 1848 and 1849 considerab~ exercised the directors. 
AntiCipating large and heavy trains Lacy had boasted of the 15" cylinder 
locomotives obtained, claiming that the compa~ had been enabled to "profit 
from the experience of others"~ But, when the actual level of traffic had 
1 Herapath's editorial commenting on2 'Inquirer's' letter in the same issue, 3 15th December, 1849. Ibid. 
Head, op.cit. p.l48. ~ Meeting of the 3rd November, 1847. 
- ill 
revealed itself, Bruce was left wishing for 9" and 10" cylinders as a means 
of fuel econo~, although he also held that the resultant saving would not be 
1 
as great as some imagined. Consumption of coke (coal was only permitted by 
law in the raising of steam) was probab~ at the rate of some 16 lbs. per mile 
(compare 35.8 lbs. during 1848 on the Great Western, 34.6 lbs. on the London 
2 & North Western in the June of 1849, in both cases the trains being much 
heavier and the terrain less favourable than on the East Anglian) as a 5Q% 
saving was claimed in respect of Messrs. George England & Coys. new light 
engine, introduced experimenta1~ on the Wisbech branch in 1849 and consuming 
8 lbs. of fuel to the mile (including steam raising), an amount that could be 
further reduced by structural a1terations~ It would seem, however, that the 
cost of buying this engine outweighed its merits, for after the initial 
publicity no more w~s heard of it. Speed was a relevant factor, but as the 
trains probably averaged no more than 25 m.p.h. or so, (the national averages 
for 1848 showed the normal speed of passenger trains to be an average 30 m.p.h. 
4 
and the average weight 75 tons) and as, in view of the traffic receipts the 
trains were very light in weight, the potential saving to be realised by 
reduction could only have been marginal in extent. An indignant shareholder 
did in fact write that excessive speeds were much to blame for the working 
costs being so high, but as he proposed substituting horses for the locomo-
tives his concept of speed may justly be questioned~ On the whole, having 
inherited the large cylinder engines, the later boards did all they possibly 
could in the circumstances when, in September, 1849 they installed, and 
contracted for the working of, 24 coking ovens near tl~ coal depot; 
1 2 Herapath, 24th August, 1850; meeting of the 21st August. 
3 Lardner, op.cit. p.72. 
De~cribed by Valentine at the meeting of the 28th February, 1849. 
4 Lardner, op.cit. p.43f. 
5 Herapath, 3rd Au/jUst, 1850, p.752; letter of 'Veritasl. 
k 
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throughout, in keeping with the general practice of the time, considerable 
econo~ was realised by the extensive adoption of horse shunting. 
Final~, a word should be said as to the effect of various external 
impositions levied on all railway companies of the time. Local rating 
assessments were such that railway companies paid an average of £12/10 per 
1 
employee as opposed to the average £1/10 per worker over the whole country. 
Indeed, in some parishes the railways were assessed for as much as 8~ of the 
rate levy despite the contributions they made to employment and prosperity~ 
All that companies could do was appeal against their assessments, but few 
could hope to be as fortunate as the Eastern Counties which made a formal 
appeal against an £800 per mile assessment imposed in the parish of 
Sawbridgeworth and had the figure reduced to £300, £100 less than it had been 
3 before. As the accounts show the East Anglian felt the pressure as all 
others, and in 1849 went as far as presenting a futile petition to Parliament 
asking for "the revision of the law relating to the rating of railw~s". 
As for the iniquitous 5% duty on gross receipts, like ratee levied without 
regard to the ability to p~, it is suffioient to paraphrase the words of the 
contemporary Francis who complained that this 5% was the sum paid for the 
4-privilege of increasing the country's commeroial prosperity. Any argument 
that it served to control dividends is superfluous, for if this was the case 
the tax could have been levied selective~. The real extent of the dual 
burden, however, can be proper~ illustrated only in figures. 
1 Scrivenor, op.cit. p.19. 
2 Pratt, op.cit. p.50. 
3 The case was reported at length in the ~nn Advertiser & West Norfolk 
Herald during the course of 184-8. 
4- Op.cit., Vol.2, p.4-8. 
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279 1 Government Duty and Rates and Taxes paid by certain companies duri!Y!j 1848: 
Duty Rates and Taxes 
£ s d £ s d 
East Anglian Railway 722 19 6 321 9 ~ 
Eastern Counties Railway 16,817 5 1 24,754 3 8 
Midland Railwa;y 23,043 10 5 33,125 13 2 
York & North Midland 7,092 14- 1 13,960 18 2 
Great Western Railwa;y 29,603 18 8 38,555 5 2 
London & North Western 50,505 8 
° 
58,649 15 10 
Proportionally the E.A.R. may be seen to have fared better thnn some, but the 
£1,050 represented here could have been well employed by the struggling 
company. 
Section 3: The Construction Period and the Local EconoD\Y 
In that the areas under consideration lacked iron and engineering 
industries the effects of construction on the local econo~ were inevitab~ 
small and mai~ confined to the question of labour supnlies. It is of 
course essential to keep the whole matter in proper perspective, for all the 
factors involved affected in the main on~ narrow areas of land within the 
immediate vicinity of the actual lines; this remains true even when consider-
ing the movement of the labour forces engaged. 
Little that is conclusive CRn be said of ~nn Harbour. It has already 
been stated that a condition of contract for the delive~ of the railwa;y 
materials was that such must come through the harbour there, and at the same 
time materials for other lines (e.g. the Norwich & Brandon) were coming 
through there as a matter of convenience, but at the sp.me time the volume of 
business in the harbour was declining as a consequence of the national 
depression and of the cheaper and more direct conveyance offered by the new 
inland railways through Peterborough. An examination of the apnronriate 
1 F' f '~gure5 rom Scrivenor, op.cit. p.19. 
s 
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figures for the period allows fOr no other comment than that the influx of 
railway materials served as a temporary compensation in what otherwise would 
have been a period of dramatio decline. 
Year Coals im}orted Other imports ARi Vessels registered Arrivals 
8X!Hu,.e (Tons) in runn & Seamen (Lof-ded) (Tons 
1845 302,463 141,935 157 881 2,841 
1846 208,392 120,468 154 844 2,171 
1847 264,671 107,948 172 958 2,493 
1848 232,831 82,386 177 987 2,037 
Source: Admiralty Preliminary Inquiry into the Norfolk Estuary Bill, April, 
1849 Appendix 4, p.64; for 'Arrivals', Appendix 5, p.65. 
The effect of the railways is best seen in the first two columns. The quite 
extraordinary figure of imports for 1845 has been discussed in n previous 
oontext but it is to be noted that after a sharp drop in 1846, the 1~7 
figure (that is for the year in which the L & E was fully opened and the 
L & D extended) is above the average of 241,422 tons per annum for the whole 
1 
period from 1841 to 1848. The demands of locomotives both on the ~nn lines 
and elsewhere is the only factor that can explain this in viev! of the reduced 
demand oonsequent upon both local agricultu~al depression and general nationel 
de!)ression. Thereafter, however, the total declined in terms of the general 
2 trend until in 1854 no more than 172,589 tons were imported. The decisive 
factor had of course been the opening of the Great Northern Railway in 1850 
(that is to London; the Peterborough - Lincoln loop ha.d been ODen since 
Octob~r, 1848, and the direct Retford line since 1852) which the rate reduc-
tions of the rater interes ts had done little to offset. !\:ore clel',rly still 
is the pattern to be seen in the second column. Unlike coal the railw~y iron 
and timber required in such 1arge C]unntities during 1~6 am '47 did not 
~ Hillen, op.cit. p.606; 0lso Lacy to the shareholders in Februnry, 1848. 
Ibid. 
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represent n continuous der.w.nd.-The 184-8 figure, a decrellse of 4-57~ on thrct 
of only three years previously, speaks for itself. Paradoxically, however, 
the munber of ships registered at LylUl Ilctual1y incre" sed. It can only be 
nsc;umed that in a very difficult period for the owners of co[' st~l shi!'l:.ing 
such were seeking the comfort and security tho.t could follow the Norfolk 
Estuary works and the declared policy of Bruce that the East Ansli:o.n was 
1 
intending to do everything in its power to pottract tr8de through the harbour. 
In other llirections some positive benefit is more e~sy to discern. 
Fine llew lodges at such places [1S Nf'rborough, I.riddleton 900 Beechamwel1 
(clearly dated 1846) along the L & D route clearly sugGest one use found for 
the Innd compensation paid to local landown~'rs. Thot such W3S 21so a fe.ctor 
in the era of ':1iSh Farming' so soon to follow h8 s r-.lrendy been sugGested. 
That it also led to increased domestic esbblishmcnts is :: probability that 
cannot be demonstrated. To Lynn Corporation the compensation extorted came 
as a positive lifesaver, more than offsetting the decline in H""rbour Dues 
2 
(£1+,211/14/3 in l8l!-5 to £3,2"20/9/0 in 1848) that accompanied falling trade. 
WIth the .£21,000 gained from the compaIliY a £10,000 bond. debt was discharGed, 
£4.,000 invested in Norfolk Estuary Bonds, £1,393/13/8 invested. in the purchase 
of new lams, and £3,039 in the construction of a neVi Corn Exchange. Further 
sums were expended. in grants to local schools and churches, the extension of' 
St. James' Cemetary, the rebuilding of Framlingham almhouses and the 
3 
decoration of the Assembly Rooms. Grants were also made towards the Great 
Exhibition and. to the establishment of ~ Telegrn~h Office in Lynn. In short 
the Corporation was enabled by its release from the uayment of debt interest 
1 
2 Sec the Directors' Report delivered at the meeting of 24th Auf,Ust, 1845. 
Admiralty Preliminary Inquiry into the Norfolk Estuary Bill, 1849, 
3 Allcnchx 5, ).65· 
See [! s the principal source, the Guild ilnll Book, 17th September, 1846, 
p.806. 
I 
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to expand its )urc;lasing povler, increase its income further by investment, 
and in general escage from its difficulties, all without the imposition of a~ 
,'-' ddi tionr~,l local levie s. In this narrow sense the character of Lynn life 
was changed. In a wider sense the construction of the railways began a 
:->rocess which was within a few years to alter the structure of the town's 
society beyond all recognition, and cause, by the mid-1850s, the older 
1 
inhabitants to give up "all idea of a future close corporation". In a 
2 
double sense the East Anglian "breached the town walls" and destroyed the 
former exclusive and self contained atmosphere. In the first plA,ce the 
compalJiY made Ii;rnn reedily accessible and was soon to lead to 2.n influx of 
straIlbers of A.l1 kinds. In the second instance the construction of the 
railways was something that ~nn could not achieve of its own resources. 
Thus, from the very outset of the constructional process entered with their 
families a growing stream of engineers and skilled mechanics, draftsmen and 
others versed in occupations hitherto virtual~ unrepresented in ~nn. With 
them too came an influx of the labouring class to find employment on the 
railways. ',Vith the completion of these tnere W:'IS the Norfolk Estuary Cut to 
provide further work and further incentive to come into the town. The extent 
of the incursion is to be gauged from the fact that between 1841 and 1851 
the population of ~nn rose from the 16,039 of the former year to the 19,148 
of the latter1 in all probability the figure for 1848 would have been even 
1 ~nn Advertiser & West Norfolk Hernld, 24th February, 1872; Memories of 
~nn - a reprint of a lecture delivered in 1858 by W.Armes. 
2 Ibid. 
3 An interesting footnote in the 1851 Census Report (note 'h', u.57 of the 
Divisional Index) reported that the establishment of the rail~ay terminus 
had caused a great increase in the popUlation of sub-division F~ng's Lynn 
Middle since 1841, nDme~ from 5,652 to 7 ,041~. 
------~-------.-.-.. 
283:1. 2 
higher as then the two major works involved in the increase overlapped. 
The increase, however, was not permanent, for by 1861 the population was down 
to 15,981 and slight~ lower than it had been in 1841. If the increase were 
not to be permanent, however, the same could not be said for its effects. 
It had in fact broken down for ever the exclusive system of social castes on 
which ~nn society had for so ma~ centuries been based. The railways and 
their construction thus let a breath of fresh air into the town and rendered 
it more able to adjust itself to the changes which the railw~s and the 
decline of the harbour had brought. In the meanwhile, of course, local 
3 builders and tradesmen flourished as never before. 
A detailed study of the labour question on the ~nn lines is worthy of 
attention not only because of its importance to one of the main themes of 
this work, but also because of the light it sheds on an important aspect of 
national history. The mlmbers actual~ engaged on the construction of the 
4 East Anglian lines as on the 1st May, 1847 were as follows. 
1 J.J.Coulton, Memories of ~nn, ~nn Advertiser & West Norfolk Herald, 20th 
November, 1880, states that all observers were agreed that the coincidence 
2 of the two works during this decade explains the rise in population entirely. 
Possible confirmation of a higher figure still in the intermediate years 
comes from the comparative figures of houses for 1841 and 1851. In the 
former there were 3,422 of which 193 stood empty, but in the latter 4,028 
of which 148 were unoccupied at the time of the census. It is unlikely that 
so ma~ new houses would have been built without the certainty that th~ 
would be occupied without a long del~. 
3 For full discussion of these matters see chapter 9 below. 
4 Accounts & Papers, 1347 (579) lxiii-10l; A Return of the Numbers and 
Descriptions of Persons employed in England and Wales, Scotland and Ireland 
respectively on the 1st Day of May 1347. 
-" 
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Compal'\Y Length Involved Employed by Employed by Total 
Company Contr:'.ctors 
E&H 4t miles 3 329 332 
Aver~ge: 74 men per mile. 
Of the contractor's men 97 were skilled artificers, the rest labourers. 
LC'eE 22* miles 58 2,946 3,004 
Average: 136 men per mile. 
Of the contractor's men 287 were skilled, the rest labourers. 
L & D 17* miles 9 2,177 2,186 
Average: 128 men per mile. 
Of the contractor's men 165 were skilled, the rest labourers. 
N.B. The rituation on the L & D line may be compared with that of the 1st May, 
1848 when the total employed on 17 miles 60 chains had dropped to 922, 
including 128 artificers; overall this represented an nverage of no more 
than 54 men per mile, a restriction enforced by financial stringency and 
explaining in part wl'\Y the last stages of the line took so long to 
complete. 
Interesting comparisons m~ be made with certain statistics on a national 
2 basis. 
Date 
1st May, 1847 
1st May, 1848 
1849 
1850 
Miles under 
construction 
6,455 
2,958 
1,540 
864 
Total men 
employed 
256,509 
188,177 
103,816 
58,884 
Average 
per mile 
39 
64-
69 
68 
In all 190,000 were turned off railw~ works between May, 1847 and the end of 
1850~ The first and most obvious conclusion to be drawn from the comparison 
of averages is that the East Anglian constituents employed too mal'\Y men 
especially in view of the easy terrain on which they had to work. The 
1 Accounts & Papers, 1849 (249) li-lOl. 
2 The figures for 1847 and 1848 are derived from the same returns as above, 
those for 1849 and 1850 from the Report of the Commissioners for Railw~s 
1850, p.ix. The figures given are in striking contrast to that of 107 
cited by Francis (op.cit.Vol.2, p.152) and repeated by Jeaffreson & Pole 
(op.cit. p.209). ~ 
3 Report of the Commissioners ~ Railw~s 1850, p.ix. 
~ 
difficulties over bridges might explain the situation on the L & E, but 
virtual~ the same average aupears for the L & D on which there were no major 
constructional difficulties. It would therefore seem that in their eagerness 
to have the lines opened the directors and contractors defeated their own ends 
by the employment of labour forces so large as to contribute directlY and 
1 
sUbstantiallY to the latters' financial difficulties. Of course the fact 
that a large proportion of the work on the L & E and the L & D lines had to be 
done in the winter should be considered, but the effect of this was perhaps 
not so great as might be supposed. Chawella, a railway contractor, told a 
Parliamentary Committee that none were turned off in the winter because it was 
the winter~ for, indeed, except for brickwork "the frost is rather favourable~ 
Shortness of light waS at all times a handicap, but the 1055 of work from bad 
weather was only fractional: " •• in the summer months we consider that on 
average our men make perhaps 21 days or perhaps 22 days in a month; in the 
4 
winter months it will be from 17 to 18 days a month." After making every 
allowanoe for the extreme~ bad weather encountered, however, it still remains 
impossible to reconcile the discrepancy between the looal and national 
averages. 
Excluding the E & H section it would therefore seem reasonable to assert 
that between September, 1846 and the opening of the L & E some thirteen months 
later there would be about 5,000 workers of all kinds employed on the railw~s 
and within easy reach of King's Iornn; between October, 1847 and the opening of 
the Wisbech branch in the February of 1848 the number would decline, perhaps 
1 The oontractors perhaps felt the implied pressure of the contract clause 
noted in a previous section to the effect that if in the judgement of the 
company insufficient labour was being employed, then the compa~ would 
employ the required amount and deduct the cost from the balance of the 
2 contract sum still held. 
Select Committee on Railway Acts Enactments, 1st Report, Minutes of Evidenoe 
3 Q.96l. 
Ibid. Q.962. 4 Ibid. Q.963. 
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to 3,000, and thereafter, to t~September of 1848 and the completion of the 
L & D, would stand at about 1,000. In all probability these totals involved 
a considerablY larger number of individuals than is at first sight suggested, 
for turn-over in manpower tended to be high, in the case of one Scottish line, 
I for example, it was as high as 50.% per month. Isolation and dissatisfaction 
with working conditions were the most usual causes of men leaving the works, 
but in the case of rural lines there was the positive draw of harvest wages 
2 
to be earned in the nearby fields. There is no direct evidence on w~ge 
levels on the East Anglian works, but there is sufficient generfll evidence 
to allow a fair~ firm conclusion. The cream of the workers, the navvies, 
were earning ~bout 5/- per day throughout the count~~ but it would seem that 
in view of the absence of major works there w~ none such on the Lynn lines, 
and that construction was carried through by ordina~ labourers at a rate of 
between 2/6 and 3/- per day, this being under normal conditions" but with the 
possibility of earning as much as 20/- to 25/- in a week during the height of 
the summer v.'hen daylight was long. All the evidence points to this con-
clusion. This was a period of rising wages because of the premium that 
railw~ growth put on labourers' servioes. On the Glouoester & Bristol 
works in 1843 the labourers received 2/4 to 2/9 per day, on the Hawiok branch 
4-
of the North British Railway in 1846 2/6 per day, and on the Great Northern 
Railway in 1&+9 2/9 to 3/-~ These figures are in keeping with T.Brassey's 
evidence of 184.6 that labourers' wages had risen some 10'f0 within the last 
two yea.r8~ and still allow for the Hon.Bouverie's statement to the Select 
1 Report from the Select Committee on Railway Labourers, 1846, P.P.,1846 xiii 
2 (4.89-II), Minutes of Evidence, Q.24-78, evidence of the Rev. J.Gillies. 
Railway Acts Elltlctments'3 Minutes of Evidence to the 1st Report, Q.952 
4- Brassey. Clapham, op.cit. p.407. 
Select Committee on Railway Labourers, Q.~+, evidence of A.J.List. ~ He~ps, op.cit., Appendix C, p.370. 
Ral1w~s Acts Enactments, First Report, Minutes of Evidence, Q.95l. 
---------- -------
m 
Committee on railway labourers (also 1846) that average wages were already 
1 
20/- to 22/- per week ani likely to rise to as much as 30/-; the latter 
certainly could be the case in the summer months, Rnd it is significant that 
his statement was made in the early summer. 
If the various estimates relating to the E~st Anglian made above be 
accepted it suggests that the workers on the three lines received between tlle 
Septembers of 1846 and 1848 a minimum aggregate total of £310,000. This 
calculation is based on an assumed labourer's wage of about 18/- per week, but 
a higher total still is indicated when allowance is m.::.de for the increased 
rates of the summer months and the fact that the skilled artificers (of whom 
there were 450 or so in the May of 1847) would in any case be paid more than 
the unskilled labourers. From the accounts presented in the February of 1849 
it would appear that the bulk of the labour costs were concealed under the 
heading of earthworks, bridges and stations. It is hard to believe that more 
than £100,000 of the £516,077 shown there Can have been consumed by the cost 
of materials and their transportation and, where applicable, by contractors' 
profits. Accepting this and deducting a further £20,000 in respect of 
Parliamentary Expenses wrongly included in this account, it seems probable 
that labour costs in construction were in fact close on £400,000, or £6,000 
per mile. The undue prolongation of the construction period, the dirricult~ 
encountered in making the bridges, over-employment and poor depl~ent of 
labour must be held responsible for this grossly excessive figure. 
Obviously such vast sums as those involved must have had some effect 
1 Select Committee on Railw~ Labourers, Q.2213. 
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-on the areas I economies, but such was largely localised .::.nd spread along the 
whole of the 68 miles involved. Publicans and the keepers of beer houses may 
be expected to ha.ve been amongst the principal direct beneficiaries - it has 
been asserted that £1,000 per mile of construction of British railways was 
I 
spent on drink - and in turn these would benefit 10cnl tradesmen. Tradesmen 
themselves could o~ expect to derive in the direct sense a marginal benefit, 
for truck shops (for more on which see below) and money taken by the men out 
of the area have to be taken into consideration. Various cottagers 
supplemented meagre incomes by offering accommodation to labourers from the 
lines, but gain from this was inevitably limited by considerations of both 
space and time. All in all it must seem unlikely that the railway workers 
brought much incre~l.se of wealth to the areas through which they passed. In 
that these men were not infrequentJs" riotous in behaviour and not over 
particular 8S to the damage they did to private property their coming was 
something rc.ther to be feared. 
Much more important is the question of from where the builders of the 
East Anglian lines did come. Sir John Clapham says that the best of all 
railway workers were the 'bankers' of Cambridgeshire and Lincolnshire who, in 
2 
their orglmised gangs, were second in number ()nly to the Irish. He further 
states that the Irish did not penetrate into the south, and that most lines in 
the sout\lern half of the Gountry were built by local labour~ Thu sit might 
be expected that the East Anglian found its labour supulies amongst those best 
fitted by experience for their new tasks. Moreover, simnle comnarison of the 
1 
'rVillhm3, op.cit. p.138. 
2 Op.cit. p.4.05, quotinG from Smiles (who himself gave no authority); nlso 
3 cf. Williams, op.cit. p.138 and Francis, op.cit., Vo1.2, p.68. 
Op.cit. p.l+o6. 
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20/- or so that could be earned in a week on the railway with the 8/- to 10/-
attainAble in locnl agriculture woul·i S'3'3lU to proville conclusive justification 
for this assumption. It may also be argued that railw·3.Y work 1'Ias well 
within the capacity of the farm worker; 'P.awlinson tolrl the Select Committee on 
1 
Railway Labourers that agricultural lab:>urers CQuld mana89 3.rry railway work; 
only barrow work proved harder at first, but after a short time they were as 
2 good in that ~s an,yone. As long as there were sufficient skilled men (and 
there certainly were on the Sast Anglian) it wn.s on such e~rth work that the 
3 
vast mr.jori ty of railwE'.Y labourers were employed. 
There were, however, other aspect s to be considerec'., which tOGether 
suggest that the mature and well disposed man vlonld f~.nd rQ.Dway labour 
singularly unattractive despite the hi(;hcr financial reward. In general 
terms he woulcl be re'l.'.lirea to leave his fr.mily and home, as well as arv 
reasonably secure empl~ent that he might have. He would then have to 
support both his family and himself, lose the security afforded by the Law of 
Settlement, and run the risk that on the completion of the line he would not 
be able to return to the work that he had left. This applied particularly 
to those who lived in tied cottages, and to the growing number in Norfolk who 
had their precious allotments to consider. Thus, it is reasonable to suppose 
that large numbers of mA.rried men would be precluded from seeking employment 
on the viOrks; indeed, in psxtial confirmation of this, is the direct evidence 
of the Rev. Wilson that on the Norwich & Brandon and Lynn & Dereham lines at 
least very few of the labourers had families with them~ 
1 Select Committee on Railway Labourers, l,linutes of Evidence, Q.896. 
2 Ibid., Q.899. 
3 Select Committee on Railw83' Acts Enactments, Minutes of Evidence to the 
1st Report, Q.958, evidence of Brassey. 
4 Select Committee on Railw83' LAbourers, Q.678. 
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But perhaps most important of all were the conditions of railw.;y l~bourj 
despite everything that Parliament and individual co~panies could do these 
remained general~ atrocious. The report of 1846 had this to say in defining 
the more repellent features: 
"These evils seem mainly to consist in the mode and time of payment 
of the men and their consequent discontel~, disorder and irregularity: 
in the want of proper lodgings for them; in their cC',reless exposure 
to risl<; in the defective provision for mnintl'lining peace and good 
order among them; and in the imperfections or absence of provisiof 
for their relisious instruction and education of their children." 
Now to a cert~in extent the one extant contract of the East Anglian lines did 
contain certain safeguards against some of the evils suecified above 
(although drawn up in the April of 1846, several months before the publica-
tion of the report) but it will be observed that a number of important matters 
[l.re not touched upon at all. 
summarised as follows~ 
The clauses protecting the labourers may be 
1. The men must be paid at least every two weeks, and then in n place 
chosen by the compa~ and in the presence of cornpa~ ~~tnesses. 
2. The contractors were explicitly forbidden to maintain a~ truck 
shops or to retail a~ article of consumption on pain of a £20 
fine for each offence. 
3. Sund~y work was forbidden without special licence issued by the 
comp2.IJ\Y'; any me' n found worldng without such would be instantly 
dismissed. 
4. There were to be no sub-contracts except in labour. 
Even assumin6 that these clauses were included in all subsequent contracts it 
cannot be suggested that they created model conditions. In considering this 
much reliance must be placed on the 1846 evidence of the Rev. Wilson before 
the Select Committee on Railway Labourers. He identified himself to the 
committee as an exoerienced J.P. much concerned of late with the -::lroblems 
arising from the construction of two lines within his area, namely the 
1 2 Report of the Select Committee on R~ilw~ Labourers, 1846, p.iv. 
Drawn up for the section between ~nn nnd Denver, nnd found in the Lynn 
of.i'ices of Mes:'rs. Bp.ntoft, Broadley and Ward. See :>150 Ap )endix G. 
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Norwich & Brandon and the line from Swaffham to Dereham. Of course, in 
1846, the ~ork on the latter had extended only ns far as S~2ffham to Sporle, 
and the evidence he gave, although no distinction is made, must refer 
primari1y to the former; but, even so, as direct evidence of conditions on a 
Norfolk line of the same period as the ~nn lines there remains great value 
for the present purpose in what he said. It is particularly interesting in 
that the Brandon line w~s built by Peto, reputed~ one of the ve~ best of 
contractors from the viewpoint of those employed. 
The first two intended safeguards may be considered together, the 
principal point being that they were incapable of being enforced in the 
spirit of the intention even if in the letter. In the first ~lace the 
hated truck shops were not illegal, the act of 1 & 2 Wil.4.c.37 not extending 
1 
to cover railway workers. Thus, if the contractor did defY the contract 
terms he found himself in a strong legal position on the general principle 
that what is legal in common law cannot be rendered illegal by private 
agreement. However, the contractor need not go so far, for the clause 
could be circumvented by simple agreement with some priv::-te trader to issue 
truck shop tickets against the latter's stock. Circumstances rendered some 
such system virtual1y inevitable; of the situation in Norfolk the Rev. Wilson 
2 
said: 
"Labourers come frequently in search of work after havi~~ been out 
of employment in their own parish, and after hanging about a few 
d~s they get work; they have only enough money to supply them for 
a few d~s and if they have to continue work for a month they cannot 
go on ••• and they are compelled to go to the truck shop for their 
goods by which they lose." 
1 
2 Report of the Select Committee on Railway Labourers, 1846, p.vi. 
Ibid., Minutes of Evidence, Q.636. 
~ 
In whatever form they might take truck shops were general, deDendence on 
them frequent~ being increased by the very remoteness of the railway sites. 
In them high prices were invariab~ charged, often for inferior goods, so 
that the high rates of p~ tended to be discounted in realisation. In fact, 
when conducted on a large scale, contractors could find in them their 
orincipal source of profit; Chadwick, for example, took contracts at a working 
I loss, but counted on making £7,000 or more profit from his shoos. 
Truck shops depended fundamental~ on the uncertainty of the pay system. 
Intervals between p~ment tended to be most irregular. The contract under 
consideration did speci~ each fortnight and sought to regulate the place of 
payment, but it is hard to believe that when bankruptcy threatened that 
regularity could always be maintained, nor that the place of p~ent was not 
the obvious meeting place provided by a nearby public house. Even if 1 t were 
not the wages of ma~ would be directed to one within a matter of hours. 
Wilson described how p~ent was in fact often made in public houses, and 
spoke fee11ng~ of the drunken orgie~ which accompanied every pay night~ 
But another factor in the question of p~ent was the problem presented by the 
sub-contractor in labour, the only type allowed by the L & E. The big 
contractors such as Brassey employed no sub-contrRctors~ but in the case of 
the small scale local builders who took on the East Anglian lines there was no 
alternative but to do so, existing labour resources being total~ inadequate; 
moreover, the advantage of specialised knowledge wns thereby gained~ The 
sub-contracts in question were let to 'gangers' who not infreauently created 
1 Williams, op.cit. p.l4J ... 
2 Select Committee on Railway Labourers, Minute s of Evidence, Q. 652. 
3 Helps, op.cit. p.46. 
4 Head, op.cit. p.39. 
~ 1 
further sub-contracts of their own accord, these being taken up by men who 
were in essence no more than labourers themselves. These men often found 
themselves unable to meet the wage bills of their gangs, and as they had no 
goods to distrain there was left no legRl remedy for those who remained 
'd2 unpa~ • It was from this source that arose most of the complaints about the 
uncertainty of pay with which Wilson had to deal as a J.~ All in all 
Wilson's experience had led him to believe that men would work for less on the 
railways if they could be assured of regular payment in cash~ 
Certain other factors suggest that the better ty.e of Norfolk labourer 
would not willingly turn to railway 'Nork. There was, for example, the 
question of accommodation. On this Wilson reported: "MaIliY of them make a 
lodging for themselves by heaps of turf, and they get lodgings in different 
cottages; it is a very uncertain systemn~ Another consideration is that 
available evidence points to the facts that neither regular railw~ labourers 
nor contractors really wanted local men on the works. The former feared 
6 
that such would keep wnges down, and subjected new recruits to a barrage of 
brutal language and systematic "harrying" to break their spirits and cause 
withdrnwal~ The latter, above all anxious to keep their labour forces 
intact - one reason for irregular payment and enforced dependence on truck 
8 
shops - feared regular loss of men to their own homes if conveniently close, 
and the counter attrpction of the piece rl'ttes in the hFirvest fields; as 
Brassey told the 1845 Select Committee "when the harvest comes on in July or 
1 2 i{eport 
Ibid. , 
4 Ibid~ , 
7 Ibid., 
b Ibid . , 
of the Select Committee on Hnilwn.y Labourers, p.iv. 
Minutes of 1'vi.jence,S Wilson, Q·542. 6. . ? ~id., ~.536. 
Q·7S0. Ibid., Q.672. Ilal1.,."("'1v'll.nson, Q.I041. 
Qs.I044-5, :'nd ~)imilflr evidence from Wil!'on, Q.602. 
Wilson, Q.S36 • 
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August v:e s1:18.11 find lrbour scarce ~nd d'-:ar", for, ~ s ~12.i'.'linson explained in 
1846, agricultural labourers naturally turned to such especi:-:lly ('ood wages in 
2 
the work for which they were best fitted; this was n regular fe~ture of local 
1 b d · th t t . f th L d & B' . h I' 3 a our ur~ng e cons ruc ~on 0 e on on ~rm~ng am ~ne.
It would. .9.1so appear that the better type of fnm ",orker looked with some 
degree of contempt on the railway labourer, a consenuence of the c.runken, 
violent and uncouth behaviour commonly associnted flith the letter. During 
the building of the London & Birmingham line in the 1830s the n!;etives stuck 
to the f2rmer's 10/- to 12/-••••• nothing would induce -hem to submit to what 
4-
they conceived n. degredation, of working upon the works". One contr?ctor, 
Jockson, claimed an improvement after 1842 as "we are eliminating the tramp 
typell~ but others in 1846 still dubbed them as the refuse of the community 
6 despised by agricultural labourers, or as the worst characters unable to find 
7 
steady employment else·where. This latter comment would seem to a~n~ with 
particular force to the men of the locality who found work on the East Anglian 
construction. Wilson's reference to the unemployed labourers (Q.636), the 
drunken orgies (Q.652) and the absence of families on the works (Q.672) all 
confirm the impression derived from the general evidence that the local men 
employed were general~ the shiftless, the restless and the unattached. As 
such they must hAve constituted a minority, perhaps 35% to 40% of the total 
labour forces involved. 
1 Select Committee on Railway Acts Enactments, Minutes of EvL:ence to the 
1st Report, Q.952. 
2 Report on Railway Labourers, ~tinutes of Evidence, Q.908. 
3 Ibid., Q.908. 
4- Ibid., Q.895, Rawlinson. 
5 Ibid., Q.2006. 
6 Ibid., Qs.2276-87. 
7 Ibid., Q.818, Rawlinson. 
.§2. 
Before turning to the question of the origin of the m~jority some 
confirmation of the view expressed is to be found in sources on~ indirect~ 
connected with the actual construction of the railway. Individua1~ none of 
the items is conclusive, but taken together they do suggest c general 
situation in keeping with the main argument. First there is the evidence of 
the 1851 Census Report tha.t between 1841 and 1851 some 4,521 youths were 
leaving Norfolk, Suffolk and Essex each year, and that in these ten years 
1 
Norfolk sent out 39,327. Ambition and courage are the most like~ explana-
tions of this exodus - in all probability these were the better type of men. 
Some undoubted~ finished up by working on the railways elsei':here, but the 
main point must be that local railway construction held ho attraction for them. 
Second~ similar deductions may be made from the evidence of Poor LAW returns. 
It is seen that Poor Law expenditure rose stea.di~ between 1845 and 1847, and 
then steep~ to 1848. 
2 
Norfolk Poor Law Expenditure 1845 to 1848 (excluding medical relief) 
1845 1846 1§ll ~ 
£197,567 £205,692 £207,369 £258,762 
Years ending on the 25th March. 
Norfolk was amongst the &reas showing the smallest rises between 1847 and 
(the largest reported increnses were mai~ in industrial areaS such as 
4 Lancashire, Cheshire, Nottinghamshire, the West Riding etc.).which perhaps 
'483 
could sUGgest that railway work had in fact contributed to keeping the Poor 
futtes down, but reA.l~ this is t!. relative matter, for it will be noted that 
expenditure WAS already high in face of the undoubted agricultural depression 
1 0 it ... 2 p.c • pp.CV11-C1V. 
Figures derived from the annual reoorts of the Poor Law Commissioners to 
1847, and particular~ the First ~:lual Report of the Poor LRw Board, 
1848-9, Appendix B, No.1. pp.50-5l. 
~ First Annual Report of the Poor Law Board, 1848-9, Appendix B, No.6. p.92. 
Ibid. 
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in the area as ear~ as 1845 at-a-time when the count~ at large was enjoying 
an unprecedented boom. It therefore becomes possible to argue that the 
railway construction had done no more than partly offset the consequences of 
more general depression in the area after 1846. Support is lent to this by 
1 
the comparative vagrancy figures for corresponding half years of 1848 and '49. 
~ Downham ~ SwaffhaJll Wayland Norfolk 
Indoor Relief 1848 940 572 1,105 456 151 3,995 
Outdoor Relief " 170 31 4 2 368 
Indoor Relief 1849 221 92 382 81 12 1,240 
Outdoor Relief " 102 22 !:t: 1 20!t 
Decrease 784 468 723 385 140 2,919 
The dramatic increase to 1848 had been correctly forecast by the Poor Law 
Commissioners in 1848 when discussing the effects to be anticipated from the 
2 discharge of railw~ labourers and the continued influx of Irish poor. In 
local terms these figures clearly suggest the army of discharged labourers 
making their way across the area and towards the south and west. The nadir 
of depression reached in 1848 no doubt pl~ed its part, but the coincidence 
of dates between the number of vagrants and the completion of the lines is 
far too striking to be ignored. Accepting the fact and the origin of this 
suddenly increased Poor Rate burden of 1848/49 the whole situation may be 
summed up as having given a striking illustration of the aocurRcy of the 
statement in the 1842 report of the Poor Law Commissioners that railway works 
provide "an almost imperceptible addition of employment to the resident 
3 labourers II • 
1 First Annual Report of the Poor Law Board, 1848-9; Heport on Vagrancy in 
Essex, Norfolk & Suffolk and Part of CClmbridgeshire, Sir John Walsham, 
Apnendix 18, p.135. Second Report, 1849. 
2 14th Annual Report of the Poor Law Commissioners, 1848, p.4. 
3 Renort of' the Poor Law Commissioners for 1842, Appendix B, p.241. 
I 
m 
FinallY, as an indication of the large influx of outsiders, in this 
case of the skilled and better paid men, renewed reference m~ be made to the 
interesting statistics of houses and populations in some of the main centres 
involved as between 1841 and 1851. It will be observed that, between these 
two years, in each case except King's Iornn, where the Norfolk Estuary works 
continued. the number of empty houses had increased as well as the total of 
inhabited houses. Of course, some of the former group may ha.ve been 
completed just before the 1851 Census, but much more like~ in the context 
of the complete table is that they constitute an indication of a population 
peak between the two census years. 
Ki~'s ~nn Freebridse I&nn Swaffham Downham 
1841 1851 1841 1851 ~ 1851 ~ 1851 
Inhabited houses 3.422 4,028 2,406 2,689 2,577 2,843 3,766 4,317 
Empty houses 193 148 46 54 81 94 111 236 
Population 16,554 20,530 12,580 13,557 13,086 14,320 19,202 20,985 
N.B. The divisions are those of Hundreds. 
Sources: Census Tables of 1841 and 1851 
The question remains as to where the majority of the labourers on the 
East Anglian did originate. Of perhaps great significance in this problem 
is the large number of persons appearing in the 1851 Census as living in 
Norfolk who were in fact not born there. It is suggested that as the great 
construction boom died away maqy settled in the area of their most recent 
employment, many possiblY obtaining work on the railways which they had 
helped to build; it is a fact, for example, that the writer's wife's 
great-grandfather came up from Devon, worked on the construction of the Lynn 
8: Dereham line, and subsequent~ found employment on it eta a platelayer. 
In fact, in 1851, the South West had contributed 439 to Norfolk, am London 
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and Suffolk had m8de further substantial contributions, the latter sending 
1 
227 to the Wayland Hundred alone and 265 to the Hundred of Mitford. As 
Suffolk econo~ was over this period suffering the same difficulties as that 
of Norfolk's it is hard to conceive what could have prompted the migration if 
it were not railway construction. This is not to suggest, however, that men 
set out to cross the count~ with the sole purpose of finding employment in 
the Lynn area; rather was it a matter of workmen, both as gangs and as 
individuals, working their way along from line to line until finally they 
settled. Clapham shows how the South Devon Rnilway w~s built by the men of 
Dorset, Somerset p.nd ',Viltshire, ::l.S well .':'s by Devon labourers, v:ho had worked 
2 
their way along the Great Western, and before the 1845 Select Committee on 
Railway Acts Enactments a major controctor in that same :lrea, employing about 
9,000 men of whom about 5,000 were of local origin~ refuted the suggestion 
4 that he must chaIl= e his men A s he moved along: 
"They follow us; we make them. When they become rldlway labourers 
they never go back to ordina.~ labour again. In Dorsetshire I haTe 
men who before were only earning 7/- a week who are earning now 12/-
and 15/-, as they become stronger men from better food, and used to 
their work". 
It is interesting to find in view of this pattern that between 1843 and 1847 
were completed a whole series of lines pointing directly into East Anglian 
teri'itory, namely the Norwich-Brandon, the Brandon - Ely, the March - Wisbech 
and the Ely - Peterborough constructions. On the last of these alone Peto 
had 3,700 men with him~ As for the composition and sources of this army of 
workers, some 20\) ,000 strong at its peak, there is no conclusive evidence, but 
it is not l~rd to conceive a highly probable solution. The originnl nucleus 
~ lB5l .Census Rep0:t and Tables. 
Op.c~t. p.~07; his source appears to be the Select Committee on Railway 
Labourers. 3 Op.cit. Q.3555. ~ Ibid., Q.3556. 
5 Select Committee on Railway L."\bourers, Minutes of Evidence, Qs.1976 and 
1230. 
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must have been the canal workers; as time went on, and especia1~ n~ter 1845, 
these were joined by such as the miners of the dec1inine; workinGs of the 
south-west, coachmen and others displaced on the roads, the unemp1wed, the 
shi~t1ess and unattached wea~ of facto~ or mine, the adventurous from all 
types of labour, but above all by the Irish, who driven from their own land by 
crushing poverty and famine poured into the northern ports, 133,069 of them 
1 between 13th J~nua~ and the 20th April, 1846 into Liverpool alone. 
As for the eventual staffing of the lines little more need now be said. 
It is interesting that so far no advertisement for stRff on the East Anglian 
has come to light, 50 perhaps suggesting further confirmation of the vie .... that 
ma~ were recruited from amongst the builders themselves. Some local men 
would natura1~ have been employed, but there would also have been Q nucleus 
of skilled men, especial~ on the engineering staff, who cl".me from further 
afield. Such men had often gained their experience in mines~ but it is 
likely that they were joined by junior members of established railway companies 
who, in the mushroom growth of new concerns, now found unprecedented 
opportunities for rapid advancement. The older comlJanies must hf've lost many 
men in this way, but there were limitations on what even they could provide. 
3 Thus, Platt, the first E.A.F. locomotive inspector, was an "experienced man", 
as was Carrington, the first station master at ~nn, but alp8rently the 
first General Trn.ffic Mcnager was not, and had to be dismissed during the 
course of 181-tl) for Wentworth Clay who was. 
~ 13th Report of the Poor Law Commissioners, 1847, p.6. 
Cf.Hen.d, op.cit. p.30. 
3 Lacy on the 3rd November, 1847. 
